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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the nature and evolution of European supranationalism and its 
relationship to European identity formation, together with the factors promoting and 
inhibiting the development of such an identity. The central proposition of the study is that 
there exist certain conditions for the emergence of an European identity. This identity is 
developing, in accordance with a 'civic' model based on a common sense of European 
belonging rooted in constitutionalism, participative citizenship, civil and humanitarian 
rights and shared democratic institutions. 
The question of how political communities, increasingly ethnically heterogeneous, 
socially fragmented and territorially dispersed, yet institutionally and functionally linked, 
can aid a common consciousness and a sense of identity is addressed. This work 
predicates that there is a relationship between supranational institutional development and 
the development of European identity. It explores how supranational institutions 
developed within post-war Europe and demonstrates how such institutions affect 
communal European identity formation. 
The study establishes that in common with the historical experience of European state 
formation in early modernity, that enlarged polities are closely and causally linked to the 
rise of broad identification amongst their named populations. We demonstrate that as 
European supranational institutions have become politically and socially entrenched that 
the appropriate conditions for the creation of European identity have emerged. Such an 
identity, necessarily civic in nature, is inclusive of, and sympathetic to, the diverse range 
of pre-existing European ethnonational identifications. 
The study utilises an analytical framework which allows for the examination of European 
identification from a variety of perspectives. Utilising a typology of communal identity 
synthesised from sociology, social psychology and political science the study 
demonstrates that communal identity is a multdimentional phenomena. It is made up not 
only of shared feeling of community and belonging, but is further exhibited in collective 
self-description, shared values, collective attachment to common symbols, common 
actions and a common cognitive boundary separating `us' from the 'other'. 
The study demonstrates that there is a viable European identity. It finds that such an 
identity exists concurrently with pre-existing national, regional and local identities. 
European identity is found to exist, in part, as a result of the institutional recognition and 
securing of such pre-existent identities. The study concludes that it is from the 
construction of a dense and socially inclusive European civil society that European 
identity emerges. 
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EPIGRAPH 
They shall awake as Jacob did, and say as Jacob said, Surely the Lord is in 
this place, and this is no other but the house of God, and the gate of heaven, 
And into that gate they shall enter, and in that house they shall dwell, where 
there shall be no Cloud nor Sun, no darkness nor dazzling, but one equal 
light, no noise nor silence, but one equal music, no fears nor hopes, but one 
equal possession, no foes nor friends, but one equal communion and identity, 
no ends nor beginnings, but one equal eternity 
John Donne XXVI Sermons (1660). 
I 
Chapter One 
In Search of European Identity 
1.1 	 Introductory Remarks 
"Over the last decades the search for uniqueness, roots, distinctiveness, 
differences - in short for identity - has become one of the key themes of our 
age, both in Europe and abroad. As a preoccupation, the search for identity has 
invaded and coloured al our speculations about Europe, including, first and 
foremost, our often unavowed anxieties about her future at this decisive 
moment in her history." 
The political reorientation of Europe in the post-cold war period is far from over. The 
deconstruction of the old world order and its problematic re-configuration is occuring 
at a time when received notions of rootedness, of belonging and of authenticity, at 
both the colective and the individual level, are being questioned in a most 
fundamental way. The inquiry into the nature of colective European identity is a 
central element of the contemporary European experience. On one hand, we are 
confronted with the emergence of a highly sophisticated and mutualy reinforcing set 
of institutions and political apparatuses, most generaly associated with an emergent 
pan-European polity. On the other hand, there is a discernable level of ambivalence 
and uncertainty amongst Europeans as to further European integration and a revival of 
nationalist and regionalist sentiment. 
There is evidence to suggest, in common with the historical experiences of European 
state formation, that enlarged polities are closely and causaly linked to the rise of 
broad identification amongst their populations.2 Thus we might expect to observe that, 
as European supranational institutions become politicaly and socialy entrenched, the 
i 	 . Giner, S. "The Advent of a European Society" in Haler, M. & Richter, R. Toward a European 
Nation?: Political Trends in Europe - East and West, Centre and Periphery. (New York: M.E. Shame 
Inc. 1994), 15. 
2 For an examination of the relationship between the emergence of states and the colective 
articulation of a national sentiment see Rokkan, S & Urwin, D. Economy Territory Identity (London: 
Sage Publications 1983); Tily, C. Ed. The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1975) and Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1992  
(Cambridge: Blackwel Publishers 1992); Gelner, E. Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwel, 
1983) and James, P. Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community. (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 1996). 
2 
appropriate conditions emerge for the creation of a European supranational identity. 
This identity, civic in nature, is inclusive of, and sympathetic to the diverse range of 
pre-existing European ethnonational identities. However, the exact nature of the 
relationship between supranational institution building and the development of a 
supranational identity needs to be explored. Further, retarding factors, such as the 
revival of nation and the problematic of colective social identification more 
generaly, requires explicit atention, in order to evaluate their specific effects on 
supranational identity formation. 
1.2 	 Summary of Research 
This work is predicated on the assumption that there is a relationship between 
supranational institutional development and the development of supranational 
identity. It wil explore how supranational institutions develop and how such 
institutions afect identity formation. 
The study wil address the question of how political communities, which are 
increasingly ethnicaly heterogeneous, socialy fragmented and teritorialy dispersed, 
yet institutionaly and functionaly linked, aid the growth of a common consciousness 
and a sense of identity. 
This thesis examines the nature and evolution of European supranationalism and its 
relationship with pan-European identity formation. It wil also examine the factors 
promoting and inhibiting the development of such an identity. 
The central proposition of the thesis is that certain conditions for the emergence of a 
European supranational identity exist. This identity is developing, in accordance with 
a civic model based on a shared sense of European "belonging", rooted in a common 
belief in constitutionalism, participative citizenship, democratic institutions and civil 
and humanitarian rights. Such a model can be contrasted with 'ethnic' identity, 
wherein community is rooted in commonality of culture, language, religion and race. 
This work demonstrates that the advocates of European supranationalism do not 
ignore the potency of pre-existing national and sub-national sources of identification. 
3 
The institutions of the European Union are attempting to manage such ethno linguistic 
identities in such a manner as to link their continuance and viability to the emergent 
supranational European polity. The intention of such a process is the belief that a 
positive sentiment will attach Europeans to the supranational elements of Europe 
because the European Union promotes and maintains pre-existing national and local 
identities. 
Pan-European political, administrative and economic institutions are encouraging the 
maintenance of localised ethnolinguistic identities. This is occurring for two reasons. 
Firstly, European institution builders are cognisant of the ongoing significance of 
ethnic identification to the majority of Europeans. Secondly, in order for European 
civic identity formation to be successful, these identifiers need to be politically 
neutralised so that they do not politically mobilise and compete with supranational 
institutions as a basis of communal allegiance. Thus we argue that, while an implicit 
policy of inclusive European multiculturalism is being pursued, European policy is 
also being directed towards the institutionalisation of multiple European ethnic 
identifiers, such as language and regional cultural products. The intent of this process 
is to institutionally assimilate various ethnicities into a European civil society with its 
own distinctive European civic identity. 3 
This study argues that the revival of European economic and social prosperity, made 
possible by an integrated, supranational Europe, enhances a common European 
identity. European intergration counters the revival of ethnic, local and national 
identifications, which are, as we demonstrate, often the result of economic decline and 
reduced state competency. An integrated Europe in which equality, prosperity, and 
accessibility are promoted by institutional reform and enlarged policy domains, is one 
in which the spectre of national primordialism is reduced. 4 Thus actions such as the 
advancement of a single market, environmental protection and the promotion of full 
3 
We are informed here by the contribution of W. Kymlincka who in Multicultural Citizenship  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995) outlines the mechanisms available to a polity for the inclusion 
of varying forms of cultural pluralism within a single state apparatus. We shall consider this process in 
Chapter Two. 
4 
The significance of European political, economic and social integration to the creation and 
maintenance of a positive European sentiment, most particularly in the context of the decline in 
competency of individual European states is one to which we will return in subsequent Chapters. 
4 
employment are consistent with the institution-building, and the strengthening of a 
pan-European identity. These policies create the necessary conditions for the 
establishment of a colective civic identification. Supranational Europe's actions in 
the articulation and defence of European civic values including freedom, security, 
justice and the commitment to fundamental human rights, equality and non-
discrimination further reinforce the development of a pan-European civic identity. 
1.3 	 Methodology 
Folowing an introductory discussion on the nature of European identity in late 
modernity, the study wil examine the individual elements of identity, offer an 
integrated definition, and examine its elements. Utilising that definition it wil test 
empiricaly and by analysis of both primary and secondary sources the extent to 
which a pan-European identity currently manifests itself. Further the work wil 
consider the reinforcers and retardants that effect the emergence and continuance of a 
European identity.5 The work wil focus on the influence of institutions in the rise of 
colective identification. It wil be informed by a detailed review of the major 
theoretical contributions to nation building. 
Given the diverse elements that constitute identity and identification the data utilised 
in this work comes from a variety of disciplines.6 The data utilised in the 
demonstration of an European identity include the folowing: 
International Social Sciences Program (ISSP); 
European Commission materials, most particularly the Eurobarometer series; and the 
European Values Systems Study Group (EVSSP). 
5 It should be noted that while the analysis of European identity wil be undertaken on a 
comparative basis, the examination of retardants to European identity wil be considered by case study 
of the elements that we expect to retard European identification, without empirical analysis of such 
elements. 
6 We are against any methodology that atempts to sterilise individual elements of identity and 
identification. We find that adequately establishing a typology of identity is highly problematic, that 
said our examination of a colective form of European identification utilises a variety of data sources, 
as evidenced here. 
5 
1.3.1 Units of Analysis 
There are two units of analysis in this thesis. The focus of the work will be on the 
attitudes, values and behaviours of both European individuals within discrete 
European states, and the behaviours of European states themselves. We are interested 
in both the character of individuals, and the institutional structures that inform 
individual behaviour, and shape the nature of collective identification. Both individual 
and collective data will be utilised. European identity will be considered on a 
comparative basis, between states, between differing demographic groups within 
states and longitudinally. For example, we shall consider the degree of European 
identification between differing member states of the European Union at its core and 
its periphery, and consider the variations amongst individuals within and between 
individual member states over time. As this study is concerned with exploring the 
relationship between institutional action and communal identity formation, the work 
is specifically interested in the manifestation of European identity amongst the 
peoples and states of the European Union. As a consequence examination of identity 
in those states outside of the EU will only be undertaken as a point of comparison for 
the central inquiry. 
1.3.2 Analysis 
The data analysis is to be guided by the definition of identity established, and the 
specific tests of collective identification derived from such a definition. The analysis 
will address each of the elements of the definition in turn, drawing on the relevant 
data collected by each method as required. Where possible the analysis will specify 
the relationships between various outcomes (i.e. manifestations of European 
collective identification). It will specifically examine the relationship between the 
establishment of a civic form of European identity on the one hand, and the 
continuance of national and sub-national ethnic identification on the other. Variations 
in the occurrence of European identity between different demographic groups and 
between different member states will be considered to demonstrate the uneven 
distribution of European identification. 
6 
1.4 	 Theoretical Framework 
Theories of identity have been developed considering the basis of 'civic' or 'ethnic' 
bases of community and communal expression. The articulation of the duality of 
identity is variously found, with the most significant recent contributions being made 
by Hobsbawm (1990), Beiner (1995), A.D. Smith (1995), Spencer and Wolman 
(1997), Auer (1998) and by Palculski and Tranter (1998).7 The most significant 
contribution to this discourse has been by Greenfeld in her work Nationalism: Five 
Roads to Modemity.8 She argues that the basis of ethnic and civic configurations of 
community are based in the articulation of the 'people' within a state by the nature of 
the central objects of their loyalty and by the basis of their colective solidarity. The 
conceptual framework of community within the nation is centred upon common 
meanings of unity and colectivity. Greenfeld says that the two main bases of 
distinctiveness of a national community, and the conceptualisations around which 
colective imaginings and meanings cluster, are the 'ethnic' and the 'civic' 
archetypes. In ethnic forms of national community, shared meanings and associations 
are based upon a perceived awareness of 'primordial' or inherited group 
characteristics, components of which include, language, customs, teritorial afiliation 
and physical type.9 
By contrast to the ethnic, 'civic' understandings of national community are associated 
with the interpretation of the primacy of 'civic' qualities such as individualism, a 
respect for social economic and human rights and political liberalism. Civic identity is 
tolerant, inclusive, focused on equality and reason, and ambivalent to ethnic signifiers 
7 See Hobsbawm, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990); Greenfeld, L Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. 
(Cambridge Mass. Harvard University Press 1992); Beiner, R. (ed), Theorizing Citizenship. (New 
York: State University of New York Press 1995); Smith, A.Nations and Nationalisms in a Global Era. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press 1995); Spencer, P & Wolman, H. Good and Bad Nationalisms: A Critique of 
Dualism. Paper presented at the European Sociological Association Conference, University of Essex, 
1997; Auer, S. Reflections on Nationalism and Minority Rights in Central Europe. Paper presented at 
the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia, Annual Symposium, University of 
Melbourne 1998, and Pakulski, J. & Tranter, B. Civic Identity in Australia. School of Sociology and 
Social Work, University of Tasmania. Unpublished Seminar Paper, 1998. 
8 Greenfeld, L. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1992) 
9  Ibid., 12. 
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of identity. 1° Shared meanings are located within the sovereign state imbued with 
these civic values, and states act to protect such characteristics. Such a civic-based 
shared awareness is no less "national" than that provided by ethnic signifiers. 
However the conceptualisations differ in the raw materials of communal meaning that 
comprise them and in the basis of the group's sense of particularity. The ethnic nation 
is a community of fate, whereas a civic nation is a community of choice. They share 
in common the generation of a unique communal identity that separates one 
community from another 
We can distil the characteristics of ethnic and civic identity in the following manner: 
ethnic identity is rooted in either jus sanguinis (by ancestry - by blood and birth) or by 
jus Soli (by living in a certain territory and adopting a certain lifestyle). This sense of 
identity is exclusive, compulsory and its object of attachment is the ethnic nation. 
Civic identity is rooted in civil society and voluntary association. Citizenship is the 
principal institution of identification. Such identification is built upon civil rights and 
liberal civic engagement. It is inclusive and voluntary. Its object of attachment is civil 
society within a liberal state. 
This work, utilising Greenfeld's formulation, will establish to what extent a pan-
European 'civic' identity has developed. It will further test the strength of that civic 
attachment and consider its relationship to other forms of pre-existing identity, such 
as national and sub-national ethnic identities. 
Ibid., 399-401. Greenfeld argues that the historical emergence of 'civic' conceptions of nation 
originated in English nationalism, which is readily elaborated by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who 
articulated the basis of the English civil nation: 
"No people who owed so much to a constitution, and so little to a soil or climate, were so 
indifferent towards one, and so passionately fond of the other." See Greenfeld, 399-400. 
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1.5 	 Modalities of Identity 
In order to fuly analyse the contemporary problematic of identity a review of its 
modalities is necessary. In essence we need to distil the core elements of 'identity' so 
as to be in a position, later in this work, to establish valid tests by which to judge and 
measure European civic identity. The modalities are Sociology, Social Psychology 
and Political Science. 
1.5.1 The Contribution of Sociology 
The contributions of Marx, Durkheim and Weber form the cornerstone of sociological 
discussion on the development of social ordering and identity. 
Marx considered that the keys to social structures and the identity of individuals and 
colectivities within such structures, is found in the mode of production. The material 
focus placed on social organisation and identity construction stemmed from Marx's 
consideration of the impacts of the industrial revolution and the development of 
European capitalist markets. According to Marx, social action generaly, and identity 
in particular, can only be understood in terms of the impact of material interests on 
different groups within a society rapidly evolving to meet the demands of the 
industrial revolution. Thus property rights have the effect of separating society into 
different social classes, defined in terms of their relationship to the sources of 
economic power. Within this perspective economic ordering directly effects 
individual and colective identity formation. Marx says identity has historicaly been 
defined in terms of the social structures created to manage material interests. For 
example the "slave" mode of production generates classes which assume the identities 
of slave-owners and slaves. The "feudal" mode of production structuraly organises 
identity into classes of feudal lords and serfs, and the "capitalist" mode of production 
generates identity in terms of capitalists and proletariat. Thus the structural 
exploitation and inequality characteristic of the evolving capitalist mode of production 
is primarily responsible for the determination of individual and colective identity." 
1 ISee Marx, K. Class Struggles in France 1848-50. (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1850(1965) 
and Marx, K. Capital (3 vols.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1867-85-94 (1976-78-91). 
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Durkheim was primarily concerned with the question of how, in the face of an 
increasingly differentiated and complex society, social cohesion was possible. His 
conception of society and identity centred on patterns of social solidarity embodying 
moral consensus and normative regulation. In traditional society social cohesion and 
identity were determined by what he characterised as "mechanical solidarity"; that is 
on a direct or 'mechanical' relationship between the individual and society. Social 
order and identity were possible because of the links between individuals in small-
scale settings. 
Contrasting with "mechanical solidarity" modern society and identity are determined 
by what Durkheim characterises as "organic solidarity". This, for Durkheim, is based 
upon a set of generalised values. Durkheim argues that modern conditions of 
individualism and occupational specialisation do not necessarily lead to anomie. 
Rather, due to a stable normative order, individuals are tied together by difference. In 
such a context, inequalities of social and political power are addressed through a 
standardised, state-sponsored normative order. I2 Such a form of social ordering and 
identity formation is determined by three primary factors: a common value system 
and collective norms, a common language and an educational system which reinforces 
the importance of co-operative interactions between groups, in particular occupational 
group s . 13  
Weber's contribution to our understanding of identity is rooted in both his 
epistemological considerations and in his interpretation of the effects of rational goal-
directed actions. Influenced by Kant's considerations as to the basis of human 
knowledge, he argues as to the subjectivity of the social world. In this world all 
human actors interpret and construct the meaning of the world in which they place 
themselves. Such meanings, including questions of personal and collective 
identification are socially constructed according to a plurality of different viewpoints 




embodying differing values and interests. 14 Notwithstanding the subjective and 
interpretive nature of social life, Weber argues that the 'rationality' of modern 
capitalism requires the creation of an administrative architecture of bureaucratic 
methods and instruments designed to ensure the domination of the free market. 
Without considering his work in detail, the implications for our understanding of 
identity resulting from his theoretical contributions are significant. The impersonal 
albeit legitimate, structures and agencies of domination necessary for the operation of 
capitalism have the effect of altering the nature of social life along functionalist and 
instrumental lines. Such functional reorientations of material and social life, in turn 
affects the relationships and resultant identities adopted by individuals and 
collectives. 5 
Thus the contribution of classical social theory to the concept of identity focuses on a 
number of key elements. Firstly, as Marx determined, identity construction is, in part, 
determined by external (material) forces. Durkheim expanded the notion of identity 
by injecting into the theorisation the importance of normative convergence and a set 
of generalised civic values allowing for individuals to identify within the group. 
Durkheim's focus on the transition from traditional to modern society and its effect on 
individual and collective identity is mirrored in Tonnies's contrast between 
Gemeinschaft (community) with Gesellschaft (solidarity based on voluntary 
contracts), flowing from which identity is structurally determined. 16 De Tocqueville's 
focus on collective sovereignty within a liberal democratic state is an expression of 
identity defined in terms of individual, right-possessing citizens. Weber strongly 
influenced sociology's interpretation of identity by demonstrating that individual and 
collective identity is a result of human actors interpreting and constructing the social 
world around them. Just as action and meaning are linked with individual subjectivity, 
14 See Weber, M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (London: Allen and Unwin 
1976.) and Weber, M. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press 1978). 
15  
Ibid. 
16 Tonnies, F. Community of Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). (New York: Harper and 
Row 1963) 
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so too is individual and colective identity linked to the construction of societies 
predominant legitimising principles. 17 
1.5.2 The Contribution of Social Psychology - Social Identity 
The term "social identity" was introduced by Tajfel who defined it as: 
"An individuals' knowledge of his or her membership in various social 
groups together with the emotional significance of that knowledge".I 8 
Individuals define themselves in terms of their social group or categorisation. They 
seek positive social identity, or self-definition, in terms of positive group-
memberships. As social groups acquire evaluative significance in the context of their 
relationships to other groups, social categorisations and comparisons between groups 
are basic to an understanding of social identity.I9 
Social identity theory assigns a central role to the individual's process of self-
categorisation which partitions the world into comprehensible units. Social identity 
becomes salient when individuals categorise themselves and are caterorised by others 
as participating in a shared a social category with others in particular circumstances. 
An example of this is to be found when upon winning a Nobel Prize, the recipient's 
felow national members participate in and exhibit the commonality of identity 
because of the sense of involvement in sharing the same social category (nationality) 
and thus the same social identity. 
Social identity theory has significant practical implications. The most important is that 
social categorisation (which is essential to the process of group formation) causes 
inter-group division and discrimination through its impact on self-perception. From 
the hypothesis that individuals tend to perceive and define themselves in terms of the 
17 Turner, B. The Blackwel Companion to Social Theory.(Oxford: Blackwel 1996), 43. 
18 	 . Tajfel, H. & Israel, J.The Context of Social Psychology. (London: Academic Press, Published 
in cooperation with the European Association of Experimental Psychology 1972). 
19 Tajfel, H. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1982), 65. 
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superimposed social catergorization both perceived and actual changes occur. Tajfel 
argues that aspects of the self-concept based upon group memberships alters 
perceptions: 
"that the systematic superimposition upon individuals of a cognitive division 
into in-group and out-group tends to cause the perceptual accentuation of 
intra-group similarities and inter-group differences and self-evacuative social 
comparisons in terms of these similarities and differences." 20 
Boundaries are formed between groups based not upon purely functional requirements 
but on the initial act of the adoption of a particular social categorisation. From this 
group formation, motivational or functional interdependence for the satisfaction of 
needs, achievements of goals, or consensual validation of attitudes and values 
between persons, leads to further social and psychological interdependence. The main 
expressions of this are mutual interpersonal influence and attraction, affiliated social 
interaction and the cementing of a sense of collective identity. 
Over time social relations tend to become stabilised, organised and prescribed through 
the development of a system of status and role relationships, social norms and shared 
values. Individuals become psychologically attached to the group through the 
development of cohesive social relationships. Behavioural dispositions resulting from 
the accentuation of group rather than individual identity include: 
1. Group Self Perception and Collective Consciousness - the absorption of 
personal identity into that of the group. 21 
2. Shared Values - the adoption of a social identity is largely based upon 
commonly held social representations between individuals within a group. 
Such representations are based in common values ideas and practices, and 
may form a group ideology. 22 
20  
Tajfel, H. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations., 198. 
21 Taj fel and Turner The Social Psychology of Minoritess. (London: Minority Rights Group 
1979). 
22 Hogg, M. and Abrams, D. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations 
and Group Process. (London: Routledge 1988), 159. 
13 
3. Inter-group Discrimination and Stereotyping - utilised in order to make a 
complex social environment more orderly and predictable.23 
4. In-group Affiliation, Cooperative Interaction and Relationship Building - 
the development through interaction within the group, of in-group bias 
and favouritism, which positively effects group performance and 
productivity.24 
5. Group Boundaries — Intrinsic to colective categorisation and through the 
utilisation of a single language or vernacular, behavioural and normative 
convergence and intra-group interaction.25 
According to Hogg and Abrams, group behaviour is determined by the ability of 
individuals within the group to perceive themselves, and others, as forming a distinct, 
self-inclusive social category, from which colective or social identity originates.26 
Folowing from this, Tajfel and Turner suggest that the nature of the social group is 
centraly concerned with individual alignment of identification with the colective and 
the consensus and uniformity of behaviour that results from such identification: 
"We can conceptualise a group, in this sense as a colection of individuals who 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some 
emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve 
some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their 
membership of it. Folowing from our definition of inter-group behaviour is 
basicaly identical to that of Sherif.. any behaviour displayed by one or more 
actors that is based on the actors' identification of themselves and the others as 
belonging to diferent social categories." 27 
23  Sherif, M. Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology.  (London: Routledge & 
Paul 1967), 43. 
24 Hogg M. & Abrams D. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and 
Group Process.,  95. 
25 	 . Shenf, M. Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology.,  45. 
26 Hogg M and Abrams D. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations 
and Group Process., 98. 
27 Tajfel and Turner. The Social Psychology of Minoritess.,  7. 
14 
1.5.3 Vernaculars and Social Identity 
The relationship between language and identity formation - most especialy ethnic 
identity formation, has been extensively documented. According to Lange and 
Weestin there are five conditions suggesting the connection: 
1. Language is very significant to the individual as an instrument for naming 
the self and the world; 
2. In essence, primary socialisation is a mater of linguistic interaction; 
3. Social representations are the 'cognitive connective tissue' of a culture and 
are expressed in language; 
4. Language is the medium of the ethnic group's mythological conceptions 
of its common origin; and 
5. Of al ethnic markers, spoken language is one of the most salient. 28 
The role of language is central in the process of group formation and as a process of 
identification is central. Identity formation is largely consequential upon the positive 
atribution that a common language amongst group members contributes.29 The 
salience of this aspect of identity formation has been observed to be particularly 
strong in the conditions under which members of ethnic groups atenuate or 
accentuate their distinctive languages, dialects and speech styles in the presence of 
ethnic out-group members. Language behaviours are not only important in ethnic 
relations but also to the creation of a social identity because they are often a critical 
atribute of ethnic group membership - a basic cue to inter-ethnic categorisations. 
28 See Gordon, D. The French Language and National Identity 1930-1975. (Hague: Mouton 
Publishers, 1978), 150. 
29 	 .l  . Wiams, C. (Ed) Linguistic Minorities Society and Territory. (Clevedon: Multilingual 
Matters Ltd 1991). 
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Linguistic loyalties are both a salient aspect of ethnic identity and a means of 
fostering intra-group cohesion. Thus there is a strong link between social identity 
theory and ethnolinguistics in that the differentiation between one language group and 
another display some of the key features of social identity theory - it increases the 
perceived similarities between the individual and a collective. Further it establishes 
boundaries between one language group and others, and provides an empirical 
dimension of perceived similarities and differences between one-group and another. 3° 
1.5.4 The Contribution of Political Science - The Nation as a 'Community of 
Sentiment'.  
Political Science's principal contribution to identity theorisation is rooted in its 
demonstration of the cognitive and psychological nature of communal identity as 
manifested in both the nation and national identity. The nation, as a social-political 
collective, is essentially reliant upon a collective psychological construction of a 
collectivity based upon subjective criteria. The contrived nature of national identity is 
reinforced by those theorists who see both the nation and national identity as modern 
constructs. As Weber suggests: 
"If the Concept of 'Nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it 
certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who 
count as members of the nation. In the sense of those using the term at a given 
time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from 
certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other 
groups. Thus the concept belongs to the sphere of values." 31 
While the (ethnic) nation is indirectly dependent upon the building blocks of culture, 
language and custom and the (civic) nation upon common participation in a liberal 
political system and the rights, privileges and duties associated with such, both ethnic 
and civic conceptions are ultimately dependant upon a collective sense of community 
30 
Turner, T., Tajfel, H., Fraser, C. & Jaspars, J. The Social Dimension: European Developments 
in Social Psychology vol.2. (Cambridge (Cambridgeshire): Cambridge University Press 1984), 531. 
31 
Weber, M. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, 1921 in James, P. Nation 
Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community., 83. 
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and solidarity which ideally unite all individuals within a given territory and within an 
abstracted state apparatus. Confirming the subjective focus of nation Kellas says: 
"A nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound 
together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry. Nations have 
'objective' characteristics which may include a territory, a language, a religion 
or common descent (through not all of these things are always present) and 
'subjective' characteristics, essentially a people's awareness of its nationality 
and affection for it. In the last resort it is 'the supreme loyalty' for people who 
are prepared to die for their nation." 32 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument from political science in support of the 
subjective and cognitive origins of the construct of the nation in the modern period is 
that offered by Anderson in his work Imagined Communities. 33 Anderson argues that 
nations and national identity are a construct - they do not exist independently of 
peoples' needs to create them. Historically national identity came about by virtue of 
the decline of the interrelated certainties of a privileged script language, the belief in 
an ecclesiastically determined secular hierarchy of power and the view that the origins 
of the world and of men are essentially identical. He suggests that the most 
satisfactory interpretation of the ties that bind people together in increasingly 
disparate and heterogeneous communities must ultimately be cognately derived; 
'imagined' because without this sense of community the absence of practical face-to-
face interaction would lead to communal breakdown. As he states: 
"The nation: it is an imagined political community. . . . It is imagined because 
the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear about them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communities. . ."34 
Renan advocates national communities as being constituted by belief, rather than by 
objective communal convergence. Nations exist where individuals recognise each 
other as equal members of a political community, and only while they perceive that 
32 
Kellas, J. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London, Macmillian 1991). 
33 
Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
(London: Verso 1991), 6. 
34 Ibid. 
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they share common characteristics (irrespective of whether they actually do or not). 
The nation is best described by its heroic past with its resultant rich trail of memories 
that the present generation can share in: 
"A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute 
this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is in the present. 
One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other 
the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the 
heritage which all hold in common."35 
Further reinforcing the cognitive basis of national communities, John Stuart Mill, in 
Representative Government, defines nationality in the following terms: 
"A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united 
amongst themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them 
and any others - which make them co-operate with each other more willingly 
than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire 
that they should be governed by themselves or a portion of themselves 
exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various 
causes . . . but the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the 
possession of national history and consequent community of recollections; 
collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same 
incidents in the past." 36 
Shared prejudices and shared emotions, shared pride and myths are the basis of 
nation, not language or culture on their own. When a group of people begin to feel 
proud or humiliated by the same things; when they are pleased or saddened 
collectively, then that group of people has acquired a common identity - insofar as 
they identify with the group based upon common emotional dispositions and common 
responses to the same stimuli. 
It would be a fundamental mistake for an external observer to try to identify nations 
or national identity by reference to common criteria such as race or language. We 
argue that the basis of nation and of national identity is psychological not physical; as 
Miller suggests: 
35 Renan Ou'est-ce qu'une nation. (trans M. Snyder) (Paris: Calmann -Levy 1882), 26. 
36 . Eisenstadt and Rokkan, S Building States and Nations. vol.] (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 
1972), 467. 
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"We may find people who share one or more such atributes and yet do not 
constitute a nation because they do not think of themselves as forming one 
(Austrians and Germans, for instance). On the other hand, if we take those 
peoples who do by the test of mutual recognition and shared beliefs form 
nations, there is no one characteristic (such as race or religion) that each of 
them has in common."37 
Accordingly, the existence of the nation depends, to use Renan's phrase, upon "a daily 
plebiscite"; its existence depends upon the continuance of shared beliefs and of 
reciprocal commitments, once such beliefs and commitments fail, so too does the 
nation, irespective of demonstrably objective ties of blood or language.38 
1.6 	 Identity - A Definition 
Synthesising the elements of identity which can be traced from psychology, sociology 
and political science into a unified definition is a chalenging task. We have seen that 
identity draws upon a number of different disciplines. Sociology informs us of the 
essential social and discursive nature of identity and the importance of identity as 
being capable of projecting across traditional associations due to civil and institutional 
linkages. Social identity theory best ilustrates the nature of the linkages of members 
within a community, considering normative convergence, common objectification and 
intra-group cooperation and interaction as forming the basis for the articulation of a 
colective identity. Political science, while considering national identity to be 
essentialy a modern construct, further informs us of the symbolic and imagined 
nature of such identity. The object of such common imaginings being capable of 
being split into two main objectification 'ethnic' signifiers of community and 'civic' 
signifiers of community. 
Based upon our analysis we ofer the folowing definition of identity: 
37 	 . Miler, D. On Nationality. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), 22. 
38 The fact that the number of potential national communities that exist throughout the world far 
exceeds the number of state apparatus that exist, or could reasonably be expected to exist, suggests that 
the claims of nationalism of the promotion of a unique and separate national identity within a single 
state is both untenable and in practice almost completely never found. Rather than states adapting to 
particular nation-groups the most common occurence is that nation-groups adapt to state centred 
political arangements. 
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Identity is best understood as a sense of belonging; to feeling part of a collectivity. It 
is associated with a readiness to adopt certain self-descriptions. 
Identity formation is a process of community formation in which membership and 
association is based on a set of criteria which have both subjective and objective 
characteristics. Such as the characteristics of ethine or language, as in the case of 
'ethnic' identity or the features of citizenship, individualism and equality - as in the 
case of 'civic' identity. Identity is enabled by individuals, who by making favourable 
comparisons with the in-group and unfavourable comparisons with out-groups 
collectively categorise themselves as part of the collective. Communal identity is 
displayed in cooperative intra-group interaction, normative convergence and 
functional relations. 
Identity exists where individuals identift with and wish themselves to be identifiable 
as members of distinct social categories such as nations, ethnic groups or societies. 
1.6.1 Elements of Communal Identity 
1. A Sense of Belonging - A collective cognitive disposition (variously 
described as a sense of belonging, loyalty, or a communal sense of 
difference) toward a group with a common object of attachment, such as 
the nation, and a common medium of attachment such as language or 
citizenship. 
2. Collective Consciousness and Self-Description - Group self-perception 
and self-consciousness - collective self-awareness as being part of a 
collective, and self-description as a member of the collectivity. 
3. Shared Values - (Situational) normative convergence - shared values, 
ideas and culture, including political culture, especially where there is a 
common means of communication such as a shared language, and the 
totality of experience conditioned by such shared values. 
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4. Common Symbols - Collective attachment to common symbols such as 
flags, language, the arts, national monuments and historical figures and 
places with symbolic significance. 
5. Common actions - Cooperative intra-group interaction - collective 
behaviour and collective goal definition and attainment. Demonstrable 
commitment to common action in the name of the collective. 
6. Common cognitive boundary - A discernible cognitive boundary, 
demonstrated by in-group favouritism and out group discrimination - both 
positive discrimination of other collective members and negative 
discrimination of the constructed 'other' including collective memories. 39 
Identity is essentially a discursive, relationall and particularised state of shared 
consciousness. Identity relates to particular interactions in particular contexts, and is 
subject to spatial-temporal fluctuations. The objects of common identifications are 
open to change over time and space. 
Identity varies in accordance with the strength of the social attachments within the 
community (strong or weak) and the nature of the objects of such attachments (such 
as 'ethnic' or 'civic' signifiers - blood or citizenship, nation or society). Communal 
identity is also influenced by the benefits that individuals perceive as being attainable 
as a result of group membership. 
At its core identity is a subjective, psychological response to a set of objective 
conditions, which sorts the world into both favourable and unfavourable symbolic 
categorisations. 
39 
Deeply rooted in the European cognative boundary is the dynamics of Europe's frontier — both 
Southern and more particularly Eastern. An important element in the articulation of 'Europeaness' is 
Europe's East/South frontier and its effect on determining the character of Europeans and the nature of 
European identity. This point will be more fully considered in Chapters Two and Nine. 
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1.7 	 The Problematic of Identity in Late Modernity° 
The relevance of our analysis of the nature of European identity is heightened as a 
consequence of the fundamental transformations of political and cultural life in late 
modernity. The advanced capitalist state is facing a number of critical chalenges: the 
impermanence of economic sovereignty, the decline in the institutions of the welfare 
state and, most significantly, in the context of this work, the fragmentation and 
contestation of received notions of individual and colective identification.41 This 
transformation of identification within the advanced capitalist state is most readily 
observed within the European context. A brief examination of this phenomenon is 
useful in ilustrating the relevance and urgency of our broader work. The problematic 
of European identity in late modernity is predominantly concerned with issues of 
ethnicity, nationalism, fundamentalism, individual identity formation, ideological 
extremism, the effects of globalization, and citizenship. It is an understatement to 
suggest that we stand at the end of the twentieth century not so much in an identity 
vacuum, rather we float untethered in a kaleidoscope of identities. 
The rise of "identity politics"42 comes at a time when a number of theorists are 
suggesting a fragmentation of broadly inclusive communal identities and the 
assertion, or re-assertion, of more fundamental, sometimes primal identities.43 
40 We take the term 'late modernity' from Giddens. See Giddens, A. Modenity and Self-Identity: 
Self and Society in the late modern age. (Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991), 3. 
The Advanced Capitalist State is defined as: 
I. A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying; 
2. Centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover: 
3. A teritorialy delineated area, over which it exercises, 
4. A Monopoly of authoritatively binding rule-making, back up by a monopoly of the means of 
physical violence 
See: Alen, J. Braham, P. & Lewis, P. Political and Economic forms of Modernity. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press in association with the Open University 1992) On the fragmentation of received notions of 
identity in late modernity see Bradley, H. Fractured Identities: Changing paterns of Inequality. 
(Polity Press. 1996) 
42 The term 'identity politics' refers to the hardening of exclusive cognitive and socialy 
constructed boundaries around constructed or invented self-designated groups such as pre-national 
ethnic groups, women, gays or other traditionaly voiceless social groups. It is claimed by Gitlin that its 
rise is; 'the most compeling remedy for anonymity in an impersonal world'. It is a politics of dispersion 
and separateness which rejects the arbitrary commonalities of civil society. Such a process has 
significant political and social consequences as Gitlin remarks 'The proliferation of identity politics 
leads to a turning inward, a grim and hermetic bravado celebrating victimisation and stylised 
41 
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The composition of new forms of community and identity, centred in smaler, more 
tangible colectivities and based on special and exclusive value systems are emerging. 
The transformation of inclusive civil communities into smaler, exclusive fragmented 
communities based on income, gender or sexual orientation is contributing to the 'end 
of the social' - the end of received notions of cultural cohesion and social interaction 
within a national teritory as forming the primary basis of political identity.4 What is 
occurring is the breakdown of the cultural forms of solidarity and generalised values 
that Durkheim saw as holding modern society together. In its place are emerging more 
authentic and more ancient identity 'fault lines' in political and civil life; which are 
ordering society according to aspects as diverse as race, gender, value systems and 
sexual orientations. The revival of nationalism in the Balkans, the alternative social 
ordering offered by the feminist movement and the religious return to the 
(fundamentalist) future in Afghanistan and Iran are the most obvious examples of 
reorientation of paterns of identification and community. 
At the level of the individual, late modernity has paradoxicaly on one hand brought 
with it unique mechanisms for self-expression and the creation of self-identity 
through the mechanisms of advanced technology and, on the other, the decline of 
regulating and limiting social institutions. Late modernity has been characterised by 
what Giddens refers to as the reorientation of time and space and the expansion of 
'disembedding' mechanisms which "radicalise and globalize pre-established 
institutional traits of modernity" and reorientate the fundamental elements of identity 
formation.45 
marginality'. see Gitlin, T. 'The Rise of "Identity Politics" : An Examination and a Critique'. Dissent. 
Spring 1993, p172-177. 43 The literature on the fragmentation of identity in the late modern period is extensive. One of the 
earliest and perhaps most seminal is Inglehart, R. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political 
Styles Amongst Western Publics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Other contributions 
include Jameson, F. Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. (London: Verso 1991). 
Touraine, A. Critique of Modernity. (Oxford: Blackwel 1995), Rootes, C & Davis, H. (eds) Social 
Change and Political Transformation. (London: UCL Press 1994); and Bradley, H. Fractured 
Identities: Changing paterns of Inequality. 
44 See Durkheim, E. The Division of Labor in Society., 121. 
45 	 . Giddens, A. Modenity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age., 2. 
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At the collective level, the rise of identity politics has become one of the defining 
features of the last two decades. Wide varieties of collectivities based on gender, 
sexual orientation, ethnic origin, or socioeconomic collectivities (such as welfare 
recipients, or the underclass) have offered their own preferred signifier of their 
communal distinction. These denotations are not without social, political, economic or 
psychological importance: they offer a serious challenge to the Enlightenment vision 
of the nature of the European model of civil society; the configuration of the state and 
the ordering and distribution of economic resources within political societies. They 
additionally have the effect of feeding back into a loop of the reconfiguration of the 
self s identity, insofar as the individual's identity is a product of communal and 
environmental conditions. These new configurations also offer challenges to 
psychology's understanding of human nature and the psychological basis of selfhood 
and the formation of groups.46 
The foundation of exclusive (insofar as those without the appropriate identity are 
excluded from the collective and the benefits and aspirations of the collective) identity 
politics comes at a time when a variety of theorists have suggested a fragmentation of 
inclusive communal identities, most especially in the political sphere. 47 The 
Enlightenment construction of individual political identity based in citizenship, the 
emancipation of the self through constitutionalism, rule of law and liberty under the 
auspices of the sovereign state, have been questioned. The common identity 
determinants of citizenship, participatory democracy and universalism that were the 
promise of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries have become too remote, vague 
and ethereal to unite and bind entire communities. The recomposition of new forms of 
association, (perhaps initially suggested in the student movements of the 1960s), are 
more appropriately centred in smaller, more tangible values and collectivities. They 
are based principally upon exclusionary, non-universalistic conceptions of group 
loyalty. As Wieseltier suggests: "It is never long before identity is reduced to 
46 
See: Samson, E. 'Identity Politics: Challenges to Psychology's Understanding' American 
Psychologist December 1993 
47 
For an examination of the decentring of identity in late modernity see Giddens, A Modenity 
and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the late modern age., and Jenkins, B & Sofos, S. Nation &  
Identity in Contemporary Europe. (London: Routledge 1996) 
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loyalty."48 The division of broadly cohesive political and civil societies into divisions 
based upon race, gender, sexual orientation, post-material values or relative 
socioeconomic position represents what is characterised as either a revolt against the 
colonialist smothering of innate diversity or the inevitable roll-back of inappropriate 
narratives of power and exploitation. Each of these new collective movements claims 
that they have been denied a voice in establishing the conditions of life and in 
determining its own identity and subjectivity.49 
The cumulative effect of these processes has been the rejection of the familiar, both in 
practical action and intellectual theorising. The pre-ordained, unquestioned loyalties 
to self and community are giving way to impermanence, transition and irreconcilable 
dilemmas of self-image and communal participation. As Bauman argues: 
"Everything seems to conspire against. . . lifelong projects, permanent bonds, 
eternal alliances, immutable identities." 5° 
The development of theoretical discourse challenging fixed or static notions of 
political, social and economic life reflects the increasingly self-contradictory unity of 
ideological, cultural or economic structures and practices. As Hinkson suggests: 
"The momentous natures of the ruptures which characterise politics today is 
reflected in the inadequacy of our familiar interpretative frameworks. 
Disorientation, along with a sense of foreboding and even helplessness, has 
become widespread. Not only does this effect the relatively familiar political 
discourses of social democracy and socialism, it strikes too at the core of the 
more basic frameworks of liberalism and Marxism. The grounding categories 
of these different versions of political economy are opened out to questioning 
as change charts a course into unfamiliar territory." 51 
48 
Wieseltier L. 'Against Identity'. The New Republic. (November 29 1994), 25-32. 
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Sampson, E. 'Identity Politics: Challenges to Psychology's understanding' American 
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Thus the designation of social and political relations has itself come under sustained 
critical inquiry.52 In such an environment the already contested nature of self and 
colective identity has become highly topical. Not only has there been a splintering of 
communal identities, but there has also been a theoretical, discursive fragmentation 
which in itself negates communal identity. 
The crisis of identity within pre-existing social networks has also effected the 
relationship between colectivities and those outside the community. Thus the rise of 
nationalism, which operates at a variety of levels, includes a return to xenophobia as 
social fragmentation finds an outlet in the rise of cultural nationalism and in an 
increased hostility against immigrants from other nations.53 
1.8 	 Nation and Supranation in Late Modernity 
The foregoing analysis of identity in late modernity should be considered in the 
context of the decline in the competence and coherence of the state, given the fact that 
the state forms the backdrop against which colective identification has taken place in 
Europe. Since the late 18th century the dominant unit of political organisation has 
been the state. The state claimed a monopoly of administration and the use of 
legitimate force over a given territory. The State gained legitimacy and drew on the 
alegiance of a body of citizens possessing equal rights. This body of citizens, while 
varying from state to state in their degree of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, were 
52 The inherent paradox of deconstructionalism as a theoretical discourse has itself been criticaly 
read as being essentialy unsustainable, as Gery Gil has poignantly observed: 
"On can deconstruct the construction of others, or deconstruct the deconstruction of others, or 
deconstruct one's own prior deconstructions. But by having no theory (or ethnics) of how or 
when the moment of deconstructive seeing through should be reintegrated into shared 
colective practices and meanings, the dictum that 'there is nothing outside the text' when 
extended to social interpretation, places one in abstraction from (and in that sense outside) that 
society. Texts are amenable to endless interpretations, but of life - we have only one." 
See Gil, G. 1984 "Post-Structuralism as an Ideology" in James, Nation Formation:Towards a Theory 
of Abstract Community., 179. 
53 The relationship between a decline in societal security, the rise of ethno-nationalism and the 
social fragmentation most readily manifested in xenophobic behaviour is addressed by Waever, 0. et al 
Identity. Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd 1993). 
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symbolically linked to each other and to the state by a collective process of cognitive 
identification, most readily described as political identity. 
The traditional concept of the state is imbued with conceptions of a territorially 
bounded, politically sovereign and economically unified homogenous nation in which 
collective activity is conditioned by group loyalty to the state and where sanctions are 
taken, both internally and externally, by a state apparatus. This apparatus is 
significantly responsible for economic, social and political policy outcomes within the 
territory. Such a characterisation of statehood is under some considerable dispute. 
Confronted with a set of experiences broadly characterised by the terms 
'globalization' and 'new world order' many theorists are concerned about the 
imminent collapse of the traditionally understood conventional model and experience 
of statehood. 54 
The complexities associated with the nature of the state in late modernity are aptly 
characterised in what Rodman ironically refers to as: "The resurgent (yet possibly 
receding) state". 55 Questions relating to the organisation and decision-making 
authority of the state as well as its political, military and economic sovereignty are 
being raised. The interconnection between the state and civil society are being 
addressed as theorists are attempting to fit the new reality of state action to the 
traditional conceptualisation of the state as a reservoir of a delineated society. 56 
The transnational flow of global capital, large population flows across 'national' 
borders, an increased focus on individual and sub-national group rights together with 
the growing acceptance of trans-state military and security forces, taken together, 
constitute a challenge to the essential characteristics of the state. In the European 
54 
The literature on this phenomenon is extensive, see Spence, E. 'Entering the future backwards: 
some reflections on the Current international scene.' Review of international Studies (1994) 20, 3-13; 
Cassese, S. 'The Rise and Decline of the Notion of the State'. International Political Science Review 
1986 and Rodman, B. 'Minding the State - or a State of Mind? Issues in the Comparative 
Conceptualisation of the State' Comparative Political Studies Vol 23, April 1990. 
55 Rockman, B. 'Minding The State - or a State of Mind? Issues in the Comparative 
Conceptualisation of the State'Comparative Political Studies  , 25-55, 25 
56 
See Axford, B. The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture (London: Polity Press 
1995) 
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context, postwar developments have shown a number of paralel but contradictory 
trends. These include the institutionalisation of trans-state economic, social and 
military arangements, and the transnational flow of peoples, capital and information. 
They can be contrasted with increased regionalism, proto-nationalism and exclusion 
both at the community and national level. 
The changes in the nature of the state have been observed by a number of 
commentators. Osterud has suggested that while the essential criteria for statehood 
have become gradualy more specific during the twentieth century, the conceptual 
ambiguities of the system of states have proliferated.57 Strange has exhaustively 
examined the decline of the state as an autonomous vessel of economic and political 
activity. She shows that the pressures of world markets are not only forcing structural 
and practical changes on 'sovereign' states, but also more profoundly are contributing 
to a crisis of popular legitimacy and authority in the relationship between citizens and 
the state.58 A.D. Smith, while recognising the impact of global communications and 
economic trends on dissolving national boundaries, sees the true crisis of the state 
arising from the revival of pre-modern ethnies. According to Smith these ethnies 
have the potential to chalenge the 'authentic' memories, symbols, myths, heritage and 
vernacular culture which form the basis of the national community and provide the 
state with its required legitimacy.59 
The principles of legitimate statehood remain contested, shifting between civic and 
ethnic basis of legitimisation. The ethnic basis of the nation continues to exert a 
strong atraction for the legitimisation of those arguing for the creation of new states 
and for the legitimisation of existing ones. The struggle of the Palestinians in Israel 
and the Kurds in Northern Iraq are two highly visible reminders of this. However, 
political communities based exclusively on organic national elements such as 
language, religion or ethnicity are an exception to the norm in political communities. 
The pursuit of such national purity in states is often a fraudulent and destructive 
57  Ibid. 
58 See Strange, S. The Retreat of the State: The Difusion of Power in the World Economy. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.). Most particularly Chapters one and five. 
59 	 . Smith, A. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era., 85. 
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activity. In the Balkans the problem of nationalities was not solved by the dissolution 
of the Habsburg Empire. Nor did the implosion of Soviet Union lessen nationalist 
feelings or allow for the establishment of viable states. The difficulty with states 
which are based on ethnolinguistic criteria, such as language or religion, is that as 
they attempt to create national unity by cultural standardisation and the assimilation of 
sub-national groups, they often trigger a nationalist backlash from those proto-
national minorities which are being marginalised by such a process. 60 
In an environment of eroding state sovereignty and authority there has been a trend 
towards more supranational forms of governance in order to better manage what were 
once national economic and political activities. This is nowhere more evident than in 
Europe. As Strange argues: "Why should we imagine that states are the only 
institutions which exercise authority over others in setting not only rules but norms 
and customary procedures?"6I The primary functions of the state - the maintenance 
and protection of territory, the arrangement of socioeconomic settings for the 
protection of its peoples and the conduct of relations between itself and other states - 
are altering to a point where the most appropriate unit of analysis in discussions of 
power and socioeconomic ordering increasingly falls in the sphere of the 
supranational rather than the national. The recurrent failure of individual states to 
manage their domestic and external affairs has, with increasing frequency, been 
reflected in the emergence of international organisations, both inter-governmental and 
supranational. Such organisations have attempted to better manage those matters 
beyond the resources, competence and jurisdiction of individual states. 62 Today 
matters as diverse as environmental improvement, arms control, international postal 
matters are dealt with by international organisations. In the European context the 
ignominy of military self-destruction and economic bankruptcy at the end of the 
Second World War imbued European elites with a strong motivation for the 
60 A poinant contempoary example of this process is the systemic repression of Kurdish ideneity 
in Turkey. For example the Turkish Government gave a two-year jail sentence to Akin Birdal, a 
Kurdish human rights campaigner who publicvlly spoke of a "Kurdish identity". See 'So where is 
Kurdistan?" The Economist June 10 2000 Turkish Survey 10. 
61 Strange, S. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy., 33. 
62 The rise of supranationalism in the context of declining state competency is addressed in 
David Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and 
the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World. ( New York: Simon & Schuster 1998). 
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establishment of supranational institutions and structures to both avoid further conflict 
and to better manage pan-European economic, social and political matters. 
An important consequence of the decline of the state and the rise of supranational 
institutions has been a fundamental reconsideration of communal identity in the late 
modern period. It has been observed that the `state-nation', and the less common 
`nation-state' 63 have been the locus of self and collective identity in the modern 
period. 64 The contemporary challenge to the authority and credibility of the state 
should not be seen as simply requiring a shift to supranationalism. More profoundly it 
poses a threat to social (and self) identity in the late modern period. The state-
mediated nation, historically the focal point of self-identification, deeply felt amongst 
national communities, now, paradoxically, seems at once both redundant yet fiercely 
resilient. The question as to how such contradictions in national identity in a 
globalised political and economic system can be reconciled is highly problematic, and 
will be addressed within this work. 
The conception of the state as playing the role of an intermediary in controlling the 
milieu for state-society relations is under some pressure. The expression of society is 
both compressed and splintered in late modernity. The organisation of private 
interests has taken on a public dimension and the expansion of difference and 
exclusion challenges the state for the premier role in the organisation of state/citizen 
relationships. 
The response from supranational organisations to this identity crisis varies. On one 
hand some supranational institutions, such as the United Nations, have projected a 
universalist and normative institutional framework without seeking to unilaterally 
intervene in pre-existing states to force compliance to such a framework. Institutions 
such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), North American Free Trade 
63 For an examination of the differing conceptions of nations, States, state-Nations and Nation-
States see Arbos, X. "Nation-State"; The Range and Future of a Concept." Canadian Review of Studies 
in Nationalism XVII. 1-2 1990. 
64 The literature on the instrumental and modernist aspects of National identity is extensive. In the 
first instance see Gellner E. Nations and Nationalism,and Nairn. T. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and 
Neo-Nationalism (London: New Left Books 1977). 
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Agreement (NAFTA) and other functionaly orientated supranational organisations 
have chosen to ignore the societal and identity implications of their activities, 
focusing rather on specific instrumental behaviours to serve the interests of the state 
structures and elites which constitute them.65 The circumstance in the case of Europe 
and its premiere supranational organisation, the European Union (EU), is somewhat 
different. Europe is providing the economic, societal, coercive and political certainty 
and security that Europeans once looked to their individual states to provide, and from 
which national identities originated. European supranationalism, responding at first to 
economic and geopolitical imperatives for integration, has progressively seen a 
convergence of supranational institutions and also sociocultural policy. Both are 
specificaly capable and active in promoting a common acceptance and loyalty 
amongst its subject citizens — while acknowledging the differing cultural and 
historical origins of the pre-existing European states, and the status of the different 
ethnic and sub-national groups within its territories. From programs as diverse as the 
single market, the social welfare provisions associated with 'Social Europe' and the 
evocation of the concepts of a 'Europe of Nations', and European rights associated 
with the development of 'Citizens Europe', European supranational polity has actively 
sought to provide a sufficient impetus for a supranational identity based on civic 
grounds to develop. Importantly such a process, as this work wil consider, has 
addressed the crisis of identity both at a national and sub-national level. 
1.9 	 Identity and Europe 
Given the profound differences which exist within European societies at al levels, is 
there any point in talking about a Europe as a discrete unit or as a meaningful 
framework for comparative research?6 We believe there is. There are a number of 
emergent factors suggestive of the existence of a common Europe. The (increasing) 
level of economic, cultural and personal exchange within Europe indicates the 
existence of a bounded discrete Europe. The predominance, at least within Western 
65 The failure of such institutions to take account of the identity concerns of the citizens they act 
on behalf of is taking an increasingly violent aspect. The aggression exhibited during the Seatle WTO 
is evidence of the increasing backlash against international organisations apparently blind to the 
identity rights of their constituents. 
66 Llobera, J. The God of Modernity (Oxford: Berg Publishers 1994), 24. 
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Europe, of market economies and liberal democratic political ideologies and 
structures are additionally suggestive of a homogenous European polity. While there 
are significant variations in the robustness of political institutions and economies 
within greater Europe, it is reasonable that a commonality of political and economic 
culture indicates that the concept of Europe can be given meaningful boundaries. The 
political process of legislative and institutional alignment and standardisation, taken 
in the context of the historical process of nation-building in European history, 
suggests that the institutions of supranational Europe may act as a catalyst to greater 
cultural and national homogeneity within Europe and contribute to the possible 
emergence of a European consciousness. 
However it would be unwise to ignore the significant historical and cultural 
differences within Europe. Even at the most superficial level there seems more to 
divide Europe than there is to unite it. The three main religious groupings; Catholic, 
Protestant and Orthodox have played their part in splintering Europe. There are at 
least three important and vastly different linguistic groups: Romance, Germanic and 
Slavonic, with their own particular characteristics and spatial-temporal 
discontinuities. The defining contribution of intra-European warfare over many 
centuries demonstrates that Europes' internal boundaries are highly contentious and 
not easily erased. Its external frontiers are as much normatively and spiritually based 
as they are geo-politically. Delineating Europe's centre and periphery is historically 
contingent. Spain and Portugal were centrally important in the fifteenth century, a 
position they no longer enjoy today. Given the contested nature of middle Europe, we 
may ask whether Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics or Russia are part of 
'Europe' or do they derive their 'Europeaness' from their geographical proximity to the 
West, rather than their active participation in it. 
Beyond geo-political considerations there is little question that Europe is made up of a 
diverse range of peoples, each with their own discrete and enduring identity. These 
are identities, which have, for the last two centuries, been largely suppressed by the 
mono-identity of the 'nation'. They are now re-emerging. The foundering of the 
authoritarian states in Eastern Europe and the resurgence of nationalism there after 
years of state-sponsored ethnic suppression is further destabilising received notions of 
identity and Europeaness. President Havel of the Czech Republic commented: 
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"It is astonishing to discover how, after decades of falsified history and 
ideological manipulation, nothing has been forgotten. Nations are now 
remembering their ancient achievements and their ancient suffering, their 
ancient statehood and their former borders, their traditional animosities and 
affinities - in short, they are suddenly recalling a history that, until recently, 
had been carefully concealed or misrepresented." 67 
Within Europe there has been an active collective re-invigoration of nationalism and 
identity. Such a process is occurring in two ways. Firstly we are seeing a return to the 
nation and proto-nation. 68 There has been a collective, empathetic response to the 
nostalgia of the sovereign nation, focusing on the protection of national self-
determination and self-identity at the national levels based upon 'ethnic' models of 
nationhood. Such a phenomenon is most striking in the divisive, exclusionary and 
unstable expression of national identity offered by the various constituent elements of 
Europe's extreme right. Secondly, at the other end of the scale, the institutionalisation 
of both a pan-European polity and the incorporation within it of a 'civic' model of 
inclusive nationhood, belonging and identity. The rise of local and regional 
particularism that has characterised much of the post-cold war decade present as both 
a problem to pre-existing European state structures, but more importantly in the 
context of our discussion, makes the task of subsuming these allegiances within an 
overall European supranational identity problematic. While, in some European states 
a strong sense of national pride can coexist with strong local loyalties and a sense of 
European identity, such as in the case of Spain, the inability of state systems to 
respond adequately to the effects of globalisation is revealing weaknesses in the civic 
basis of identification. Into this vacuum is moving regional based political movements 
such as the Northern League and the MSI in Italy and the regional separatists in Spain 
and the United Kingdom. 
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As a result of the discernible tension between the institutionalisation of a 
supranational Europe and the internal revival of more authentic ethnonationalism, a 
cautionary approach to an exploration of pan-European identity formation is required. 
In the context of a decline in the functional competency of the state, the revival of 
selective intra-national and trans-national historical bonds and cultural heritages and 
the perceived absence of meaningful 'ethnic' signifiers of a common European 
identification, the building of a European identity requires a focus on civic values 
which avoids conflict with the pre-existing loyalties of Europeans. Nevertheless this 
focus on civic values must somehow imbue in Europeans a sense of community and 
belonging. 
As we shall consider in Chapter Two, differing approaches promote differing 
conceptions of European identity. Europe is Michaelangelo, Brecht, and the contents 
of the Louvre. Europe is also the political inheritance of the Age of Reason; 
constitutionalism, the rule of law, citizenship and rational secularism. If in the 
Fourteenth Century you were to look for Europe it would be sufficient to talk of 
Christendom. Europe for others is embraced in the notion of individualism, 
cosmopolitanism, universalism and the social contract. Alternatively Europe is simply 
the amalgam of its sovereign states and little else. For some 'Europe' is an empty 
vessel, suggesting that in the absence of a common culture, language and a sense of 
communal cohesion there is no common Europe as it lacks the necessary social and 
cultural homogeneity to enable it to assert a separate identity. 69 However, for many 
there exists an innate and unshakeable notion that Europe is greater than the sum of its 
parts, that a great and powerful turn in the collective fate of its inhabitants is under 
way and that this will directly affect the common form of a European identity. It is 
from this starting point that our analysis begins. It is clear that European identity and 
the notion of a distinct European symbolic and discursive space invites constant 
speculation. It is never wholly, or even partially observable or definable. It is an 
essentially problematic entity. The problem of defining the exact nature of Europe is 
aptly suggested by Giner: 
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"For many of its citizens, "European" is the widest possible social identity, 
beyond occupation, locality and nation: it is the ultimate frame of social 
reference in terms of education, taste, ethics, belief and public and private 
conduct. Yet its cultural and even physical boundaries are never clear. Until 
recently, Europe has been only a shared notion, albeit a crucial one, for a set of 
Western Peoples."7° 
This thesis examines both received notions of European identity and demonstrates, 
according to our established definitions and utilising both empirical and qualitative 
materials, that a form of European identification is clearly discernible amongst 
Europeans. Such an identity is necessarily civic in form and compliments and does 
not 'crowd out' pre-existing forms of individual and colective identity. 
This work argues that contemporary Europe is comprised of diverse peoples, ethnies, 
languages and local identities acting out their fate within the confines of a European 
civic society. Such a society draws its alegiance and loyalty from the positive 
sentiment atached to it from amongst its peoples, as an institutional structure ofering 
a limited measure of identity protection. 
1.10 Concluding Remarks 
Our principal argument is that there is a relationship between supranational 
institutional development and the development of transnational European identity. It 
wil explore how European supranational institutions developed and how such 
institutions affect identity formation. We wil establish that, in the context of the 
splintering of national and sub-national European identities and the ambiguous 
position of the state-sponsored national identity, the active intervention of European 
institutions and policies wil determine the nature of such a pan-European 
consciousness. This thesis, building upon Greenfeld's distinction between the civic 
and ethnic basis of identity, wil demonstrate the mechanisms that supranational 
Europe is employing to develop a form of pan-European civic identity. 
70 	 . Giner, S. The Advent of a European Society in Haler, M. & Richter, R. Toward a European 
Nation?: Political Trends in Europe - East and West. Centre and Periphery., 15. 
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In Chapter One the thesis considers the contemporary crisis of identity and the 
disagregation of received notions of meta-social integration and identification within 
national societies within the framework of modernity. It examines the nature of 
identity and offers a definition that is informed by the main discourses. We argue that 
in essence identity is a sense of belonging; to being a part of a collectivity associated 
with a readiness to accept certain self-descriptions, share common values, partake in 
common actions and display a common cognitive boundary. Having considered 
identity in broad terms we locate identity within contemporary Europe and illustrate a 
number of the tensions associated with European supranationalism, the contestation of 
the state and the evocation of a broad range of previously politically dormant 
'imagined communities' most especially ethnic 'communities of fate'. 
Chapter Two will provide a study of the discourse of identity and suggest the nature 
of, and tensions between ethnic and civic notions of European identity. Further, the 
main competing narratives of 'Europe' including linguistic, cultural and geo-political 
approaches will be defined and discussed. 
Chapter Three will consider the origins and raison d'etre of both states and 
supranations and consider the mechanisms utilised by states and supranations to 
engender communal identity from amongst their populations. The work will consider 
the relationship between supranationalism and pre-existing national and local 
identities and the mechanisms that may be employed by supranational institutions to 
neutralise the challenges of pre-existing identities. 
Chapter Four will analyse the emergence of European Supranationalism since the 
end of the Second World War and consider the precise nature of a supranational 
European polity. 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six will consider the reinforcers and retardants of a 
European supranational identity, respectively. 
In Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine the manifestations of a European identity will be 
tested against the criteria of identity established in Chapter One. 
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In Chapter Ten it will be argued that only through a critical examination of both the 
meaning of identity and the rapidly changing structure of socio-cultural life that one 
can postulate a legitimate, albeit modest, basis for a common European identity. It 
will suggest that there exists a form of pan-Europeaness, based upon a civic, inclusive 
notion of political community sponsored and positively and directly assisted by the 
institutions of the European Union. Such a European identity, it will be argued, 
reflects the shift away from the nation as the prime locus of communal identity in the 
late modern period. Such identity exists above the level of the state or nation; it 
compliments, rather than overwhelms pre-existing national, regional and local 
identities. It will be argued that in contrast to the process of state building and nation 
formation in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, wherein state elites 
suppressed emergent local and regional identities in the pursuit of an official national 
identity, the contemporary European experience is highly suggestive of a unique 
phenomena in community formation. We argue that the positive and concerted effort 
of Pan-European institutions and elites to create a European abstract community 
rooted in inclusive diversity and the disposition of ordinary Europeans to positively 
associate with Europe insofar as it positively expresses its aspirations has been 
successful. It will be noted that while a European identity is emerging, there are both 
some novel and unpredictable factors that will influence the nature of such an identity. 
Further we shall suggest that our understanding of identity requires some revision so 
as to be relevant in late modernity. While the historical experience of Western Europe 
has seen the construction of national based identities, we will suggest that it is in the 
construction of a denser and more socially inclusive conception of European civil 




Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Identity in Europe 
2.1 	 Introductory Remarks 
Our search for evidence of supranational European identity, while focusing on civic 
identity, must not lose sight of the vitality of ethnic identification within 
contemporary Europe. As examples as diverse as devolution within the United 
Kingdom and the implosion of Yugoslavia demonstrate ethnic identification within 
Europe is both powerful and enduring. Prior to an examination of the civic basis of 
European identity we need to examine in some detail the competing claims made by 
signifiers of communal identification, in three main areas. Firstly it wil be established 
that the basis of communal identification can be divided into two spheres; ethnic: 
language, customs and ethine, and civic: participation, citizenship, constitutionalism 
and rule of law. Secondly, this Chapter wil explore the detail of both civic and ethnic 
identification and argue that while there is systemic tension between the two elements 
of identity, that ethnic and civic identities are not exclusive of each other and that they 
co-exist within contemporary Europe. It wil be argued that it is improbable that either 
mode of identity can exist, without the influence of the other.' Thirdly, we shal 
demonstrate the relationship between civic and ethnic forms of colective identity in 
Europe by reference to materials gathered by the European Values Systems Study 
Group (EVSSG), the European Commission, via its Eurobarometer surveys and 
international survey data gathered as part of the 1995 International Social Science 
Program (IS SP). 
This Chapter argues notwithstanding the resistance between the two modes of 
identification, that communities based upon civic notions of belonging are, in part, 
reliant upon some elements of the ethnic to create and maintain a sense of communal 
belonging. Such congruence alows for the existence of a European civic identity, 
with the concurrent disposition of national and sub-national identification. The 
research wil later establish that it is the successful institutional management of the 
Which, in part, explains the systemic resistance between the two manifestations of communal 
identity. 
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ethnic mode of identification that determines the durability of the civic mode. This 
Chapter considers, based upon a review of the literature, the competing mental maps 
employed to present pan-Europeaness from both an ethnic and civic viewpoint. 
Finaly we suggest that pan-European civic identity is in part reliant upon a common 
conception of Europeaness derived from ethnic signifiers. 
2.2 	 Civic and Ethnic Nationalism 
2.2.1 Introductory Remarks 
The dual nature of identity, conceived, on one hand, as containing elements of ethnic, 
cultural and traditional signifiers while on the other as originating with the 
individualistic, voluntarist and rational conception of civic association, has particular 
significance in our consideration of contemporary Europe. A civic nationalism exists 
in Europe insofar as membership of Europe, and identification with it, is inclusive and 
open to al who adopt a particular cluster of civic virtues, irrespective of ethnic 
qualities. If the rights and duties which constitute European citizenship are both in 
principle and fact universal, then membership of a community of Europeans and 
identification with it is open to individuals who make secondary their ethnolingistic or 
cultural particularity in order to become, as A.D. Smith describes, 'universal' 
individuals like 'everybody else'.2 However even in the context of individuals 
participating in a civic society and narrowing their ethnic identification to a more 
private sphere, the affinity of the people with those signifiers of race, language or 
culture remains important. Such ethnic identifiers are heightened in those 
circumstances where the promise of citizenship - participation, material benefit and 
protection are not readily achievable, or where citizenship fails to promote colective 
desires and aspirations.3 In the folowing sections we shal initialy place the 
distinction between the two forms of identification in social theory and then contrast 
the ethnic and civic conceptions of colective identification, both from a theoretical 
standpoint and in their application to Europe. While the extension of a civic 
nationalism within Europe has proven to be easier in Europe's West relative to its 
2 	 . Smith A. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era., 97. 
3 The revival of ethnic identification in contemporary Indonesia is a poignant example of the 
effects of economic and material dislocation on identity formation. 
39 
East, that the legitimisation of a European civic identity is to a degree, reliant upon a 
highly selective and stylised form of common European ethnic imaginings. 
2.2.2 Social Theory and Identity 
The distinction between ethnic and civic identification reflects one of the most central 
distinctions in social theory; the distinction between "community" and "society", 
"mechanical" and "organic" social bonds. Nations are "Gesellschaftlich" in so far as 
they are reliant upon non-contractual relations and strong social bonds. Society, by 
contrast is a far more calculated and deliberate entity. As we briefly reviewed in 
Chapter One, both Toennies and Durkheim see it as a product of modernity, a result 
of increasing interaction — "moral density" that is more purposive and calculated. 
societial bonds, as distinct from communal ones, appear in the process of interaction 
and collaboration that accompany social differentiation and division of labour. Such 
bonds, stresses Durkheim, rely on recognition, acceptance and appreciation of cultural 
as well as functional differences. Therefore the spread of societal bonds- organic 
solidarity — coincides, in Durkheim's view, with the ascendancy of individualism. In 
order to be effective as social glue, a collective requires societal bonds on an 
altogether more abstracted level than is typically found in traditional societies. Thus 
the process of modernisation and the resultant individualisation that is derived from 
functional specialisation requires a shift from ethno-cultural bonds and linkages to 
more universalistic civic ones. This process, as we considered briefly in Chapter One, 
is variously explained by key social theorists. While DurIcheim explained the shift as a 
consequence of the implicit division of labour required by more functional production 
techniques, Toennies sees it as a consequence of spreading contractual relations. Marx 
saw the shift in collective identification resulting from the feudal to capitalist mode of 
production whereas Weber linked the changes in the mode of collective identification 
to Protestantism and marketization. 4 
It is in such a context that we consider the two orientations to collective identification 
in contemporary Europe. 
4 
For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between classical social theorists and collective 
identification see Pakulski. J. & Tranter, B. How Nationalistic are Australians? Unpublished research 
paper, University of Tasmania: School of Sociology and Social Work, 1999. 
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2.2.3 Ethnic Nationalism 
For a number of writers the basis of nation and national identity is the existence of 
distinct ethnic groups and their ethnocentric behaviour and collective dispositions. 5 
The conviction that collective identification is 'of the blood' is suggested by its 
definitional origins. As Connor notes, the word nation is derived from the Latin verb 
nasci, meaning to be born, and from the latin noun, nationem, denoting breed or race. 6 
E.H. Can in trying to formulate a definition of nationalism committed to an ethnic 
conception of national identity wrote in 1945: 
"The nation is not a definable and clearly recognised entity. . . . Nevertheless 
the nation is . . . far more than a voluntary association; and it embodies in 
itself. . . such natural and universal elements as attachments to one's native 
land and speech and a sense of wider kinship than that of family. The modern 
nation is a history group."7 
The ethnic model of the nation is, as Smith defines it; 'first and foremost a community 
of common descent'. 8 Nations are the products of history and identity is derived from 
the extent that people are born into them. As Jenkins and Sofos relate; "Rather than 
free associations based on residence, they (are) historically determined entities based 
on ancestry."9 In short the ethnic nation is a community of fate, rather than as in the 
civic model, a community of choice; as Smith argues: 
"Whether you stayed in your community or emigrated to another, you 
remained ineluctably, organically a member of the community of your birth, 
and were for ever stamped by it." 19 
5 
See Kohn. H Nationalism, Its Meaning and History (Princeton N.J. Van Nostrand 1965) ; Smith, 
A. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford U.K. Basil Blackwell 1986) and Kedourie, E. Nationalism  
(London: Hutchinson 1960). 
6 
Connor, W. A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is an .. . Ethnic and Racial 
Studies vol 13 No.1 January 1990, 381. 
7 
Carr, E. The Interregnum 1923-1924 (London: Macmillian 1954) 
8 Smith, A.  Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era., 11. 
9 Jenkins, B. and Sofos, A. Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe., 15. 
10 Smith, A. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era., 11. 
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Atachment to the ethnic nation is not a mater of personal choice. The nation is 
exclusive, closed rather than open. As Kelas suggests: 'No one can become Kurd, 
Latvian or Tamil through adopting Kurdish etc ways." ' Citizenship is acquired by 
birth, through blood, determined by jus sanguinis not by jus soli. The perceived 
indelible and enduring nature of ethnic identification, is aptly observed by Margalit 
and Raz: 
"Identification is more secure, less liable to be threatened, if it does 
not depend on accomplishment. Although accomplishments play 
their role in peoples sense of their own identity, it would seem that 
at the most fundamental level our sense of our own identity depends 
on criteria of belonging rather than on those of accomplishment. 
Secure identification at that level is particularly important to one's 
wel being."12 
Considering in greater detail the elements of the ethnic model of national identity, 
there are six key building-blocks of the ethnic 'nation'. They are: 
I. 	 Assumed Blood Ties  - kinship, tribal alegiances and family ties; 
2. Race - ethno-biological and phenotypical features -such as skin colour, 
facial form, hair type etc; 
3. Language  - a central feature of national identity and of inter-national 
conflicts; 
4. Region  - regionalism is a feature of national identity - smal scale 
historical boundaries, it is linked in turn to tradition and folklore; 
5. Religion  - can form the nation and give it cohesiveness or it can 
undermine the state; and 
6. Custom  - differences in custom undermine state identity - however it 
can strengthen the identity of the nation. - the bearer of 'civilisation'. 13 
Notwithstanding the differing 'weightings' placed on these factors in differing 
contexts, it is from a combination of these that (ethnicaly based) national identity 
t t Kelas, J. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity., 51. 
12 Margalit, A. & Raz, J.1990 'National Self-Determination' Journal of Philosophy (87/89), 439- 
461, 447. 
13 Geertz. C, 'Old Societies and New States' in Hutchinson, J & Smith, A. Nationalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1994) 
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develops. The ethnic group is exclusive; its membership is based on certain inborn 
atributes, which are generaly culturaly or linguisticaly defined. 
2.2.4 Civic Nationalism 
The modern paradigm of the state, and most particularly the liberal European state, 
has generaly assumed a civic basis of nation and national community.I4 In such a 
schema membership of the national community is mediated through membership of 
the 'people' in which individuals are accorded the rights, duties and most significantly 
identity of (civic) citizenship. As Smith details: 
"Only members of a people can be citizens and receives the benefits of 
modernity which only citizenship of a nation state can confer."15 
For Smith the nature of civic identity is: 
"Historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of 
members, and common civic culture and ideology, these are the components 
of the standard Western model of the nation;"16 
Or as Ignatief theorises: 
"Civic nationalism maintains that the nation should be composed of al those - 
regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity - who subscribe 
to the nation's political creed. This nationalism is caled civic because it 
envisages the nation as a community or equal, right beating citizens, united in 
patriotic atachment to a shared set of political practices and values."17 
Within the civic model, the nation is constructed freely as 'an association of 
citizens'.18 The polity comes into being on a voluntary, wiled basis; it is the product 
of agreement, of consent. It is thus simultaneously national and democratic. As 
14 See Walace, W. 'Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe, 1945-93' in 
Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. The Question of Europe. (London: Verso 1997), 21-50. 
15 	 . Smith, A. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era.,  97 
16  Smith, A. National Identity  (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1991), 11. 
17 Ignatief, M. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.  (London: Vintage 
1994), 3-4. 
18 Schwarzmantel, J.  Socialism and the Idea of the Nation. (London: Harvester 1991), 207. 
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Ignatieff argues: "This nationalism is necessarily democratic since it vests sovereignty 
in all the people." 19 The members of the civic nation are those who have rights and 
obligations as citizens of the polity. Membership is open to those who qualify as 
citizens and carry out the responsibilities as such. 2° 
A civic nation is one in which the shift away from particular, exclusive ethnic 
signifiers of identity leads to the creation and protection of a zone where individuals 
freely associate, as inclusive equals, to pursue shared purposes. It is within such a 
civic association that individuals are able to express distinctive identities, such 
identities existing without threatening the viability of the state. 21 The civic 
conception of nation is strongly associated with the civic society, for it is from the 
dense network of differing individual and collective purposes, associations and 
identities that a set of inclusive non-prescriptive associations develop within the state, 
which stand apart from the state. 22 
In its most idealised form, the civic nation does not attempt to prescribe the 
boundaries or inclusiveness of individual members by virtue of individuals' ethnic 
signifiers. The civic nation recognises the plural and often conflicting identities within 
society. Rather than attempting to enforce a limited, ethnically based state-sponsored 
identity, the state rather delineates a private space for the articulation of ethnic 
identities while at the same time instituting a set of overriding public, civic, 
principles. 23 Such principles act to limit the plural and conflicting values associated 
19 
Ignatieff, M.  Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism., 4. 
20 i It s i nteresting to note in the contemporary United States, that the failure of citizens to carry 
out their responsibilities, such as to maintain order, in fourteen American states, results in the 
deprivation of a central element of citizenship - the right to vote. Thus civic society is moulded to 
create insiders and outsiders on 'civic rather than ethnic grounds. See 'Disenfranchised for Life' The 
Economist October 24th 1998 
21 Galston, W. Value Pluralism and Political Liberalism  
http://www.puat.umd.edu/Ippp/galston.htm p.1 accessed 14 Nov 1998 
22 For a recent and novel analysis of the nature of civic identity, at a pan-European level, see: 
Deudney, D. & Ikenberry, G. 'The Nature and Sources of liberal International Order'. Review of 
International Studies (1999), 25, 179-196, 192-195. 
23 
The most obvious example of such public principles are found in the constitutions of liberal 
civic states, such as the United States, Germany or Canada, where the civic values of public 
cohesiveness and solidarity do not, unnecessarily, erode the sphere of private ethnolinguistic or cultural 
identities. 
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with differing ethnic identities. Further there is a public commitment to value 
pluralism and a commitment to limit its intervention in the internal affairs of civic 
associations.24 
Within the civic paradigm the political creation of free and equal citizens, does not 
ignore the importance of families and communities or the ethnic, class and religious 
identities atached to them. Rather it establishes that which Bridges cals a system of 
'preferences' - a set of differential identities, including community, religious and 
ethnic associations and identities with a primary civic signifier, - of citizenship - 
which makes the layered identities below it practical and feasible. Bridges argues: 
"A liberal democratic state defines its citizens as free individuals who are only 
incidentaly members of particular ethnic, class and religious communities."25 
A liberal state has a fundamental role to play in the creation of a civic identity. It 
achieves communal identification rooted in definitions of membership as citizens, 
rather than as linguistic, ethnic or tribal members.26 More profoundly, it institutes 
formal and informal mechanisms, such as political socialisation through public 
education, so as to ensure that the population identities with it and with each other on 
civic grounds, alowing for the greatest range of diversity consistent with the 
management of a civil society. It is a truism to state that the world contains plural and 
conflicting values. A liberal, civic polity is one in which the choice of sub-state 
identifiers remain in the private sphere for as long as they pose no threat to each other 
24 	 i It simportant to note that notwithstanding the overt inclusiveness of civic identification, al 
civic nations impose limits as to inclusiveness and acceptance, which often include ethnic criteria. The 
language competency criteria for citizenship in Australia and the blood association criteria in Germany 
are two examples of this not uncommon phenomenon. Other cases, such as the resistance to North 
Africans in France, and the historic animosity, albeit at a social rather than a political level, to former 
commonwealth immigrants, in the United Kingdom, demonstrates that ethnic exclusion operates even 
within civic states. 
25  Ibid., 2. 
26 While we suggest that citizenship is a central element in maintaining a common form of 
identification in multi-ethnic polities, such as Europe, we are cognizant that citizenship on its own is 
often incapable of, on its own, sustaining a common communal sentiment, and thus other elements 
such as non-civic identifiers such as symbols and language are important in maintaining the civic 
identity. See Requejo, F. 'Cultural Pluralism, Nationalism and Federalism: A Revision of Democratic 
Citizenship in Plurinational States'. European Journal of Political Research. (1996): 35, 255-286. 
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or to the predominant ideas of the civil state such as liberal politics, civic diversity, 
accommodation and non-discrimination on ethnic, religious or national grounds. 27 
2.2.5 Tensions Between 'Ethnic' and 'Civic' Identification. 
It is important to examine in greater detail the relationship between ethnic and civic 
conceptions of collective identification. To understand the emergence of civic 
identification in Europe it is first necessary to consider the uneasy dynamic that exists 
between the two models 
The transformation of what Greenfeld describes as 'rabble' to 'nation', not only 
involves institutional reconfiguration but more significantly individual and collective 
cognitive reorientations. To be part of a national community, as Greenfeld suggests, is 
to be part of an elite, a separate community with qualities and opportunities removed 
from those non-members. National members as an elite resist those who do not share 
their national particularities strongly. 28 We have observed that the distinctiveness of 
the ethnic community, which presupposes the ethnic uniformity of its origins as a 
source of uniqueness is easier to acquire and maintain than civic forms of community, 
based on more abstracted grounds. Whereas a clear line separates those of common 
ancestry and language from the other, such distinctiveness is less immediate in the 
case of communities of choice; civic communities. 29 
Given that the articulation of uniqueness is both central to collective and individual 
identification and that both civic and ethnic modalities, to a greater or lesser degree, 
require the active intervention of institutions or elites to manifest themselves, the 
search for distinctiveness is intimately linked with the neutralisation and often the 
active suppression of alternative models of community. The modernity of nation and 
the emergence of new national identities, resulted from the appropriation and 
27 
We shall more fully consider the mechanisms available for managing ethnic signifiers within a 
civic nation later in this chapter. 
28 
Greenfeld, L. Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity., 9. 
29 
We are not suggesting that collective identification in civic nations such as the United States is 
less distinct than that experienced in national communities rooted in ethnic sources of belonging and 
uniqueness. Rather, there needs to be a more conscious elite and institutional effort to create such 
distinctiveness. 
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manipulation of signifiers, ethnic or civic, to substantiate them. Further, the 
emergence of national identity involved the rejection of elements of signification that 
did not fit the chosen national model. Because the community was a construct and 
involved the comparison between itself and those excluded from it led to what 
Greenfeld denotes as Ressentiment; which is defined as: 
"a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred 
(existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings." 30 
The macro-political manifestation of such Ressentiment is exhibited in both the 
promotion of particular elements of values, traditions and ideologies within a single 
national community and the active suppression of alternative and competing elements. 
Further such Ressentiment is displayed in the often uneasy relationship between the 
state-endorsed forms of signification and those rejected by the state, its elites and 
institutions. 31 At the interstate level the tension between the differing basis of identity 
is exhibited in the tension between states whose basis of communal identification 
differs from others, such as that between France and Germany.32 Greenfeld argues 
that within a single national community the transformation from ethnic identification 
30 
Greenfeld, L. Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity., 15. 
31 
Examples of such intra-state tension between ethnic and civic conceptions of community are 
numerous. In Western Europe the revival of ethnic, xenophobic and exclusionary conceptions of 
national community by the extreme right forms a active counterpoint to civic forms of community. 
Whereas the endemic violence in Yugoslavia demonstrates the physical manifestation of the clash 
between civic and ethnic concepts of community. 
32 
The clearest example of the tension between competing state-centred conceptions of civic and 
ethnic conceptions of community within Europe is exhibited by the civic and ethic nationalisms of 
Germany and France respectively. This tension is considered primary and fundamental, as Brubaker 
suggests: 
"for two centuries, locked together in a fateful position at the centre of state-and nation building 
in Europe, France and Germany have been constructing, elaborating and furnishing to other states 
distinctive, even antagonistic models of nationhood and national self-understanding." 
Even today: 
"the opposition between the French and German understandings of nationhood and forms of 
nationalism remains indispensable." 
The origin of these archetypes can be traced to the intellectual contributions of the German Meincke on 
one hand and French writers such as Michelet and Renan, on the other. See Brubaker, R. Nationalism 
Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1996), 3. We can further see this juxtaposition in the relationship between Western 
and Eastern Europe, as we shall consider later in this Chapter. 
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to a colective civic form of community results in structural constraints on the cultural 
traditions that preceded it. Such a process of the selective articulation of a particular 
form of national community within one state leads to open hostility being exhibited 
towards other states that do not share the same basis of community.3 
The competition and antagonism between the two modalities of identity, if we accept 
Greenfeld's Thesis, presents substantial chalenges to the articulation of a pan-
European identity. If ethnic and civic identities stand in a position of Ressentiment 
relative to each other, so too do different European states whose basis of identity 
differ, then the synthesis of a common sense of pan-European belonging becomes 
highly problematic. Mechanisms must be found to manage such Ressentiment in 
contemporary Europe, lest the potential splintering efect of local identities contribute 
to the retreat from an inclusive civic European identity. Such mechanisms become 
necessary so as to manage the enduring nature of national and ethnic forms of 
identification while ensuring a pan-European civic form of identity can emerge. Such 
a process of identity management, as we shal demonstrate in this work, is currently 
underway in Europe. Ethnic identification wil not disappear in Europe, it wil endure, 
and accordingly pan-European civic identity must accommodate pre-existing and 
enduring (ethnic) signifiers. As Smith reminds us: 
"Whenever and however national identity is forged, once established it 
becomes immensely difficult, if not impossible (short of total genocide) to 
eradicate." 34 
Those advocating the formation of a European civic identity must be cognisant of the 
tensions between the two paradigms and act to politicaly neutralise ethnic 
identification and strengthen ethnic inclusiveness within a civic form of community. 
Such a process, in the contemporary context, is an urgent one as the institutions of the 
European polity lack resilience without a substantial sense of community and shared 
identity. As Deudney and Ikenbery suggest: 
33 The occurrence of Ressentiment between the German ethnic conception of community and the 
French Civic conception, as suggested by Greenfeld, is perhaps the clearest example of the 
incompatibility of the two modes of community. 
34 	 . Smith A. 1993 'A Europe of Nations — or the Nation of Europe? Journal of Peace Research. 
(30/2), 129-135, 131. 
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"Political identity and community and political structure are mutualy 
dependent. Structures that work and endure do so because they are congruent 
with identities and forms of community that provide them with legitimacy."35 
The mechanisms by which polities atach a communal sense of belonging to their 
structures and institutions wil be considered in detail in Chapter Three and 
anticipated in the concluding sections of this Chapter. 
2.3 	 The Objectification of European Identity - Competing Discourses on Pan- 
European Identity - Ethnic and Civic 
In 1994 Giner aptly described the paradox of European identity as: 
"Europe invites constant speculation because it cannot be taken for granted."36 
Capturing the spirit of the paradox, Ash commented in 1996: 
"In short, no continent is externaly more il-defined, internaly more diverse 
or historicaly more disorderly. Yet no continent has produced more schemes 
for its own orderly unification."37 
The question of the essence of Europeaness has been variously expressed, ranging 
from Dubois writing in the Fourteenth century of a Europe unified by virtue of its 
Christianity, to Durlcheim's Nineteenth century contributions on the common social 
structures that formed the basis of a common European society. The formation of 
representations of European homogeneity and identity reflects not only the 
complexities and histories of European peoples, but also, and equaly importantly, the 
interpretations made of such experiences by theorists. As our analysis demonstrates 
the discourse of Europeaness is unclear as to the precise nature of its basis — ethnic or 
civic. 
35 Deudney, D. & Ikenbery, G. 'The Nature and Sources of liberal International Order'. Review 
of International Studies., 193. 
36 	 . Giner, S. 'The Advent of a European Society' in Haler, M & Richter, R. Toward a European 
Nation? Political Trends in Europe: East and West. Center and Periphery., 15. 
37 Ash, T. 'Is Europe Becoming Europe?' Sanford S. Elberg Lecture in International Studies. 
Institute of International Studies, University of California. (Berkeley 1996) 
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Even the most clearly defined civic conception of Europeaness, contains within it 
vestiges of a pan-European ethic or cultural community. Akyuz, considering Europe 
from Turkey, argues Europe is best understood by its own unique 'mental structure'. 
Such a structure has four strands. The French Revolution, seen as a 'premiere' result of 
Renaissance and Enlightenment, the industrial revolution and colonialism, German 
National Socialism with World War II, and the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the 
Soviet Union. 38 Valery considers the most legitimate basis of Europe can be 
established by three factors. 39 The influences that make Europeans European are 
Rome, Christianity and science. Rome, according to Valery, gave to Europe a model 
of organised and stable power, Christianity contributed to European identity by giving 
Europeans a common normative system and a common consciousness as sharing in a 
common people beyond individual localities or kinship relations. Science 
distinguishes Europe most profoundly from the rest of humanity - the Greek 
inheritance is the origin of this determinant of European identity: 
"What we owe to Greece is perhaps what has most profoundly distinguished 
us from the rest of humanity. To her we owe the discipline of the mind. . . To 
her we owe the method of thought that tends to relate all things to man . . . 
Man became for himself the system of reference to which all things in the end 
must relate . . . from this discipline science was to emerge - our science, that is 
to say, the most characteristic product and the surest and most personal 
triumph of our intellect. Europe is above all the creator of science. There have 
been arts in all countries, there has been true science only in Europe." 4° 
The Pan-European Movement reinforces Valery's thesis. The core elements of 
Europe, as articulated by the Movement, are, 'Liberalism, Christian, Social and 
European'. The heart of Europe is its focus on individualism, personal and collective 
self-determination, which necessitates a free market economy and a state of 
constitutionally guaranteed law and order. The Movement considers Christianity as: 
'the soul of Europe, the foundation of its cultural, social and spiritual development'. 41 
From Christianity human rights are clustered and observed. The third element of 
38 
Akyuz, A. 1998 Europe as a Concept http://informatik.rwth -
aachen.de/AEGEE/articles/oe8/alper.html accessed 18 October 1998 




Paneuropean Movement http://www.w1b.at/paneu/paneue.htm  accessed 18 October 1988. 
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Europe is the social, humanitarian aspect of Europeaness - the preservation of 
concepts of justice and dignity of man, and the removal of discrimination and the 
protection of minorities, with just living conditions for all. Fourthly, Europe is 
European because it has, ' created a unique order of peace and justice'. 42 
Writing at the end of the Second World War, T.S. Eliot strongly articulated the unity 
of Europe as a cultural community. An entity made complete and united by virtue of 
its common culture - and by this he meant ecclesiastical and the traditions and 
material cultural artefacts associated with it. Eliot states: 
"The dominant feature in creating a common culture between peoples, each of 
which has its own distinct culture is religion. . . . I am talking about the 
common tradition of Christianity which has made Europe what it is, and about 
the common cultural elements which this common Christianity has brought 
with it. . . . It is in Christianity that our arts have developed; it is in 
Christianity that the laws of Europe - until recently - have been rooted. It is 
against a background of Christianity that all our thought has significance. An 
individual European may not believe that the Christian Faith is true; and yet 
what he says, and makes, and does, will all . . . depend on [the Christian 
Heritage] for its meaning. Only a Christian culture could have produced a 
Voltaire or a Nietzsche. I do not believe that the culture of Europe could 
survive the complete disappearance of the Christian Faith." 43 
The inclusiveness of Europe, East and West, in a pan-European cultural community is 
well argued by Seton-Watson: 
"The European cultural community includes the peoples living beyond 
Germany and Italy. . . something in no way annulled by the fact that they 
cannot today belong to an all European economic or political community. . . 
Nowhere in the world is there so widespread a belief in the reality, and in the 
importance, of a European cultural community, as in the countries lying 
between the EEC and the Soviet Union. . . . To these peoples, the idea of 
Europe is that of a community of cultures to which the specific culture or sub-
culture of each belongs. None of them can survive without Europe, or Europe 
without them."44 
43 
T.S. Eliot, in Davies, N. Europe: A History. (London: Pimlico 1997), 9. 
44 
Seton-Watson, H. in Davies, N. Europe: A History., 14. 
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The absence of a systematic expression of European identity is broadly observed. As 
Davies suggests, finding the essential ingredients of a common European culture, or 
more properly a common European Civilisation, is an extremely difficult exercise. 
Davies argues that Europe includes elements of both the ethnic and civic notions of 
community - Elements include the Christian faith, the intelectual and cultural 
inheritance of Greece and Rome as wel as the influences of the Enlightenment, 
modernisation, romanticism, nationalism, liberalism, imperialism and 
totalitarianism.45 Al such features assists in defining Europe from non-Europe and it 
is only from such a combination of such disparate factors that the complexity of a 
pan-European identity can theorised.46 
Davies identifies a number of models of 'Western Civilisation' in which 'Europe' has 
been defined, and which have both ethnic and civic elements. These frameworks 
include: 
1. The Roman Empire - 'the West' came to be associated with those parts 
of Europe which can claim a share in the Roman legacy, as distinct 
from those which can not; 
2. Christian Civilisation - Christendom was the West, Islam the East; 
3. The Catholic World - In which the divorce of ecclesiastical and secular 
authority facilitated the rise of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the 
scientific revolution and the Enlightenment; 
4. Protestantism - the rise of northern Europe; 
5. The French Variant - the secular philosophy of the Enlightenment and 
the ideals of the Revolution of 1789; 
6. The Imperial Variant - the assertion of perceived superior European 
cultural, economic and constitutional conditions on a pre-modern 
external world; 
7. The Marxist Variant - That Western Europe had reached a superior 
level of development compared with the rest of the world 
45 	 . Davies, N. Europe: A History., 15. 
46 The importance of diference in the articulation of European Identity has bee widely observed. 
See Said, E. Orientalism., (New York: Pantheon 1978), Giner, S. 'The Advent of a European Society' 
in Haler, M. & Richter, R. Toward a European Nation? — Political Trends in Europe East and West, 
Center and Periphery., 15-30. And Evans M. 'Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe' in 
Jenkins, B. & Sofos, S. Nation & Identity in Contemporary Europe., 33-53. 
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(notwithstanding the assertion that such development would end in 
decadence and revolution); 
8. The First German Variant - The centrality and primacy of Germany 
within Mitteleuropa and the rejection of liberalism; 
9. The WASP Variant of Western Civilisation - The commonalities of 
Protestantism, parliamentary government and common law shared by 
the US and Britain, in opposition to German Hegemony in Europe; 
10. The Second German Variant - Conceived by the Nazi's features 
include 'Aryan ' Racism, Greater German nationalism and pagan 
mythology; 
11. The American Variant - democracy and capitalism versus the threat of 
communism; and 
12. The Euro Variant - based firmly on the Franco-German alliance, intent 
on increasing material and social prosperity, and limiting the influence 
of the 'Anglo-Saxons'.47 
This discussion illustrates the difficulty in explicitly and categorically offering a 
universally acceptable or valid 'cultural' basis for pan-Europeaness that escapes 
conjecture. Further it demonstrates both the discursive nature of identity theorisation 
and that a European civilisation based upon a European culture is enormously elastic, 
and uses elements of both ethnic and civic elements of commonality and community. 
Of relevance to this discussion are the priorities and assumptions implicit in the allied 
attitudes to Europeans in the Second World War. The allied leadership attempted, 
using the concept of a common cultural European inheritance, to rally the West 
against the European 'other', which had adopted values and behaviors that removed it 
from the sphere of the European civic community. Such attempts remain a clear 
statement of the core of Europeaness, notwithstanding being in the form of a trans-
Atlantic Europeaness. As Davies concludes: 
"The belief in a unique, secular brand of Western civilisation in which the 
Atlantic Community is presented as the pinnacle of human progress. Anglo 
Saxon democracy, the rule of law in the tradition of the Magna Carta, and a 
capitalist, free market economy are all taken to be the highest forms of the 
good."48 
47  
Davies, N. Europe: A History., 23-25. 
48  Ibid., 40. 
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Perhaps the most famous recent example of the assertion of Pan-Europeaness rooted 
in a common culture is that offered by Huntington. The central theme of his work is 
that in the post cold-war world the premier patterns of cohesion community and 
identity are less political and more cultural reflected in a revival of what he terms 
'civilization identities'. Rather than globalisation shaping a universal civilization, 
modernisation is rather reaffirming the importance of unique cultures and identities to 
communities, no where is this more the case, according to Huntington, than in non-
western, specifically Asian and Islamic hemispheres. Accordingly Huntington 
suggests that a 'civilization-based world order' in which societies sharing cultural 
affinities are hieratically arranged and between which there is increasing conflict. The 
survival of western identity, which is dependent upon the United States, will be 
achieved only if the west accepts the practical challenges from the non-west.49 
Huntington's analysis suggests that while the United States is the premiere military 
power, and thus has responsibility for carriage of the physical protection of the West, 
the decisive ideological, cultural roots of the west are centrally European. More 
specifically the ancestry, religion, language, history, values customs and institutions, 
at the broadest level are reliant upon Europe. Clearly for Huntington the central 
elements of Europe is its civilization, and it is the European civilization that created 
the western identity. 50 He argues: 
"Western ideas of individualism. . . human rights, equality. . . democracy. . . 
the separation of church and state . . . have little resonance in . . . Islamic . . . 
or Orthodox cultures."5I 
Deudney and Ikenberry make a more recent exposition of a common European civic 
identity. Crystallizing the European civic community in terms of its adherence to the 
49 Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: 
Simon & Schuster 1996), 1 
50 There is little doubt as to Huntington 's cultural preferences, as he argues: 
"those with Western Christian heritages are making progress towards economic development and 
democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political development in the Orthodox 
countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim republics look bleak." 
Ibid. 1. 
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public values of political democracy, market economics, ethnic toleration and 
personal freedom, they suggest: 
"The western civic identity is a consensus around a set of norms and 
principles, most importantly political democracy, constitutional government, 
individual rights, private property-based economic systems, and toleration of 
diversity in non-civic areas of ethnicity and religion. Throughout the West, the 
dominant form of political identity is based on a set of abstract and judicial 
rights and responsibilities which coexist with private and semi-private ethnic 
and religious associations."52 
The advent of civic identity represents a distinctive solution to the issue of managing 
what are often reactionary ethnic and cultural loyalties and sensibilities. European 
civic identity alows, within a liberal tolerant framework, for identity pluralism. 
Contributing to such a framework is the development of economic and political 
structures, such as a market economy, and participative citizenship, to dilute the 
potential political influence of ethnic identities. European cohesiveness and solidarity 
is brought about by the civic ethic of toleration and diversity that dilutes the potency 
of ethnic identification. 
2.4 	 The Division of Europe — 'The West and the Rest'53 
One of the key features in the evocation of Europe as a unified cultural community 
has been the maintenance of the division of Europe between its Western and Eastern 
hemispheres. While such a division is, at times, politicaly motivated and arbitrary, 
often forgeting whole histories and regions, there are 'real and important' lines on the 
map that divide Eastern and Western Europe. 
2.4.1 The Eastern Frontier 
The disposition of 'ethnic' and 'civic' forms of nation and national identity in Europe 
can be made on spatial, rather than purely theoretical grounds.54 First suggested by 
52 Deudney & Ikenbery, 'The Nature and Sources of liberal International Order'. Review of 
International Studies., 193. 
53  This phrase is taken from Hal, S. & McGrew, T. The West and The Rest: Formations of 
Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity Press 1992). 
54 The significance of spatial discourse to the exploration of European identify is a recuring 
element.; See Keith, M. & Pile, S. Places and The Politics of Identity (London: Routledge 1993). 
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Kohn, Plamenatz and Gellner, the distinction of the form of political community in 
the two European hemispheres has been most recently suggested by Spencer and 
Wollman. 55 According to Kohn, nationalism in the West developed first, and was 
based firmly on 'civic' objectification. Such nationalism was the product of the 
Enlightenment, of the age of reason, as an expression of the confidence of self-
interested rational individuals. Eastern nationalism, by contrast, developed in a 
profoundly different environment, along different, more ethnically orientated lines, 
and as a reaction to the success of the west. Plamenatz identifies in the West a: 
"Nationalism of peoples who for some reason feel themselves at a 
disadvantage but who are nevertheless culturally equipped in ways that favour 
success and excellence measured by standards which are widely accepted and 
fast spreading, and which first arose among them and other peoples culturally 
akin to them."56 
In contrast, the Eastern model represents: 
"The nationalism of peoples recently drawn into a civilisation hitherto alien to 
them and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence 
by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. This is the 
'nationalism' of peoples who feel the need to transform themselves, and in so 
doing organise themselves: of peoples who come to be called 'backward' and 
who would not be nationalists of this kind unless they both recognised this 
backwardness and wanted to overcome it." 57 
The distinction between the emergence of the civic nation in the West and the ethnic 
nation in the East and by the characterisation of the differing forms of nation have set 
up an identity counterpoint, has been addressed by other authors. According to Kohn, 
nationalism developed in the West first and along singular lines. It was the product of 
the Enlightenment, the age of Reason - an essential expression of the confidence of 
rational individuals wishing to pursue their legitimate interests. Eastern nationalism 
by contrast was characterised as developing in a profoundly different environment, 
along quite different lines. The perceived fissures revealed in the literature on the 
55 
Spencer, P. & Wollman, H. Good and Bad Nationalism: A Critique of Dualism., 3. 
56 
Plamenatz, J. 'Two Types of Nationalism'. Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea. 




relationship between the West and the East is most acutely demonstrated in the 
typology ofered by Spencer and Wolman in the table below. 













Imperialism National Liberation 
Source: Spencer, P. & Wolman, H. 'Good and Bad Nationalism: A Critique of Dualism.' Paper 
Presented to the European Sociological Association Conference, University of Essex, Colchester 
August 1997. 
These distinctions while conveying a somewhat ethnocentric suggestion of Western 
superiority and characterising the East as backward, regressive, reactionary and not 
authenticaly modern, is useful in ilustrating the enduring nature of the fissures in 
European identity conceptualisations. It is not a dramatic departure from such 
stereotyping of the East to see the origins of the evolution of the Eastern other - as 
stealing 'our' jobs, or swamping 'our' culture. The West has been and remains 
stereotyped as authenticaly modern and liberal, the East characterised as alien to 
liberalism, secularism and progressive rationality.58 
The division of Europe into the progressive 'civic' West and the more traditional 
'ethnic' East serves two purposes. Not only may such an East/West, 
58 i It s important to note that the analysis of the division between Eastern and Western European 
hemispheres is heavily value-laden, as is suggested by the terminology utilised. The East is variously 
described in terms of its backwardness (Plamenatz), inferiority (Kohn) and incompleteness (Gelner). 
Such stereotypical responses may be rooted in what Hal has caled the discourse of the 'West and the 
Rest'; developed over hundreds of years of unequal contact, imperialism and colonialism, founded on 
elements of power and coercion. This discourse has deep historical origins in the form of opposition 
between western and eastern spheres of Europe. It goes back to the Roman and Greek hostility, to the 
barbarian Other from the East, to the schism in Christianity between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western 
Catholicism, and to Christianity's struggle with Islam. 
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progressive/backward division serve, in rudimentary terms, to ilustrate the 
geographical division of Europe into civic and ethnic conceptions of political 
community, but further serves an important role in the maintenance of Western 
identity by imbuing it with a profoundly ethnocentric and superior self-definition, 
when contrasted with the eastern 'other'.59 Thus notwithstanding the uncertain 
theoretical basis of the East/West ethnic/civic schism, the practical effect of such a 
perception has been to further reinforce a sense of (Western) European identity, albeit 
at the expense of a stereotyped, Eastern, 'other'.69 
2.5 	 Ressentiment Revisited - The Impossibility of the Civic Without the 
Ethnic 
At this juncture it is important to return to the ontology of Greenfeld's model of 
identity. Notwithstanding Greenfeld's compeling thesis, it is, in practical terms not 
plausible to completely discount the effect of ethnic identifiers, even within a civic 
community. As our preceding analysis has demonstrated, maters of language, 
ethnicity and culture are important signifiers of identity and community, even within 
a civic polity. By constituting sharp lines of demarcation between civic and ethnic 
conceptions of communal identification, theorists ignore a host of subtle interactions 
and causal influences between the two modes of identification. Such interactions and 
influences may be overlooked in an exclusive and absolute reliance on the narative of 
either the ethnic or civic identification. This polarized ontology ultimately leads to a 
dead end, for such an understanding rejects the plausibility of overlapping identities, 
of both a civic and ethnic nature, within a single territory. In such a conception local 
and regional identities, which manifest themselves in ethnic signifiers such as 
59 Jennifer Welsh offers a strong argument in support of the critical role of the other, Eastern and 
ethnic in her work 'The Role of The Inner Enemy in European Self-Definition: Identity, Culture and 
International Relations Theory'. History of European Ideas, (vol.19, no.1-3), 53-61. 
60 The common cognitive boundary that the East/West Schism evokes has been variously 
described. Notwithstanding its inadequate scholarship Kaplan's work 'Balkan Ghosts' aptly 
summarises the enduring historical divide between Europe's West and East, and the foundation that 
this division provides for European identification: 
. . the batle between communism and capitalism is merely one dimension of a struggle that 
pits Catholicism against Orthodoxy, Rome against Constantinople, the legacy of Hapsburg 
Austria-Hungary, against that of Otoman Turkey — in other words West against East, the 
ultimate historical and cultural conflict." 
See: Kaplan, R. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1993) 
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language, customs or common religious observance, may exist within a set of 
structural and institutional settings which promote and which are themselves reliant 
upon, a common sense of (civic) identification. 61 
The co-existence between differing forms of identification, such as ethnic 
identification at a local or national level and a civic form of association at a European 
level, first suggested by Waever, can be best understood by reference to psychological 
contributions and interpretations. We are informed by psychology that identity is 
multidimensional; it is in part formed by relationships within the family and extending 
from it to sub-group and group relationships, and their derived values and orientations 
developed from them later in life. Accordingly other interactions that develop, and the 
meanings that individuals attach to them, within social economic and political settings 
form conditions for the emergence of other modalities of identification. As one or 
another of these associations and relationships becomes more active or meaningful, 
and as behaviors alter to reflect the relative importance of such associations, the focus 
and intensity of identification may alter markedly. 62 However the pre-existent 
identifiers continue to exist but are not operationalised concurrently or with the same 
intensity. In this way the primary identifier of citizenship within a civic polity can 
accommodate the secondary ethnic identifier of race, religion or language. 
Identity and identification are not unidimensional; an individual can at one and the 
same time adopt the ethnic signifiers of language and ethnic origin while proudly 
declaring their confidence in, and allegiance to, the participative and right-bearing 
virtues of the civic state. In short, identity is much more variable than might be 
supposed by a simple division between ethnic and civic identification. Just as looking 
through a prism from different angles we observe differing images, so too with 
identification. Communal identification is situationally derived and malleable 
depending upon the context of the individual and the individual within the 
collectivity. What is certainly true, as Greenfeld argues, is that it is possible for 
61 
See Waever, 0., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. & Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe., 34-40. 
62 
Brown, J. Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing (Harmondworth, 
Penguin 1963), 245. 
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multiple and overlapping centres of identity and identification to come into contact 
and clash with each other if not managed adequately, at both a societal and 
institutional leve1. 63 
The nature of the relationship between ethnic and civic identification in contemporary 
Europe is best demonstrated by the results of the International Social Sciences 
Program (ISSP). While the ISSP survey considered a variety of issues, it considered 
the basis and intensity of respondents' attachments to their neighborhood, regional 
and national communities. Such consideration allows for an interpretation of the basis 
— ethnic or civic of individuals' communal identification. As part of the survey 
respondents were asked to indicate what, for them, were important factors in their 
form of belonging to a community, elements attributable to ethnic identification or 
alternately features which demonstrated the predominance of civic belonging. In 
short, as Pakulski and Tranter have argued, the ISSP data demonstrates what are the 
elements — civic or ethnic, or a combination of the two, which form the basis of 
communal solidarity. 64 Ethnic identification was established by a positive response 
from survey participants to questions that aligned their sense of belonging to 'ethnic' 
factors, including attachment to customs, importance of birthplace and having lived 
all one's life in the state. By contrast, those who derived their sense of belonging on 
'civic' criteria identified with their community on grounds including positive feelings 
63 
We are not suggesting that the two differing conceptions of identity are autonomous, or that 
different dimensions of identity do not impact upon each other — because they clearly do. As Greenfeld 
argues the two modes of identification do not coexist at all times amicably, however it is plausible that 
conditions may exist that allows them to coexist without overt tension or fragmentation. Accordingly 
the cultural traditions associated with the Crown, and the differing (ethnically derived) national 
identities of Scotland, Wales and England remain important reference points of identification within 
the United Kingdom, without threatening the integrity of a common form of British (civic) 
identification. The tension between ethnic and civic forms of identification and the systemic failure to 
manage such Ressentiment is perhaps most recently found in Europe in the case of Yugoslavia. The 
Yugoslav's demonstration of a primarily ethnic identification based on a historically enduring package 
of linguistic, cultural and social practices, and which was the decisive factor in the construction of a 
large scale national community, did not easily accommodate a form of communal belonging on civic 
grounds that the post-cold war environment required. Accordingly a shared affiliation between 
localised ethnic and transnational civic forms of identification in Europe, as it will be established, exist 
insofar as the European polity provides sufficient security, rights and privileges to these localised 
identities and those who share in them. 
64 
See Pakulski, J & Tranter B. 'How Nationalistic are Australians?' 
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of being a member of a state by virtue of their respect for the political institutions and 
the laws of their state. 65 
Considering the 1995 ISSP data, the basis of collective identification varies 
significantly, and informs the spatial ordering of ethnic and civic identification in 
contemporary Europe. In a number of central and Eastern European states, most 
particularly Poland, Bulgaria and Russia, the population can be described as strongly 
'ethnic' in their expression of collective identification. Whereas the citizen body of 
advanced industrial European states, including Italy, Ireland, Germany and Sweden 
are both civic and ethnic in their orientations; that is to say they value their communal 
membership because of both ethnic and civic orientations. Such a result suggests that 
under certain circumstances the Ressentiment between the two modalities of 
identification can be accommodated within a single polity, most particularly in 
Europe's Western hemisphere. 
The figure below demonstrates the nature of both ethnic and civic identification 
amongst a number of European and non-European states. It shows that there is a 
considerable spread in the nature of communal orientations ranging from communities 
based firmly in ethnic conceptions of community such as those in Europe's East, to 
ones more civic in orientation, not coincidentally territorially located in Europe's 
West. Importantly it demonstrates the concurrent existence of states in which 
communal identification is both civic and ethnic in nature. 
65 
For an operationalisation of the typology of identity utilising 1SSP data, see Ibid., 6. 
dr. 
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Figure 2.1 Ethnic and Civic Orientations Amongst Europeans 
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Source: Pakulski, J. & Tranter, B. 'How Nationalistic Are Australians?' Unpublished Paper. School of 
Sociology and Social Work, University of Tasmania 1999 
The figure demonstrates two significant points. Firstly, Western Europeans are 
comparatively more civic in their orientations when compared to those  in the east. 
Secondly, the data supports our argument that ethnic and civic identification may 
exist conterminously. The data establishes that this is the case in Italy, Ireland, Spain 
and (West) Germany. It would appear that notwithstanding Greenfeld's thesis, that 
the two forms of identification are antagonistic, we suggest that in certain 
circumstances ethnic and civic identification are found to exist conterminously. The 
basis of such coexistence is, as we shal demonstrate in this work, based on the 
institutional creation of an environment where pre-existent identities are protected, 
made secure and maintained by the polity.6 
Even the most cursory survey of the main contributions to social and political theory 
confirm our argument on the relationship between ethnic and civic forms of 
6 	i It sworth noting again the significance of this argument. European identity, notwithstanding 
the shared cultural and historical basis, does not constitute an 'ethnic' community or in itself alow for 
the articulation of a communal sense of belonging on ethnic grounds, thus a civic form of association 
must emerge to unite Europeans, however given the enduring nature of pre-existing ethnic  forms of 
community and belonging, such a form of pan-European civic association must accommodate rather 













identification. Nietzsche keenly observed that the civic virtues of the Enlightenment 
had killed the (ethnic) Christian God. The result of this process was an agonised 
atheism, in which man searched for a new set of moral imperatives to avoid the 
intolerable consequences of such rootlessness, which for Nietzsche derived from what 
we might describe as a rational civic religion. 67 Rousseau considered that the end of 
Christian society necessitated the development of a civic religion; some form of 
communal association that synthesises peoples without reference to what had been the 
unifying factor of Christianity. 68 Such a view was taken up by de Tocqueville. 69 
Notwithstanding the tension between the two modualites of communal identification, 
without some reference to the traditions, customs and relationships that underpinned 
(ethnic) communities, civic society becomes incapable of sustaining community, as 
societal bonds are brittle and vulnerable to the unresolved longing for (ethnic) 
community amongst its members." 
Considering contributions by contemporary theorists we find that notions of 
exclusively civic or ethnic forms of identification are elusive; that it is not possible to 
entirely discount ones influence on the other. 7I In the context of powerful, persuasive, 
yet highly stylised and 'imagined' ethnic identities in Europe, what scope is there for 
the evocation of a unifying civic identity? As Auer has observed, Habermas seeks to 
overcome: 'the ghosts of the past' by replacing conceptions of ethnically defined 
nation and national identity with a cosmopolitan notion of a Verfassungspatriotismus 
(constitutional patriotism) based on shared principles of justice and democracy. 72 
67 
See Nietzsche, F. Beyond Good and Evil. (New York: Canton House 1952) 
68 
See Rousseau, J.J. Basic Political Writings. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers 1987) 
69 
de Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America (New York: The Modern Library 1981). 
70 
Perhaps the best example of the failure of civic communities accommodating ethnic forms of 
community were the states of the former eastern bloc, where the absence of substantive rights or 
security for ethnic forms of association contributed to the brittleness and weakness of those civic 
regimes. 
71 
For a closer reading of these matters see: Auer, S. Two Types of Nationalism in Europe? 
Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia. Unpublished research paper 1998. 
72 Ibid. 
63 
Dahrendorf rejects Habermas' concept of constitutional patriotism as unrealistic. 
Rather, he looks to arrangements that would accommodate the needs of the majority 
of people in the world who cannot live without an ethnicaly derived national identity, 
with the requirements of a modern and open society. Dahrendorf suggests the creation 
of a heterogenous nation state - as opposed to a homogenous state built on the idea of 
an ethnic nation - which is liberal and open for people of other etImicities.73 Tamir 
raised more serious objections to contract theories of nation-building that have 
national values hidden in their liberal agenda.74 According to Tamir if the liberal state 
were a truly voluntary project based on contract in which citizenship was idealy 
based on shared principles of justice and democracy, then two problems would arise. 
Firstly al those who comply with the criteria of constitutional patriotism should 
become citizens - clearly not a practical option for most states. Secondly, the 
implications of the civic model is that those who 'opt out' by questioning the value of 
justice and democracy should be stripped of their citizenship - which does not 
correspond to a general concept of justice.75 Further, a civic form of identity cannot 
escape the exclusionary and discriminatory aspects of al identities; as we established 
in Chapter One, identity, no mater what its objectification, involves some form of in-
group favouritism and out-group discrimination, so too in a civic form of 
identification, Tamir suggests: 
"Contrary to widespread perceptions, national communities might, in some 
respects, be more open and pluralistic than communities in which social bonds 
rely on a set of shared values. . . . But in a society where social cohesion is 
based on national, cultural and historical criteria, holding nonconformist views 
does not necessarily lead to exconununication."76 
An example of such a process of civic discrimination is the United States, where 
Communists were marginalised not because they differed in ethnolinguistic terms but 
because they were perceived as not sharing the political values of the state. Likewise 
73 Dahrendorf, R. 1993. "Citizenship: A New Agenda For Change", Sociologia-del-Dirito. 20, 
no.1: 7-18. 
74 Auer, S. Two Types of Nationalism in Europe?. P.2 
75 	 . 
76 Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993), 90. 
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Germany's institutional intolerance for elements of the extreme right, which 
conceives German identity on fundamentaly diferent grounds. 
Today, as in the past, some form of ethnic national identity is required to support and 
sustain the structures and institutions of a civil society within a civic state. Further not 
only states in which civic virtues form the basis of association, most people cannot, or 
do not want to discard or marginalise their sense of belonging to the nation on ethnic 
grounds, whether such belonging is imagined or otherwise. As Tamir suggests: 
"Features characteristic of a nation - language, history, culture religion, 
geography - are amongst the most substantive components of individual 
identity."7 
Hence Hampshire is corect to observe that: 
"in the last analysis, a sane nationalism is to be justified by a utilitarian 
argument - that most men and women are happy only when their way of life 
prolongs customs and habits which are familiar to them."78 
Thus even in the context of a civic state, one in which atachments are rooted in 
participative democracy and civic engagement and the evocation and protection of 
individual and colective rights, some concession must be made to the emotional, 
symbolic, yet central role of ethnic identifiers. Such is the chalenge of the 
contemporary pan-European project, to champion an inclusive sense of belonging on 
civic grounds while alowing for the multi-dimensional and powerful evocation of 
pre-existing national ethnic identities, in a politicaly controled manner. The 
mechanism by which such accommodations may be achieved wil be considered in 
Chapter Three. 
2.6 	 A Counterpoint - The Impossibility of an Exclusively Ethnic Nation 
Without Civic Components. 
Just as there are limitations in atempting to portray any civic nation as exclusively so, 
without taking account of pre-existing and powerful ethnic signifiers, so too is it 
77  Tamir, Y. 'The Enigma of Nationalism' World Politics 47 (April 1995), 427. 
78 Hampshire, S. in Grey J. 1995, Isaah Berlin, (London: Harper Colins), 104. 
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implausible to suggest that an ethnic nation with ethnic identification can remain 
exclusively so without some form of civic concession. As Kymlicka suggests: 
"To assume that any culture is inherently iliberal, and incapable of reform, is 
ethnocentric and ahistorical. Moreover, the liberality of a culture is a mater of 
degree. Al cultures have iliberal strands, just as few cultures are entirely 
repressive of individual liberty. Indeed it is quite misleading to talk of 'liberal' 
and 'iliberal' cultures, as if the world was divided into completely liberal 
societies on the one hand, and completely iliberal ones on the other."79 
As Auer reminds us, al nations that pride themselves on being liberal today had 
iliberal pasts.8° Similarly as ethnic states have within them elements of a political 
culture which has at least rudimentary characteristics of open deliberation and popular 
participation, even if such deliberation and participation is heavily qualified by the 
ethnic considerations.81 Accordingly to talk of the differentiation between the two 
conceptions of national identity can only be made sensible if it is conceded that 
neither a civic nor an ethnic nation can be entirely removed from some elements of 
the other. Civic nations are reliant upon some form of ethnic signifiers, no mater how 
formed or manipulated by the state, to give the state legitimacy, credibility and 
continuance (in the form of a mythologised national history and memory). Similarly 
states which are rooted in ethnic forms of communal atraction, cannot be consistently 
or universaly intolerant or iliberal. Such an ethnic form of nation wil contain within 
it some mechanisms for popular participation and the maintenance of a form of a civic 
normative order and structure. 
2.7 	 A Civic Europe - The Resolution of the Civic and the Ethnic 
One of the earliest conceptualisations of Europe as a civic rather than an ethnic 
community was given by Voltaire, Writing in 1751 Voltaire described Europe as: 
"A kind of great republic divided into several states, some monarchical, the 
others mixed . . . but al corresponding with one another. They al have the 
same religious foundation, even if divided into several confessions. They al 
79 Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship., 94. 
80 Auer, S. 'Reflections on Nationalism and Minority Rights in Central Europe.', 12. 
81 Such as in contemporary Iran 
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have the same principle of public law and politics, unknown in other parts of 
the world."82 
We have argued in this Chapter that a civic model of community, insofar as it is 
considerate of preexisting and enduring forms of ethnic identification, offers the 
possibility for the emergence of a pan-European identity. The possibility of a 
resolution of the ethnic within the civic model of identity is best demonstrated by 
Tamir. 83 Tamir argues that the civic cannot ignore the ethnic, notwithstanding the 
unease between the two. Further she argues that: "the liberal tendency to overlook the 
value inherent in nationalism is mistaken." 84 Tamir explores the ways in which 
nationalism may in fact contribute to liberal thinking. Offering a polycentric model of 
liberal nationalism Tamir suggests that such a model, "respects the other and sees 
each nation as enriching a common civilisation".85 Unlike ethnocentric nationalism: 
"which sees one's own nation as superior to all others and seeks domination." 86 Such 
a concept of liberal nationalism is considerably more positive about the actual 
potential for a nationalism for a modern liberal democracy. 'Nationalism', Tamir 
argues: "is not the pathology of the modem age but an answer to its malaise - to the 
neurosis, alienation and meaninglessness characteristic of modem times."82 The 
proponents of liberalism and civic identity have more in common with some 
proponents of ethnonational forms of identification and community than might at first 
appear to be the case. Both liberal 'civic' nation-builders and ethno-nationalists 
concede the importance of seeing individuals in a social context, for without such a 
social context, the idea of a collective political identity is meaningless. Tamir suggests 
that: 
"the liberal tradition with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection and 
choice, and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty and 
82 
Voltaire, in Davies, N. Europe: A History., 7. 
83 
Tamir, Y. Liberal Nationalism. 
84 Ibid., 4. 
85 Ibid., 3. 
86  Tamir, Y. The Enigma of Nationalism World Politics., 430. 
87  Ibid., 432. 
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solidarity, although generaly seen as mutualy exclusive, can indeed 
accommodate each other."8 
2.8 	 A European Civic Identity with an Ethnic Sub-Text 
As this Chapter has demonstrated many theorists have argued Europeans derive a 
broad and abstract sense of communal identity rooted in 'ethnic' criteria - language, 
history, and common descent. However such a form of communal belonging is too 
abstracted to form a primary sense of community, and involves too many historical, 
linguistic and geographic 'fault lines' to withstand either rigorous scrutiny or to 
effectively unite Europeans in an enduring manner. It is important to conceptualise a 
form of European identity which is inclusive, common and open to al - on civic, 
liberal grounds, while meeting the emotional, and symbolic needs of Europeans. 
Ethnic identity answers both some urgent psychological needs of people and also 
fulfils some important political functions. Ethnic identity can lead to feelings of 
solidarity in a community and aleviate alienation of individuals in modem societies. 
Furthermore it gives people a sense of community by strengthening the perception of 
a society as a partnership between what Burke describes as: "those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born."89 While imagining themselves as 
a part of a larger community with a deeply symbolic past and a common future, 
individuals can transcend their own limits, and even their own mortality.90 In that 
88  Ibid., 432. An example of the close relationship between civic and ethnic conceptions of 
political community is found in the rise of civic identity in the Czech Republic, which is, in part, 
dependent upon ethnic signifiers of community. According to Holy, the Czechs pride themselves on 
being a 'democratic, wel-educated, and highly cultured nation' Such was their ethnic unity and 
openness to civic reform that it was a relatively straightforward process for their former Prime 
Minister, Vaclav Klaus, to utilise their ethnic national sympathies and unity to engender support for 
civic elements of national community. Klaus argued that support for democracy and a free market 
economy was a 'natural' way of life for any civilised nation. Notwithstanding the embracing of a 
liberal, civic form of state-building, there is litle to suggest that the Czechs have radicaly altered their 
self-definition of national identity on primarily cultural, 'ethnic' criteria. While, as Auer suggests, many 
Czechs stil believe that their national identity is, 'in one's blood' and thus are rooted firmly in an 
ethnic conception of nation; their embracing of democratic reforms and values of popular participation 
and accountability suggest that our understanding of the dichotomy of ethnic and civic bases of nation 
and national identity require some revision to be relevant in contemporary Europe. See: Holy, L. 1996 
The Litle Czech and the Great Czech Nation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 77 & 
Auer, S. 'Reflections on Nationalism and Minority Rights in Central Europe'., 12. 
89 Burke, E. Reflections on the Revolution in France. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1968), 195. 
90 See Anderson B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991) and Smith, A. National Identity (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1991) 160. 
68 
way membership in a nation promises individuals redemption from personal oblivion, 
a point made by both Tamir, and A.D. Smith.9I While such a common response 
evades strict conceptualisation amongst those who share in it, one should not dismiss 
their significant political impact; they shape, make and define communities, and give 
the ethnic nation a historic and moral dimension that civic forms of association find 
difficult to emulate. In such a context a polity, such as Europe, that unites on a civic 
basis, can only mobilize its population by what we cal identity liberalization — that is 
by not threatening pre-existing identities, but by providing a structural and policy 
framework in which its population derives a sense of colective belonging because of, 
rather than in spite of, the diversity of its secondary ethnic signifiers, and the tolerance 
that the political structures display towards such signifiers of community. 
The significance of the ethnic within a civic in Europe is wel ilustrated by the work 
of the European Values Systems Study Group and that of the European Commission. 
Within a civic community of Europeans the articulation and protection of ethnic 
identities provides one of the key binding elements that atach Europeans to each 
other and to the European polity. In its 1990 study Europeans were asked whether 
they felt that national identities (taken, in the context of the form of the question, as 
ethnic identities) would disappear or be enhanced in a united Europe. While 22% felt 
that a united Europe would probably mean the end of member states' national, 
historical and cultural identities, 50% of those Europeans surveyed felt that there was 
more chance of a united Europe protecting national identities than undermining them, 
as the table below outlines. 
	
Table 2.2 	 Atitudes Towards the EC by Country 1990  92 
There is much talk about what the individual member states of the European 
Community have in common and what makes each one distinct. Which opinion 
is closest to your own opinion, the first or the second? 
a) 	 Some people say: If the European member states were truly to be 
united, this would mean the end of their national, historical and 
91 Tamir, Y. The Enigma of Nationalism World Politics., 433. 
92 	 . This table, originating from the European Values Systems Study Group is cited in Ashford, S 
& Halman, L 'Changing atitudes in the European Community' in Rootes, C. & Davis, H. Social  
Change and Political Transformation., 83. 
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cultural identities. Their national economic interests would also be 
sacrificed. 
b) 	 Others say: Only a truly united Europe can protect its states' national, 
historical and cultural identities and their national economic interests 
from the chalenges of the superpowers. 
By Country — Percentage of those who agree that EC means the end of identities. 
Total G.B N.I Ireland West 
Germany 
Norway Belgium France Italy Spain 
22 33 31 28 25 22 17 19 12 17 
By Country —Percentage of those who agree that the EC protects identities. 
Total G.B N.I Ireland West 
Germany 
Norway Belgium France Italy Spain 
50 35 38 49 44 45 48 59 65 47 
By Country — Percentage of those who are unsure/don't know. 
Total G.B N.I Ireland West 
Germany 
Norway Belgium France Italy Spain 
28 32 31 23 31 33 35 22 23 36 
Note: 	 G.B — Great Britain; N.I — Northern Ireland 
Source: European Values System Study Group in cited in Ashford, S & Halman, L 'Changing 
atitudes in the European Community' in Rootes, C. & Davis, H. Social Change and Political 
Transformation.,  83. 
Notwithstanding regional variations, such as the views of the British towards Europe, 
the dominant view across Europe is that national and cultural identities are not 
threatened, but that they wil be maintained or enhanced, by membership of a united 
Europe. Such a Europe resonates amongst Europeans because of the maintenance of 
civic virtues of tolerance and diversity. 
Such results are replicated in the results of Eurobarometer surveys, conducted by the 
European Commission. The Editors of Eurobarometer 38 have found that a sizeable 
part of the European public is in favor of European integration in so far as Europe 
respects, protects and defends national and regional identities and where there are 
democratic channels of citizen influence. However Europeans reject a Europe in 
which National identity and cultural diversity is threatened; where citizens have 
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insufficient democratic influence and where their country and government has no say 
in European decision making. 93 
European beliefs as to the nature of collective identity are predicated on the 
institutional maintenance of pre-existing ethnic signifiers, within a tolerant, 
democratic, pan-European civic framework. As we shall more fully explore later in 
this work, European civic identity exists in the context of its protection of European 
ethnic identifications. 
The dangers of nation-building on ethnic grounds and its implicitly exclusionary and 
divisive elements cannot form a basis of a common European identity. A common 
identity for Europe based upon a common language, history or ethnic inheritance can 
only be sustained at the most general level. While political stabilisation, economic 
integration and the weaving of a robust social network may appear unrelated to the 
building of a European identity, we have already observed that 'ethnic' identity is 
often evoked as a result of the failure of such institutional measures to benefit all the 
members of a community. Further, the continuance of ethno-national identities in 
modernity were sustained and legitimised by an emergent 'civic' state apparatus 
wherein individual's citizenship status and the blend of a states' normative order acted 
to sustain particular ethnic identities, while suppressing or dissolving others. Thus 
consideration of European identity in the late modern period must accomodate the 
ongoing significance of the 'ethnic' role that institutions have in moulding the 
conditions for the success or otherwise of such identifiers, and the importance of 
structural and institutional progress to ensure that there is not a revival of the nation as 
a reflection of social anomie and rootlessness. 
Accordingly, the evocation of a European civic identity is possible to the extent that 
supranationalism in Europe can firstly maintain the ongoing significance of ethnic 
identities, such identities not easily dissipated. Secondly Europe must negate such 
identities and the implicit tension between it and pan-European civic identity by 
suppressing economic social and political marginalisation amongst its population and 
93 Eurobarometer 38, pp ix-x, in Taylor, P. The European Union in the 1990's. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1996), 158. 
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thirdly, ensure that individualism, tolerance and participation on the social and 
political settings are maximised. The mechanisms available to facilitate such a process 
will be more closely examined in Chapter Three. 
2.9 Chapter Two - Concluding Remarks 
Writing in 1771, Rousseau ambitiously announced: 
"There are no longer Frenchmen, Germans and Spaniards, or even English, but 
only Europeans." 94 
This assertion, reflecting a belief in the shift in European thinking from the 
ecclesiastical and particular to the secular and universal, stresses the commonality of 
Europeans and of Europe itself according to the emergent enlightened, rational and 
humanist collective focus. Europeans, according to Rousseau, were united as 
Europeans by virtue of their developing forms of secular polities and the promise of 
self-determination, rather than by their ecclesiastical or ethnic heritage. 
This Chapter has provided an analysis of the paradigms of collective identification, 
ethnic and civic. We have observed that Ethnic identification is characterised by close 
communal bonds rooted in common ethnolinguistic origins. By contrast, civic 
identification is more inclusive, originating in the adoption of the civic virtues of 
participation, tolerance and the enjoyment of state-mediated rights and 
responsibilities. We considered Greenfeld's arguments in support of her observations 
on the resistance between the differing conceptions of community. However, while 
agreeing with the bipolar nature of identity that Greenfeld proposes, we depart from 
Greenfeld's contribution. We argue that the manifestation of communal identification 
is in practice somewhat more subtle and complex than Greenfeld's contribution leads 
us to assume. We argued that ethnic and civic identities are not necessarily exclusive 
of each other and that they can co-exist, under certain institutionally mediated 
conditions, with each other. We demonstrated the enduring nature of both ethic and 
civic identity in contemporary Europe by reference to ISSP, Eurobarometer and 
EVSSG data. The formation of a European civic identity, tentative as it is, is 
94 
Rousseau, J.J. in Davies, N. Europe: A History., 8. 
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necessarily dependent upon the maintenance of the pre-existent ethnic and localised 
modalities of collective identification. 
We further considered the contributions of contemporary theories considering the 
divergent interpretations of Europe and Europeaness on both civic and ethnic groups, 
and attempted to illustrate that the two elements are substantially interrelated. We 
argued that European civic identity in the contemporary period will be in part 
dependent upon the appropriation of elements of European ethnic identifiers. The 
search for a pan-European identity, looking back across European historical 
experiences is, as we have established, problematic. What makes for European 
distinctiveness and belonging is more than a common history, or culture or cluster of 
linguistic groups or even its unique contribution to political thought, it is all of these 
and yet none of them when each is considered in isolation. The difficult task of 
drawing historical experience and contemporary trends together is only made 
plausible by the acknowledgment of the necessity of each individual component for 
the substantiation of that which is uniquely European. 'Europeaness' shares not only a 
substantial part of the civic signifiers of political pluralism, individualism, 
constitutionalism and citizenship, but is also informed by an often ill-defined 
conception of a common European cultural heritage and 'ethnic' signifiers of culture, 
religion and her defence against the 'other'. 
Prior to a detailed examination of the issues associated with the emergence of a 
supranational European civic identity, we need to consider the motive force behind 
the occurrence of supranational identities; the decline of the state and the evolution to 




States, Supranations and Identity 
3.1 	 Introductory Remarks 
"Transnational relations are not 'new', although. . . the growth of transnational 
organisation in the twentieth century has been spectacular. Yet, our contention 
is not only that the state-centric paradigm is inadequate . . . but also that it is 
becoming progressively more inadequate as changes in international relations 
take place." 
In the preceding Chapters this thesis considered identity in late modernity. The work 
has ilustrated identity's two-fold constelation: civic and ethnic. It is necessary, in the 
light of the recasting of political life since the end of the Second World War, to 
discuss the nature of supranationalism, and its effect on communal identity. This 
Chapter examines the mechanisms available to polities, both state-based and 
supranational, to engender positive identification towards them from their 
populations. This Chapter wil demonstrate, utilising the theoretical contributions of a 
number of theorists, including Max Weber, Marx and Durkheim, that the development 
of a homogenous and mutualy empathetic community, sharing a common 
identification within a supranational polity, is most readily achievable where civic 
rather than ethnic identifiers predominate. Such a common form of identification 
within a supranational polity is achievable only where sufficient political 
infrastructure is created to project and protect the rights and security of the 
population. We wil demonstrate that in order to engender a common form of 
identification, the dominant value structure erected in a multicultural and multiethnic 
supranational seting must be built upon mutuality, security and tolerance, embodied 
in civic values including rule of law, citizenship and the advancement of rights.2 
In short, we argue in this Chapter that just as the state, as a set of historicaly 
determined institutions within a given territory, specificaly contributed to the 
Keohane and Nye 1971 p.xxv in Archer, C. International Organisations. (London: George Alen 
& Unwin 1983), 97. 
2 We are largely informed by Kymlincka, W. Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of 
Minority Rights in the development of this argument. 
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emergence of an abstracted national community which only became possible, and 
necessary, in the context of the stretching of economic, political and social relations 
within the state, so too do supranational institutions require a community of sentiment 
to sustain and legitimise them. This necessitates the creation of the conditions 
contributing to the emergence of a common form of belonging amongst its citizen 
body.3 
3.2 	 A Definitional Clarification - States, Supranations and Suprastates 
Prior to an examination of the nature of the supranation, we are obliged to review its 
precursor; the state. Having established the principles of the state we wil then be in a 
position to determine the extent to which supranational entities differ in their 
structure, framework and breadth of responsibilities and powers, and most 
significantly in their ability to engender a common empathetic response. 
3.2.1 Defining the State 
Any atempt to synthesise a common definition of the state is highly problematic. 
Theorists select different characteristics of statehood and account for questions of 
nation and national identity differently. According to Hal, the state includes three 
elements. Firstly a state is a set of institutions which possess the means of coercion, 
through violence should it be necessary. Secondly these institutions control a 
geographicaly bounded territory, usualy referred to as a society. Thirdly the state 
3  This argument is most simply stated as such: 
i. that 'nations' national communities' and 'national identity' are a psychological 
exercise in communal cohesion; the development of a myth community; 
i. proto-nations may take an ancient form and may be configured around ethnolinguistic 
or civic atributes; 
ii. that while proto-nations may take an ancient form, the assertion and projection of a 
nation and its national identity is most often achieved through the mechanisms of the 
state; 
iv. that the institutional and policy basis and priorities of the state create the conditions 
for the emergence of a specific communal identification, such identification is 
directed to the functional interests of the state; and 
v. that there continues to exist a number of proto-national identities within the state, 
which given their relationship of Ressentiment to the other forms of identification 
have the potential to conflict with the predominant basis of communal identification. 
See Brubaker, R. Nations and Nationalism, Gelner, E. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the 
National Question in the New Europe. For an examination of the proto-nation see Hobsbawm, E. 
Industry and Empire., (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1980). 
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monopolises rule-making within its own territory. According to Hall this tends toward 
the creation of a common political culture by all citizens. 4 
For Max Weber, giving perhaps the definitive critique of statehood, the state is best 
understood in terms of progressive political centralisation within a single polity. He 
defines it as: 
[The modern state] possesses an administrative and legal order subject to 
change by legislation, to which the organised activities of the administrative 
staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are orientated. This system of 
orders claims binding authority, not only over members of the state, the 
citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very 
large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus 
a compulsory organisation with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use 
of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the 
state or prescribed by it . . . . The claim of the modern state to monopolise the 
use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and 
continuous operation. 5 
An institutional definition of statehood is furthered by Mann who defines the state 
according to the following elements: 
A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying: 
a. centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards 
from a centre to cover a; 
b. territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises; and 
c. a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by 
a monopoly of the means of physical violence. 6 
While authoritative and coercive factors are central elements in conceptualisations of 
the state, the significance of the state as the central actor and the rational arbiter of 
social action is equally significant. The state, according to Crook, is intimately linked 
4 Hall, J.1993 'State' in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the world. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1993), 878. 
5 Weber, M. 1978 , 54-6 in Pierson, C. The Modern State. (London: Routledge 1996), 7-8. 
6 Mann, M. 'The Autonomous Power of the State.' in Hall, J. (ed) States in History.  (Oxford: B. 
Blackwell 1989) 112. 
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with the process of modernisation and the rationalisation of social action. 7 Such 
modern rationality is linked to a variety of phenomena including the displacement of 
tradition as a basis for action and its replacement with action that is calculable and 
impersonal.8 The state transforms social relations in four principal areas - production, 
law, administration and ethics. 9 In areas of production the state is characterised by 
industrial capitalism and relationships based upon material grounds. The law within 
the state is: 
"characterised by an abstract formality and universality in which legal norms 
have no meaning . . . . but merely serve to solve disputes, protect property and 
enforce contracts." 10 
The maintenance of such elements is subject to impersonal and technically efficient 
administration, by a bureaucratic administrative staff. Ethics and normative 
considerations are discounted to the rationality and efficiency of technically efficient, 
impersonal decision making systems in which specialist knowledge and the 
instrumental needs of the state predominate over personal or traditional values." In 
such a context there is an incremental breakdown of local loyalties allowing for the 
emergence of conditions in which ethnocentrism and ethnic loyalty weaken 
significantly so as to allow for the emergence of nationalism and a collective (state-
sponsored) national identity. 12 
3.2.2 Defining The Supranation/Suprastate 
Supranations are generally both poorly defined and misunderstood, we should more 
properly refer to them as suprastates. Let us explain what we mean by this. The state 
is, as we have considered earlier in this Chapter, an institutional apparatus with 
7 
Crook, S. et al Postmodemization: Change in Advanced Society. (London: Sage 
Publications. 1993), 8. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 9. 
11 Ibid., 8-9. 
12 
See Kellas, J. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity., 163. 
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executive and coercive powers, such powers exercised over a defined territory. By 
contrast the nation is essentialy a colective spirit of belonging located within, and 
legitimated by, the state." Accordingly supranations are more accurately understood 
as `suprastates' — that is, they are an institutional and regulatory apparatus that 
transcend state boundaries, irrespective of the emotional commitment populations 
may, or may not, have to them. Whereas we suggest the supranation, as with the 
nation, is the occurrence of a colective, positive, subjective perceptions of belonging 
to a society that transcends state boundaries and which unite peoples, albeit 
emotionaly, across different states. However, for the sake of convention, we shal 
discuss the suprastate, according to its common term, supranation. Accordingly we 
adopt Magalhaes' understanding of the supranation as: 
"Supranational government institutions are organisations on nation-states 
characterised by possessing some degree of authority over those states. They 
typicaly are formed to promote colective security, advance economic 
interests or handle regulatory maters."14 
3.3 	 Supranationalism - An Overview 
The first modern international government organisation (IGO), the precursor for 
supranational organisations, was established in 1815; the Central Commission for the 
Navigation of the Rhine. Complex supranational organisations are primarily a 
twentieth century phenomenon. Before the First World War there were fifty IGO's, 
and eighty by 1940. In the decades folowing the end of the Second World War, at a 
time when complete and emphatic focus on the destructive limitations of sovereign 
statehood occurred in the international community, the growth of international 
organisations expanded rapidly. By the 1990's there were approximately three 
hundred IGO's that have given effect to the articulation of a complex network of 
overlapping memberships. Concurrent with the numerical growth of such 
13 As we stated in Chapter Two we are adopting the theoretical position most recently articulated 
by Brubaker that the institutional apparatus of the state is the motive force behind the occurrence of a 
colective communal sense of identification. We argue in this Chapter that such a phenomenon of 
'states making nations'; is equaly applicable at the supranational level. 
14 Magalhaes, E. `Supranational Government Institutions' in International Encyclopedia of 
Government and Politics., vol. I, 1323-1327, 1323. 
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organisations, the scope and power of such IGO's has dramatically increased, as has 
their supranational ability to make binding decisions on their member states. I5 
As Archer suggests, the rationale for the existence of international and supranational 
organisations can be found by considering events prior to their emergence. The 
emergence of the system of European states that resulted in the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648, divided a notionally united Christian Europe and necessitated the 
introduction of mechanisms at the trans-national level for the making and regulation 
of voluntary agreements between sovereign states. I6 However, as Claude suggests, it 
was not until the Nineteenth century that four necessary preconditions for 
supranational organisations came about. Firstly the existence of a number of states 
functioning as independent political units, secondly a substantial measure of contact 
between these subdivided units, an awareness of problems that arise from states' co-
existence; and their recognition of the need for the creation of institutional devices 
and methods for regulating their relations with each other. Only the first of these 
qualities manifestly existed before the Nineteenth century. 17 
The scope and stature of supranational organisations in late modernity is diverse. 
While we can consider organisations such as the United Nations, the Organisation of 
African Unity, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, few 
international organisations can be properly described as supranational. Most 
international organisations are more accurately described as transnational in character 
and effect, yet whilst membership transcends state boundaries, sovereignty does not. 
In the case of many international organisations there is both a lack of institutional and 
judicial independence of the organisation, and an absence of coercive or judicial 
authority of the organisation over its member states. Accordingly international 
organisations can be evaluated in terms of the degree of supranational authority that 
they possess and the degree to which such organisations can obligate their members to 




Archer, C. 1983 International Organisations., 3. 
17 
Claude, I. 1964, in Archer, C. Ibid., 4. 
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There are several types of situations where cooperation and in some instances 
acceptance of supranational authority offers advantages for members. One of the most 
significant, for some members is the promotion of peace and security. Many 
supranational organisations have developed the primary goal of the prevention of 
regional or international conflict. The League of Nations, the United Nations and the 
Organisation of African Unity, for example, have all engaged in efforts to provide 
collective security. The role of the United Nations in the ongoing Gulf crisis is an 
unambiguous example of where a supranational institution has intervened 
diplomatically to manage conflict, has imposed economic and other sanctions on Iraq, 
which all members of the United Nations are (morally) obliged to follow. I8 
Economic cooperation, has proved no less important a rationale for the increased 
occurrence and significance of supranational institutions. The years following the end 
of the Second World War have seen an increasing realisation of the impotence of 
individual states to manage their economic affairs independently of the affairs of other 
states, and the significance of international trade and capital flows on sovereign, 
national economies. The Bretton-Woods agreement of 1944 was the pre-cursor to 
international management of economic matters and the establishment of supranational 
organisations in order to achieve such management. The lowering of tariffs and the 
regulation of international trade, while clearly serving the interests of some individual 
states has only been achieved by institutionalised international cooperation, such as 
the case in the negotiations associated with the World Trade Organisation. 
Importantly, cooperation and international agreement in the case of economic affairs 
has had the effect, in a number of instances, of pushing back the boundaries of state 
authority and independence in non-economic domains. Such a process, best known as 
the `spillover' 19 effect leads to greater political integration in order to maximise 
18 For an evaluation of the role of the United Nations in managing conflict see Heininger, J. 
Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 
Press 1994); Hill, S. & Malik, S. Peacekeeping and the United Nations. (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1996) 
and United Nations. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping. (New York: 
United Nations, Department of Public Information. 1985). 
19 Urwin defines 'spillover' as: 
"A term used.... to describe how sectoral integration lead to economic and political union in 
Europe. Functional spillover described how, as more economic sectors became integrated, they 
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economic growth and with increased economic cooperation, increasingly non-
economic, social and political alignment takes place. 
Thus we can see that supranationalism is the process by which transnational 
governing institutions are created by common agreement of two or more sovereign 
states, and where such institutions have legal autonomy and authority over the states 
that have formed it. A supranational government can take decisions that are legaly 
binding on its constituent member states whether the individual states approve of the 
decision or not. It is this judicial autonomy and authority, and the legal obligation to 
comply otherwise face legal sanctions, that ultimately defines supranational 
organisations from intergovernmental ones. Accordingly supranational polities 
develop their own international stature and presence as they go beyond being an 
organisation of or between states, and become a new political entity that supersedes 
individual state members.2° 
3.4 	 The Rise to Supranationalism - Transnational Interdependence and the 
Decline of the Modern State 
As we noted in Chapter One, there has been a heightened focus on international and 
transnational cooperation between states in the post war period more than at any other 
period. The increasing depth and breadth of international interdependence poses a 
direct threat to the realist position of state sovereignty and state autonomy. The realist 
presupposes that states are conditioned by their need to survive in an essentialy 
anarchic global system. Such rulelessness necessitates that the state competes openly 
and often violently with other states in order to realise its ends. Thus an essential 
feature of the traditional realist conception of the state is its geo-political sovereignty 
would afect and place pressure upon the remaining sectors. Political spilover refered to the 
belief that the benefits derived from integrated sectors would lead interest groups and other 
organisations to look to the supranational level for the realization of their demands" 
See: Urwin, D. A Dictionary of European History and Politics 1994-1995. (London: Longman 
1996), 375 
20 Magalhaes, 'Supranational Government Institutions' in International Encyclopedia of 
Government and Politics. vol. I., 1323. 
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and the maintenance of strong externally focused coercive forces. 21 By contrast, the 
liberal-pluralist position is far more relevant to the state in a global perspective in the 
late twentieth century. The central feature of states is their interdependence. States 
and societies have become enmeshed in a whole network of relationships - (economic, 
political, social and cultural) which tend to promote forms of stable international 
cooperation. Rather than states being cast in the realist mould of belligerent 
adversaries, states are best characterised as existing within a logic of what Keohane 
and Nye refer to as; "complex interdependence".22 Such a process of interdependence 
has been made possible and facilitated by the growth of institutional arrangements 
which have allowed for much greater international cooperation than the realist 
conception of the sovereign state has traditionally allowed for. 23 The contemporary 
logic of interdependence, institutionalisation, the development of international 
regimes in which relations between states are managed, and the emergence of 
transnational regional alliances in areas of trade, security and economic policy (such 
as the European Union) argues persuasively against the traditional realist model of the 
self-contained, sovereign state. 24 The rise of the European Communities can be seen 
then as a regional response to the failing powers of the state. 
The role of the unilateral exercise of force as a defining characteristic of state 
sovereignty, has dramatically declined in the contemporary period. While the ability 
21 
Such a conception of the realist position can be described as the 'billiard ball' view of 
international relations in which a number of more or less self-contained and self-sufficient units crash 
into each other with more or less violent results. 
22 
Quoted in Pierson, C. The Modern State., 172. 
23 According to Keohane: 
"International Politics . . . is institutionalized. That is, much behaviour is recognised by 
participants as reflecting established rules norms and conventions. . . .Such matters as 
diplomatic recognition, extraterritoriality, and the construction of agenda as form unilateral 
organisations are all governed by formal or informal understandings; correctly interpreting 
diplomatic notes, the expulsion of an ambassador, or the movement of military force in a 
limited war all require an appreciation of the conventions that relate to these activities." 
Keohane, 1989, 1. quoted in Pierson. C. The Modern State., 173. 
24 The literature on the nature of the state in late modernity is extensive. See Hoffmann, S. 
'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe' Daedalus Vol 
95 No.3 Summer 1966, 862-915 and Spence E. 'Entering the Future backwards: Some Reflections on 
the Current International Scene'. Review of International Studies (1994), 20, 3-13. 
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to maximise military security and the monopoly of such forces was seen as a clear 
defining characteristic of the traditional state, the revised global order has largely 
diminished the role of military security as a reason of state. While the physical 
security of a state remains a fundamental concern it is not to the exclusion of other 
concerns, as Keohane and Nye argue: 
"The agenda of interstate relationships consist of multiple uses that are not 
arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among 
issues means, amongst other things, that military security does not consistently 
dominate the agenda." 25 
While the uncertainty of the international order means that the military option may 
rapidly become salient, military forces in the context of an international system of 
complex interdependence occupy a quite 'minor role'. 26 Thus the key characteristic of 
military force in the elaboration of a conception of the state in late modernity is that 
the achievement of state-centred goals are better achieved from a 'zone of complex 
interdependence' in which: 
"Power is an important element in relationships . . . but this power does not 
derive from the use or threat of force towards one another." 27 
Even in those circumstances where the projection of coercive power is considered 
necessary, the unilateral projection of such power is increasingly unlikely, as Helmut 
Schmidt, the former West German Chancellor argued: 
"The nature and magnitude of problems likely to confront us will prove too 
much for any individual state."2 ' 
The complexity of interrelated factors makes it difficult to quantify the scale of the 
changes to the state or to gauge with any accuracy the degree to which the forces of 
globalisation 29 are subverting the economic, security, social and economic power of 
25 
Keohane and Nye 1977, 25 quoted in Pierson, The Modern State., 176. 
26 . Pierson, The Modern State., 176. 
27 Keohane 1989, 9 in Pierson, The Modern State., 176. 
28 
Schmit, H. 1999 'The Transatlantic Alliance in the 21' Century' in NATO Review 50 th  
Anniversary Commemorative Edition Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press. 
29 We adopt the definition of globalisation suggested by Rhodes, who defines globalisation as: 
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individual states. However there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the traditional 
conception of statehood is representative of modernity rather than late modernity. In 
such a context, trans-nationalism and globalisation have both profoundly altered the 
parameters of state action and, more significantly in the context of our argument, 
undermined traditional models of statehood and state-mediated identity. The practical 
limitations of the state in the late modern period are readily apparent. The role of the 
state as an authoritative, independent, policy making system, as an economic manager 
and its role as a repository, creator and mediator of societal interests and identities and 
the state as a provider of collective economic social goods are under serious critical 
review. 30 States have found it difficult to both provide authority, and public goods and 
as a result is becoming less salient as a central repository for loyalties and 
commitments. The 'over-burdened state' 3I called upon to live up to increasing societal 
demands is rapidly becoming impotent. 32 The consequences of all such notions are 
unclear. What is significant is that the nature and logic of the traditional state is 
rapidly altering and the rise of supranational polities is directly attributable to the 
decline in the state's competence and credibility. 
"the subsuming and rearticulation of individual national economies within a global system by 
international processes and transactions." 
see Rhodes, M. 1995 'Subversive Liberalism: Market integration, Globalization and the European 
Welfare State' Journal of European Public Policy. vol.2 no.3 1995, 384-406, 396. 
30 As suggested earlier the literature on this is broad, see, Held, D. and Mcgrew, A. 1993 
Globalisation and the Liberal Democratic State, Government and Opposition, 28, 2, 261-285. 
Camilleri, J & Falk, J. 1992 The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting 
World., (Aldershot) Edward Elgar and Kofman, E. & Youngs, G. Globalization: Theory and Practice. 
(London: Pinter 1996) 
31 
Rockman, B. 'Minding The State - Or a State of Mind' Comparative Political Studies., 40. 
32 A variety of factors are suggestive of globalization's negative effect on individual states' 
policy making autonomy, most especially in economic and defence matters. Of the 100 largest 
economies in the world 51 are corporations. Ford Motor Company has larger sales revenue than the 
South African State. General Motors is economically more significant than Denmark. Military 
unilateralism is the exception rather than the norm. The NATO action against the former Yugoslavia in 
March 1999 and the Gulf War of 1991 illustrating the coordination of coercive force, once the clearest 
defining feature of statehood. (Global Corporate Power Statistics: Royal Australian Navy Reserve 
News February 1999, 10.) 
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3.5 	 Supranationalism and Identity I 
The decline of the states' authority has not been without effect on communal 
identification. 
A central consequence of the decline of the state's competence and the rise of 
supranational institutions, is the replacement of the state by the supranation, to the 
position as described by Yergin and Stanislaw as 'The Commanding Heights'.3 That 
is to say premier control and authority over political, social and economic 
management, has been a fundamental questioning of the basis and nature of 
communal identification in late modernity. 
The structural impetus to build dynamic and efficient supranational institutions has 
yet to adequately address the issue of identity. The desire for material progress, rising 
standards of living, and increased international competitiveness that are core drivers 
of supranationalism, are yet to reconcile themselves with the (increasing) desire for 
the expression of primary group identities - religious, linguistic or cultural - which as 
we have already considered, provide a distinctive basis for a community's sense of 
identity. Accordingly, as Geertz points out, there has developed; "two powerful, 
thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actualy opposed motives" in 
contemporary sociopolitical life. Firstly, the desire for increasing institutional and 
structural efficiency via transnational integration. Secondly, the need for individuals 
to express distinctiveness and localised identities.34 The manifestation of increasingly 
larger polities has yet to adequately account for the normative basis of pre-existing 
'national' societies and the central importance that such traditions, rules and practices 
have in efecting identity and identification. 
In the period folowing the end of the Second World War there has been a rapid 
increase in the political manifestation of international political organisations and 
33 Yergin, D. & Stanislaw, J. The Commanding Heights: The Batle Between Government and 
the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World. (New York: Simon & Schuster 1998.) 
34 Geertz, C. Ed. Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. 
(London: Colier-Macmilan), 108 in Cameron, D. (ed) Regionalism and Supranationalism. (London: 
Policy Studies Institute 1981), 3. 
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supranationalism. At the same time, as Watts suggests, there has been a strong trend 
in the appeal of smaller-scale, more ethnically-based communities and the identities 
that flow from them. 35 During the last fifty years the logic of international political 
and economic alignment has seen the establishment of supranational associations and 
organisations such as the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and the World Trade Organisation. Such organisations 
are considered necessary for the efficient management of trans-national issues. During 
the same period there has been a rapid increase in the number of 'mini-states' 
according to Duchachek: 
66
. . . whose viability is rightly in doubt but their appearance gives evidence of 
the strength of the desires, particularly in former colonial areas to go it 
alone."36 
Notwithstanding the logic of international political integration, there has been a 
heightened resistance to such forces from amongst named populations. The demand 
for self-expression, identity and self-determination has been revealed in regional 
groups asserting difference most commonly on ethnic grounds. Differences of 
language, race, religion, social structure and cultural tradition have driven the politics 
of identity in areas as diverse as Canada, Nigeria, Afghanistan and most recently in 
Yugoslavia. 37 
The (re)discovery of more local affinities and identities at the sub-national and 
regional level, in the context of a declining state competence has implications for the 
ongoing viability of state-sponsored 'national' identities. There are numerous 
indications of a disjuncture between the state and the (state mediated) civil society. 
Whereas in modernity old loyalties were overtaken by civic affiliations and social 
obligations were codified as legal codes, in late modernity confidence in state- 
35  Ibid., 4. 
36 
Duchachek, I. 1970 'Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics'. New 
York: Holt. 
37 
On the Canadian experience, see Cameron, D. (Ed.) Regionalism and Supranationalism : 
Challenges and alternatives to the nation-state in Canada and Europe. (Montreal, Quebec: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1981.)7 
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sponsored power and social arrangements have, according to Keane, plummeted. 38 
The consequences of such a disjunction are clearly disadvantageous to the articulation 
of communal identification. 
As states engage in increasingly complex activities and face international coordination 
and integration, the state increasingly loses control over a range of social groups, 
including groups calling for local autonomy and local identification. 39 Such a process 
is observable in cases such as the devolution debate in the United Kingdom, the 
Northern League in Italy and the Basque movement in Spain. Such instances not only 
reinforce the perceived impotence of the state, but also further challenge its 
legitimacy, not only in practical terms but also in its symbolic role as the vessel of a 
national community. The rise of anti-state movements then, are not simply political 
movements calling for localised political control, but are more a highly symbolic 
claim for self-identity along often ethnically-inspired lines. ° 
The weakening of states' capacity to exercise executive power is having 
consequences on the confidence that it enjoys from its 'national' populations who are 
increasingly looking to other domains for meaningful associations and identities, such 
as sub-national and transnational movements. DiMuccio and Rosenau consider these 
'loyalty shifts' as a multi-directional phenomena - comprising of 'inward shifts' - 
where loyalties are redirected toward sub-national groups and institutions, and 
'outward shifts' where loyalties are redirected toward supranational or transnational 
38 Keane, J. Civil Society and the State. (London: Verso 1988), 22. 
39 See Woods, D. 'The Crisis of Centre-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional  
Populism: The Lombard League. Comparative Politics January 1995. 
40 Thus the real threat to the existent state, is not that caused by a shift from practical sovereignty 
to supranational structures, but rather what Rose terms 'civic indifference' where the linkages between 
state and civil society become weakened. As Rose describes: 
"An indifferent citizen does not need to take up arms against a regime; he simply closes his 
eyes and ears to what it commands. The apathetic masses may sit out power struggles within 
government, and turn the victor's position into a hollow triumph by shutting out a new 
government behind a wall of indifference." See Rose, R. 1979 "Ungovernability: Is there fire 
Behind the Smoke?" Political Studies (27 September 1979), 368. 
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entities.4' This limitation of the state as a vessel of primary identification is further 
addressed by 'turbulence theory' which suggests multi-dimensional shifts in 
identification.42 Turbulence theory argues that as supranationalism and sub-groupism 
are occurring as a result of the global dynamic which has led to the decline of the 
state, that increasing global interdependence at a political level is occuring in paralel 
with increasing independence of identity determinants. Turbulence theory sees the 
simultaneity of integration and disintegration, fragmentation and aggregation, 
centralisation and decentralisation, not as a paradox but as an expectation.43 In the 
European context any analysis of identity and supranationalism has to be cognisant of 
the resultant split between Europhiles and Europhobes, the pro-European movement 
favouring Europe as a champion of material progress and European liberal 
multiculturalism, whereas the anti-Europeans, including the extreme nationalists, see 
supranationalism as failing to recognise the cultural diversity and identity at the 
national level. 
Internationalisation, then, has profound and potentialy complex effects on the way 
identity is manifested. Perceived threats to localised cultures, tradition and language - 
societal identity can, as Buzan suggests, have the effect of strengthening the local 
identities under threat. Even when supranational entities do not directly act to modify 
localised signifiers of distinctiveness, such as language or education, the resultant 
interplay of ideas and communication, which Deutsch has argued as being central to 
identity construction, can be enough to provide politicaly significant societal and 
cultural threats creating societal insecurities and a communal flight to primordial 
identities as a defence against supranational incursions." 
41 	 . DI Muccio, R. & Rosenau, J. 1992 'Turbulence and Sovereignty in World Politics: Explaining 
the relocation of legitimacy in the 1990's and Beyond' in Milnar, Z. (Ed) 1992 Globalization and 
Teritorial Identities. 
42 Rosenau 1990, in Milnar, Z. Globalism and Teritorial Identities., 4. 
43 	 . Milnar, Z. Globalization and Teritorial Identities., 4. 
44 For an argument on the importance of civic transactions and the formation of a communication 
community as a basis of colective identification see Deutsch, K. Nationalism and Social 
Communication (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1966) For a detailed analysis on the threats to societal 
integration by supranationalism see Waever, 0. et al 1993 Identity, Migration and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe and Rootes, C. & Davis, H. Social Change and Political Transformation (London: 
UCL Press, 1994). 
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In an environment of such disorientation the chalenge then, is for supranational 
entities to overcome the contradictory tendencies which are on one hand contributing 
to their institutionalisation and on the other are concurrently enhancing micro-
identification; a process giving rise to both political and market integration while 
significant numbers of communities react by looking inward. Such a 
globalization/internalisation dynamic is most noticeable, according to LarocheIle, by 
the manifestation of a sense of resistance to the threat of the leveling characteristics 
of supranations, described as; 'diversity reveal[ing] itself in a moment of unity'.45 
Supranational integration, new localism and the effect of political-economic 
integration on social identification are interrelated forces that evade narrow 
conceptualisation. The expanding range of cross-level linkages and interdependencies 
at a macro-institutional level are effecting modalities of atachment both in terms of 
causing inward regionalism and yet advances in communications and technology are 
alowing for the atainment of non-territorial atachment and relationships. Within 
such a context the necessity to form a supranational civic culture based upon the 
values of some form of liberal multi-cultural becomes a complex yet pressing issue. 
Let us now consider how such a process may occur. 
3.6 	 Supranationalism and Identity H: Attaching the people to the 
(supranational) Polis 
3.6.1 The Making of a Polity 
"Nationalism is not engendered by nations. It is produced - or beter it is 
induced - by political fields of particular kinds. Its dynamics are governed by 
the properties of political fields, not by the properties of colectivities."46 
45 	 . Mliner, Z. (ed) Globalization and Territorial Identities., 5. 
46 	 i It s important to note that the analysis of the process of communal identity formation has 
produced a multitude of studies and theoretical approaches. There are many differences in approaches 
and findings depending upon the author, the theoretical and methodological framework used and the 
data utilised. Notwithstanding such variation our analysis in this section is rooted in the 'nationalising 
states' thesis, as applied to polities at both the national and supranational level. That is, rather than 
colective political identity being an organic, natural and somehow preordained process, that such a 
phenomena is better understood as a political and cultural form institutionalised within and among 
polities, both states and supranations. See Brubaker, R. 1996 Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and 
the National Ouestion in the New Europe., 16-17. 
89 
In Chapter Two we reviewed the basis of civic and ethnic integration. In the case of 
ethnically-grounded community the ties that bind are those associated with a common 
ethnic and linguistic status, a common history, a set of traditions and symbols and the 
subjective consciousness built upon these ethnic and cultural signifiers. Civic 
integration, by contrast, is associated with the building of a common empathy founded 
in civic institutions wherein ethnic signifiers of identity and community, while 
important, are secondary to those of commonality rooted in participative citizenship, 
civil rights and rule of law. The process of political integration into supranational 
polities has, as was the case in the initial process of state formation in early modern 
Europe, had a direct effect on collective identification. 47 Such a process leads, in 
certain circumstances, to a paradoxical communal awareness of the material benefits 
of political integration with the concurrent call for increased self-sufficiency and for 
communal autonomy from increasingly larger political structures at the national and 
supranational leve1. 48 
In an environment where there is an apparent credibility gap between the deficiencies 
of states and the efficiencies of the supranation, polities are becoming increasingly 
reliant upon civic strategies to engender confidence in loyalty to the supranational 
polity from amongst its peoples. Such a process is necessarily reliant upon civic rather 
than ethnic qualities given the diverse ethnolinguistic qualities and origins of the 
peoples within the jurisdictions of the supranational polities. 49 
47 
For a good account of the effect of institutional development on communal idneitfication in 
early modern Europe see Strayer and Weiss, L. & Hobson, J. States and Economic Development: A 
Comparitive Historical Analysis., (Cambridge: Polity Press 1995). 
48 
We need only to look to the Scottish and the Welsh cases of devolution for examples of this 
process. 
49 
The diversity of ethnolinguistic communities within states is significant, and has required 
strategies of civic inclusion and participation so as to prevent the splinting of communal identification. 
As Connor points out in a survey carried out in 1971, in only 23.5 percent of the 132 states surveyed 
did the predominant ethnic group represent more than 50 percent of the population, and that in only 9.1 
percent of the states was there a direct correlation between the state's borders and the distribution of a 
singular ethnolinguistic group. Clearly the likelihood of an unadulterated ethnolinguistic basis of 
communal identification is even further removed at the European supranational level, than at the level 
of individual states. See Connor, W. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. (Princeton, NJ. 
Princeton University Press 19.), 96. 
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The role of the institutions of the state in fostering and moulding colective civic 
identity is wel documented. As few states can count on the spontaneous loyalty of 
their populations, state intervention in enhancing and directing civic communal 
empathy is a wel-observed phenomena. On one level we observe the contributions of 
Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) who sought to 'modernise' Turkish culture and identity 
along western, civic lines, declaring that: 
"The new Turkey has no relationship to the old. The Otoman government has 
passed into history. A new Turkey is now born."5° 
The distinctive civic nation in the United States of America came about by a direct 
and deliberate action by elites to create an inclusive and immediately cohesive 
community, irrespective of ethnolinguistic background. Such a process took a variety 
of forms from the more visible process of the mandatory daily flag salute and publicly 
sponsored civic education to the more banal process of the naming of counties and 
minor civil divisions after selected national heroes and notables. 51 
The key to civic identity is the ongoing loyalty of its citizens to each other and their 
communal confidence in and support for the institutions of the polity. Such elements 
are far less immediate or emotive than elements of ethnic identity. Given the more 
abstract nature of civic identification the structures and institutions of the civic nation 
must actively and constantly intervene in society, in ways as diverse as the daily 
reproduction of the structures of a democratic polity, to regular elections, to 
maintaining a civic form of identity. Such a set of processes are taking place in 
contemporary Europe and are resulting in the articulation of a colective identity. 
50 The Turkish example is perhaps one of the most significant cases of the manipulation of 
colective identity on civic grounds. Arangements to create a civic state were comprehensive and 
included the abolition of the caliphate; the disestablishment of the state religion and the dissolution of 
dervish orders and brotherhoods. Steps taken to modernise, which in this context also meant to 
westernise the state included the adoption of the Gregorian calender; the creation of a western style 
penal code and the purgation of Persian and Arabic influences from the language. See Robbins, K. 
1997 'Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe' in Hal, S. and du Guy (Eds) Questions of Cultural 
Identity.(London: Sage Publications 1997), 61-87. 
51 	 . Zehnsky, W. 1988 Nation into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American 
Nationalism (Chapel Hil: University of North Carolina Press 1988), 76. 
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Let us review the mechanisms open to polities in achieving colective identification 
from amongst their populations and a sense of individual and colective atachment to 
them. 
	
3.7 	 Polities Making Civic Nations - A Typology of Causal Factors 
It is not coincidental that the rise of the modern state and the state mediated nation 
and national identity was associated with the enhancement of economic rights, the 
enfranchisement of citizens, the uniformity of cultural mediums and the entrenchment 
of territorial security.52 Notwithstanding the diversity of particular national 
experiences and the diversity of theoretical approaches we argue that not only is the 
provision of security and rights central to the emergence of new polities from old, but 
that such reordering has a specific, definitive and positive efect on identity formation. 
We offer two macro-casual factors, security and rights, and develop from these eight 
specific mechanisms for the engendering of communal identity.53 
3.8 	 Identity and Security - The Development of an Integrated Security 
Domain 
State sovereignty is, within the modernist paradigm, inextricably linked to the 
maintenance of security, both internal and external, within a finite territory.54 The 
52 We agree with Rokkan & Urwin that the modern states' core competencies and its core motive 
power in effecting communal civic identification are derived from three factors; Economic System 
Building, including, firstly, increasing economic interdependence and fiscal integration. Secondly 
military-administrative System building, including the organisation of armies police and administrative 
agencies. Thirdly, cultural system building which includes religious, linguistic and ideological 
standardisation at the core but alows for the maintenance of distinctive identity amongst peripheral 
communities. See Rokkan, S. & Urwin, D. Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European 
Peripheries., 15. 
53 It should be noted that we are not offering an integrated theory of the process of nationalism 
and/or nation building. It is beyond the scope and practical ambitions of this work to do so. Rather in 
this section we review the key factors, as argued by major contributors to social and political theory, as 
to the mechanisms available and utilised by polities to engender a sense of belonging and community 
amongst their national members. While we have atempted to be as comprehensive as possible, it is 
clear that the results of this approach may be subject to some debate. Understanding the rise of 
communal identification, whether ethnic or civic, is a highly complex social phenomenon that can and 
has been studied from various angles. Theories of communal identification; of national identity reflect 
the ethnic/civic distinction that we have made. To atempt to list the main contributors, while 
interesting, would not add relevance to our argument. This analysis clearly highlights the main 
theoretical contributions to the process of nation building, and thus has direct applicability to the 
broader issue of the formation and development of European identity. 
92 
combination of increased military technology, the costs associated with it and the 
difficulties elites found with maintaining territorial cohesiveness over increasingly 
larger polities and peoples, contributed to the necessary emergence of the centralised, 
bureaucratic western state system. 55 Together these forces, as Tilly argues, required a 
more sophisticated political apparatus both to control coercive forces and to 
administer the increased taxation and revenue apparatus and demands made upon 
populations. Such a process in turn required a further consolidation of the territorial 
boundaries of the polity so as to create a compliant and contributive constituency. 
Further it created a physical then psychological division between those within, and 
those external to the polity — reinforcing collective identification. 56 As Bloom argues: 
"Studies of identity formation are back as a clue to questions of peace and 
war. Human collectivities such as nation-states forge their identities by 
offsetting the collective against other entities." 57 
The process of polity formation involves not only the refinements of security 
provisions but concurrently involves the creation of a communal 'security 
community' which shares in a common allegiance with its members and a common 
and equal bond to the security provider — the state. Accordingly functional 
convergence, enabling an enhanced physical security framework, contributes to a 
stronger sense of communal consciousness and identity as communities both ally 
themselves with the state as a consequence of the protective measures instituted by 
the state and further, by participating in the security of the state, populations more 
readily identify with it, with each other, and against the 'other', external to the 
54 The relationship between these two factors is, as we have earlier examined, explicitly stated in 
Weber's definition of statehood. 
55 For a clear analysis of the relationship between increased costs and sophistication of military 
technology on state formation in early modern Europe see Strayer, J. On the Medieval Origins of the  
Modern State. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1970; Tilly, C. Coercion Capital and 
European States AD 990-1992: A Comparative Historical Analysis and Weiss, L. & Hobson, J.  States 
and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis. For a review of the centralisation of 
state functions and the emergence of entrepreneurial markets see Schwartz, H. States versus Markets:  
History, Geography and the Development of the International Political Economy. (New York: St 
Martin Press 1994). 
56 See Kellas, J The Politics of Nationalism & Ethnicity.  164-165. 
57 Bloom, W. Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990). 
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security community. 58 The relationship between security and identity is not however 
limited to security's most obvious manifestation — physical security. It includes 
economic, social and ethno-cultural security. 59 
Physical security, while significant in conjoining a people to a polity is insufficient in 
itself to engender enduring loyalties and a common communal identity. Waever et al 
have suggested that a physical security centred analysis of communal identity 
formation is too limited, most especially in the context of the diminution of military 
security preoccupations in the late modern period. 69 Populations attach themselves to 
a polity in circumstances where insecurity, social, economic as well as physical, is 
minimised and neutralised by the polity. The breadth of such insecurities is broad. 
Ranging from territorial insecurity manifested in disputed boundaries, to 
ethnolinguistic insecurity demonstrated in subregional conflict to external economic 
insecurities such as the effects of globalisation on national economies and fears of 
immigration, as representing a threat to economic as well as ethnic stability, such as 
signifiers of ethnic identity - language and culture.61 Accordingly, the integration 
process of state and society to create a communal national identity occurs when the 
dynamics of economic, political and more generally 'societal' insecurity are managed 
and reduced effectively by the polity. 
Waever et al argue that the linkages between a polity and its population is enhanced, 
or diminished depending upon the relative strength or weakness of the 'societal 
security' that the polity is able to provide for its population. 62 According to this 
argument polities can act to provide for, or neglect, societal security not only in the 
military sector, but in the political, economic, and environmental sectors as well. 
58 
See Tilly, C. Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1992 (Cambridge: Blackwell 
Publishers 1992) and Norton, A. Reflections on Political Identity (Baltimore MD: The John Hopkins 
Press, 1988). 
59 
For a contemporary critique of the role of economic and social security in creating communities 
see Steketee, M. 'Social Insecurity' The Weekend Australian. (December 27-28 1997), 17. 
60 
Waever, 0., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M & Lemaitre, P. Identity, Migration and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe., ix. 




Citing the Yugoslavian crisis as an example of the impact of societal security on the 
creation and maintenance of communal identity Waever et al considers that the 
combination of a number of factors contributed to the disjuncture between polity and 
society. The decline in Yugoslav economic conditions in the last two decades created 
a high level of economic insecurity. Such an economic decline, considered in the 
context of ethnonational contradictions, and the disjuncture between territorial 
aspirations and geopolitical realities, created territorial insecurity and contributed to a 
rapid and very public disintegration of not only a common state, but more 
significantly the breakdown of a common identity. 63 The failure of military, economic 
and social security assisted in the emergence of an identity crisis, which contributed to 
a defence of the enduring signifiers of identity: ethnicity. Security and its effects on 
identity formation can be further broadened. Rhodes suggests the acceleration of 
societal convergence as a consequence of the enhancement of social security 
measures is a further means to enhance collective identification. 64 Not only does 
physical protection and the protection of cultural and linguistic groups assist in the 
formation of collective identification so too does the provision of social welfare. 
Accordingly the adoption of public policy designed to provide public charity a strong 
interventionist public sector, the elimination of poverty and public insurance in the 
form of health and welfare aids are central to creating an inclusive (civil) society. 
Such an enhancement of identity, through the provision and improvement of social 
protection is further accelerated where the social goals of economic redistribution, 
welfareism and full employment are no longer provided by the 'traditional' social 
service provider: the state.65 
63  Ibid., 93. 
64 
Rhodes, M. 1995 'Subversive Liberalism: Market Integration, Globalization and the European 
Welfare State.' Journal of European Public Policy. vol. 2. No.3. 
65 The threat to the articulation of a common identity is nowhere more prevalent than in 
contemporary Europe. As Hassner has observed: 
"the perception of a threat to national identity coming, on the one hand, from the 
cosmopolitanism and standardisation of mass culture and consumption (often seen as 
'Americanisation") and, on the other hand, the influx of immigrants, who for racial or 
religious reasons are often seen as alien or hostile. Individual, social and national insecurity, 
the preoccupation with law and order, jobs and the nation are thus combined into one complex 
syndrome in which external threat and internal doubts are hard to disentangle." 
Hassner P. 1991 'Culture and Society' , The International Spectator, Vol. 26: 1, 136-153, 151. 
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The range of possible security factors affecting a society are far more complex than 
the simple question of physical security. The spectrum of possible factors that may 
enhance or inhibit locating colective sentiment within a polity include the more overt 
factors such as physical and economic security, but further include factors such as 
security for cultural expression, linguistic freedoms and the guarantee of an inclusive 
liberal education. While the expression of economic and territorial security may be 
common to both ethnic and civic conceptions of polity, the methods and bias differ 
significantly. The stringent expression of the nexus between polity and society made 
by advocates of ethnic nationalism strongly delineates those cultural and linguistic 
groups which are to receive the security of the state, and those which are to be 
physicaly and symbolicaly excluded. Whereas civic notions of community, while 
institutionaly favouring particular vernaculars and cultures provide a far greater 
degree of certainty and security for minorities. Such security includes judicial 
elements such as legal protection, sympathetic public policy, the funding of minority 
cultural activities and symbolic support such as the recognition of minority cultural 
traditions and symbols.6 
3.9 	 Identity and Rights - The Development of an Integrated Rights Domain 
The development of political community and identity has taken two paths in the West. 
Firstly, state elites and institutions pursued policies aimed at reducing multiple 
incidences of ethnic difference within a single polity by physical elimination, 
expulsion or coercive modification.67 In such a manner the promotion of a common 
identity among polity members is ethnicaly based and is achieved by the alienation, 
coercion and modification or destruction of (ethnic) difference.68 The second path to 
the construction of a common identity amongst polity members is the civic model. As 
Kymlincka suggests primary loyalty to the polity and common association based on 
the principles of inclusion, equality and tolerance within a highly rationalised state 
apparatus is the basis of civic identity.69 The promotion of higher aspirations such as 
66 The support given by the United Kingdom to cultural and ethnic groups is evidence of the 
adoptive measures of civic states at including and providing security for minority groups. 
67 The actions of 'Ethnic Cleansing' in Yugoslavia is perhaps the most insidious and dramatic 
example of such a process. 
68 Such as in the case of Yugoslavia 
96 
rule of law, procedural equality and common citizenship is implicitly associated with 
the enjoyment of common civil rights and the acceptance of the free expression of 
cultural and linguistic difference in a manner consistent with societal ends. A critical 
element in both civic and ethnic models is thus the projection or denial of rights. In 
the case of ethnic identification, such a process involves the denial and removal of 
peripheral linguistic, cultural and ethnic rights so as to create a sovereign 'right' for 
the state-mediated ethnic identity. Whereas in a civic, multiethnic setting the 
articulation of minority rights is a key feature of social life and may enhance, rather 
than inhibit, collective identification. As Kymlincka argues: 
"The evidence is overwhelming that the members of liberal cultures do value 
their cultural membership. Far from displacing national identity, liberalization 
has in fact gone hand in hand with an increased sense of nationhood . . . .The 
same combination of liberalization and a strengthened national identity can be 
found in many other countries. For example, in Belgium, the liberalization of 
Flemish society has been accompanied by a sharp rise in nationalist 
sentiment."70 
While an ethnic conception of political community perceives weakness in cultural and 
ethnic pluralism, the civic conception of political community finds strength in the 
expression of cultural and ethnic diversity. Such cultural diversity is only made 
possible as a result of the active intervention of the state in the institutionalisation of 
multiple identities and protection of them within a private sphere of civil society. 
As suggested in a recent Jean Monnet Working Paper, the assertion of strong 
individual and collective rights provides a strong integrating force for communities. 71 
Free speech, assembly, association and cultural liberties are indispensable elements in 
the emergence of a civic identity where individuals can form voluntary associations, 
articulate particular interests and pursue their self-interested material, political and 
social goals individually or as members of voluntary associations. However the 
practice of participative citizenship is not sufficient to unite a political community 
within a common identity. Such an integrative process must extend beyond the 
69 Kymlincka, Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights., 88. 
70  
Ibid., 89. 
71 Harvard Law School, The Jean Monnet Chair 'Three Conceptions of a European Political 
Identity' http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/97/97-04-4.html.  
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recognition of formal civic and political rights to include the practice of, and 
protection for, social, economic, linguistic and cultural rights.72 
In the context of multiethnic polities, such as the European Union, Kymlincka 
suggests that there are three key strategies that can be employed to strengthen the 
relationship and communal identification between difering ethnolingistic groups. The 
three forms of group differentiated rights that may be instituted to ensure communal 
solidarity are: 
1. Self-Government Rights — The delegations of powers to national 
minorities, often through some form of federalism. 
2. Polyethnic Rights — financial support and legal protection for certain 
practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups; and 
3. Special Representation Rights — guaranteed rights for ethnic or 
national groups within the central institutions of the larger state. 73 
Kymlincka's argument is a simple one - rather than civic states, excluding diferences, 
it institutionalises ethnic difference by regulating the expression of it. Thus even 
within purely civic conceptions of community the special and enduring status of 
ethnolinguistic groups are not ignored.74 Kymlincka argues that it is within the scope 
of the liberal civic notion of community that the liberal commitment to freedom and 
personal autonomy is such as to ensure the continuance and protection of 
ethnolinguistic and minority cultural signifiers. Thus within a civic liberal conception 
of community, while being institutionaly 'blind' to ethnolinguistic and cultural 
signifiers, does by creating the conditions for a private civic society, and by creating 
obligations and sanctions within political society so as to ensure that ethnolinguistic 
minorities are granted rights.75 
72 Such a process being dependant upon active inclusive citizenship. 
73 Kymlincka, Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights., 7. 
74 
 
This 	. ipoint is consistent with our argument in Chapter Two of the inseparability of the ethnic 
and civic even within civic conceptions of communities. 
75 While Kymlincka's work focuses on the necessity of integrating ethnolinguistic communities 
into the civic state by ensuring they have meaningful rights, the relationship between the 
institutionalisation of rights and communal identity construction has been furthered by other theorists. 
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While the political institutionalisation of rights and security overlap in areas such as 
territorial security, economic policy and cultural policy it would be erroneous to 
conclude from this that the relationship between identity formation security and rights 
are mutualy compatible. We have observed that the construction of identity, most 
particularly in late modernity originates as much from the colective resistance to 
dominant institutions as it does from the positive influence of them. While social 
actors do internalise the norms, values and signifiers of political institutions and 
organisations and symbolicaly identify with the society and polity in which s/he is 
situated, the reverse is often the case. The construction of identity is assisted by the 
Janoski suggests that inclusiveness and identity in civic communities is rooted in a far broader scope of 
rights. Suggesting that societal rights act to extend the linkages between a polity and its peoples, it is 
suggested that there are four main forms of rights. They are: 
1. 	 Legal Rights: 
a. Access to courts and counsel; 
b. Equal treatment under the law; 
c. Freedom of speech, religion, association and privacy; 
d. Freedom from assault and unsafe environment; 
e. Choice of residence; 
f. Choice of occupation. 
2. 	 Political Rights: 
a. Rights to run and hold ofice; 
b. Rights to form and join a political party; 
c. Legislative and administrative consultation; 
d. Refugee rights; 
e. Minority rights to equal and fair treatment; 
f. Social movement and protest rights. 
3. 	 Social Rights: 
a. Health Services; 
b. Primary and Secondary Education; 
c. Vocational Training; 
d. Educational Assistance for Special Groups; 
e. Old Age Pensions; 
f. Unemployment compensation; 
4. 	 Participation Rights: 
a. Labor Information Programs; 
b. Job placement and creation Services; 
c. Job Security Rights; 
d. Afirmative Action; 
e. Colective Bargaining Rights; 
f. Regional investment and equalisation programs 
Just as the presence of rights have the efect of including members within a civic community, the 
absence of such rights are inherently exclusionary and directly and negatively efect the expression of a 
common sentiment of belonging and solidarity. The creation of a dense framework of rights within a 
polity, and the associated realocation of societal resources to foster such rights, has the efect of 
promoting strengthened group solidarity. See Janoski, T. Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework 
of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1998), 33. 
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development of security and rights domains functionally instituted by polities, which 
legitimates a regularised social identity and social action. However the political and 
social reorientations necessary for the provision of rights and security for societal 
members may have the effect either directly or indirectly of marginalising elements 
within the polity. In such circumstances CasteIls suggests a 'resistance identity' may 
emerge. Such an identity originates in those social actors that: 
are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatised by the logic of 
domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of 
principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of 
society." 76 
Such domination includes that of the prevailing security and rights within a polity 
which may promote and protect certain groups, their interests and identities to the 
detriment of other societal members. We can readily find examples of such a 
phenomenon. The construction of dominant linguistic rights, and its institutional 
security, may have the effect of ostracising linguistic minorities which then form a 
point of resistance and a counter-identity to that endorsed and supported by the 
polity. The promotion of economic rights for certain groups within a polity may lead 
to economic inequalities, contributing to the economical marginalisation of societal 
members who are effectively economically excluded and may likewise provide a 
counterpoint of resistance and identity. While the provision of collective rights and 
security may have the effect of promoting collective identification, the process may 
also have the effect of creating points of exclusion and resistance with a 
consequential articulation of counter-identities. 
Having considered the macro-influences affecting the dynamics of societal identity 
integration with a polity, consideration will be given to the specific mechanisms 
employed by the polity, state-based or supranational, in the manipulation of a 
communal identity. 
76 
Castells, M. 1997 The Power of identity. Malden, Massachusetts. (Blackwell Publishers), 8. 
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3.10 The Influence of Elites 
The central role of political, economic, religious and academic elites in both 
constructing a communal identity and influencing the growth of political institutions, 
political rights and a secure environment is readily apparent. In the initial stages of 
European modernity, 'national' consciousness was articulated by intellectuals and 
those who were intellectually trained such as clerics, well before the incremental 
consolidation of the linkage between state and nation occurred during the Nineteenth 
century. 77 Brass demonstrates the effectiveness of elites in developing either positive 
or negative perceptions of communal attachment and in the creation of perceptions of 
communal sameness and difference. 78 Llobera shows the role played by the French 
Monarchy, as early as the Middle Ages, in creating an idea of nation and through 
French language and culture portraying the idea of France as an imagined 
community. 79 
The recognition of the specific functions undertaken by elites in the creation of a 
communal identity, has been made by a number of theorists including: 
1. Howell demonstrates the role of elites in defining a homogenising 
ethnic and cultural policy;80 
2. Zelinski argues that elites play an important role in the formation of a 
communal conscious by their articulation of a common national or 
supranational, rather than local or regional, sentiment and their 
communication of it;8I 
77 See James, P. 1996 Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community.,45. 
78 Brass, P. Elite Groups, 'Symbol Manipulaition and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of 
South Asia' in Political Identity in South Asia Ed. Taylor, D. & Yapp, M. (London: Curzon Press 
1979), 35-43. 
79 See Llobera, L. The God of Modernity (Oxford: Berg Publishers 1994) 
80 See Howell D. Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modern Japanese State'. Past 
and Present: 1994, 142 February 69-93. 
81 See Zelinsky, W. Nation into State — The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American 
Nationalism. 
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3. Lawson demonstrates the role of elites in the formation and 
dissemination of a homogenous mythology and common communal 
memory, including denying the validity of oppositional challenges to 
such a mythology and memory; 82 
4. Harris and Desrues argue that elites, by virtue of their control of the 
security and military community from which elements of national or 
supranational memory, mythologisation and the consolidation of a 
national territory arise, actively influence the formation of a national 
community; 83 
5. Wilterdink examines the positive role in communal identity formation 
that elite leadership plays in the consolidation of national or 
supranational territory and the intertwining of national or supranational 
politics and economics within such a territory; 84 and 
6. Rokkan and Elias demonstrate the effect of elite control over the 
maintenance of the level of institutional differentiation, the level of the 
extraction of resources and the extent of institutional penetration into 
civil society and its effect on communal identity formation. 85 
The articulation of a national consciousness, even in those cases where there is a 
power struggle between existing state elites over the nature of the cultural and ethnic 
composition of the state, and the role of political and social interests within it has been 
shown, as in the case of state formation in Belgium in the Nineteenth century, to be a 
source of collective identity creation. 86 
3.11 The Consolidation of Territory 
As elucidated in Chapter Two, a central element of the state is its ultimate reducibility 
to its authoritative coercive power over a delimited territory. Unlike other forms of 
influence, the state's legitimate authoritative power stops at a defined territorial 
82 See Lawson, S. 'The Politics of Tradition: Problems for Political Legitimacy and Democracy in 
the South Pacific'. Pacific Studies: 1993, 16, 2, June 1-29. 
83 See Harris, M & Desrues, T. 'The Role of War and Violence in the Origins and Evolution of 
the State.' Revista-International-de-Sociologia 1992, 2, May-August, 11-39. 
84 See Wilterdink, N. 'State Formation from the Perspective of Figurational Sociology' 
Antropologische-Verkenningen: 1993, 12, 4, Winter, 59-71. 
85 See Rokkan S. & Elias, N. The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell 1982) 
86 See Delfosse, P. 'State Formation, Social Classes and Political Hegemony: The Belgian Case 
(1830-1914)' Recherches-Sociologigues: 1994, 25, 1, 1-32. 
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boundary. 87 The scope of the state likewise is limited to the articulation of a single 
state-endorsed national community within its territorial boundaries. 88 The 
construction of communal identity is intimately linked with the construction of a 
territorially bounded state and its physical security. It became apparent early in the 
formation of sovereign states, which were defined in part by their territoriality, that 
there was a necessary requirement to link a 'people' to the entity of the state. 
Theorists, including Jackson & Penrose and Preston, have demonstrated the effect of 
place on the evocation of communal identity resulting from a range of symbolic and 
cognitive responses from amongst a population to a territory. 89 While the nexus 
between territoriality and identity is generally uncontested, the means by which the 
institutions of a polity construct and define the nation, through the consolidation of 
territory, is less certain. Individual self-identity cannot be meaningfully projected 
across a state-based, or supranational territory. Such a territory can only be cognately 
appreciated. Thus the construction of the self, in the context of a state-based or 
supranational territory, is consequential upon the identification within a social 
collectivity; of membership of a national or supranational community. It is from 
membership of such a community that meaningful individual conception of place and 
identity can be achieved.9° 
The polity's consolidation of territory because of improvement in transportation and 
communication infrastructure engenders communal identity. The facilitation of 
individual mobility and communications, and the consolidation of a common 
education system allow for the transference of common symbols, norms and a 
common political culture within a given territory. As Mann suggests, improvements 
87 
With the exception of the projection of force by virtue of international agreement in the 
contemporary period, such as the circumstances in East Timor,in the southern hemisphere and Kosovo 
in the northern hemisphere. 
88 
Notwithstanding the fact that there may be a number of proto-national communities within its 
territory. 
89 
See Jackson, P. & Penrose, J. Constructions of Race, Place and Nation. (London: UCL Press 
Ltd 1993); Preston, P. Political/Cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era. (London: Sage 
Publications 1997). 
90 
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965), 117- 
118, see also Anderson B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. 
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in conditions for the transport of peoples and ideas across a given territory greatly 
accelerates the homogenisation of a national or supranational community.91 
3.12 Protection (both internal and external security) 
As suggested earlier in this Chapter, the ultimate utilisation of coercive power is both 
a defining element in the emergence and maintenance of the state and a technique by 
which the state is able to engender a sense of communal, national community. 
The maintenance of internal order has a varied efect of engendering positive feelings 
of belonging to the polity from its community. The control of internal societial 
economic and political activity, consistent with a uniform judicial system, both 
defines the individual's identity in terms of citizenship and as subjects sharing in the 
universalised law of the state, which alows for individual liberty. The creation of 
civil order, via the state's policing and judicial functions, acts to protect the majority 
from the arbitrary usurpations of socialy and economicaly powerful groups, other 
than those sanctioned by the state. One of the important means by which the state 
assists in the development of a positive cognitive bias towards itself from among its 
population on maters relating to internal security, is the protection the national 
members enjoy by virtue of the states protection of existing property relations from 
the mass of the "propertyless".92 
Both the protection of society from external threat, and external military aggression, 
in part, define and create a community and a communal identity.93 Both military 
defence and ofence requires the mobilisation of a community along national lines for 
its own self-protection or self-promotion. While defence may be generaly a colective 
91 See Mann, M. 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanism and Results' in 
Hal, J. (ed) States in History 117. 
92 	 . While Mann Op.Cit p.120 pursues this argument, it is from Weber and Marx that the nature of 
the relationship between property relations and community originates. See Weber, M. Economy and 
Society New York 1968 Vol 1 p.245. and Marx, K. Selected Works vol 2, 24. 
93 The efect of military action in creating a national sentiment is related by Jahn in the case of 
Germany: 
'Germany needs a war of her own. She needs a private war with France in order to achieve her 
nationality. Germany . . . needs a war against Frankdom to unfold herself in the fulness of 
her Nationhood' quoted in Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity., 370. 
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experience, requiring collective integrative and homogeneity in action and sacrifice; 
military action requires the state to co-opt the population by ideology, mythology and 
targeted information in order to act. The nation signifies its autonomy and declares its 
solidarity on the battlefield. The individual's self-conception is enhanced by the social 
commitment necessary for the defence of the nation. The external fight is internalised 
and insofar as the individual sees him/herself as assisting in the defence and/or 
liberation of the state from aggressors, the citizen becomes conscious of him/herself 
as a distinct national member. 94 The citizen finds fulfilment in the public work of 
national defence, and national mythology associated with military service and 
sacrifice grows as an expression of the solidarity of the national members, such as the 
Australian ANZACs in the Twentieth century and the Yeomen of England in 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries. Everyone could contribute, and often had no 
choice but to do so. 95 Both preparation for and the actual process of warfare often 
involves the nullification of other complex identities by the categorical simplicity of 
ascribed nationality, and a renewed national consciousness and national spirit often 
results from military struggle. 96 
The symbols and mythology of warfare, and the ideological rhetoric of the defence of 
the nation, are powerful elements in the creation of a communal identity and the 
linking of a people to the state. The tomb of the unknown soldier, the cry of, 
'remember Pearl Harbour' and the innumerable war memorials, sacred battlefields and 
94 Mead, G. Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1934), 67. 
95 Conscription is a key element in the political socialisation of a population into a national 
community. 
96 The relationship between military participation and the creation of national identity is acutely 
summed up by Slavenka Drakulic, in relation to the recent Balkan wars: 
"Being Croat has become my destiny. . . . I am defined by my nationality, and by it alone.. . . 
Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of nationhood - notionally by 
outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal Army but by national homogenisation within 
Croatia itself. That is what the war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: The Nation. 
The trouble with this nationhood, however, is that whereas before 1 was defined by my 
education, my jobs, my ideas, my character - and, yes, my nationality too - now I feel stripped 
of all that. I am nobody because I am not a person any more. I am one of 4.5 million Croats. . . 
. One doesn't have to succumb voluntarily to this ideology of the nation - one is sucked into it. 
So right now, in the new state of Croatia, no one is allowed not to be a Croat." 
Drakulic, S. The Balkan Express: Fragments From the Other Side of War. (New York: W.W. Norton 
1993), 50-52. 
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days of national remembrance and collective grief, all act to cement the individual to 
the national community. 97 
3.13 Economic Stimulation and Regulation 
A less destructive source of engendering a positive sense of belonging to a political 
community is improvements to people's economic circumstances. Economic 
vitalisation and the redistribution of financial resources can be equally facilitated by 
both state and supranational polities, and as Gellner suggests is a prime driver of the 
creation of national communities.98 
As Gellner argues communal identity is the product of differentiated industrialisation. 
Technological progress demands occupational mobility but such social fluidity 
requires a unified culture across increasingly complex occupational structure. Gellner, 
along with Bendix, argues that the economic imperatives of efficiency and mobility 
required collective 'intellectual mobilisation' which links peoples across time and 
space within a single 'national' group. 99 Confirming the role of an interventionist 
polity in the creation of a community of sentiment, Mann argues, the state forms a 
basis of economic and administrative cooperation which is capable of sustaining the 
character of a 'national' community. Mann suggests that the authoritative 
redistribution of scarce material resources between different groups within civil 
society has a strongly collective and homogenising effect within a given 
population. 10° While the redistribution may benefit particular societal groups, the 
effect of such economic redistribution has a collective societal building dimension. 
Insofar as there is an accepted mechanism for the state-sponsored redistribution of 
97 
For a detailed examination of the role of symbols in nation building see Lasswell, H. 'Nations 
and Classes: The Symbols of Identification' in Berelson, B. & Janowitz, M. (eds.) Reader in Public 
Opinion and Communication 2 nd Ed. (New York Free Press), 27-42 and Zelinsky, W. Nation into 
State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism., 13. 
98 
Gellner,  , E. Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: B. Blackwell 1983) 
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See Gellner Nations and Nationalism & Bendix, R. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate 
to Rule. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) & Koelble, T. 'Towards a Theory of 
Nationalism: Culture, Structure and Choice Analyses Revisited.' Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 
Vol.1, No.4, (Winter 1995), 73-89. 
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Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power., 121. 
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economic assets within a society, there exists a sense of collective responsibility and 
economic solidarity, which creates a national society, with a communal 
consciousness. 
Associated with the more general regulation of the economic life of the polity is the 
introduction of a set of national financial institutions which reinforces the communal 
recognition of national membership. 101 Included in this process is the establishment of 
a national bank and national financial regulatory institutions as well as a national 
currency, including coinage and bank notes. While a national currency allows for 
commodities to be exchanged under an ultimate value guaranteed by the state, it 
additionally acts as a symbol of the nation and ties individual everyday transactions 
with the mythology and history of the national or supranational community. 102 
The state's regulation of its international economic life has two further effects on 
communal identification. Firstly, consistent with the rational choice paradigm, the 
evocation of a communal sentiment is achieved when the benefits, including 
economic, of aligning oneself as a 'national' member, outweigh the costs. Frank's 
'commitment model' explains communal national sentiment as resulting from 
people's rational analysis of their economic circumstances and entering into national 
relationships and cooperation where the pay-off offsets the costs. In such a model 
material interests form the basis of national identity. 
The state's development of institutional uniformity and bureaucratic accountability 
were necessary conditions for the maintenance of effective state-based economic 
relationships which in turn allowed for the process of collective identification. 1°3 To 
the extent that the state normally regulates trade relations and currency exchanges 
across its boundaries it creates a heightened sense of the 'other', albeit in economic 
101 
A clear example of the positive effect of economic stimulation on the accentuation of 
communal identification is the experience of the United Kingdom during the late Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth century. See Hobsbawm, E. Industry and Empire., 249. 
102 
See Billig, M. Banal Nationalism (London: Sage 1995) 
io3 
See Davies, R. 'The English State and the 'Celtic' Peoples 1100-1400' Journal of Historical 
Sociology: 1993 6,1. March 1-14. 
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terms, between its national community and other communities. As we have earlier 
considered such a heightening of difference is an integral part of identity formation. 
3.14 Representation and Participation of Interests 
The transition to large scale polities, with new modalities of rule and power, involved, 
as Marx argues, a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the subject 
and the ruler. 104 Despite the emergent state becoming centralised, institutionalised and 
powerful it lacked any substantial avenues of popular legitimization. The outcome of 
the tension between increasing powers and claims upon communities and the rise of 
individualism and liberal political philosophy led to a variety of popular responses 
ranging from local disturbances to revolutions. 105 The revolutionary spirit revealed 
that states lacked any substantial means by which to take account of the disposition or 
aspirations of the community over which it had control. This exclusiveness had two 
effects. Firstly it distanced the state from the people. Secondly it made it extremely 
difficult for the state to claim legitimacy from the people. Compounding this, the 
absence of the recognition of communal or individual rights, made salient in the 
emergent philosophy of liberalism, made the relationship between the state and the 
community difficult to legitimately sustain. Such circumstances mitigated against the 
linkage of state to people and the building of a truly national community. Accordingly 
European history of the last two centuries involved the often violent negotiation of 
state power and popular legitimacy with the effect of the emergence of institutional 
mechanisms in which participation and representation affected the development of a 
national community. 106 
The more intrusive and costly polity formation became, the more rulers had to bargain 
with and win the support of their subjects. With the increased demands of the state, 
whether financial or physical, according to Giddens, came the dependence of rulers on 
104 The influence of economic systems on identity formation is most powerfully argued by Marx. 
See Marx, K. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (London 1964) and Marx, K. A Contribution to the  
Critique of Political Economy (Chicago 1904) and Mehring, F. Karl Marx (Ann Arbor 1962). 
105 We can look to incidents as diverse as the French Revolution to the Chartist uprising in 
England and the Resorgimeto in Italy as examples of this process. 
106 See Nairn, T. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism., 332-341. 
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cooperative forms of social relations.1°7 Resulting from this bargaining process were 
greater opportunities for subordinate groups to influence their rulers and a greater 
awareness of their membership of both a political and national community. 
The introduction of conceptions of citizenship proved instrumental in the achievement 
of a state-mediated national community, by means of the 'politicization' of social 
relations that folowed from it. The formalisation of social and political intercourse 
within the state achieved by the ascriptive identity as a citizen, is influential in the 
suppression of personal interest and consciousness, and the promotion of communal 
and public identification with the nation. The 'public space' created by citizenship 
provides an objective public world in which the individual finds personal fulfilment. 
Such fulfilment, whether in the form of meaningful involvement in public affairs, 
going to war for the nation or sharing in the normative values of the state has the 
effect of strengthening the loyalty and affection of the individual for the nation.1°8 
From a cognitive viewpoint the effect of citizenship extends beyond an instrumental 
commitment to the affairs of state, but extends more deeply to the extension of the 
individual's self-concept to include a communal normative content centring around 
the nation. Individuals within the sphere of citizenship, define themselves not only in 
individual or kinship terms but also in national terms.109 
The institutionalisation of the state involves the integration of smal local 
communities into larger 'national' entities. Such a process, a central element of nation 
building, is achieved within the context of state centralisation. The local community is 
merged into the larger polity and retains litle political authority. In such an 
environment the state institutes a representative mechanism to alow the local 
community to align themselves and identify with the larger political structures and 
institutions, with which they have had only fragmentary contact.10 Further, the 
107 Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity Press 1985), 14-15 and 198. 
108 	 . 	'Citizenship Port's, E. Citzenshi & Personal Identity' Polity Vol 18 No.1 Fal 1985-86: 457-472, 460. 
109 Ibid., 458. 
io For a discussion on the disilusion of local and regional power in the process of European 
State formation see Given, J. 'Autonomy, Integration and Marginalisation in the Construction of 
Medieval States: A Comparison of Gwynedd and Languedoc under outside Rule'. Archives-
Europeannes-de-sociologie: 1990, 31, no.2, 285-315. 
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politicization of social relations embedded in the realignment of communities from 
the local to the collective and the consequential development of national identity was 
a central means of achieving the coordination of state policy and legitimacy. The state 
plays a crucial role in the development of a national civil society. The processes of 
self-organisation within society, the degree of political involvement and social 
mobilisation are products of the states' actions. Whilst in the nations of the former 
Soviet Union the dominance of state institutions resulted in 'learned helplessness' and 
anomie within civil society, the experience in Western states where institutional 
intervention in civil society is less prescriptive and more representative allows for a 
more authentic and organic set of linkages to be developed between state and national 
members.' 
At its most abstract and perhaps idealised level, the involvement of the citizen in the 
polity is a central element in nation-building. The granting of civic rights and duties 
and the response of citizens to such rights and duties is a key element in the 
enlistment of individual and communal loyalty to the nation and the state. 112 
3.15 Political Socialisation - via Education, Communication and Information 
(through the promotion of an official language) 
The articulation of a collective political consciousness is significantly influenced by 
the political socialisation of a named population.' 13 
For an examination of the effect of the Authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe on the 
development of civil society and national identity during the cold war period see Kolarska-Bobinska, 
L. The Changing Face of Civil Society in Eastern Europe. Praxis International: 1990-1991. von°, 3-4 
October-January, 324-336. 
112 The articulation of nation and national community through the mechanisms of political 
participation has been no where more keenly felt than in the United States of America. De Tocqueville 
was perhaps the most famous advocate of political participation as a key to nation building, suggesting 
the positive effect of representative democracy within that state on the engendering of a positive spirit 
of nationhood. Participation in the political process afforded by participatory democracy in the United 
States resulted in a more engaged and interested national community, less individual-orientated and 
more concerned for collective liberty and advancement: elements central to the articulation of a 
national community of sentiment. The process of linking the community to the state is similar in 
supranational institutions. See: De Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America., and for a more 
contemporary examination of the importance of civic engagement in political community formation 
see: Putnman, R. "Making Democracy Work." Political Science and Politics (December 1995), 664- 
683. 
113  Political socialisation is defined by Dekker as: 
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The means by which political socialisation occurs are varied. They include the 
transfer of a common national memory, the political education of youth within 
educational institutions, the effects of government sponsored information and media 
campaigns and induction into state-mediated professional life, most particularly the 
military. Importantly, as Anderson argues, the rise of the nation took the period of the 
widespread distribution of printed materials, allowing for the standardisation of 
information and education within a territory. 114 
Reinforcing the importance of social communication in the evocation of a state-
mediated nation, and the cohesion derived from it is Deutsch's concept of a 
communications infrastructure. Within Deutsch's schema the creation of a collective 
identity is dependent upon the development of 'facilities of Communication'. 
Suggesting that the basis of identity is the collective perception of social 
communication which acts as a lubricant for national homogenisation, Deutsch 
defines the nation as a: 
"Community which permits a common history to be experienced as common, 
is a community of habits and facilities of communication." 115 
For Deutsch what is important is not simply the presence of, 'languages, or character 
or memories or past history' but rather, 'the presence of sufficient communication 
facilities with enough complementarity to produce the overall resule. 116 From such a 
perspective, the means of communication available have a direct effect on the 
development of a collective identity is further pursued by Anderson, who argues that 
the development of the printing process had the effect of changing 'the appearance 
"the whole of the structures and processes through which individuals acquire certain political 
knowledge, beliefs, insights, opinions, attitudes behavioural intentions and behavioural 
patterns with respect to political systems." 
See Dekker, H. Perceptions of The European Community 1992 at http://www.bis.uni-
oldenburg.de/bisverlag/meyper92/inhalt.html   
114 See Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. 
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and state of the world' and the growth in communication resulting from it allowed for 
the rise of national consciousness.' 17 
The central element of state-sponsored political socialisation is an official language. A 
common official language allows for a common symbolic structure to be constructed 
and facilitates state-mediated and standardised messages about the nation, its culture, 
traditions and history to be transmitted throughout the state's territories by its agents. 
Further it enables legal responsibilities to be codified and stored. 118 A state-sponsored 
national language further allows for the complex set of economic, political and social 
interactions necessary for the state's continuance to take place efficiently. 
The value of education in the achievement of collective political consciousness 
represents another central element in the state's production and mediation of the 
nation. Fichte's "Addresses to the German Nation" placed education at the centre of 
the state's moulding of a national community. Education was not simply to provide 
the means for material advancement but was to 'mould men'. Fichte advocated a 
national system of education, which would make German national culture something 
'inner' and vital, not simply external. The national educational system was central to 
producing the German 'fundamental character'. Its curricula had to be designed so as 
to be compatible with the elements of this character. The uniqueness of German 
culture, language and history both required a unique state-sponsored educational 
system, and contributed to the continuance and strengthening of the nation. I19 
The insertion of the discourse of nation into educational settings varies in intensity 
depending upon differing institutional and cultural settings. At one end of the 
spectrum is the mandatory daily flag salute and the pledge of allegiance of the United 
States of America and at the other is the curriculum of vernacular prose in Australian 
117 
Anderson, B.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism., 
89. 
118 
For a closer examination of the 'storage' power of language and its application to the extension 
of state power see Giddens, A. A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. (London: 
Macmillan 1981) 
119 
A good analysis of Fichte's position on the mechanisms of German nation building may be 
found in McClelland, J. A History of Western Political Thought. (London: Routledge 1996), 633-634. 
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schools. Education, as a sub-set of the process of political socialisation, plays a 
positive role in the amalgamation of individual into collective national community 
and the subsequent attachment of people to polity. 120 
Other specific mechanisms by which political socialisation effects the creation of a 
common sentiment include the establishment of educational curricula for schools, the 
introduction of national anthems, oaths of allegiance and specific government 
sponsored information campaigns 121 
The effectiveness of central political actors in building national institutions and 
national loyalty is assisted by the institutionalisation of education. The centralisation 
of institutional responsibility for the budgeting and curricula of schools assists fragile 
states to build strong nations. The overcoming of local resistance to the state, and the 
suppression of regional and local loyalties and allegiances is also achieved by the 
political socialisation achieved through the education of a national community. 122 
3.16 Communal Mythologisation 
The development of a communal sentiment of belonging is closely linked to the 
creation of a homogenous and inclusive set of cultural products. The state-endorsed 
appropriation and enforcement of a standard 'national' historical memory, official 
customs and traditions, and the guiding of national cultural products is a dominant 
feature of the development of a sense of national community and identity. The process 
of "national awakening", whereby an emerging collective cultural consciousness is 
manipulated so as to give legitimacy to the institutions of the state is most often 
deliberate and elite driven. Speaking before the Society of Estonian Literati in 1839, 
120 
For an examination of the role of Education, amongst other factors, in the American 
construction of American nationalism see Zelinsky, W. Nation into State: The Shifting Symbolic 
Foundations of American Nationalism., 76. 
121 
See Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism. & Anderson, B.  Imagined Communities:  
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism  
122 
See Fuller, B eta! 'Nation Building and School Expansion under the Fragile French State'. 
Social Forces: 1992. 70. Number 4 June 923-936. 
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G. Schultz-Bertrams declared: "Let's give the nation an epic and a history; the rest 
wil be won."123 
The process of mass cultural production by the polity resulting in a sympathetic 
communal sentiment is most accurately described by Hobsbawm as the: "invention of 
tradition". The process by which elites invent, manipulate and impose on a 
community a 'national' history, culture and mythology is defined by Hobsbawm as: 
"'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normaly governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek 
to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automaticaly implies continuity with the past." 124 
The invention of tradition is essentialy a process of formalisation and ritualization of 
either pre-existing localised cultural products or the production of new products, such 
as a national literary and cultural movement, characterised by repetition and an 
endorsed narative of political community.125 
The processes by which such tradition is invented are varied. One way is the use of 
ancient materials by the state to construct novel invented traditions for novel 
purposes. A large reservoir of such materials, generaly within various proto-national 
communities is accumulated in the past of any society and an elaborate language of 
symbolic practice and communication is always available to modernise and 
nationalise such pre-national traditions. In Switzerland existing customary traditional 
practices - folk-song, physical contests, marksmanship - were modified, ritualised and 
institutionalised for new national purposes.126 
123 G. Schultz-Bertrams quoted in Bliss, M. 'National Culture/Cultural Nation: The Social Drama 
of Estonian Independence. Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism. XXII, 1-2 (1996),67-77. 
124 Hobsbawm, E & Ranger, T. (eds) The Invention of Tradition New York: (Cambridge 
University Press 1983), 1. 
125 One of the most dramatic recent examples of the 'invention of tradition' was the National 
Socialist appropriation of elements of German culture and the manipulation and stylisation of it for 
political purposes, to create a 'yolk' within the mould of the Nazi ideology. See Wistrich, R. Weekend 
in Munich: Art, Propaganda and Teror in the Third Reich. (London: Pavilion Books. 1997) 
126 	 . Ibid., 6. Further, the Statutes of the Swiss Federal Song Festival declared its objective to be 
'the development and improvement of the people's singing, the awakening of more elevated sentiments 
for God, Freedom and Country, union and fraternisation of the fields of Art and the Fatherland.' 
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Beyond those cases where states can rely upon a pre-existing reservoir of proto-
national cultural products, new 'national' cultural products have to be invented by the 
state. Further, the claim of historical continuity of such products also have to be 
asserted. In cases such as central symbols of nationhood; the development of the 
National Anthem and the National flag, and the more banal examples such as the 
stereotypes of the English 'John Bul' or the American 'Uncle Sam', the symbolic 
vocabulary of the nation was at the same time entirely contrived, highly symbolic, and 
suggestive of a (fictional) national lineage and history. 127 
The necessity for the invention of cultural products for the emergent polity is rooted 
in the impetus for revised social arrangements and of the new state-centred centres of 
authority and hierarchy. It was not that there was a dearth of cultural products 
available to European states that made them invent many such traditions and confirm 
many more. Rather those traditions of the pre-modern period reflected and reinforced 
pre-modern, localised social and communal arrangements and proved incapable of 
creating the social and economic homogeneity vital to the modern state. Accordingly 
the invention of tradition in modernity via the state based articulation of a national 
community was driven by the overt rejection of those pre-modern cultural products 
that were considered as being either obstacles to progress because of their regional 
nature (or sources of alternative-claims of legitimacy against the state).128 The state in 
modernity sought to invent and promote those cultural products, national memories 
and mythologies which exhibited one or a combination of the folowing three 
characteristics: 
I. 	 those establishing or symbolising national social cohesion or the 
membership of groups or communities within the nation; 
2. 	 those establishing or legitimising state institutions, the status of state 
elites or state-mediated hierarchies and authority; and 
127  Ibid., 7. 
128 It was only in very limited circumstances where the pre-existing cultural and traditonal 
cleavages reflected the economic and occupational cleavages created by the modern state. Such an 
example is Sweden. 
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3. 	 those whose main purpose was political socialisation; the inculcation 
of national beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour. 129 
Examples of individual European states' creation of traditions, cultural products and 
colective mythology designed to unite a national community are plentiful. Those 
most central elements of Scotish national identity - the kilt, and the bagpipe are 
modern inventions, introduced and encouraged after the Act of Union by the English. 
The invention of tradition played an essential role in the maintenance of the Third 
French Republic. Firstly the development of a secular equivalent to the Church - 
primary education, imbued with revolutionary and republican principles.130 Secondly 
the invention of French public ceremonies, such as Bastile Day, was a deliberate 
action by the state to transform the heritage of the revolution into the assertion of 
France the nation. Thirdly the mass production of public monuments represented 
visible links between the Frenchman and the nation.13 I Other examples of the 
production of 'tradition' within Europe as a means of beter linking state to nation 
include the mass of monuments and statues erected in Germany in the 1890's such as 
the Reichstag building and the national monument to Wiliam I. While in the British 
context, the systematic staging of public events, such as the royal funeral of Queen 
Victoria in the United Kingdom, are examples of the creation of a national set of 
traditional and rituals designed to assist in the creation of a 'national' community.I32 
3.17 Centralisation and Institutionalisation of Political, Economic and Social 
domains 
An exploration of the key elements involved in creating communal identification in 
modernity cannot overlook the very economic, political and social reorganisation that 
implicitly defines modernity and community. 
According to Mann, the polity's institutional and regulatory functions have significant 
social utility and assist in the creation of a national community of sentiment by the 
129 This list is closely based upon that developed by Hobsbawm Ibid., 9. 
130 Ibid., 270. 
131 Ibid., 270-273. 
132  Ibid., 289. 
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routinalisation of political and civil relationships and interactions. Successful states, 
with strong national communities, are those which have not only successfully 
consolidated territory, managed their economies and created a national mythology and 
history, but which had sufficient infrastructural powers including centralised, highly 
organised and hierarchically based bureaucratic institutions, both for executive 
decision making and for the development and implementation of public policy, 
providing for the maintenance of societal security and the allocation of material and 
social rights. Ancient Rome, the United Kingdom during its colonial period, and 
China are examples of the necessity of a strongly integrated institutional regime for 
the articulation of both state power and national consciousness. I33 
States which undertake a wide variety of social, economic and political activity 
require a disciplined and well organised bureaucracy working within the framework 
of a penetrative and legitimate set of authoritative institutions. The legitimisation of 
state power in military, economic, political and social fields required not only the 
territorial centralisation of power, but also created a need for loyalty to such 
institutions and power bases. The state's centralisation and bureacratisation create 
opportunities for the generation of extra resources, for the achievement of previously 
unattainable goals and for the general protection and promotion of the civil society. It 
is in this way that regional communities develop a positive interest in efficient state 
centralisation and institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of the state's functions 
assists in communal identification in a number of ways. The institutionalisation of 
political and economic domains stimulate both core and peripheral populations 
stimulating them into a developmentally derived collective consciousness, which 
bypasses pre-existing ethnic and regional forms of identification. Secondly the 
defence of the national community from outsiders or from the misappropriation of the 
societies resources by elements from within it, forms a basis for the evocation of a 
national community. Such a community becoming increasingly national and 
collective as a result of the universal application of the states institutions over its 
members. 134 
133 The principal contributor to the argument on the contribution of political rationality and 
institutionalisation to the development of a national community is given by Max Weber. See Weber, 
M. Economy and Society. 
134 
See Mann in States in History. 128-129. 
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3.18 Limitations of Supranation Engendered Communal Identity 
The tools available for the consolidation of state-mediated national communities, as 
examined above cannot be said to be universally or directly applicable to 
supranational polities. While a strong theoretical case can be made for the articulation 
of community and identity amongst named populations in increasingly centralised and 
autonomous supranational polities, there are significant limitations to such a process, 
Such limitations include: 
1. supranational elites insufficiently concerned with or incapable of 
gaining sufficient legitimacy to provide 'identity leadership'; 
2. strongly motivated national and sub-national elites antagonistic to 
supranationalism and capable of effecting public support for it; 
3. the non-territoriality of the supranational institution, or its universalism 
- thus removing the 'people' from place and the removal of a key 
determinant of identity - territory; 
4. the national and sub-national backlash against the supranational entity 
as being too removed; 
5. the absence of sufficient institutional uniformity structure or intent to 
provide a unified level of political socialisation; 
6. the absence of executive political and judicial institutions, or 
competition with such institutions from national institutions with their 
supranational equivalents; 
7. the absence of the supranational institution to have a mandate and/or 
sufficient resources to provide internal and/or external security; 
8. the relative degree of economic and social penetration of the 
supranational organisation into the lives of its population; 
9. the absence of supranational citizenship, and the resultant limitation on 
supranational authority and legitimacy and popular participation in 
decision making; and 
10. the absence of a common supranational language, and the supremacy 
of national and sub-national language groups pursuing separate claims. 
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This list is not exhaustive, however it is indicative of the practical barriers for the 
development of a supranational identity. There are very few supranational 
organisations that would approach having sufficient 'state-like' qualities to be able to 
effect the creation of a positive communal identity. The European Union, as we shall 
presently consider, is the best placed to do so. Further in the case of a supranational 
entity promoting a civic form of identification the utilisation of 'ethnic' signifiers of 
identity such as language, custom and mythology, which are essentially localised and 
exclusive in nature, and not suitable for broader application, and further limits the 
avenues open to the supranational polity for the articulation of a common 
consciousness. 
3.19 Chapter Three - Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has reviewed the nature of states, the nature of supranations and the 
mechanisms available to polities to engender a communal sense of positive 
identification from amongst their respective populations to them. 
One of the central features of late modern political life has been the emergence of 
increasingly competent international organisations, both intergovernmental and 
supranational. The rise of such organisations has occurred in a period in which an 
increasing number of commentators have identified the difficulties experienced by 
states to deal with complex policy issues in an autonomous manner. In circumstances 
where the functioning of market places, societal protection and physical security as 
well as environmental and normative considerations are being globalised, the scope 
for meaningful state autonomy is significantly restricted. The internationalisation of 
political and economic activities not only raises questions about the nature of political 
activity in late modernity, but more significantly, the relationship between polity and 
people. Modernity synthesised polity and people into state and a state mediated 
'national' community, with the occurrence of collective 'national' identification. In an 
international environment increasingly dominated by supranational organisations, 
national allegiances become increasingly problematic and supranational identification 
needs complex political intervention to become operationalised. 
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A specifically quantified analysis of the relationship between political structure and 
collective response is elusive, as the plethora of theoretical contributions attest to. 
This Chapter has demonstrated a number of core causal influences, based upon a 
critical reading of key theorists, which may act on and contribute to the development 
of collective (supranational) identification. Arguing that identity formation is 
primarily orientated around the concepts of security and rights, this Chapter illustrated 
specific mechanisms for the homogenisation of differing individuals and collectivities 
into a single; 'community of sentiment'. 
Notwithstanding the employment of the mechanisms for social, political and 
economic integration that supranational polities may employ, the potency of cultural, 
ethnic and linguistic identity remain. Rather than supranationalism removing 
difference it has, as Watts suggests, the power to heighten difference. 135 In such a 
context the only plausable basis available for the alignment of supranational 
communities are civic identities. 
The task at hand then is to demonstrate the emergence of European supranationalism 
and to demonstrate the mechanisms, based upon the typology presented earlier in this 
Chapter of how the European supranational polity has aligned allegiance to it from 
amongst its population. This will be demonstrated in the next two Chapters. 
000000 
135 Watts, R. 'Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration' in Cameron, D. Regionalism 
and Supranationalism., 7. 
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Chapter Four 
The Emergence of the European Civic Supranation 
"The Nation-state is a thing of the past. Some ten years ago state nationalists 
in most of the European countries were resisting diversity, and their activities 
were based on retaining the borders of the nation, the currency, the army, the 
language and the flag. Now that the iron curtain no longer exists and most of 
the internal borders have disappeared with the Schengen treaty, the euro is 
going to replace the national currency in eleven states, most of the armies are 
co-operating in peace-keeping missions, and there is only one centre of 
coordination. The blue flag with its twelve yelow stars is becoming our 
common flag. In a few more years more states wil join the European 
Family." I 
4.1 	 Introductory Remarks 
The contemporary construction of a unified European polity2 is a remarkable 
achievement. That states, historicaly beligerent and sharing a landscape divided by 
fundamental linguistic, ethnic, and political boundaries have not only freely 
cooperated to create supranational institutions, but further, have established structures 
and instruments which directly erode their own sovereign powers, is a historicaly 
unique phenomena.3 While the European project has proceeded on functional and 
pragmatic grounds, with a resultant 'spilover' from economic, to political and now to 
social and cultural policy, it is clear that the growth of the European polity also 
t Boon Brezigar, President of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, European 
Commission Contact Buletin June 1998, Volume 14 Number 3. 
2 In this work we are specificaly interested in the emergence of a united Europe sphere of 
governance, accordingly we focus on the emergence of the European Communities and the European 
Union. While we are mindful of the various differing constelations of European integration during the 
last fifty years, we suggest that the European Union is the premiere sphere of European political and 
economic convergence, and importantly, in the context of this work, the best able to effect the 
realisation of a communal European identity. 
3 The only comparable historical phenomena, and one that is not without some poignancy, is the 
initial process of European state formation in early modernity, which, as Schwartz has remarked, was 
without precedent: 
"One of the great peculiarities of history is that an economicaly marginal, technologicaly 
backward set of religiously fractionalized and fanatic peoples "governed" by elites with 
virtualy no administrative apparatus managed to conquer most of the world in about 300 
years" 
See: Schwartz, H. States versus Markets: History Geography and the Development of the International 
Political Economy., (New York: St Martin's Press 1994) 10. 
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constitutes optimal conditions for the emergence of a common community of 
Europeans. Such a community reflects the institutionally derived civic qualities of 
constitutionalism, liberalism, and inclusion based upon a common normative position. 
Our examination of the emergent European polity is predicated by its definitional 
uncertainty. We need to recognise and acknowledge that there is an extensive range of 
interpretations as to it nature. Notwithstanding the establishment of the European 
polity we remain profoundly ignorant of the appropriate terminology with which to 
describe it - state, proto-state, nation or confederation. This results from a number of 
factors. From the EU's unique status and structure, from its relationship both 
externally with the international community and internally with its citizen-body. Since 
the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, and the Treaty on EU in 1992, the 
European Union has been marked by an acceleration in its supranational qualities. 
Legislative developments, judicial activism and ongoing reform of institutional issues 
is indicative of what Caporaso has described as Europe's: "long, meandering, often 
messy process of political change."4 That European integration has taken a non-linear 
path is not dissimilar to the processes taken by individual states in their formative 
period. Bulmer and Deudney remind us that the American state, at least between 1789 
and the end of the Civil War, experienced similar characteristics of periods of rapid 
consolidation and reactionary paralysis. 5 Contemporary Europe provides us with a 
keen paradox. On one hand, it has an established executive government structure; on 
the other hand we can be far less certain as to the existence of a European state, at 
least insofar as that term is normally understood. While Europe appears 'state-like' in 
its structure of political authority, and in its autonomy to decide within a specific 
'European' territory, the European Union is far less state-like in questions of 
legitimacy, collective loyalty and in its ability to use coercive force either internally or 
externally.6 
4 
Caporaso, J. 1996 'The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-
Modern?' Journal of Common Market Studies  vol.34, No.1 (March 1996), 29-51, 30. 
5 See Bulmer, S. 1994 'The Governance of the European Union: A New Institutionalist 
Approach' Journal of Public Policy, vol.13, No.4. 351-380. and Deudney, D. 1995 'The Philadelphian 
System: Sovereignty, Arms Control and Balance of Power in the American States Union, circa 1787- 
1861'. International Organisation, Vol 49, No.2, 191-228. 
6 For a more detailed examination of the difficulties in adequately conceptualising an adequate 
theorisation of the European polity see; Warleigh, A. 1988 'Better the Devil you Know? Synthetic and 
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Our task in this Chapter is not to provide a definitive categorisation of the European 
polity, but rather to demonstrate that there is a definitive European supranational 
polity, one that has specific 'state-like' jurisdictions, qualities and competencies. In 
this Chapter we shall consider the structural and sovereign elements of the European 
supranational polity. We shall demonstrate that the pan-European polity represents an 
autonomous and sovereign sphere of governance. A sphere that is entirely consistent 
of the definition of supranation as established in the previous Chapter. The purpose of 
this analysis is to demonstrate that the European polity is well positioned to actively 
influence the emergence of a communal European identity, utilising the mechanisms 
described in Chapter Three. 
The rise of a European supranational polity, as considered earlier in this work, is 
directly related to the crisis of individual states and the decline in the Westphalian 
understanding of statehood more generally. The development of the European polity 
not only provides a more certain and attainable basis for the actualisation of many of 
the traditional functions of states, including economic management, foreign relations 
and social protection, but further creates the conditions suitable for the manifestation 
of collective identification. 7 
Let us now consider the nature of the emergent European Supranational polity in the 
years following the Second World War. 
Confederal Understandings of European Unification.' West European Politics. Vol .21, No.3 July 1998, 
1-18, and Gabel, M. 'The Endurance of Supranational Governance: A Consociational Interpretation of 
the European Union.' Comparative Politics, (July 1988), 463-473. 
7 As states decline in relative importance and as collective confidence in state competency 
similarly diminishes, state mediated identity becomes increasingly problematic. The result of this 
process has two consequences. Firstly collectivities look below and above the state for signifiers of 
identity. Below the state to regional and proto-national signifiers and above to globalised, 
environmental, social, humanitarian and gender signifiers. Secondly, as supranational polities are 
increasingly empowered, the constituent causal elements of identity formation become operationalised 
at the supranational rather than the national level. Accordingly as issues of security, the articulation and 
promotion of social, cultural, economic and political rights and the centralisation of administrative and 
bureaucratic domains, are activated at the supranational level, so too is an environment created for the 
emergence of collective identification. The re-invention of meaningful arenas for the maintenance of 
economic, political, economic and social life at the supranational level thus provides the appropriate 
infrastructure for collective identity formation. 
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4.2 	 Realigning European State and Society in Uncertain Times 
In the areas where individual European states had traditionaly been paramount; 
economic management and defence, the devastating effects of prolonged conflict and 
the rise of two technologicaly superior and beligerent superpowers had, in the 
immediate post Second World War period, severely eroded the role and potency of 
individual European states. Such a set of circumstances demanded a cohesive, 
coordinated response in order to halt and reverse Europe's declining position in the 
international arena. 
The second global war had major implications for Europe. At its most manifest level 
its destructive effect on European material, personal and financial reserves returned 
Europe, in a practical way, to the depths of the Middle Ages.8 However, the 
destruction of the myth of the paramountcy and sovereignty of the self-interested, 
rational state was a more profound effect. It removed many of the practical and 
emotional barriers towards the construction of a united Europe. Whereas European 
states had enjoyed over a century and a half of expansion and the deepening 
integration of state and society, the product of total war and the rapid decline in 
European economic performance had profound implications for both the structural 
and cognitive composition of European society. 9 
8 There are a plethora of indicators demonstrating the destructive efects of total war on European 
economic, political and social conditions. Whereas in 1913 Western Europe had accounted for one half 
of the world's industrial production, by 1950 this had declined to one quarter. The European transport 
infrastructure had been seriously eroded, with the reduction of the European Merchant Fleet by 60 
percent. European wheat production in 1947 fel to less than half of what it had been in 1938. British 
coal production in 1946 was 20 percent lower than it had been in 1938 and in the west of Germany the 
output had been reduced three-fifths over the same period. Inflation also had its effect. In France 
Wholesale prices rose 80 percent. Further the rapid loss of Europe's colonial assets in the immediate 
post-war period removed sources of cheap raw materials and markets. These factors combined to 
provide a powerful impetus for a rapid and dramatic reorientation of European economic and political 
life. See Wilams A, The European Community. ( London: Blackwel Publications 1994) 
9 While it is not possible to come to any definitive conclusions as to the precise nature of 
supranational formation, post-war Europe shared a number of the key factors which have been 
identified as necessary for the adoption of more centralised political structures. Such features 
productive of the impetus for Pan-European supranational integration included: 
1. 	 External Competition - In common with the emergent European states in the early 
modern period, armed conflict was an essential determinant in institutional change 
leading to European supranationalism. Viewed through the lens of the two great 
European wars, the costs of technology, the inability of any one state to provide an 
effective umbrela of European security and the perceived threat from beligerent 
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European political convergence was initialy necessary to give sufficient stimulus to 
re-build the European economy after the Second World War. The market imperatives 
of efficiency, competition and the removal of barriers required a 'spilover' wherein 
the political structure of Europe was altered to alow for a single European market, 
including the free transfer of goods, services and peoples across national boundaries. 
Such a process rapidly requires deeper political and then social integration.10 While 
in the early years the individual European states created a single European economy, 
more recently economic imperatives have driven supranational political and, 
poignantly, social convergence.' 
The military defeats of the Second World War impressed upon Europeans their 
colective impotence in the nuclear age. Just as in the early modem period the effect 
of the revolution in military costs and technology meant that pre-existing political 
forms of association became instantly redundant, which necessitated the emergence of 
the modern state.12 The development of a united (albeit under the leadership of the 
United States) response to maters strategic was the only option available to the 
'outsiders', European political structures were obliged to respond to such chalenges 
in an integrated pan-European manner. 
2. 	 Economic Rationale - became an increasingly important element in European 
supranationalism. Directly after the cessation of hostilities, Europe's economic base 
was dislocated in such a fundamental way that the great multiplicity and complexity 
of economic stimulus necessary to rebuild it, while initialy aided by the United 
States, could only meaningfuly be provided by a series of pan-European economic 
initiatives, taken at a supranational level. Further as the imperative of capital 
formation and economic competition both within and without Europe gained pace the 
requirement to re configure European economic life into a single market became 
necessary so as to secure Europe's long term viability. This resulted in a set of 
profoundly important functional and instrumental reforms that accelerated the rise of 
a European supranation so as to maximise Europe's economic position. 
This model of the imperatives towards macro-polity formation is taken from Weiss, L. & Hobson, J. 
States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis. 
10 The most obvious example of such 'spilover' was the establishment of the freedom of goods, 
services, capital and peoples that the introduction of the European Single Market enabled. 
1 We shal consider European economic convergence in greater detail in a subsequent part of this 
chapter. The arguments of Mark Wise and Richard Gibb in Single Market to Social Europe is 
particularly iluminating as to the 'spilover' efects of economic convergence in Post-War Europe. See 
Wise, M & Gibb, R. 1993 Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s. 
(Harlow:Longman Scientific & Technical). 
12 See Tily, C. The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe., 19. 
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Europeans. Further, and not unrelated to the first point, the revival of a free European 
market required the guidance of a pan-European set of institutions and provided a 
growing European fiscal basis for the financing of the institutions and structures of the 
European supranation. 
This brief review suggests that similar factors conducive to the emergence of macro-
polities, most particularly the European centralised state, were equaly applicable in 
the context of the contemporary European experience. 
4.3 	 Structural Characteristics of Supranational Europe 
4.3.1 Introductory Remarks 
While the literature on European integration is broad, we suggest that in most crucial 
spheres European Union governance is supranational.13 Examples of this are found in 
three main arenas, firstly the creation of supranational institutions such as the 
European Commission and the Court of Justice." Secondly, it is found in the 
establishment of a separate legal system with enforceable sanctions, and finaly in the 
legislative process and the scope of policy domains; their universal applicability and 
the sanctions associated with them. Accordingly, while the significant treaties of the 
Union were negotiated at an intergovernmental level, the structure of European 
institutions, the nature of European law, the regulations and directives of the 
Commission and the articulation of policy within the Union is supranational. 
4.3.2 The Creation of a Supranational European Institutional Domain 
The creation of executive institutions is a central element in the manifestation of 
supranationalism. In the modern state political power over a wide territorial area is 
centralised, and is concerned with an increasingly large range of policy domains. 
13 For an analysis of Intergovernmental Europe see Moravcsik, A 1991 'Negotiating the Single 
European Act' in Keohane, R. and Hofmann, S. The New European Community: Decision Making and 
Institutional Change. (Boulder: Westview Press Inc. 1991). For an analysis of European 
Supranationalism see Weiler, J. 1991 'The Transformation of Europe' Yale Law Journal, vol.100, No.8, 
2403-83. 
14 Such institutions are deriving their suprationationality specificaly as a result of their trans-
national judicial competence. 
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Further the modern state, as Weber suggests, involves bureaucratisation and the shift 
to rational-legal authority, as opposed to discretional, traditional and customary 
authority.15 The strengthening of the state and its competency across a defined 
teritory saw both the widening of the scope of Government activity and the growth of 
government bureaucracies. The European polity is remarkably similar to states in this 
regard, as Lord Cockfield suggests: 
"The Commission is the executive arm of the Community, the Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers share the legislative function; and the Court of Justice 
in Luxembourg is the Judiciary."I6 
Elaborating upon this, the European Union shares the structure of a state in the 
folowing manner, it has: 
1. A supranational Executive - (Elements of) The European Commission; 
2. An Intergovernmental Executive - The European Council and the 
Council of Ministers; 
3. A Legislature - The European Parliament; 
4. A Judiciary - The European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights; 
5. A Cabinet - The 20 Commissioners (the heads of the directorates); 
6. Ministries - The Commission directorates; and 
7. A Bureaucracy - (Elements of) The European Commission. 
4.4 	 The Institutions of the European Supranation 
4.4.1 A European Executive and a European Bureaucracy - The European 
Commission 
The Commission is one of the most supranational elements of the European polity. 
Led by 20 Commissioners appointed by individual national governments and 
substantialy comprising Europe's civil service is efectively the motive and executive 
15 Weber M, Theory of Social and Economic Organisations. (Free Press 1997). 
16 Lord Cockfield, The European Union. Creating the Single Market. (London: Wiley Chancery 
Law 1994), 96. 
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power of supranational Europe. It has an exclusive right to initiate legislation and to 
largely mould the policy direction of the Union." Commissioners, while appointed by 
states should, according to the Commission; 'in the general interests of the 
Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties'. 18 In 
reality this is neither practical nor desirable. Emphasising the supranational focus of 
the College of Commissioners is the decision making process, which is by qualified 
majority voting, weighted not to unduly disadvantage smaller states, and which 
critically, ensures that decisions can be reached, even if certain individual states fail to 
support an issue. I9 To provide suitable assistance, each Commissioner has cabinets; 
groups of advisers and support staff who are responsible for managing policy 
development and liaison with other parts of the Commission. 
The responsibilities of the Commission are broad. The Commission is responsible for 
the development of European policy and legislation. Associated with this 
responsibility is the work of the Commission's advisory committee network which are 
organised to provide both specialist and non-specialist advice on specific Commission 
proposals. 
The second key responsibility of the Commission is its diverse executive functions. 
The Commission has delegated rule-making powers under the European Treaties and 
EU legislation, in a similar manner to individual national executives, the Commission 
can and does provide a basis for technical and administrative law. Such law takes the 
17 
However the Commission's executive and unilateral powers have been subject to modification 
as a result of the ascendancy of the European Parliament, most especially in the Parliaments veto and 
codecision powers, as a consequence of the wholesale resignation of the European Commissioners in. . 
1999. Further the appointment of Neil Kinnock as Vice President for Administrative Reform and 
Loyola de Palacio as Vice President responsible for relations with the European Parliament reflects the 
greater importance of the European Parliament relative to that of the European Commission. 
18 
European Community Treaty Establishing the European Community as Amended by 
Subsequent Treaties. Article 155 in Rudden, B. & Wyatt, D. 1996 Basic Community Laws 6th Edition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996),109. 
19 The importance of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in entrenching the competence and 
independence of the European Union, in reflecting its supranational nature, cannot be overstated. The 
incremental shift in the EU from unanimity to QMV ensures that in increasingly broad areas of 
European public policy, individual states are legally obliged to follow EU decisions, without the 
recourse of opting out. This consequently secures the functional sovereignty of the EU over the 
governments of individual member states. See Jupille, J. 'The European Union and International 
Outcomes' International Organisation 1998, 409-423. 
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form of directives, regulations and decisions. While most of these are routine and 
administrative some of this law has a significant policy component, such as that 
associated with competition policy or the Common Agricultural Policy. A further 
aspect of its executive functions, is the Commission's responsibility for regulatory 
management, financial management and the actual supervision of policy 
implementation. The Commission is responsible for managing the budget of the EU, 
and in practical terms, is the treasury of the Supranational European polity. 
4.4.2 A European Intergovernmental Executive - The Council of Ministers 
Whilst the European Commission displays a large degree of autonomy in its structure, 
decision making processes and in its policy making, the Council of Ministers is the 
domain of national representatives and national interests, and is paradoxically 
intergovernmental by nature, but supranational in its decision making processes. The 
primary role of the Council is to initiate the more important legislative and policy 
proposals on behalf of the European Union. It is the principal legislative body of the 
EU (Although under the co-decision legislative procedure, its powers are shared with 
the European Parliament). 
The decision making procedures of the Council reveal its increasing supranational 
powers and resultant lessening of national discretions. Whereas unanimity had been 
required within the Council for the adoption or development of policy, following the 
introduction of the SEA and the TEU conditions in which unanimity is required for 
Council decision making have been largely limited to issues associated with the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs matters under the 
TEU. Qualified majority voting (QMV) is applicable to most decisions taken by the 
Council, qualified to the extent that the larger states can neither form a voting bloc, 
nor dominate the smaller states. This is as a consequence of the weighted votes that 
each state holds. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 votes each; 
Spain has eight. Belgium, Greece the Netherlands and Portugal five, Denmark and 
Ireland three and Luxembourg has two. A qualified majority vote is 54 of the 
available 76 votes. Simple majority voting, in which all states have a single vote is 
used for minor procedural issues. The adoption of QMV ensures that in wider policy 
domains recalcitrant European states find themselves increasingly marginalised and 
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effectively powerless to prevent the adoption of a common, and legally binding, EU 
policy, thus enhancing the EU's effective sovereignty and demonstrating the 
supranational qualities of the European polity. 20 
4.4.3 A European Intergovernmental Executive II - The European Council 
The European Council was established to give greater urgency and direction to the 
process of European integration. Conceived and articulated by Giscard d'Estaing and 
Chancellor Schmidt, the Council was conceived as a body that would bring Heads of 
Government together to informally exchange ideas and more fully involve themselves 
in the strategic direction of European policy formulation. 
Almost irrespective of the formal, legal status of the European Council, the public 
status of its membership and the high media profile of its meetings have assisted in 
ensuring that its deliberations are noted of by the other institutions of the Union. 
Historically the major areas of interest to the Council have been broad questions about 
the growth and evolution of the Union; including matters of the Single European 
Market and enlargement, in addition to the economic development of the European 
economy. Perhaps one of the most significant areas of policy addressed by the 
Council is that of external relations. First-order issues such as the EU's position with 
regard to international organisations and negotiations, such as the WTO, matters 
associated with high-profile international incidents such as the former Yugoslavia and 
the Middle East and the direction of policy towards the emerging states of Eastern 
Europe are all matters considered by Council members. 21 
4.4.4 A European Legislature - The European Parliament 
We have considered the primary role of both the Council of Ministers and of the 
European Commission in initiating, formulating and implementing European 
legislation and policy; roles which would typically be notionally reserved for both the 
executive and legislative arms of Sovereign governments. The European Parliament, 
20  Jupille, J. 'The European Union and International Outcomes' International Organisation., 423. 
21 Von Ham, P. 'The EU and the WEU: From Cooperation to Common Defence?' In Edwards, 
G. & Pijpers, A. (Eds.) The Politics of European Treaty Reform (London: Pinter 1997), 306-325. 
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has had, from its inception, a rather tenuous role in the development of the new 
/ Europe, as it has had very litle practical power. However this power deficit, 
recognised virtualy as soon after it was initialy constituted as the Assembly of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, has, in part, been remedied, as a result of its 
symbolic and practical assertion of power in February 1999.2 
Rather than acting as the initiator of legislation, it is more accurate to characterise the 
European Parliament as a shaper or influence of legislation developed in other places. 
There are five principal ways that such influence may come about. Firstly the 
European Commission may involve appropriate elements, such as a Parliamentary 
Commitee, in the pre-legislative discussion phase, secondly the European Parliament 
can generate its own legislative program, by virtue of the submission of structured 
reports or proposals to the Commission. The Parliament's third avenue for legislative 
influence is through its input into the structure of the Commission's annual budget; it 
must be formaly consulted and agree to the annual legislative program of the 
Commission and finaly the European Parliament must be consulted, and in particular 
cases its approval sought, in relation to the most significant or politicaly sensitive 
legislation. 
4.4.5 A European Judiciary - The European Court of Justice and the European Court 
of Human Rights 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a - if not the - central element in the 
empowerment of the emergent European supranational polity. Ostensibly its role is to 
ensure that European law is observed. It achieves this end by hearing cases as to the 
particularities of the interpretation and application of the Treaties, of the legal acts and 
of the decisions adopted by the Council and the European Parliament or by the 
Commission.23 
22 The central role of the European Parliament in effecting the resignation of the entire 
membership of the European Commission in February 1999 is evidence of the increasing practical 
influence of the Parliament, as is its increased veto and co-decision powers — see Delegation of the 
European Commission to Australia and New Zealand European Union News vol.17, No.7, 
(September/October 1999), 5-6. 
23 Its key powers are: 
I. 	 referral for a preliminary hearing - when it is asked to adopt a position on the validity 
of Community provisions; 
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The ECJ's role in binding the European polity together is pivotal for three reasons. 
Firstly, the development of case law within the European Judiciary, and the Court's 
willingness to extend the scope of the European judicial competency, has resulted in 
the emergence of a body of European law that elevates the EU above the level of 
being yet another variation of an intergovernmental organisation, to a truly 
supranational one in which member states are bound by specific European law to the 
collective decisions of the Union. Further, physical sanctions are taken against those 
states who transgress the accepted body of European laws. Secondly, the Courts are 
significant in ensuring European-wide judicial consistency; if the common rules of the 
Union were to be interpreted by member state national courts differently then the 
resultant divergence of legal outcomes would significantly erode the integrity of the 
whole Union edifice. Thirdly, as the Court has proven willing to not only rule on 
annulment it has reinforced the strength of the Union and provided the EU sufficient 
power, of a supranational nature, to exert authority over member state's governments, 
national judiciaries, Parliaments and citizens. 
As the above discussion suggests, notwithstanding its modest size (16 Judges and nine 
Advocates-General) the effect of the ECJ on binding Europe together into a practical 
and homogenous whole by virtue of its case law, and the integrative and state-making 
consequences of many of its decisions makes its importance disproportionate to its 
size. Corresponding to its structural importance the European judiciary is a 
reinforcing feature of European identification. It provides an evocation and defence of 
a common European normative system, it reinforces the status of Europeans as free 
and equal citizens, allows them the right to initiate actions and thus creates and 
sustains a meaningful common European rights domain. Finally it provides security 
for individual Europeans from the political resistance of national governments. Such 
2. proceedings for annulment - to annul those acts of the institutions that are at variance 
with the provisions of the treaty; 
3. proceedings for Failure to Act - to secure a ruling where the Council or Commission 
has failed to act to meet its legal obligations; and 
4. proceedings for Infringement - where a member state has failed to comply with a 
ruling of the court of justice. 
see Moussis, N. Handbook of European Union: Institutions and Policies. 4th Edition. (Rixensart: 
European Study Service 1997), 37. 
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resistance forms either generalised resistance to integration or opposition to 
constitutionaly granted European rights. Accordingly European Judicial integration 
contributes to civic integration and the promotion of common European rights and 
security, which are core elements of common civic identification. 
4.5 	 The Policy Domains of the European Supranation 
According to the scope of the initial treaties, the policy domain of supranational 
Europe was of a particularly limited and specific nature. The treaty establishing the 
ECSC resulted in policy development limited to economic policy while the Treaty 
establishing EURATOM was focused upon the trans-national management of atomic 
materials, their purchase, usage and disposal. The measures for establishing the 
internal market as outlined in the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Common 
Market were strongly focused upon financial maters. Apart from the establishment of 
a unified customs union, the most important policy initiatives were: 
1. competition policy, the atainment of free movement of persons and 
capital and the right of establishment; 
2. coordination of general economic policy; 
3. a common agricultural policy; 
4. a common transport policy; and 
5. preliminary positions in regard to energy and regional policy. 
Development of broader social policy, external policy and deeper policy to assist 
further financial integration and harmonisation did not occur until some time after the 
initial treaty's ratification. The European supranational policy mix is more than 
removal of internal trade barriers or harmonisation of internal non-tariff barriers; it 
extends beyond this into areas including working conditions, environment protection 
and education, areas normaly reserved as domains for sovereign states.24 
24 It should be noted that the European polity does not have a uniform degree of involvement in 
the development and implementation of policy within and between its member states. Its 
responsibilities for policy development varies significantly across policy areas. Accordingly while the 
European Union has extensive policy involvement and legal competence in areas such as agriculture 
trade and fishing, it shares such responsibilities with the governments of member states in policy fields 
such as working conditions, regional development and completion policy and has limited policy input 
and jurisdiction in areas such as health, education, foreign afairs and defence. 
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Significant policies of supranational Europe can be divided into the folowing 
categories: 
1. external relations; 
2. the Single Market; 
3. regional and social policy; 
4. economic and monetary integration; and 
5. cooperation in the Fields of Home Afairs and Justice. 
4.6 	 The Creation of a Supranational European 'Sovereign' Domain 
4.6.1 Introductory Remarks 
The construction of a European sovereign space, central to supranationalism, is 
influenced by a variety of factors. Such factors include the strength of the structures 
and institutions of the Union relative to the member states, the nature and scope of the 
European treaty system, and the relationship between Europe, its citizens, and with 
the rest of the world. The central element in sovereignty is, however, the autonomy of 
European institutions and the decisions of such institutions both internaly, within 
European territory, and externaly, in terms of the recognition of the European polity 
and its decisions by members of the international community.25 Both factors largely 
contribute to the description of a European sovereign space. 
4.6.2 European Law and European Sovereignty 
While the treaties and institutions of Europe are the building blocks of the European 
supranational polity; it is the competence of European law that is the mortar that holds 
'Europe' together. As opposed to intergovernmental organisations, wherein action is 
cooperative and based on generaly unenforceable international law, within the 
European polity the nature, competence and applicability of very detailed and specific 
European law is such that the polity has both a set of autonomous legal instruments, 
paramount over those other member states, and further it has a legal personality and a 
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institutional identity separate from that of its constituent member states. European 
member states have displayed a willingness to voluntarily surrender certain legal and 
institutional judicial powers across a diverse range of areas at the state level, and to 
accept the precedents of the European Courts that have greatly extended the Judicial 
competency of Europe. Such a process is both a reflection of member states' 
acceptance of their own national limitations in pursuing complex policy objectives, 
and more importantly reflects the importance and autonomy of the emerging 
European polity. 
The Court of Justice has exercised the greatest influence in extending (widening) and 
strengthening (deepening) the competence of the European Union. Its judicial 
activism has significantly facilitated the formal adjustment from the primacy of 
member state's national legislation and judicial judgements to almost universal 
acceptance of the paramountcy of European law; a central element in the formation of 
a supranational European polity. As a consequence of Court judgements, European 
cohesion has been reinforced in areas as diverse as European citizenship, the practical 
operation of the Single European Market, employment law, health policy 
harmonisation and the Common Agricultural Policy. European Court judgements 
have required that not only other community institutions, but more significantly 
member state Governments, to act in a manner consistent with the European Treaty 
System and more broadly with regard to an expansionist, inclusive vision of European 
federation and harmonisation. 
The paramount characteristics and effects of the European Judicial system in not only 
the direct application of EU law but further extending the bounds of supranational 
Europe are best illustrated by reference to particular cases. In 1963, in Van Gend en 
Loos, the Court observed that: 
"The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the 
functioning of which is a direct concern to interested parties in the 
Community, implies that this treaty is more than an agreement which merely 
creates mutual obligations between the contracting states . . . the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the 
25 See James A, Sovereign Statehood. (London: Allen & Unwin 1988), for a brief introduction 
on the nature of sovereignty. 
135 
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of the Member States. Community law 
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to 
confer on them rights which become part of their legal heritage." 26 
The 'direct effect' capacity of European law (which refers to the capacity of EC law 
to be invoked by individuals in proceedings before national courts) was the central 
principle of the Van Gend en Loos case. It ensures that not only can EC law be 
invoked at the supranational level, but also at a national level. While at the 
supranational level the Commission may initiate proceedings against a defaulting 
state, at the national level an individual who believes that s/he is prejudiced by a 
violation of Community law it is possible to both seek to persuade the Commission to 
bring the member state to account in the court and secondly the individual can invoke 
European law in national courts to seek redress. Accordingly 'direct effect' reinforces 
the independence and judicial sovereignty of the European polity, at the expense of 
the sovereignty and competence of member states. Further it acts to dissolve the 
division between community law and national law while at the same time serves as a 
means of creating individual rights and thus assisting in the practical elaboration of 
European Citizenship. As Mancini and Keeling have commented: 
"As a result of Van Gend en Loos, the unique feature of Community law is its 
ability to impinge directly on the lives of individuals, who are declared to be 
the 'subjects' of the new legal order, entitled as such to invoke rights 'which 
become part of their legal heritage'. The effect of Van Gend en Loos was to 
take community law out of the hands of the politicians and bureaucrats and to 
give it to the people. Of all the Court's democratising achievements none can 
rank so highly in practical terms."27 
The supremacy of European over national law reveals not simply its independence 
from national constraints, but is further illustrative of the supranational sovereignty of 
the European polity. In Costa v. ENEL, the European Court of Justice defined the 
central constitutional principle of the supremacy of Union law, notwithstanding the 
fact that there is an absence of codification in Treaty of such supremacy; another 
26 
Weatherill, S. Law and Integration in the European Union. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), 18 
27  Ibid., 99. 
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indication of the progressive nature of the court in the construction of the European 
polity. In that case the Court ruled that: 
"The integration into the laws of each member State of provisions which 
derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and spirit of the 
Treaty, make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence 
to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them 
on the basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent 
with the legal system. The executive force of Community law cannot vary 
from one state to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without 
jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the treaty." 28 
It follows from these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of 
its character as Union law and without the legal basis of the Union itself being called 
into question. 29 Thus Community law has been held to be supreme over national law 
as the integrity of the Union would be undermined without such pre-eminence. 
In those circumstances where member states fail to implement directives, and thus 
deny European citizens their intended rights, the European court, and in effect the 
national courts, which in practical and policy terms become community courts, can 
act to prevent the fragmentation of the Union system. Further, States are liable for 
failure to implement directives, and can be liable to an individual in damages. This 
was first illustrated in Andrea Francovich and others v. Italian State." The ECJ held 
that Union law recognised the liability of the state to compensate for loss suffered as a 
result of their deprivation of the protection it was intended that thecomplainants 
should receive under the directive. Again Union law was found to be pre-eminent at 
national level and the court acted to apply sanctions against individual states which 
failed to act in a manner consistent with Union law. 
Accordingly, the European Court of Justice is perhaps the most powerful institution in 
ensuring the provisions of the European Treaties and the legislative proposals of the 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
3° Ibid., 127. 
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Council and Community actually results in the harmonious operation of supranational 
Europe. We have earlier observed the Court's power of direct effect, the primacy of 
its decisions, and while its competence is a moot point it is clearly steadily increasing. 
It has the power to impose a penalty against either divergent states or individuals, and 
is capable of providing opinions on the compatibility of proposed international 
agreement is compatible with the provisions of the Treaty. It is not unreasonable to 
accept Nugent's remarks that: 
"The legal framework (of the European Union) . . . constitute the single most 
important feature distinguishing the EU from other international 
organisation."3I 
4.6.3 Sovereign Outcomes - The Manifestation of a European Sovereign Space 
We have considered the nature of supranationalism in Europe in some detail, having 
considered its legal and judicial framework and its formal institutions. In this section 
we will focus on an analysis of Supranational Europe's tangible outcomes, or the 
degree to which the EU has displayed the authority and paramountcy that we earlier 
described as being central to supranationalism. The completion of the European 
supranational polity is demonstrated to the extent that European member states 
condition their behaviour to meet the expectations and to avoid the sanctions of 
supranational Europe. 
The application of Union law at the member state level represents a particularly 
tangible test of the compliance of member states to European integration. To the 
extent that individual states demonstrate adherence to Union law we argue that the 
idea of a European sovereign space is manifested. Based upon analysis conducted by 
the Commission the number of suspected infringements of Community law has 
remained relatively static in the period 1990 to 1994 with the actual figures being: 
31 
Nugent, N The Government and Policies of the European Union. (London: MacMillan 1994). 
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Source: Commission of the European Communities 12th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application 
of Community Law 1994, 82 
The transposition of Commission Directives into national law, which is an essential 
element in both the effective manifestation of European sovereignty varies 
significantly between each member state, with Greece appearing the least 
conscientious in this regard, and Denmark the most, as the table below indicates: 
Table 4.2 	 National Adoption of Community Directives 1994 
Member State Directive Applicable 






Belgium 1213 1088 89.7 
Denmark 1213 1184 97.6 
Germany 1216 1107 91.0 
Greece 1214 1053 86.7 
Spain 1214 1108 91.2 
France 1214 1120 92.3 
Ireland 1213 1115 91.9 
Italy 1213 1072 88.4 
Luxembourg 1213 1137 93.7 
Netherlands 1213 1137 93.7 
Portugal 1213 1171 96.3 
United Kingdom 1213 1084 89.4 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 12th Annual Report on Monitoring the 
Application of Community Law  1994, v 
Accordingly by 31 December 1994 the Member States had, on average, notified 
91.89% of the national implementing measures required to give effect to the EU 
directives; thus confirming the supremacy of European legal authority. In the main 
areas of European policy, the single market, Agriculture and the environment, 
member states are improving the transposition of Community law into national law in 
the first two, but are less diligent in implementing Union environmental law at the 
national level. 
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A further test of the internal sovereignty of the European polity is the degree to which 
the member states' national courts have sought preliminary rulings from the European 
Court of Justice where difficulties arose within the national courts in the interpretation 
of community law or where there were doubts as to the validity of a Community 
Instrument. To the extent that this mechanism has increased, as the figures detailed in 
the table below illustrate, we conclude that the perceived authority of European law 
over that of its member states law and national judicial systems is increasing. 
Between the years 1990 to 1994 there was a 61 per cent increase in national 
references to the European courts. 
Table 4.3 Preliminary Rulings Sought from the European Court of Justice 







Source: Commission of the European Communities 12th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application 
of Community Law 1994, 338 
4.6.4 European External Sovereignty 
"[European States] will find themselves compelled - regardless of their 
original intention - to adopt common policies vis-a-vis third parties. Members 
will be forced to hammer out a collective external position (and in the process 
are likely to rely increasingly on the new central institutions to do it)."32 
The cohesiveness of European sovereignty can be established not only by reference to 
the autonomy and penetrative powers of European law within its domestic setting but 
also by reference to the unity and cohesiveness and continuity of supranational 
Europe externally. European sovereignty is established by reference to the supremacy, 
cohesiveness and differentiation of its actions in world politics by virtue of its external 
relations in areas such as trade, defence and development policy. Such symmetry 
reveals both the European polity international personality and also its growing 
sovereignty, relative to the sum of the member states that comprise it. 
32 . Lindberg and Scheingold, The European Community in World Politics., 10. 
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European external sovereignty has, in part, been established by virtue of the 
international recognition of the EU as having both a legal personality and an 
independent role in international relations. The status of individual organisations as 
having a separate identity in international law has been established in the Reparations 
Case (Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 1949) 33 
In that case, decided by the International Court of Justice, it was established that 
international organisations, in this instance the United Nations, "was an international 
person capable of possessing international rights and duties and capable of 
maintaining its rights by bringing international claims". 34 From this, the court 
established that the organisation was exercising and enjoying functions and rights 
which could: "only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of 
international personality and the capacity to act on an international plane" 35 
According to Macleod, there is no doubt that the European Union, given the 
supranational powers conferred on them and their institutions by their constituent 
treaties, satisfies the criteria for international personality as established in the 
Reparations Case. Moreover, unlike the Charter of the United Nations, each Union 
treaty expressly confers legal personality on the organisation it creates, thus 
demonstrating the supranational intentions of the member states to establish a legal 
entity - with its own separate personality and identity. Furthermore, each treaty 
confers powers on the community to act on the international plane by concluding 
international agreements, and the EU has acted in a direct manner as a separate 
sovereign entity, in exercising its powers. The European Union's separate 
international sovereign identity is further established not only by its conferred external 
competencies, but also by the positive recognition given to it by other international 
actors to its legal capacity under international law. Macleod goes on to suggest: 
33 MacLeod, I. Hendry, I. &Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities 






"So is the widespread acknowledgment of the Communities and their 
representatives as being entitled to possess certain rights and duties 
corresponding to the rights and duties of States and their representatives." 36 
The external recognition of its legal personality confirms the EU as a distinct, separate 
and unique actor in international relations and confirms the EU's status as a member 
of the international polity. For example Article XI of the Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organisation, signed at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, provides as 
follows: 
1. The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of 
this Agreement and the European Communities, which accept this agreement 
and the multilateral Trade Agreements and for which schedules of 
Concessions and Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which 
Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become 
original members of the WTO" 37 
The scope of the European polity in external autonomous action is conditional, but 
nonetheless comprehensive. It should be noted that although EU law has supremacy 
over the national laws of Member States, the EC is not recognised as a sovereign state 
and consequently does not have all the powers of sovereign states to conclude 
international agreements. However in the case of external trade policy, as with other 
policy areas, Member States, in accordance with the EEC and amending treaties, have 
given up some of their treaty making powers to the community. As with domestic, 
internal policy, the activism of the European Court of Justice has extended the 
competence of the Communities in external trade policy beyond that stipulated in 
treaty. Accordingly the Union has justifiably claimed the right to negotiate and 
conclude international treaties, covering an ever widening number of sectors of EU 
activity and to participate either together with or on behalf of member states. The 
participating role of the Union varies according to the terms of the treaty concerned 
and can be limited to participation without vote, with vote, on behalf of or with 
member states. The provisions of these treaties have a binding effect on member 
states and have a direct effect on individuals and can have a limiting effect on the 
36  Ibid. 
37  .Emiliou, N. & O'Keeffe, D. The European Union and World Trade Law. (Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons 1996,) 3. 
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individual actions of member States once the Community has exercised its external 
competence.38 
4.6.5 The European Supranational Polity and World Trade 
The practical completion of the Single European Market folowing the institution of 
the SEA has led to a greater centralising of powers, as considered in relation to EU 
external trade relations.39 This was further amplified as a consequence of the 
provisions of the TEU, which affected the roles of the institutions in relation to their 
power over the conduct of trade relations. 
The EU, folowing the SEA, has taken ful part in multilateral international trade 
negotiations including GATT rounds. Further, the recognition of the EU as having a 
paramount external competence is evidenced by the fact that over 140 countries have 
diplomatic representation accredited to the EC and about 120 trade and other 
agreements have been concluded between the EC and third countries as wel as about 
30 multilateral agreements.° 
The establishment of effective European sovereignty by virtue of its external trade 
relations is expressly stated by treaty and implied by the European Court of Justice 
and the principle of implied powers. The independence of EU institutions to act 
independently of member states, or to act in paralel with them, is stated in treaty and 
case law. Without wishing to give an exhaustive analysis of the minutia it is suficient 
to state that folowing the reasoning of Article 113 of the EEC that in the commercial 
policy of the community that it should have the same content as that of a state. Further 
the ECJ has found that the community has both the capacity to enter into binding 
agreements with other subjects of international law and that whether the EU has the 
authority (competence) to enter into an agreement in a particular case depends on the 
question as to whether a treaty provision expressly or implicitly provides the authority 
38 see article 228 (7) TEU.in Rudden, B. & Wyat, D.(Eds) Basic Community Laws (6th  Edition) 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
39 	 . Emiliou, N. & O'Keefe, D. The European Union and World Trade Law. 19 
40  Ibid., 20. 
143 
to do so. However it has been clearly established that the EU has exclusive 
competence in the fields of commercial policy including the entering into association 
agreements, the undertaking of financial obligations and entering into international 
agreements with third countries for research and development. Further the EU has 
acquired exclusive external powers in dealing with the UN and other international 
organisations including the GATT.41 
Accordingly in matters concerning international economic relations, the role of 
individual member states is secondary. Member states cannot assume international 
responsibilities likely to affect community rules or obligation; the framework of EU 
commercial policy both internally and externally limits the scope of independence for 
individual member states. While there is some dispute over the division of power 
between the EU and member states in the field of external relations, there can be little 
doubt that the EU has a separate, differentiated and independent competency and thus 
acts in a sovereign manner relative to the position of its constituent member states. 42 
41 
The principles of the powers relating to the EC's external relationships can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. The Principle of General Powers. Article 210 of the EEC Treaty provides that the 
Community has legal personality which 'means that in its external relations the 
Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with third countries 
over the whole field of objectives defined in part one of the treaty. 
2. The principle of implied powers. In order to determine in an individual case the 
Community's authority to enter into international agreements: 
"Regard must be had to the whole scheme of the treaty no less than to its substantive 
provisions. Such authority arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty. 
• • but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures 
adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions." 
3. The principle of exclusivity. Each time the Community, with a view to implementing 
a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, has adopted common rules, whatever form 
these may take: 
"The Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even 
collectively, to undertake obligations with third counties which affect those 
rules. As and when such common rules come into being, the Community alone 
is in a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations affecting the 
whole sphere of application of the community legal system." 
42 
The preeminance of the EU over its constituent member states is widely recognised in 
international trade. The US Government has publicly stated that the EU, rather than its member states 
form the locus of trade policy and perceived trade barriers. See National Trade Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers. (Washington D.C. Office of the United States Trade Representative 1996), 91- 
115. 
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Substantial examples of the external independence of a European polity are most 
prominently found in the negotiations associated with the GATT. 
The Uruguay round of GATT demonstrated the international communities recognition 
of the EU's autonomy, while EC Member states acted independently of the EU, the 
European Court of Justice have recognised the 'substitution' of the EU for member 
states in the conclusion and implementation of international agreements such as the 
1994 GATT. 
The creation of the WTO offered the opportunity to draw the formal international law 
consequences from this both internal and external recognition of the supremacy and 
autonomy of the EU, and thus to formally replace the member states by the EC. 
However political considerations (the negotiations for the TEU was progressing 
concurrently with the negotiations for the establishment of the WTO and for 
pragmatic reasons it was considered unwise to push the issue of EC paramountcy in 
the WTO, in case negotiations towards the TEU was upset) led to the result that under 
Article XI of the WTO agreement both the member states and the European 
Communities have become original members of the WT0. 43 Accordingly, despite the 
explicit external acknowledgment by international organisations and states of the 
separateness and paramountcy of the EU, the potential for internal dispute worked 
against the EU succeeding the member states formally as members of the WTO. 
Perhaps the most obvious aspect of Europe's external economic competence is that 
associated with agricultural trade, and in particular with the external consequences of 
the Common Agricultural Policy. The Community's desire to formulate a new policy 
basis for agricultural production and income support for primary producers in the 
sovereignties has led, as the policy has evolved, to create policy and mechanisms that 
highlight the primacy and independence of the EU. 
43 
Moussis, N.  Handbook of European Union: Institutions and Policies.,  87. 
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While research into even a single aspect of the CAP has been likened to 'chasing a 
moving target through thick fog' 4 for our purposes an examination of how it 
confirms supranational Europe competency is a relatively straightforward task. The 
CAP is a pivotal aspect of the creation of the European polity. The reverse side of 
CAP's essential features which in effect are internal production subsidies, are 
externaly focused export subsidies to shift excess European farm product off-shore, 
and the imposition of common agricultural tariffs to lower-priced world market 
primary products to inhibit their penetration into the European market. The European 
polity artificialy increases prices paid within the Union for domesticaly produced 
foodstuffs by the application of production subsidies, and significantly restricts the 
introduction of third country products by applying import tariffs, and habitualy 
'dumping' surplus European product on the world market at below production cost. 
The paramountcy of the CAP over member state's agricultural policy, its external 
manifestation in export subsidies to community producers and import quota's and 
tariffs for would-be importers is evidence of the very real and tangible presence of a 
separate, autonomous and most significantly, sovereign European polity in the 
international arena. 
4.7 	 Who's Running Europe? - Emergent Supranation and Existent Nation - 
Managing the Dynamic 
It would be naive to argue that the transition from European intergovernmentalism to 
supranationalism has occurred on a linear path. There have been both significant 
disruptions and relapses into the assertion of member state autonomy and their right to 
pursue individual ends, and at the same time atempts by other states to hasten the 
process of integration. The United Kingdom's failure to join the European Community 
in the 1950's and then, as a consequence of France's position, her exclusion from the 
Community until 1973 is perhaps the first significant example of differentiation or 
'variable geometry' within the supranational process. While the United Kingdom 
represented the first division within the Union, even within the original EEC Treaty of 
Rome, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were alowed (at Article 233 of the 
44 Usher.J, Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1988) 
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Treaty of Rome) to develop a deeper form of integration than that agreed by the 
original six members. In 1963 France and Germany signed a bilateral treaty of 
friendship and cooperation which has had the effect of strengthening their mutual 
integration; Britain and the Irish Republic had established a closer relationship and 
members of the Nordic Council have developed linkages separate but complimentary 
to European integration. 
The potential scale and competencies of the Communities became increasingly 
apparent once the customs union was completed. In 1975 the Belgian Prime Minister, 
Leo Tindemans, drew attention to the European Council and that some member states 
were more prepared in economic and political terms to fully integrate into Europe 
than other states. 45 It was inevitable that a mechanism should be put in place to allow 
differences in development of the European member states towards fulfilling 
provisions of integration, as Tindemans said: 
"This does not mean Europe a la carte: each country will be bound by the 
agreement of all as to the final objective to be achieved in common; it is only 
the time scales for achievement which vary."46 
Accordingly flexible integration, with a common base and optional open partnerships 
in less important policy areas, provided a loose basis for the development of Europe 
on a variable geometry basis. However, such differentiation has provided haphazard 
results, and allowed European member states to evade complete integration. Such a 
result has compromised the supranational process. Examples of this 'differentiation' 
may be found in three main areas, the Social Charter, the common currency and 
defence matters. 
The Social Charter, while endorsed and implemented by all the EU states with the 
exception of the United Kingdom up until the recent change of Government, is a 
central element in deepening the Union and strengthening it by including greater civil 
and social rights. In the case of Britain's intransigence, and the inability of the Union 
45 Background Paper Dividing the Union? Britain and the IGC Federal Trust Conference 11 June 





to formally ensure compliance, reveals the primacy in this matter of national rather 
than supranational interests. 
The common currency strongly illuminates the differentiation of member states in a 
less than solid supranational environment. The issues concerning the relationship 
between those member states that have made the transition to the single currency in 
1999 and those who have not, further reveal a disjuncture in the supranational 
attributes of the Union. However the refusal of the United Kingdom to engage in the 
ERM not only reveals the opportunities that all EU states have to effectively 'opt out' 
of the supranational pact, but further demonstrates the brittleness of the supranational 
enterprise wherein certain states condemn themselves to the second or third tier of the 
European supranation. In the field of defence only ten of the fifteen member states 
have joined (in stages) the Western European Union (an organisation which itself 
lacks significant supranational differentiation from its constituent member states), 
likewise only eleven member states have joined NATO, although three others are 
participants in NATO's 'Partnership for Peace'. 47 
Such differentiation does not necessarily distance Europe from an interpretation of 
supranational integration, but it does distance Europe from a more traditional 
definition of statehood. It is an environment of member states moving forward at 
varying rates, and with the practical replacement of a multi-speed Europe being 
replaced by a wider, multi-tier Europe. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
illustrated the problematic issues associated with further integration. Further progress 
in the integration of social policy, the introduction of measures to make a reality of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and common monetary policy are frustrated 
not only by the practical difficulty in achieving such uniformity in functional terms, 
but the unwillingness of particular states to progress them. The enlargement of the 
Union in 1995 to include Austria, Finland and Sweden, and the further potential 
inclusion of central, southern and eastern states serves to attenuate the coherence of 
47 
See Balanzino, S. 'A Year after Sintra: Achieving Cooperative Security through the EAPC 
and PIP' NATO Review No. 3 Autumn 1998 Volume 46. 
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the Union in important policy areas and to dilute its supranational effectiveness." 
Steps which would enhance the integrity and potency of the Union, and give it a 
greater supranational identity, include collapsing the third pillar into the first, the 
incorporation of the Schengen agreement within the Treaty and the implementation of 
practical measures to make a reality of the common foreign and security policy, while 
supported by the majority of states, has proven difficult to achieve when individual 
states have mounted opposition to further integration. In such a situation, most clearly 
illustrated in the case in the United Kingdom's posturing during the Thatcher years, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that European supranationalism has yet to fully 
present itself." 
Notwithstanding the motivations of the individual member states and their differing 
capabilities to more fully integrate into the European project, the core elements of 
European supranationalism are in place. Europe, as a consequence of its treaty system 
has a coherent constitutional order. 5° European law is constitutionally superior to that 
of its member states and has direct effect on the member states, and the individuals 
and corporate entities that exist within them. 51 The tensions between the European 
48 See Wallace, W. From Twelve to Twenty-Four? The Challenges to the EC Posed by the 
Revolutions in Eastern Europe.' In Crouch, C. & Marquand, D. (Eds.) Towards Greater Europe: A 
Continent Without an Iron Curtain  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1993), 34-51. 
49 Importantly while enlargement has the potential to make decision making more difficult, the 
retention and spread of qualified majority voting in an enlarged European polity means that the role and 
importance of the smaller European states, becomes proportionately greater. For example in the EU of 
12 (prior to the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland) the qualified majority was attained when 54 
votes were counted, constituting 71% of the 76 votes. Accordingly two big European States could ally 
with a 'small' one to block a decision. As the Union enlarges, with an increasing percentage of votes 
being held by smaller states, the ability of the major European states to block decisions is increasingly 
reduced. 
50 Interestingly, its constitutional order is considerably more transparent than a number of its 
member states constitutional arrangements, such as the United Kingdom and Italy. 
51 As was found in the Van Gend en Loos case: 
" . . . the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which 
the states have limited their sovereign rights . ."; and 
"Independently of the Legislation of Member States, Community law . . . not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but it is intended to confer upon them rights which will become part 
of their legal heritage." 
Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transportaen Expedite Oderneming Van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.1. 
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polity and the member states, is, in part, explained by two factors, firstly European 
supranationalism has not been accompanied by a functional recharting of European 
political boundaries, to reflect the erosion of state sovereignty. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the member states have been quick to point out that the building of a 
supranational Europe, despite its material advantages, has yet to be fuly matched by 
the building of a participative and representative 'people's Europe'. It is argued that 
community, society and identity continue to reside at a national rather than a 
supranational leve1.52 
4.8 	 Chapter Four - Concluding Remarks 
4.8.1 The European Polity - Supranational or a Late Modern Form of State? 
".. never in human history have different nations cooperated so closely with 
one another, implemented so many common policies or, in such a short space 
of time, harmonised ways of life and economic situations which differed so 
greatly at the outset."53 
Both the functioning and study of the emergent European polity is at an early stage. 
Europe more closely resembles a state than many pre-existing states, yet to describe it 
as a state or even a `proto-state' is premature. While Europe appears particularly 
strong in its institutional, policy and most especialy judicial competencies, the 
European polity stil fals wel short of the basic profile of a state. The European 
polity lacks ultimate coercive force and is reliant upon intergovernmental, rather than 
supranational, structures for internal policing. The European Union is weak in terms 
of the traditional tax and expenditure functions of government. As Caporso aptly and 
simply states: "The extractive capacity of EU institutions is nearly zero."54 The 
question of legitimacy remains deeply problematic, ,and further distances the 
European Union from the traditional conception of the state. Further the EU's 
52 See Weiler, J. 1996 European Neo-constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the 
European Constitutional Order. Political Studies XLIV, 517-533, 524. 
53 Moussis, N. Handbook of European Union: Institutions and Policies., 13. 
54 Caporaso, 'The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-
Modern?' Journal of Common Market Studies., 39. 
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institutions remain, as they began, systematically different from those of national 
governments. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the European polity displays significant 
supranational attributes. The emergent European supranational polity exists as a 
stable, clearly structured instrument not only of international co-operation, but 
supranational authority. It has agreed aims, and specific institutional features such as 
statutes, rules of procedure, and objective criteria for membership. It acts with 
significant autonomy in important policy domains with increasingly narrower avenues 
for other subordinate polities to constrain or induce its behaviour. The European 
supranation has its own constitution (the European Treaties), its own legislative, 
executive and judiciary. It has a range of autonomous policy instruments and policy 
objectives. Its decision making procedures, increasingly based on qualified majority 
voting and co-decision, underme the ability of member states to opt out of its 
decisions. Compliance with the European supranation, as we have observed, is closely 
monitored, and actions are taken against its members for non-compliance. Such are 
the powers of the European polity, and its ability to compel its constituent member 
governments to act differently than they would otherwise have done, and the fact that 
the European supranation has a role separate than that willed by its membership, 
confirms that we are entirely justified in determining the separate, independent and 
capable nature of the European supranation. Further, its institutions, and the values 
that underpin them establish the pre-conditions for the articulation of a common 
European civic identity. As Jacques Delors suggests: 
"For civilisation, the unification of Europe has a significance which goes 
beyond peace and security. Europe stands at the starting point of that progress 
from which we will all benefit; and Europeans, thanks to their creative spirit, 
can provide to the development of civilisation a contribution as great as that of 
the past. However to allow this creative spirit to bloom again, we must bring 
about union." 55 
The European Union, which evolved from both the renewed drive for European 
integration in the post war period, and which reflected the imperatives of the 
international market is perhaps the first of a new type of state. It is, as Bomschier has 
55 Delors, J. in Ishay, M. 'European Integration: The Enlightenment Legacy.' History of European 
Ideas Vol. 19, Nos 1-3, 207-213, 207. 
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commented: "a somewhat strange hermaphrodite - something between a confederation 
of states and a federal state."56 The European Union is not a federal State uniting 
several states within the framework of a single polity, with a single state-endorsed 
nation and national identity, and with an international legal personality. Nor is it a 
confederation of states. The EU appears as a federal state in so far as the sovereignty 
of its member states are truncated by self-imposed limiting treaties creating 
Community Law - the acquis communautaire, which is supranational in intent and 
execution. However the EU still appears as a confederation of independent states to 
the extent that individual member state jurisdictions continue to exist, as do active 
state sponsored nations. Taylor has suggested that the EU is simply a powerful 
illustration of the limits of state-theory insofar as it; "is neither a federation in the 
making nor a society in the betraying". 57 Accordingly hitherto theoretical approaches 
to European integration may be imperfect insofar as Europe represents an entirely 
new form of political association, yet to be adequately categorised. 
Despite these ambiguities the case for the recognition of the European Union as an 
emergent independent polity is strong. Within its territory, the Union has jurisdiction 
over an ever enlarging range of policy domains, including internal economic 
regulation, social policy and the regulation of transport, communications and 
increasing coercive responsibilities. There are few aspects of internal European life 
that are not directly influenced by the European Union and its laws. Externally, the 
European Union's autonomy and competence is acknowledged in its acceptance as a 
respected and powerful figure on the international stage. During the renegotiation of 
the GATT the EU was an accepted party to the bargaining process. Its status as an 
independent polity is further acknowledged, as Springer suggests; "International 
politicians have added Brussels to their itinerary when on world tours." 58 The 
European polity shares considerable similarities with a confederation to the extent that 
it is dependent upon funding from local contributions from constituent member states. 
56 See Volker Bornschier 1997' European Processes and the State of the European Union' Paper 
presented at the third European Sociological Association Conference, University of Essex (UK), 27-30 
August 1997. 
57 




Europe resembles a federal state insofar as sovereignty is divided between itself and 
its constituent members and to the extent that its supranational law is supreme in its 
sphere and member state national law is supreme in its jurisdiction. However Europe 
also takes on the characteristics of a unitary state. There is an increasing degree of 
centralisation of state powers and to the extent that there exists European citizenship 
and where the European polity acts directly upon individuals, by-passing member 
stateS.59 
Whether or not we agree with Raymond Vernon's description of the European Union 
as: "an historical aberration smuggled into the family of nations"60 it is clear that the 
European Union presents us with a further challenge to the traditional conceptions of 
statehood and state formation. The European polity is clearly inconsistent with the 
traditional model of state formation based upon the expression of, and claim for self-
determination of national elements within it. Neither does it accord with the 
traditional model of states, its external competence is limited, it cannot sufficiently 
project external power to guarantee its sovereignty by military means and it lacks a 
meaningful executive and forms of representation. However what the European Union 
does achieve in the context of the declining competence of the member states which 
comprise it, is that it pools and sharpens the sovereignty of its member states. The 
Union represents the real power of the member states in the face of rigorous global 
forces which have denuded the competency and authority of the individual European 
states. Europe has subsumed much of the authority of the member states however it is 
not a state. It is a new form of supranation, one which challenges our conception of 
statehood and confirms the vulnerability of the traditional state. 6I 
59 
For a useful typology of the differing forms of Government see Jaensch, D. The Politics of 
Australia, 2nd Edition 1997, 45. 
60 
Quoted in Volker Bornschier, 'European Processes and the State of the European Union' ,.2. 
61 
However there are reforms that need to be instigated if the supranationality of the EU is not to 
be compromised; no greater example of this is in the matter of EU enlargement. The planned expansion 
of the EU to 20 or 25 member states poses central problems for the European polity, both in terms of 
achieving effective decision making processes, which are sufficiently inclusive but outcome orientated, 
and the need for reforms in fundamental policy areas, most especially the Common Agricultural Policy, 
in order to practically manage the EU's finite resources. 
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The significance of the emergence of the European supranational polity for the 
emergence of a clearly articulated European identity is clear. We have, in Chapter 
Three, established that centralised and authoritative political institutions can create the 
appropriate structures and policy instruments capable of influencing communal 
identity. That identities can originate from the dominant political institutions is not 
problematic, what is unique, is that in the case of contemporary Europe, however is 
that such institutions are supranational rather than state-based. Communal identity has 
been traditionally understood as a social construction, a collective imagining, 
originating in the collective self-definition of a community, and in the political 
structure of the state. By contrast the supranation forms the basis of a communal 
expression of belonging. Accordingly the preceding examination in this Chapter of 
the emergent European polity is relevant, as it is from its structural autonomy that the 
reinforcers of collective European identity are constructed. 
Having established the clear supranational qualities of the European polity, and the 
scope of its political and policy structures, we will consider the mechanisms employed 
by Supranational Europe to reinforce a communal sense of European identity and the 




Reinforcers of European Supranational Identity 
5.1 	 Introductory Remarks 
"Nations are more often the consequence of seting up a state than they are its 
foundations."I 
The development of commerce and industry, the widening of markets, greater social 
mobility, urbanisation, and the speeding up of communications made it easier for 
people to 'imagine' their membership of a national cornmunity.2 In a similar manner 
the influences of trans-national economic, social and cultural markets, the 
'Europeanisation' of previously national policy domains, the removal of internal 
borders, the practical implementation of European rights within a framework of 
European citizenship and institutional support for intelectual and cultural interaction 
and communication have colectively raised the degree of European social cohesion 
and created a positive environment for a communal European identity. 
In Chapter Three we examined a number of the possible avenues available to a polity 
in its role as a stimulator of communal identity.3 In this Chapter we shal utilise the 
typology to establish their applicability at a European level. Chapter Five 
demonstrates that many of the institutional changes that have occurred in Europe 
since the end of the Second World War have had a positive influence on the 
development of a European identity. 4  
I Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality., 178. 
2 See Jenkins, B. & Sofos, S. 1996 Nation and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe: A 
Theoretical Perspective in Jenkins, B & Sofos, S. (Eds.) Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe., 
12. 
3 These being: 
1. the positive intervention of elites, 
2. the consolidation of a bounded teritory, 
3. the protection of such teritory, and the peoples it contains, 
4. economic stimulation and regulation, 
5. representation and participation of individual and communal identities and interests; 
6. political socialisation, 
7. the adoption of a state-sponsored mythology; and 
8. the centralisation and institutionalisation of economic and social domains. 
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The importance of institutional elements in the advancement of individual preferences 
and behaviours within a European context has been variously examined. Keohane is 
perhaps the clearest on the complex and subtle interaction between the institutions and 
the evocation of communal identification: 
". . . individuals, local organisations and even states develop within the context 
of more encompassing institutions. Institutions do not merely reflect the 
preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions 
themselves shape those preferences and that power. Institutions are thus 
constitutive of actors as well as vice versa. It is not sufficient in this view to 
treat the preferences of individuals as given exogenously; they are affected by 
institutional arrangements, by prevailing norms, and by historically contingent 
discourse among people seeking to pursue their purposes and solve their self-
defined problems." 5 
This Chapter demonstrates that the expression of belonging to Europe is in part 
determined by an objective materialistic calculation of perceived benefits of 
participation in the European polity. Such a phenomena is most strongly found at 
Europe's territorial periphery, where, not coincidentally, economic insecurity is most 
acute. Further, European identification is influenced by the EU's recognition and 
observance of pre-existing identities. Just as individual states provide collective 
security - a guarantee against both internal and external warfare, and personal security 
- the maintenance of personal social and economic rights; so too has Europe provided 
such rights and security sufficient to engender collective identification. Such a 
dynamic process has occurred within Europe as it has unified. 6 European states 
became 'giant insurance companies' in the three decades following the end of the 
Second World War as a consequence of their expansive social programs and planned 
" It s not our intention to demonstrate the manifestation of European identity in its entirety in this 
Chapter, but rather to demonstrate the central role that institutions have played in creating the 
conditions and opportunities for the realisation of a pan-European identity. In Chapters seven eight & 
nine we shall consider the evidence and manifestation of European identification in greater detail, 
consistent with our definition of communal identification established in Chapter One. 
5 Keohane, R. 'International Institutions: Two Approaches' In Keohane, R. (ed) International  
Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. (Boulder: Westview 1989), 158-79, 
161. 
6 Alan .S. Milward 'The Springs of Integration' in Eds Gowan, P. and Anderson P. The Ouestion 
of Europe., (London: Verso 1997) 14. 
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economic intervention.7 As those states, 'holow-out' and become less capable of 
sustaining meaningful competencies and protecting their citizen bodies from the 
detrimental effects of globalised economic and social influences, the EU has 
increasingly assumed the functions and outcomes of the constituent member states, 
with a positive efect on European identification. 
5.2 	 Specific Progress Towards a European Identity - The Role of European 
Elites 
In Chapter Three we argued that a key factor in the creation and maintenance of 
colective identification is the active intervention of elites.8 
Even the most superficial exposure to the history of the idea of a unified Europe since 
the end of the Second World War provides a plethora of biographical detail on the 
central role of European elites in the conceptualisation and building of the European 
project. The role of Churchil, Monnet, Schumann and Adenaeur in both articulating 
the vision of a common European home and in initiating the practical actions to give 
substance to their vision is unparaleled. Without the drive of Schuman there may 
have never been the emergence of the European polity, and in the absence of Monnet, 
the Schuman plan may never have been implemented. Further, the technical skil of 
Paul-Henri Spaak in establishing the framework of pan-European economic 
coordination was central to the creation of a working European polity. 
The contemporary period ofers other examples of the centrality of European political 
elites in the construction of supranational Europe. Perhaps the most influential 
European elite in the contemporary period is Jacques Delors, described as: "the first 
7 	 • Ibid. US President Lyndon B Johnson, in attempting to replicate the European experience 
expressed the process of alegiance building through the implementation of an expansive public welfare 
program as "giving people a stake in society'. 
8 There are five domains in which elites effect the process of polity-formation and the engendering 
of colective identification. Elites are firstly important in the process of institutional consolidation and 
in the extension of political, social and economic rights to the polities' individuals. Secondly the role of 
economic elites is pivotal in the reconfiguration of society so as to ensure the most effective means of 
economic production and in the emergence of a regulatory system alowing for certainty and 
consistency of economic transfers within a territory. Coercive (military) elites provide the leadership 
and the motive power to both consolidate territory, and to resist competition from both internal and 
external threats. Intelectual elites are elemental to the process of conceiving and articulating a common 
mythology of a colective people within a specific territory, with unique values, lifestyles and 
aspirations. 
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transnational leader of the new Europe." Delors was not only focussed on the goal of 
European political and economic integration, but moreover he was committed to a 
unified Europe in which European citizens could fully enjoy both material prosperity, 
but also their combined cultural and intellectual traditions.9 For Delors economic 
interdependence was to lead to political and cultural interdependence. 10 His vision 
was of a Europe both economically vibrant but also one in which citizenship and 
social issues were equally valued." 
Within the immediate past ranks of the European Commissioners we find examples of 
European elites commuted to the furtherance of the European project. We examine 
two by way of demonstration. Commissioner Hans van den Broek, the man 
responsible for accession negotiations with Eastern and Southern European states has 
had the responsibility of both establishing the nature of the territorial expansion of the 
European polity, while maintaining that the civic values and practices of the Union 
are upheld. Such key values and practices, which in part divide Europe from non-
Europe and define a European civic identity include; democratic practices and 
institutions, an independent judiciary, a market economy and the central body of 
European laws — the Acquis Communautaire. Accordingly van den Broek's role is 
pivotal in the public expression of the essential elements of European civic identity-
democracy, the free market, social protection and judicial independence, and is a 
tangible reminder of the European identity and the role of political elites in defining 
and enhancing it. 12 A further example of European elites in the articulation of a 
common polity is the work of Emma Bonino — the former European Commissioner 
9 Delors, J. Our Europe: The Community and National Development. (London: Verso 1988), 1. 
to  Ibid. The Single European Act and the Social Charter were largely the result of Delors' passion 
and commitment. So central to the process of European institutional development, and to the 
empowering of a European vision, that many have doubted the ongoing viability of Europe during the 
difficult 1980s in his absence. 
Delors' contributions to the consolidation of the European polity can be contrasted with his 
British colleague during the period, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher's opposition to 
Europe during her tenure as Conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain had the effect of not only 
excluding Britain from the full benefits of European integration during her tenure, but further provided 
a counterpoint to her European counterparts who championed European integration. Thatcher argued 
that 'Coming together in Europe would necessarily lead to a constraint on liberty.' Her effect on 
European integration, while largely symbolic, did retard the adoption of European identification 
amongst the British, an effect, which is still currently felt. See Ibid. 
12  'Hans van den Broek, Europe's Expander'. The Economist, (June 6 th 1998), 58. 
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responsible for Consumer Policy, Community Health Protection and the European 
Community Humanitarian Ofice. Commissioner Bonino has done much to strengthen 
the role and independent status of the European polity in the external world and in 
engendering a European consciousness such as in the field of food safety- specificaly 
raising European awareness of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (or Mad Cow 
Disease), which has resulted in a strong public sympathy for the work of the 
Commission.13 Her support for international humanitarian issues, as diverse as 
women's rights in Afghanistan and the plight of refugees in the former Yugoslavia, 
has struck a popular chord which resonates in the colective European consciousness, 
insofar as it reflects the primacy of European civic values. 
Considering the empirical relationship between the expression of Europeanness and 
the strength of national elite support for European integration we find that there is 
evidence of a correlation between active political elites at the member state level and 
colective European identification amongst the citizen body. We find that in those 
'pro-Europe' States, such as Germany, France, Ireland and Italy where political elites 
have been comparatively more supportive of the creation of the European polity than 
in other states, that the expressed level of European identification, from amongst the 
state's populations is considerably higher than is the case in those states such as 
Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom, where the respective political elites have 
been ambivalent towards the European project. The figure below demonstrates this 
phenomenon. 
Figure 5.1 	 European Elite Mobilisation and European Identification  
RL 	 NL 	 F 	 e 	 UK 	 FIN 	 S 
Pro EU Elites 	 Clusters of States 	 Ambl Want EU Elk a 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 
13,Emma Bonino, Europe's Commissioner for the Future'. The Economist. (September 12th 1998), 62. 
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Figure 5.1 illustrates in those states where European elites have been openly 
supportive, over an extended period of time to European integration, such as in 
Germany and France, under the leadership and direction of elites such as Monnet, 
Spaak, Adenaeur and Schumann that the level of articulated support for the EU is 
considerably higher than in those states, such as the United Kingdom, Finland and 
Sweden where elites, at least up until recently, have been resistant to European 
integration. Accordingly, we argue that there is a correlation, as the data above 
demonstrates, between the active involvement of political elites and the engendering 
of a stronger sense of support for the European project. 
5.3 The Consolidation of European Territory 
Europe's constructed landscape has taken shape more tangibly over the last five 
decades as a result of the institutional overlays that have been imposed upon it. An 
adequate definition of Europe's landscape must now take account of the evolution of 
the European polity and of the geo-political shifts of the post-cold war period. There 
has been both the realisation of a unified European landscape on one hand and on the 
other a splintering of national, cultural and religious paradigms of identity which have 
shaped the 'mental maps' of Europe. Examples of the practical consolidation of the 
European landscape are found in the uniformity of policy across the European polity; 
a single market, a Schengen security area wherein European citizens circulate freely, 
while excluding loutsiders' 14 and the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
people across a commonly shared European landscape. The extension of networks and 
flows across the EU have likewise circumvented the old 'internal' frontiers imposed 
on Europe. Those historical indicators of 'nationalised' landscape; nation and national 
territory, currency and markets, are rapidly being absorbed into the landscape of a 
greater territory. Primary markers in the remapping of the European landscape 
include hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion based on economic status (the 
prosperous middle class as opposed to migrants and the underclass) religion (the 
rediscovery of Orthodoxy, and the exclusion of the near east such as Turkey), 
economic modernity (the exclusion of the South and the East as being economically 
14 As we shall discuss more fully later in this chapter, the distinction between insider and outsider 
is based on civic grounds- on questions of citizenship - not ethnolinguistic criteria. 
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moribund) and the conception of European as a landscape of liberalism, pluralism and 
individualism. I5 
5.3.1 The Creation of a European Territorial Space -The Historical Process 
In order to appreciate the territorial raison d'etre underling the European Union it is 
necessary to briefly examine the economic and geo-political influences upon which its 
spatial features are effected. 
The consolidation of European territory has sprung from two primary sources, 
economic, and geo-political. Economically Europe was both the home of 
industrialisation and economic modernisation and had formed the workshops of the 
world for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The need to re-
establish industry and to ensure that its reliance on foreign markets was reduced while 
maximising exports necessitated the consolidation of European trading and productive 
areas into one functionally determined territorial space. Thus from the first steps with 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1952 up to and beyond the single 
currency the economic imperative of efficiency, competitiveness and the challenges 
of economic competition has driven the centralisation of European territory. 
The territory of Germany and France have historically formed the core of Europe, and 
so they remained in the formation of the first manifestation of European territoriality 
in the post-war period; the European Coal and Steel Community. These states along 
• with Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg and the Netherlands consolidated functional 
Europe's territorial shape when they joined with France and Germany to become 
founder members of the European Economic Community and EURATOM in 1957. 
The expansion of the European Union's territory was further achieved in the following 
manner: 
15 See Prodromou, E. 1996 'Paradigms, Power, and Identity: Rediscovering Orthodoxy and 
Regionalizing Europe' European Journal of Political Research (September 1996), 30, 125-154. 
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Table 5.1 	 The Expansion Of The European Union's Territory 
Year State(s) 
1957 France, Germany (west), Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands 
1973 United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland 
1981 Greece 
1986 Spain, Portugal 
1990 Germany (East) 
1995 Sweden, Austria, Finland 
5.3.2 Supranationalism and/or A Mirror of the State? 
Europe's territorial disposition is progressively becoming more regularised and 
aligned with the spatial features of statehood. Political geographers have postulated a 
model of the spatial structure of the Western state and it is reasonable to examine the 
European polity against such a theoretical model. Central to the theoretical structure 
of the state is the centre-periphery structure identified by Whitlsey and Poinds, 
utilised by Christaler and von Thunen, and Rokkan and Urwin.I6 Such theoretical 
conceptions postulate that the territorial state grows from a central core which has 
lesser, marginal peripheral spatial areas, are dependent upon the core for direction, 
economic support, and the provision of higher organisational and institutional 
functions.I7 
The centre-periphery model, is consistent with the reality of the geopolitics of the 
European Union. The genesis of the core of the European polity is the area of central 
United Kingdom, Belgium in its entirety, the Rhineland, North-Eastern France and 
south to the Po Valey. This essence of Europe's core has been variously described as 
'industrial Lotharingia' and as the European 'Golden Triangle'.18 Within this area 
there has been both a historical and contemporary concentration of resources, finance, 
population and capital. Up until the development of the North Sea energy, this area 
16 Parker, G A Political Geography of Community Europe. (London: Buterworths 1983), 41 and 
Rokkan, S. & Urwin, D. Economy, Teritory, Identity. (London: Sage Publications 1983) 
17 Parker. A Political Geography of Community Europe., 41. 
18  Industrial Lotharingia' by Geofery Parker in Parker. A Political Geography of Community 
Europe, 63 and 'Golden Triangle' by M. Wise in Wise, M. 1963 The Common Market and the changing 
Geography of Europe' Geography XLVII, Part 2, 1963. 
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was responsible for the majority of Europe's energy output; it had the most significant 
concentration of Europe's heavy industry and it contains the economic core regions of 
Belgium, the Netherlands and western Germany which merge into each other into a 
core Europe of capital accumulation and utilisation and decision making. Kormoss 
has identified this area as a: "European metropolitan area' with many of the 
characteristics of a European 'megalopolis", similar to that of the eastern seaboard of 
the United States. 19 Rokkan and Urwin have further established this crescent as the 
core of Europe by examining data on European centre-periphery economic behavior 
such as the variations in income per capita, agricultural and industrial output and even 
by such socio-economic factors such as the numbers of doctors and telephones in this 
'core' area as compared to more peripheral European territories. 20 These analyses 
suggest that, in common with European state formation in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the distributions of economic political and social flows are 
developing at a pan-European level. Reinforcing a geopolitical and economic division 
between the European polity and the 'other' which has the potential to consolidate 
and delineate cultural and social flows. Such a process, as Agnew and Corbridge 
argue, not only has the effect of consolidating markets but alse society, and as such 
enhances communal identity as such identity is no longer anchored in the nation-state 
arena but is reconfigured at a supranational leve1. 21 
5.3.3 A European Core and a Peripheral Europe 
The fifteen members of the European Union represent one of the core economic 
groupings in the global economic landscape. Collectively the member states have a 
population of approximately 373 million with an annual GDP of 7472.5 1000 Million 
euro. 22 Notwithstanding the superficial integration and consolidation of the European 
economic space suggested by Europe's unambiguously impressive economic 
19 Kormoss, I. Les Communautes Europeennes: essai d'une carte de densitede population. (Bruges 1959). 
29 Rokkan & Urwin Economy Identity Territory. 
21 Agnew, S. & Corbridge, S. Mastering Space : Hegemony, Territory and International Political  
Economy (London: Routledge 1995), 98-99 
22  The EUs GDP exceeds that of the US (7472.5 thousand million ecu compared with 7269.4) see 
http://www.Europa.eu.int/en/comm/eurostat/facts/wwwroot/en/navbar.htm  
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performance, the European economic landscape has internal boundaries which shape 
the unity and identity of Europe. 
The European economic territory comprises areas of both economic strength and 
economic inequality and marginalisation. While Germany has a GNP per capita of 
US$22,320, Portugal's is US$4,900 23 There is significant spatial differences in 
European wealth. On a general table of wealth in Europe, with a standard European 
Union index of 100, Denmark scores 138, Germany 123, France 114, Italy 102, and 
Britain 98. Whereas at Europe's territorial and economic periphery Ireland scores 60 
and Portugal 33. 24 Beyond these Western European states, are those of Eastern 
Europe. These states inhabit quite a different economic landscape; according to 
Preston: "The eastern areas of the continent approach third world levels of living." 25 
Hungary had a GNP per capita of US$2,780, Czechoslovakia US$3,140, Bulgaria 
US$2,250 and Romania US$1,640. 26 Within the overall European landscape then, we 
can identity three areas: a core landscape of the more advanced industrial economies, 
including Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; a non-core, 
peripheral, economic space including the states of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
and a frontier area, some of which lies outside of the European economic landscape 
including the former Soviet-dominated states of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Thus a centre-periphery structure can be established on a pan-European level 
consistent with the model's validity at the level of the state. The centre of Europe 
connects Europe in not only in economic terms, but also in terms of the concentration 
of political power centres. It includes the locations of the Union's own executive and 
decision making institutions. As such we can see that while the European capital is 
shared at least in political and functional terms by Strasbourg, Luxembourg and 
Brussels, in terms of economic influence Europe's capitals are London and Frankfurt. 
23 World Bank. World Development Report 1992. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
24 Franklin, M. 1990 'Britains Future in Europe'. Quoted in Preston, P.W. Political/Cultural 
Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era., 102. 
25  Preston, P.W. Political/Cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era., 102. 
26 World Bank. World Development Report 1992., 94. 
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5.3.4 European Supranational Enlargement and the Question of European 
Teritoriality 
"The Union's environment is changing fast, both internaly and externaly. It 
must set about adapting, developing and reforming itself. Enlargement 
represents a historic turning point for Europe, an opportunity which it must 
seize for the sake of its security, its economy, its culture and its status in the 
world."27 
The political enlargement of Europe holds the promise of both the disilusionment of 
historical enmity amongst European states and a tangible aspect to create a 'Common 
European Home' for al European citizens. The European Commission has envisaged 
that the European polity could soon comprise some 25 European states and 475 
milion inhabitants.28 However, for the enlargement of European territorial space 
those states outside the Union have to 'fit' the endorsed European model; as stipulated 
by the accession criteria (such criteria largely reflecting the civic aspirations of a 
communal European identity). Al applicants to the EU must accept al existing 
European rules - the acquis communautaire. Such a pre-condition proves to be a 
significant impediment to the expansion of Europe, as the EU's high standards in 
areas as diverse as social policy, the protection of citizen's rights, the operation of the 
free market and environmental policy wil prove unobtainable for many aspirants to 
European membership.29 
27 Agenda 2000 - European Commission at: htp:/europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/agenda/2000/ 
28 Communication of the Commission DOC 97/6 Agenda 2000, Part Two: The Chalenge of 
Enlargement - Impact Study.Volume 1, Strasbourg, 15 July 1997 
29 The criteria adopted by the European Council when it met in Copenhagen in June 1993 
specificaly required of those states wishing to join the EU compliance with a set of arrangements and 
standards. We believe these standards form, or aspire to form, the core of Europearmess, without 
which states may not be admited, as a consequence of their lack of adherence to these key European 
values. Such values are expressed as such: 
"membership requires that the candidate country: 
I. 	 has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities; 
2. the existence of a functioning market economy as wel as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and 
3. [has] the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union." 
Thus what makes Europe 'European', what establishes its teritorial boundary and what alows for 
extra-EU teritory to be incorporated into the European polity is established by the fundamental 
alignment of teritories and peoples with the above-stated civic criteria of democratic institutions and 
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Accordingly, the question of the territorial enlargement of Europe is largely 
dependent not upon questions of cultural or ethnic homogeneity with pre-existing 
member states as one might expect if Europe was sympathetic to the 'ethnic' paradigm 
of state-formation and collective identification outlined earlier. Rather, European 
enlargement primarily turns on civic issues. Issues of democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities and prosaic issues such 
as agricultural pricing policy, the magnitude of structural funds required, the potential 
for the extension of the single market and the implementation of environmental, social 
and safety standards. Importantly, the extension of the European area of 'Freedom, 
Security and Justice' impacts directly on the question of territorial enlargement as it is 
in this field of legal and judicial activity that states, most notably those such as Turkey 
and the emergent Eastern states, have proved most deficient and least likely to achieve 
meaningful civic reforms. 3° 
5.3.5 European Territoriality and European Identity 
European's opinion as to the basis for possible inclusion of Central and Eastern 
European states demonstrate the civic underpinning of European identification. 
European citizens have clearly indicated which potential applicants they wish to see 
considered for membership. The uniformity of these views suggest a common 
European expression of identity, based both in the expression of a common normative 
system and by the expression of a clear grading of potential applicant states as 
(relative) outsiders, on civic grounds. As the tables below illustrate: 
functioning, a free market and a commitment to even closer union. The state's ability to adopt the 
acquis further establishes the compatibility of extra-EU territories for inclusion into the European 
landscape. 
30 Commission of the European Communities Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union Part 
Two: The Challenge of Enlargement VII. Final recommendations. 
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Table 5.2 Importance of Civic Criteria for Accession to the EU 
Statement % Responding as 
Important 
% Responding as 
Not Important 
The country has to respect Human Rights and the principles 
of democracy. 95 1 
It has to fight organised crime & drug trafficking. 93 3 
It has to protect the environment. 92 4 
Its joining should not be costly for joining member countries. 81 10 
It has to accept whatever has already been decided and put in 
place through the process of building Europe. 82 8 
Its level of economic development should be close to that of 
other member States. 
75 16 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.74 
The above table demonstrates that (Western) Europeans define European spatiality 
and identity on civic grounds, the criteria for inclusion of additional states into the 
European polity are based centrally upon the practice of civic values including respect 
for human rights and democracy, rejection of crime and protection of the 
environment. More prosaic factors such as level of economic development and the 
costs to pre-existing states of enlargement rate lower. 
Collective European perceptions as to territorial boundaries of Europe and the 
suitability, or otherwise, of potential future members is illustrative of the cognitive 
map of Europe held by Europeans. As the table below suggests, Europeans have a 
clear mental map as to those states which are, and which are not, elements of the 
European landscape. It is not simply that these states that Europeans are in favour of 
are economically and socially more advanced, but that they are also more aligned to 
civic notions of community. Thus Switzerland, Iceland and Norway are not only 
economically more aligned to the pre-existing members of the EU, but their 
observance and defence of civic values is far more significant than those states that 
Europeans are least in favour of such as Turkey and Russia. Such collective 
perceptions suggesting a commonality of civic consciousness which in part 
demonstrates a common civic European identification. 
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Table 5.3 Support for European Enlargement Amongst Citizens of the (EU15) 
Country % In Favour % Not in Favour 
Switzerland 70 13 
Norway 70 12 
Malta 50 26 
Hungry 46 31 
Poland 43 35 
Czech Republic 40 35 
Cyprus 42 33 
Bulgaria 35 40 
Estonia 36 38 
Latvia 35 38 
Slovina 32 42 
Lithuania 35 39 
Romania 33 43 
Turkey 29 47 
Russia 32 46 
Source: Al (except Russia) Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.72 — 
Russia - Eurobarometer 52 p.35 
5.3.6 The Consolidation of the European Landscape - Concluding Remarks 
The rapid changes effecting political and economic spaces in Europe and the east 
have effected the political, economic and imagined boundaries between Europe and 
the rest. Not only is Europe divided by relative levels of economic and social 
development but as we have suggested, by a civic/ethnic divide as wel The 
institutionalisation of the European landscape and its frontiers appears largely setled. 
Europeans define their landscape in detail and have put in place the institutional 
elements to secure its boundaries. The enlargement criteria establishes and 
demonstrates the key normative pre-conditions — civic in nature that map the 
European landscape, and reflect generalised communal convergence of a central 
element of European identity. 
5.4 	 Security, Protection and European Identity 
"There are so many crises and conflict going on in the world today — even here 
in Europe. My wish for the New Year is that in future such terrors wil be 
banished forever from the European Union"3 I 
The significance of security in the creation of a communal political identity has earlier 
been established. The realisation of not only a secure European territory, but also 
31 Boos, A. 1998 'New Year Wishes for Europe' Deutschland no.6/98 December/January, 2/3 
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economic and societal security, most especially in the contemporary context of the 
'hollowing-out' of the individual state economic and political competencies, gives 
rise to functionally derived communal identification that had previously hinged upon 
the individual state. 
5.4.1 An Internally Secure European Landscape 
"European unification has already brought about a number of advantages, for 
example the abolition of border controls between the signatories of the 
Schengen Agreement, making travel between these countries much easier. But 
this has also brought a rise in crime. I hope that Europol will be an effective 
instrument in combating organised crime, so we can all feel safer again." 32 
The European Union has initiated a policy designed to create a (European) 'Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice'. While guaranteeing the free movement of European 
Citizens across Europe's internal borders, the policy seeks to ensure that Europe's 
internal landscape remains secure by the introduction of a range of specific policing 
policies. 33 The elimination on the control of persons crossing internal boundaries has 
been offset against revised policies designed to control the movements of persons 
from non-EU states within Europe. Associated with this is the introduction of 
comprehensive immigration and asylum policies. The fight against crime within 
Europe is addressed by the work of the European Police Office (Europol) and by the 
cooperation between member states in combating organised crime, the spread of drugs 
and in combating the trade in human beings. Further institutional action to ensure a 
secure internal European landscape include judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters and customs cooperation between member states. 
Economic integration brought with it a trans-national focus on the need to provide 
adequate physical protection to the rapidly unifying Europe. As integration became 
more sophisticated it emerged that the informal cooperation between the policing units 
of the member states would not be sufficient to overcome the trans-European spread of 
crime networks or to satisfy the public need for security in Europe. The development of 
internal coercive elements within the European polity was another example of the 
32 Van den Berg, M 1998 'New Year Wishes for Europe' Deutschland no.6/98 December/January, 
2/3 
33 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/sg/scadplus/leg/ens22000.htm 
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'spillover' from economic integration into other policy domains. Such a process 
strengthens the institutionalisation of the European polity. 
5.4.2 Cooperation in the Fields of Home Affairs and Justice 
The institutional and legal arrangements for cooperation on justice and home affairs 
have resulted from a commitment from member states of the EU to harmonise their 
policy domains with regard to the following areas: 
1. harmonisation in the area of asylum policy; 
2. development of Community-wide immigration rules for third-country 
nationals; 
3. police cooperation with a view to combating international crime 
effectively; and 
4. framing of cooperation agreements in the fields of civil and criminal law. 34 
The Treaty of Rome provided only for the freedom of movement of persons on 
economic grounds. The introduction of Article 8a of the SEA established the objective 
of abolishing internal border controls on persons. The achievement of this goal required 
harmonisation of rules on entry, right of residence and freedom of movement of third 
country nationals. However these objectives have been made active as a consequence of 
intergovernmental cooperation and through differing international organisations, not 
necessarily involving all member states. Similarly the TEU does not provide for new 
powers in the fields of home affairs and justice to be transferred to the Union, rather 
pursuant to Article K.1 of the Treaty, they are included as the third pillar of the 
European Union and were 'without prejudice to the powers of the community ' to be 
regarded as 'matters of common interest.' 35 
Accordingly, policy matters relating to home affairs and justice were to be progressed by 
intergovernmental cooperation and negotiation, rather than supranational intervention. 
Matters relating to this policy domain is dealt with by the inter-governmental Council of 
34 European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research. Fact Sheets on the European Parliament 
and the Activities of the European Union. (Luxembourgh:European Parliament 1994), 465. 
35 Ibid., 65. 
170 
Ministers of Justice and Home Afairs, which under Article K.4 (3) of the TEU must act 
unanimously. A number of cooperative commitees support this Council acting again at 
an inter-governmental level, such commitees include: 
I. 	 TREVI Group ('Terrorisme, Radicalisme et Violence International') 
established in 1976 by the Council, its objectives are to fight terorism 
and drug-related and organised crime. Importantly it has responsibility 
for the development of the European Police Ofice (Europol) 
2. The Working Party on Cooperation in the Field of Law. Established 
under the auspices of European Political Cooperation. Its objectives are 
to improve cooperation in the fields of civil and criminal justice. 
3. The Schengen Group Based upon the Schengen Agreement signed in 
1991, the group's objectives are to introduce a comprehensive program 
of security measures covering the harmonisation of the rules governing 
checks at external borders, visa policy, the right of asylum and the rights 
of aliens. 
4. The Ad-Hoc Group on Immigration, formed in 1986, it comprises 
member states' ministerial assistants responsible for fields concerning 
immigration and asylum policy. 
5.4.3 Immigration and Asylum Issues 
EU immigration and asylum policy seeks to harmonise differing national policies on 
immigration and asylum maters. With regard to immigration, policy community law 
makes no express provisions on the status of third country nationals, other than 
Regulation 1612/68, which grants freedom of movement to members of EC migrant 
workers' families even if they are not nationals of a member state. In practical terms, 
Council and Commission immigration policy has been rather circumspect as their legal 
competence is extremely limited, and because member states have shown litle 
wilingness to harmonise immigration policy at the Union level. A significant amount of 
the work associated with the development of a common immigration policy for Europe 
is dependent upon cooperation between member states via the mechanism of 
intergovernmental commitees, thus reinforcing the strongly intergovernmental nature of 
this policy domain. 
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In order to create the self-titled 'Area for Freedom Security and Justice', the Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduces a new title headed 'Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies 
related to the free movement of persons'. The title establishes pan-European, as opposed 
to purely national, controls on the external borders of the Union, and regulations on 
asylum and immigration matters. The combined effect of such institutional changes will 
be a more integrated European response to matters of internal security and the policing 
of the common European frontiers. Whereas national governments had traditionally 
provided the impetus for the internal security of the state, the European Council, assisted 
by the ECJ, is pivotal in the process of securing Europe from threats such as illegal 
immigration and drug trafficking. 36 
The result of the institutional agreements has been the facilitation of the movement and 
interrelationship of European citizens, under a common set of agreements. More 
significantly, in the context of European identity formation, it has had the effect of both 
accentuating the distinction between Europeans and the 'other', and in providing a focus 
for Europeans on security matters. It provides a common (functional) bond which unites 
them both in their support for its activities, but in the articulation of a common positive 
sentiment to the European polity as a consequence of pan-European execution of 
security matters. The European polity has instituted measures suitable for the 
management of behaviours and relationships, while at the same time protecting and 
securing Europe and Europeans from potential internal threats. Such an 
institutionalisation of internal protective measures are poignant in the context of 
increasing awareness of, and concern over rising levels of criminality, most especially 
in the areas of drugs and illegal immigration being expressed by Europeans. 37 Further, 
the agreement has reinforced the external frontiers of the European polity by 
strengthening the institutional barriers to entry by non-EU nationals and implementing 
security and police structures to resist the entry of those beyond the frontiers of Europe. 
Accordingly European identification is, as in the case of European economic and social 
36 The ECJ will play a more significant role in maintaining internal security and the harmonisation 
of civil matters as it will enlarge its jurisdiction to deal with matters concerned with the free movement 
of persons, asylum, immigration and matters concerning member state judicial cooperation in civil 
matters. 
37 We shall consider the empirical level of these concerns in Chapters Seven Eight and Nine. 
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policy domains, reinforced by the transformation of national to supranational arenas for 
the provision of European security and rights. 38 
5.4.4 An Externally Secure European Landscape 
"I have never experienced a war and I don't ever want to. For me, one of the 
main advantages of European Union is to prevent a recurrence of wars. This is 
far more important than economic advantages" 39 
The existence of the bipolar relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, as manifested in the strategic and ideological divide of Europe during the Cold 
War, profoundly altered the nature of the European hemisphere, and Europeans 
consciousness of themselves. The extension of Russian control over its Western and 
Southern neighbours at the end of the Second World War overlayed a new security 
landscape on European territory, An overlay, which at the time, appeared permanent 
and reflective of a basic schism between Europe and non-Europe. ° Such a schism had 
two effects; it prompted rapid defence and security integration. Further, and more 
significantly it had the effect of consolidating the identity of Europeans into two 
ideologically polarised spheres. 
The establishment of Communist influence in Central and Eastern Europe at the end 
of the Second World War was a complex process with Soviet and domestic 
communist influences being exercised in a variety of ways. Notwithstanding the 
commonality of purpose that had characterised the relationships been the Western 
allies and the Soviets during the hostilities with Germany, such relationships rapidly 
dissolved into antagonism, ideological division and the collective consideration of the 
importance of building firm boundaries between the two spheres of influence. This in 
38 Specific controls put in place to protect the integrity of European Frontiers include the fact that 
carriers into Europe will have to check if passengers are in possession of adequate documentation if 
they are to cross the frontier into the Schengen area, Hotels are required to obtain a declaration as well 
as an identity paper from their customers. 
39 Jaeger, D. 1997 in' Europe Confronts a Credibility Gap' Time. (June 23 1997), 36-42, 40. 
40 It is interesting to note the enduring perception of Russia as perennially residing at Europe's 
eastern frontier. Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi considered that Russia marked the eastern border 
of Paneuropa, while in the view of Max Scheler Russia represented an independent and separate 
'cultural sphere' see Lewis, Paul 'Europe and Russia' in Waites, B.1993 What is Europe? : Europe and 
the Wider World. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press 1993), 91. 
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turn led to a reinforcement of European identity as being formed within the 'free West' 
or the 'totalitarian East.'41 
The restructuring of the European landscape on strategic grounds has had a direct 
effect on the nature of European identity. As relationships between West and East 
Europeans were distorted by the geo-political restructuring of the European 
landscape, so too did the cognitive boundaries of the two communities alter. The 
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western 
European Union (WEU) and the European Communities resulted with the increasing 
preoccupation with the consequences of a reformed European security landscape, and 
the place of individual Europeans within it. The most significant manifestation of a 
European security landscape at an institutional level is the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP atempts to ensure appropriate political 
commitment from amongst its members to protect and advance a common European 
security landscape.42 The altered perceptions of Europeans to their landscape both 
during and after the Cold War iluminates a consolidation of a particular European 
identity, one in which the outsider, on geo-political and security grounds is confirmed 
by the institutional defences and bariers constructed to control and repel it. While we 
shal consider this mater empiricaly later, it is suficient to note that notwithstanding 
significant ideological and practical revision within the European security space in the 
post-cold war period that European identity has not entirely escaped the cold-war 
mind-set. The growing problems with economic modernisation and economic 
development in the states of Eastern Europe, most especialy in the states of the 
former Soviet Union continues to form a framework for a consciousness division of 
the European landscape on security grounds.43 In Russia the political elites most 
41 Ibid., 94. 
42 The objectives of the CFSP are: 
I. 	 to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the 
Union; 
2. to strengthen the security of the Union and its member States in al ways; 
3. to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter as wel as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and 
the objectives of the Paris Charter; 
4. to promote international cooperation; and 
5. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedom. 
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highly prized are those from within the cold war mind-set of ideologicaly based 
expansion. This is demonstrated in the continued Russian preference for absolutist 
leadership. During a pol conducted in 1998 the largest percentage of respondents - 20 
percent - supported the ultra-nationalist General Zyuganov as their first preference for 
their next President." 
5.5 	 A Substantive External Coercive European Force - Towards a European 
Army? 
As the EU has concluded, the post-Cold War environment necessitated the assumption 
of a greater responsibility for its own security and to prevent and manage European 
conflicts.45 The EU perceives that its external threats come not from large-scale miliary 
actions but rather from organised crime, the ilegal traficking of nuclear materials and 
ethnic and regional conflicts. It is these threats that individual Europeans most fear and 
look to the EU to counter.46 
With the formal ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Union is now able to take 
responsibility for operations to manage certain conflicts, including the use of military 
force. In the absence of such powers The European Union has lacked the authority to 
conduct military operations in such areas as Yugoslavia, and has had to accept the status 
of observer and humanitarian aid provider, while NATO and the United States has 
directly intervened militarily. Significantly under the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU is 
capable of forming a common defence policy. However the EU wil be reticent to 
supplant the leadership of the Americans within the NATO regime, as the EU has stated: 
43 Media reporting on the ongoing economic uncertainty of the former soviet states is substantive. 
The Economist as recently as July 1998, has reinforced the ongoing uncertainty of Europe's Eastern 
frontiers in geo-political terms, titling an article on Russia's problems as 'Russia's Crisis: Could it Lead 
to Fascism? The Economist. (July 11th 1998), 17-19. 
The Economist. (July 11th 1988), 19. 
45 European Commission, Frontier-free Europe, No6/7 (Luxembourg: Directorate-General for 
Information, Communication and Audiovisual Media. 1998) 11. 
46  These concerns are expressed in both the 'fears' amongst Europeans in which an increase in 
drug traficking and organised crime are considered very high and the importance placed by Europeans 
on applicant states to the EU fighting organised crime and drug traficking. See Commission of the 
European Communities Eurobarometer 44 & 74. 
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"It is generaly acknowledged that NATO wil continue to play a 
fundamental role in the teritorial defence of Europe."47 
The WEU has the principal cariage for European-specific defence elaboration, however 
its future role wil be largely low-level, in support of NATO activities. The successful 
implementation of coercive forces under the auspices of the WEU, in the context of 
European states generaly discounting the WEU as not much more than a forum for 
establishing security frameworks and procedures, remains distant. 
Accordingly the prospect of an exclusively European army is remote. Such an army 
would never come about without the approval of each of the member states, which is 
highly unlikely given the practical and symbolic nature of military forces in the status 
and identity of individual states. Further there are no plans to compel any European 
Union member state to commit its own troops without the approval of its particular 
government. Such a significant decision as to whether soldiers should be sent to war or 
not, most especialy in a fight for 'Europe' remains the firm prerogative of the individual 
member state. Further it is unlikely that the United States would give up its leadership 
position in European security, that it retains as part of NATO." 
5.6 	 Immigration, Exclusion and European Identity 
Synthesising the disparate elements of European security and its impact on European 
identification is Europe's ongoing experience with asylum seekers and refugees. This 
is particularly salient given the recent general upsurge of 'outsiders' wishing to join 
Europe. 
47 h See 'Defending Europe' The Economist December zit 1999., 18 
48 However the current 'Euro Corps' may be an indication of the future of a European Army. 
Operational since October 1995 the unit comprises France and Germany (with Spain and Belgium 
participating intermittently). The Unit comes under the operational command of either the WEU or NATO. 
With a multinational headquarters and a mixed headquarters battalion, it is expected to grow to over 
50,000 soldiers." Further the Anglo-French agreement in December 1998 to develop an exclusive 
European defence force, either within the Western European Union or the European Union, is indicative of 
a growing perception of the need for a Eurocentric, autonomous and supranational defence mechanism to 
be adopted, as a spokesman for the Current British Foreign Secretary has commented: 
"Europe needs a stronger and more influential voice in international affairs, to match its 
economic weight. It needs to be able to back this with credible military force, which in turn requires a 
strong Common Foreign and Security Policy, backed by stronger military forces that are flexible and 
capable." See: 'Europe defence force wil cope without America' , Christopher Lockwood, Electronic 
Telegraph Issue 1287, Thursday 3 December 1998., 2. 
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There are more than 20 million foreign nationals now resident in the European Union. 
Six million from other European states, over four million from Turkey and the states 
of Yugoslavia, over three million from North Africa and other parts of Africa and one 
million from Asia. 49 The migratory pressure from the periphery of Europe is intense; 
most particularly from south Asia, the Balkans and North Africa. 50 
The Iron Curtain had served not only as a tangible geo-political divide in the middle 
of the continent but further served as a effective migratory barrier, one that had 
significant implications for identity development. With the removal of the frontier the 
general migration problem has been intensified in Europe. 51 
The creation of 'Fortress Europe' is a central element in the creation and maintenance 
of European identity. We proposed in Chapter One that the advancement of identity is 
associated with the creation or stereotypical categorisation of the 'other'. So is this the 
case in Europe, the clearest example of the European other is the immigrant or would 
be asylum seeker. Europeans form a meaningful community of sentiment and share a 
common form of identification, in so far as they reject the refugee and asylum 
seeker. 52 The tension between Europeans and non-Europeans is an obvious and 
systemic one and one that heightens identity differentials. Those within Europe wish 
49 Foucher, M. 'The Geopolitics of European Frontiers'. Paper presented at Conference on the 
Internal and External Frontiers of the European Union, University of Edinburgh 10 and 11 May 1996., 
6. 
50 As of 1991 Turkish Nationals made up the largest group of non-nationals in the European 
Economic area, totalling over 2.3 million. There were approximately one million Yugoslays and a 
similar number of Moroccans, with over 500,000 Algerians and just under 300,000 Tunisians. These 
figures do not include illegal migrants. These non -European Citizens are predominantly located in 
Germany, (which received 1.2 million in 1991) France, Italy and Luxembourg. The lowest figures are 
in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark and Ireland. 
51 Notwithstanding the fall of the Iron Curtain it is interesting to note that some of the EU member 
States, historically sources of West European labour during the last four decades have themselves 
become countries seeing the arrival of increasing numbers of legitimate and illegitimate immigrants. 
This is most particularly acute in Southern Europe: Spain for Moroccans, Italy for Moroccans and 
Albanians, and Greece for Albanians. 
52 Anecdotal evidence of pressure on Europe's borders are numerous; an Italian navy corvette 
collides with a boat crammed with Albanian refugees killing eighty. A chartered aircraft picks up 
Bosnians from the German State of Bavaria and deposits them, against their will, in the country from 
which they fled. Six Turkish immigrants die as a result of arson in The Hague. 52 See 'Who is a 
German?' The Economist April 5 1997 
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to protect their lifestyles and ultimately their identity - those 'others' - outside Europe 
aspire to both. 53 
With increasing European unemployment and reductions in government expenditure 
feelings of resistance to immigrants are increasing, entrenching feelings of Europe 
versus the 'other'. Examples of the hardening of attitudes are numerous. The German 
Government is reluctant to take more east European refugees. A 1993 revision to the 
German constitution, reduced Germany's once general commitment to take in all 
seekers of asylum. Poignantly the CDU have called for stricter limits on the 
immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union. 54 While there is a proposal from 
the CDU to confer citizenship on anyone born on German soil and to discard the 
principle that German identity runs primarily through the blood. There is popular 
resistance to such plans. 55 
The exclusion and marginalisation of the immigrant and refugee in contemporary 
Europe reflects the perceived threats to economic and societal security that such 
peoples represent to Europeans and thus solidifies the distinctiveness between the 
European and the 'other'. Europeans feel threatened — not as a result of perceived 
feelings that European cultural or ethnic values are under threat — but as a result of the 
threat to European economic security and the perceived threat that asylum seekers 
represent as a result of organised crime. 56 In such circumstances individual European 
53 There is no better example of the issue of immigration and identity in contemporary Europe than 
the case of Germany. The German State has accepted seven million immigrants and refugees since the 
end of the Second World War. However it is not enough to reside or even to be born in Germany. To 
be German, under Germany's 1913 Imperial Citizen Law, is to have German blood; a criteria for 
belonging that immigrants and refugees find difficult to meet. Paradoxically those who are guests in 
Germany have firmly established themselves, within the social and economic fabric of the German 
state. The two million Turks who arrived in Germany in the 1960s now run 40,000 small businesses in 
Germany, pay German taxes, have German speaking children and grandchildren and yet play almost no 
part in German political life. Further one in five infants born in Germany are born to non-Germans, 
however children of immigrants will need to have visas to enter Germany - their home. 
54 About 60,000 had arrived by the beginning of 1997, tripling the number of Jews in Germany. 
55 However giving anyone born in Germany the right to be German would follow the pattern of 
most other West European countries. 
56  While the rejection of the European other on civic grounds will be empirically established in 
Chapter Seven is worth noting here that the European public is almost unanimous that threats to human 
rights, democracy, the treat posed by organised crime and the degragation of the environment are the 
most pressing threats to European security — rather tna cultural or ethnic divisions or military threats. 
See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 & 74.  
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States and the EU has acted, as we have considered earlier in this chapter, to form a 
comprehensive set of institutional measures to govern the European landscape's 
frontiers, and to consequently reduce the perceived insecurities amongst Europeans. 
5.7 	 The Importance of the Creation of A European Secure Space for 
Europeans 
The potential detrimental effects of threats to Europe and the common reaction 
amongst Europeans that a supranational, rather than a national, response to such 
threats, is appropriate, unite Europeans, and, in part, define Europeans insofar as they 
colectively inhabit a secure hemisphere. 
Europeans share in common the expression of valuing their physical security, they 
articulate a common perception of the threats to Europe and believe that the European 
polity is best placed to further their security interests. Such a convergence of belief 
and aspirations reflect a common European political culture and a communal sense of 
identity. Europeans place a greater priority on a common European foreign policy 
(63%) and a common defence policy (73%) than they do on a single currency 
(60%).57 Further Europeans are united in the civic basis of their communal fears of 
the 'other'. The 'other' is not feared as a consequence of its potential ability to erode 
ethnolinguistic national identity, but rather is feared because of its ability to 
compromise civic values. Europeans colectively reject the 'other' insofar as its 
inclusion would contribute to an increase in drug trafficking and international 
organised crime, or undermine social and economic conditions within member 
states.58 Such a fear of the 'other' on civic grounds is far stronger (57%) that the fear 
of the loss of individual countries' national identities (46%) or fear of the loss of the 
central element of ethnolinguistic identity — language (39%).59 Such a communal civic 
ordering signifies the importance of security and of the communal expression of such 
importance, which is a contributing factor in the evocation of a common European 
identity.6° 
57 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49.,B.22 
58  See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51.,44 
59 Ibid. 
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Reinforcing the significance of security matters for Europeans is their preparedness to 
transfer competency for such policy domains from the national to the supranational 
level. More Europeans consider that the European Union should determine defence 
policy, rather than individual national Governments, (50% versus 44%). 61 Further a 
sizeable majority (67%) of respondents to a recent survey agreed with the assertion 
that NATO has made a positive contribution to European peace and security. Of 
interest is the fact that when surveyed, members of the European polity felt 
significantly more secure than those outside it. A recent poll demonstrates that while 
citizens in states such as Slovakia, Russia, the Ukraine and Poland believe that the 
likelihood of a World War in the next ten years was very likely or quite likely, a far 
smaller proportion of the populations within the states of the EU surveyed, including 
Denmark, Germany and France considered a world war either quite likely or very 
likely, thus confirming our hypothesis that European integration, contributes to 
increased security and a common identification with the institutions of the polity. 62 
5.8 Economic Stimulation and Regulation 
"If it means subsidies will continue rolling in, I'll endure these austerity 
measures. It's better to have a belt to tighten than no belt at all. Otherwise our 
pants will fall and we'll be left naked."63 (Greek National) 
"We see other European countries working. They have higher living standards 
and lower unemployment. The French and Germans are no better than us, and 
we want to be part of the club." 64 (Spanish National) 
6° Further demonstrating the civic basis of fortress Europe and European identification is the 
importance of enlargement criteria to Europeans. An overwhelming majority of Europeans would 
consider other European states suitable for accession only when the country respects Human Rights 
and the principles of democracy (95%) and where the country is fighting organised crime and drug 
trafficking (93%). The European identity is thus rooted in civic rather than ethnic criteria. See 
Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51.,74  
61 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49.,B.24  
62 See Angus Reid Group 1999 'Five Country rapid Turnaround poll' at 
www.angusreid.com/studies/m990422_2.html . accessed 4 May 99. 
Valsamakis, J. 1997 in' Europe Confronts a Credibility Gap' Time June 23 1997,36-42, 40. 
64 Candido, J. 1997 in' Europe Confronts a Credibility Gap' Time June 23 1997, 36-42, 40. 
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5.8.1 The Crisis of National Economic Management in Europe 
Notwithstanding the significant growth experienced by European economies in the 
first two and a half decades after the end of the Second World War, Europe's 
economic position, both in absolute terms, and relative to that of its main trading 
competitors, the United States and Japan, deteriorated rapidly during the 1970s and 
beyond. Such deterioration is displayed in the following table: 
Table 5.4 Relative Economic Position — Europe and its Main Trading Competitors 
GDP Real Growth (c1/0 Change per Annum) 
Europe USA Japan 
Average 1961-1970 4.8 3.8 10.5 
Average 1971-1980 3.0 2.7 4.5 
Average 1981-1990 2.4 2.7 4.1 
Unemployment Rate ( as a ')/0 of the civilian labour force) 
Europe USA Japan 
Average 1961-1970 2.2 4.7 1.2 
Average 1971-1980 4.0 6.4 1.8 
Average 1981-1990 9.0 7.1 2.5 
Source: European Commission EC Economic Data Pocket Book 5/1996, 12-20. 
Europe's economic position worsened in the 1970s reflecting a global economic 
downturn. However the economies of European states, in contrast to their main 
trading partners, failed to revive in the latter half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, 
heightening the imperative for further supranational coordination. Further, European 
elites, initially reticent to forego key elements of state-centred economic sovereignty, 
became increasingly articulate in their support for economic regulation on a pan-
European level. 65 
65 Even one of the most potent Eurosceptics, Margaret Thatcher suggested in 1988 that: 
"By getting rid of barriers, by making it possible for companies to operate on a Europe-wide 
scale, we can best compete with the United States, Japan and other new economic powers 
emerging in Asia and elsewhere." 
Thatcher, M. 'Britain and Europe'. Text of the Prime Minister's speech at Bruges on 20 September 





















In such a context the rationale for the removal of the administrative and regulatory 
barriers for optimum European market efficiency became increasingly compeling. 
The Cecchini Report on the 'Costs of non-Europe' ilustrated that a single European 
market would put Europe in a position of: 
"Competitive strength and an upward trajectory of economic growth lasting 
into the next century. Such additional growth. . . is not a tantalising chimera. 
On the contrary, it is a firm prospect."6 
5.9 	 The Supranational Rescue of the European Economy 
The response from Europeans to the decline in their economic fortunes was swift. 
Already commited to the liberalisation of the internal European market, European 
policy makers aimed to both improve Europe's internal competitiveness but more 
significantly to act to ensure Europe's international viability in an increasingly global 
marketplace. Such a policy could only be made viable if it was directed by a 
supranational approach, rather than individual state-based approaches. Hence 
European economic reforms, rightly seen as the original motive power of European 
integration, required the acceleration of centralised pan-European initiatives, to deal 
with an increasingly liberal and deregulated international trading environment. 
The European polity, in the context of the introduction of appropriate institutional 
measures to overcome the decline in European economic conditions, has succeeded in 
the establishment and maintenance of a functionaly coherent and prosperous 
economic space. Such a process, in turn, has created the conditions fertile for the 
emergence of a meaningful European identity. The process of the Single Market 
program, EMU and the introduction of the euro curency has supported the emergence 
of both a cohesive European economic area. The financial contributions of the 
European Union to European economic life are significant and growing. Such 
contributions, totaling 74,449.4 milion ECU in 1995, represents an increase from an 
expenditure per citizen from 105.5 ECU in 1985 to 212.4 ECU in 1995, suggesting, 
consistent with our earlier arguments, a functional basis for the alignment of 
66 Cecchini 1988 XVI quoted in Wise and Gibb Single Market to Social Europe: The European 
Community in the 1990s., 124. 
182 
Europeans with the pan-European polity.67 The growing importance of pan-European 
Economic stimulation is aptly shown in Figure 5.2 
Figure 5.2 European Communities Growth in Receipts and Expenditure 
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Source: European Commission European Economy 65, 370-372. 
Not only has the EU provided increasing levels of financial support to  its member 
states but there has been a clear convergence of macro-economic outcomes. The 
acceptance of the convergence criteria for EMU has resulted in a pronounced 
improvement in the economic conditions of European states most particularly those 
which had historicaly been at Europe's economic periphery. As the figures below 
outline, the EUs economic policies have been instrumental in strengthening European 
economies, most especialy peripheral ones and thus providing the conditions for the 
EU to adequately compete and survive in a global marketplace. 
67 Eurostat. 1995 Europe in Figures. Luxembourg: Ofice of Oficial Publications of the European 
Communities, 60. 











































Figure 53 Trends in European Inflation (GDP Deflator) - Europe's Core & Periphery 
Years 
Source: European Commission European Economy 69  454f. 
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5.10 The Creation of a Secure Supranational European Economic Space 
"European integration has already extended beyond trade: and the 1992 
process represents both a quantitative and qualitative shift towards to creation 
of a regional economic system. Yet EMU is something very different. In 
terms of national sovereignty, the stakes are infinitely higher . . . the plans for 
the creation of EMU could not be camouflaged as a technical mater with 
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limited political consequences. Money is, after all, at the heart of national 
sovereignty. ”68 
The primary logic of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 was the creation of a common 
European market. Consideration of what were then considered as being subsidiary 
matters such as monetary and financial integration across Europe were limited by both 
the limited practical scope of European integration at that stage, and the still infantile 
stage of international trade and capital flows. 
The need to ensure truly pan-European financial and monetary stability and convergence 
grew out of the failure of the international monetary system in 1971 and the realisation 
that Europe lacked the necessary tools for economic and monetary cooperation. Later, 
the tension between the realisation of a European common market, without substantive 
internal frontiers and a common external one, required the centralisation of European 
monetary and financial affairs so as to both realise a truly common and equal market, 
and to ensure that such a market had sufficiently strong economic and financial 
institutions within it to support it in times of global economic competition and potential 
insecurity. The creation of the single market was a necessary consequence of the 
European project of economic modernisation. The two key elements in the creation of a 
European economic area are the Single Market, and Economic and Monetary union. 
5.11 The Single Market 
While the objectives of creating a single market are enshrined in the original Treaty of 
Rome, such a market was left incomplete.69 By the beginnings of the 1980s the 
Communities' achievements were considerable but far from constituting a unified entity 
resembling the internal community sought by the treaties. A whole series of trade 
barriers still existed leaving the European market fragmented. Accordingly questions of 
monetary union and the costs of 'non-Europe' were now seriously addressed. Estimates 
of both the macro and micro economic benefits of the completion of the single market 
provided sufficient impetus for heads of States, in 1985, to set the target of 1992 for the 
completion of the single market. 
Tsoukalis, L. The New European Monetary Integration. (London: Longman 1993)., 176. 
69 Article 8a of the SEA 
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The Single European Act of 1986 was the result of European concerns for the slowness 
of the completion of the single market promised in the treaty of Rome. The SEA 
provides the appropriate legal framework for the completion of the internal market and 
lays down the guidelines for the accompanying policies. Its objects was to accelerate 
European integration through improvements in the functioning of the institutions of the 
Communities through the widening of their powers and to provide for greater flexibility 
in the decision making process.7° Importantly the SEA increased the supranational 
competence of the Communities in areas including social policy, economic and social 
cohesion, research and technological development and the environment. 71 
The implementation of policy following the adoption of the single market has added 
significantly to the cohesion and independence of the European supranation. The 
elaboration of the single market includes a number of aspects. At the level of the 
individual, the abolition of frontier controls for European citizens, the elimination of 
VAT controls on goods at intra-Community borders, and the creation of the right of 
European Citizens to reside without impediment in a member state of the community are 
substantial features. Provisions for the freedom of movement of workers were 
introduced, allowing for the worker's right of movement and residence, the right of 
entry for family members, the right to take up work and the right to equal treatment at 
work, and to reside in the host country at the termination of a minimum period of 
employment. 
Provisions have been made for the removal of technical barriers to ensure the free 
movement of goods and capital, including the prohibition of charges effectively taking 
the place of customs duties and prohibition of quantitative restrictions on the movement 
of goods across intra-Union boundaries. In addition harmonisation has been achieved in 
national standards on goods, allowing goods as diverse as beer to concrete to be 
produced either at the same standard across Europe, or for national differences to be 
uniformly recognised by the Community. Further policy concerning European indirect 
taxation has been harmonised. Developments in the harmonisation of indirect and direct 
taxation include the harmonisation of Value Added Tax. 
70 By the extension of Qualified Majority Voting 
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5.12 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
There are few more poignant symbols of an independent polity than a commonly 
accepted unit of currency. On 1 January 1999 the creation of the euro area was achieved. 
Eleven Member States of the European Union began their financial undertakings 
including banking and capital transactions in the euro. The creation of a euro area on 1 
January 1999, and the subsequent introduction of euro banknotes and coinage on 1 
January 2002 will represent the finalisation of a central element in the strengthening of a 
sovereign European polity. 
The implications of the introduction of the single currency on the status of the European 
supranation are difficult to overstate. Firstly the necessary requirement for a high degree 
of functional convergence amongst the member states' economies required for entry into 
the single currency regime has the effect of converging and compressing separate state-
based economies into a European one, with its own autonomous clyriamic. 72 Secondly, 
economic management will now be dealt with on a pan-European level. Control over 
public finances, public debt, employment and financial management will move from the 
realm of the national to the supranational. No single European member states, once 
having adopted the euro, will ever be able to unilaterally determine fiscal policy - so 
central to the articulation of state identity - than they had before. 73 While the European 
polity will essentially take the decisions, and run the instruments of economic policy, 
both through the European Commission and the European Central Bank, the respondent 
member states will be limited, at least with regard to national economic policy, to 
ensuring that their economic policies fit harmoniously and effectively into the economic 
policy decided at Union leve1. 74 
71 Articles 118a, 130e, 130q(2), and 130s of the SEA respectively. 
72 The requirement for a single European Currency is apparent from European trade flows. By the 
early 1990s nearly 60 per cent of the total EC members' external trade was with other members and that 
over 25 percent of EC members' GDP on average was accounted for by intra-EC trade. Accordingly the 
potential savings on transaction costs from the adoption of a single currency are quite substantial. 
73 The most significant example of this is the EU wide determination of official interest rates by 
the European Investment Bank. 
74 A recent example of supranational economic convergence was the joint decision taken by 
leading European States in December 1998 to concurrently lower interest rates. 
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The conversion process from national to supranational currency will further consolidate 
the power and autonomy of the European polity. 75 The advantages of the process of the 
single market will be multiplied by monetary union. A single European currency will 
overcome the fragmentation of the single market and will produce greater transparency 
of costs and prices by making them comparable throughout the community, thus 
increasing competition. For Europe to sensibly uphold the veracity of a single economic 
space in the form of a single market, and to effectively compete against international 
trading blocs, then a single currency was inevitable. The sub-text is equally clear; 
monetary union will progress the cause of ultimate political union further, such political 
union being unlikely in the context of a splintered set of European currencies, as Grauwe 
argues: 
. . . Not a single monetary union in the past came about because of a 
recognition of economic benefits of the union. In all cases the integration was 
driven by political objectives." 76 
The single currency, wholly desirable in terms of economic modernisation and European 
convergence, has a symbolic dynamic above such practical considerations, one that will 
directly influence European identity. It has been suggested that the European progress 
towards monetary Union is a step towards European political union as the dynamics and 
imperatives of the former will lead to the latter in the same manner as steps towards 
economic convergence have necessitated measures in social reforms. The significance 
of the single currency on European supranationalism is convincingly stated by Bean: 
"Neither the costs or benefits of monetary union are in principle as great as 
critiques or advocates respectively have made out. In fact, from a purely 
economic perspective, it seems to me something of a storm in a teacup. Why 
then has so much fuss been made over it? I think the answer is primarily 
political. . . . A separate currency is an important symbol of nationhood, 
while a common currency is an equally potent symbol of a shared political 
destiny. This is why anti-federalists such as Margaret Thatcher chose to 
75 Economic and Monetary Union has been a community objective since the 1969 Conference of 
Heads of state or Government held in the Hague. This has subsequently been restated on numerous 
occasions, such as the 1970 Werner Report, the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council 
in 1977. It was finally incorporated into the treaty of Rome by the Single European Act and enlarged 
by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 
76 See Grauwe, P. The Political Economy of Monetary Union in Europe' The World Economy vol 
16, No.6 1993, 653-62, 656. 
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make their stand here rather than on issues of greater economic 
significance."77 
The cumulative EU success in reorientating the economies of Europe is 
demonstrated in lower interest rates, falling unemployment a single currency and 
higher standards of living and international competitiveness. As the International 
Monetary Fund commented in a report released in July 2000: 
"It is hard to remember a period where the fundamentals have been so good." . . . 
"Conditions for a sustained recovery have not been so auspicious in a long time 
and leave scope . . . for the European Union becoming a high performing 
economy.” 78 
5.13 European Economic Development and The Expression of European 
Identity 
What then have been the practical results of European economic convergence, and 
how have these effects contributed to European identification? We can best judge the 
relationship between European economic stimulation and European identification by 
considering the level of support for the EU amongst those European states that have 
comparatively, most benefited financially, from European integration. 
5.13.1 Regional Economic Differences and Support for European Integration 
Demonstrating the economic stimulus to European identification, regional variation 
reveals the influence of financial support for the development of communal European 
identity. Those states in which economic performance, as measured by national 
unemployment rate and GDP, is comparatively low compared with economically 
more prosperous European States, and where economic support from the European 
Union is comparatively high, then there is a greater level of support for the European 
polity. Accordingly in those states such as Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, with 
77 Bean (1992) quoted in Dattani N. 1997 Economic and Monetary Union in Stavridis, S. et at 
New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy Making. (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company 1997), 206. 
78 International Monetary Fund quoted in Bagwell, S. "Can an old Continent learn new tricks?" 
The Australian Financial Review Weekend  22-23 July 2000, 28 
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relatively high unemployment and low GDP benefit financially when proportionately 
compared with the core European states such as Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom and Belgium where there is a significantly higher level of support for a 
common European polity. This confirms our hypothesis that economic support 
contributes to a greater sense of support for and identification with the polity. As the 
table below indicates: 
Table 5.5 Comparative European economic status, level of European financial 
aid and Support for European inte2ration  
State Unemployment 
Rate 
GDP per capita 
(US $) 




Spain 22.1 12201 47 +3090 
Greece 9.6 7465 50 +4135 
Ireland 11.8 14735 76 +2372 
Portugal 7.3 8822 54 +2505 
Germany 8.8 25179 -11830 
UK 8.2 17471 -3125 
France 12.4 24608 -1020 
Belgium 9.8 21765 +60 
Sources: Directorate—General for Economic and Financial Affairs; European Economy  Number 65 
1998, Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49, 19, Court of Auditors Annual 
Report 1994, United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, 
Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook  1994 
If we consider this process more closely, the demonstrated effect of economic 
stimulation and European identification becomes more apparent. Considering core 
and peripheral European economies, and the level of EU financial support, expressed 
as a percentage of the respective states GDP that they receive, we find that in those 
states where the economic redistribution from Europe, as a percentage of the state's 
GDP has been higher, in comparison to other (more affluent) European states, that a 
greater sense of European identification has developed. Considering first the level of 
EU financial support received by core and peripheral European states, (as expressed 
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Figure 5.5 	 Ratio of EU Financial Support to Member States GDP 
1 
European Countries 
Source: European Commission: General Report on the Activities of the European Union 1988 & 
www.europa.eu.inten/commieurostat/facts/wwwroot/en/left2.htm  
The figure clearly demonstrates that peripheral European states such as Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece receive a considerably higher return from the EU, expressed as a 
percentage of their GDP, than do the core European states, such as Germany, United 
Kingdom and France, which have far larger economies. 
5.14 European Economic (In)security and European Identification 
Beyond the gross effect of European economic stimulation on individual European 
states, if we consider specific areas of European economic stimulation, such as EU 
expenditure on social protection as opposed to that of the respective member state, we 
find that in those states where domestic expenditure on social protection is low, 
compared with the level of economic support for social protection provided by the EU 
that there is a positive correlation between high relative EU expenditure and popular 
support for Europe. As the folowing figure outlines: 
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Figure 5.6 National Per Capita Expenditure on Social Protection, European 
Financial Assistance and Support for the EU 
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Sources: European Commission European Commission General Report on the Activities of the 
European Union 1997; European Commission Directorate-General for Information, Communication 
and Audio-visual Media Monthly Newsleter 'Frontier-Free Europe' January 1999. Commission of the 
European Communities Eurobarometer 49  
The above figure demonstrates a correlation between low (national) expenditure on 
social protection, high (European) expenditure and a higher degree of support for 
European integration from amongst member states. (With the exception of the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg where support for Europe is high notwithstanding a low 
level of EU financial support for social protection.) Accordingly a feature of 
European identity formation is its relationship to relative economic instability. In 
those European states where financial support is comparatively high from the 
European polity, relative to the organic level of national financial support, there is a 
higher experience of European identification. This reflects the wish of Europeans in 
states such as Portugal, Greece and Ireland to avoid economic and societal insecurity 
by actively supporting the European polity. 
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5.15 Representation and Participation - (Through the Extension of Citizenship 
Rights) 
5.15.1 European Citizenship and European Identity 
European citizenship constitutes a central element in the creation and maintenance of 
a European identity. The precise articulation of the status of individual Europeans and 
the definition of the nature and boundaries of the inter-relationships between citizen 
and citizen, and citizen and state have transformed the notion of European identity. As 
Tilly suggests, citizenship entails duties, obligations, privileges and rights, which have 
the ability to link peoples together and to differentiate such peoples from others, and 
thus form the foundation of communal identity. 79 Theoretical approaches to 
citizenship and identity demonstrate the range of positive influences that citizenship 
has on the creation of identity and as a mechanism of differentiation between 
'insiders' and `outsiders'.8° 
Hobson and Lindholm have demonstrated that the formation of collective identity is 
facilitated by the composition of specific constituencies and the utilisation of power 
resources within the formal recognition of state-based citizenship. This is achieved by 
the states formal recognition of citizens as forming specific social groups that are, 
despite their multiple identities and loyalties, bound together and are able to imprint 
their own collective identity through participative citizenship, and the exercising of 
the rights associated with such citizenship. 81 According to Soysal, Civic citizenship 
legitimises: "individuals' participation and claims beyond national definitions" and 
imbues them with "actorhood". Accordingly, European citizenship has a dual role in 
identity formation. It creates a common thread of identity amongst Europeans by 
virtue of common citizenship rights and obligations, while it concurrently allows for 
the display of sub-state, regional and cultural identities which are exercised in 
79 Tilly, C. 1997 'A Primer on Citizenship' Theory and Society 26: 599-602, 599 
80 As our earlier argument suggested the maintenance, renegotiation and manipulation of the 
boundaries between state and society and between individuals are, in advanced multiethnic polities 
commonly organised on civic grounds, a central element of which is the social classification of 
citizenship, and differentiation on civic criteria. 
81 Hobson, B & Lindholm, M. 1997 'Collective identities, women's power resources, and the 
making of welfare states' Theory and Society 26: 475-508, 478-479. 
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individual and collective actor's narratives and strategies, complimenting rather than 
competing with European civic identity. Thus within a civic notion of identity, 
second-order identities are given sufficient space to proliferate and become more 
expressive. 
The EU, by constitutionally enabling a distinctive European citizenship with specific 
rights, such as democratic participation, economic freedom and social welfare, places 
such civic citizenship in the public domain as a common identifier, while non-civic 
identifiers, such as ethnicity and custom, are shifted to the private, politically neutral, 
domain. Thus communal civic identity emerges as a persuasive, persistent and 
meaningful discourse of participation, and is enacted as a symbolic organisational tool 
for creating new group solidarities and mobilising resources in national and world 
politics. 82 The citizen identifies with the polity publicly on civic grounds, while in the 
private domain ethnic signifiers are practiced and enhanced, rather than repressed. 
The common 'vertical connectedness' of European citizenship allows for the divergent 
'horizontal connectedness' of sub-national, cultural, ethnic or religious identifiers, 
without such ethnic signifiers needing to be publicly or politically mobilised for them 
to gain relevance or autonomous status. Thus the Ressentiment between the civic and 
ethnic is resolved in the balance between ethnic and regional signification within a 
political and institutional arrangement which both acknowledges difference and 
attaches rights and security to such markers. 
The introduction of the concept of citizenship of the Union was an attempt to create a 
more direct relationship between the citizen and the Union and to engender a sense of 
loyalty, community and a more robust European identity. 83 Such a sense of 
community that was not reliant upon the potentially divisive signifiers of ethnicity or 
linguistic signifiers, even though the rights associated with European citizenship, 
recognise and champion European national and sub-national identities, of which such 
82 Soysal, Y. 1997 'Changing parameters of citizenship and claims making: Organised Islam in 
European public spheres' Theory and Society 26: 509-527, 513. 
83 European Community 'Europe from A to Z': Guide to European Integration.,(Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Commission 1997), 184 
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signifiers are pivotal." Further the casting of European citizenship on civic rather 
than ethnic grounds diminishes the significance of ethnic signifiers in the adoption of 
a European consciousness. The objectives of such citizenship include the; 'increased 
protection of the rights and interests of member states nationals and perhaps more 
significantly in the context of this discussion; 'an increased awareness of European 
identity and as an affirmation of European solidarity.' 85 
Symbolic elements of European identity including the European flag, passport, 
anthem and driving licence are linked to European citizenship, reinforcing the 
differing elements of communal identification. Most importantly special rights and 
privileges are affixed to European citizenship. Under the TEU every person holding 
the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the EU. Nationality is however, 
defined according to the national laws of each member state. European citizenship is 
complimentary to national citizenship and comprises a number of rights and duties, 
for all citizens of the union. For all citizens of the union, citizenship allows: 
1. the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the member 
states; 
2. the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament and in the municipal elections of the member 
state in which they reside under the same conditions as the nations of 
that state; 
3. respect by the member states of the fundamental freedom guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedom; and 
4. the formal recognition of political parties at the European parties as 
contributing to the formation of a European awareness and the 
expression of the political will of the citizens of the EU. (Article 
1 3 8a).86 
84 We shall consider the specific mechanisms employed in the promotion of regional and sub-
national identifiers later in this Chapter. 




The adoption of civil rights in the Treaties comprising the constitution of the 
supranational European polity reinforces the salience of European Citizenship 
amongst Europeans. The explicit creation and protection of civic rights of community 
citizens is a powerful force in the creation of loyalty amongst its population to 
institutional Europe. This is particularly so in the circumstances where Europe, not 
just its constituent member states, becomes an important locus of both rights and 
privileges. Thus Europe, as described by Soysal and Wiener, becomes a 'citizen-giver' 
in which individuals benefit from the rights derived from it, and give to it loyalty and 
identity. 87 
European citizenship has the effect of largely politically disempowering pre-existing 
ethnic signifiers, by both recognising and supporting the desire of minorities to 
maintain their own separate identities, while attaching benefits to the individual and 
collectivity by their adoption of the commonality of civic citizenship. Such citizenship 
is based on a shared liberal conception of tolerance, accommodation, fairness and 
non-violent change. As Europe incorporates permanent migrants as citizens it does so 
as individuals, not as communities. Notwithstanding such institutional tolerance of 
non-civic identifiers, Europe exercises a tacit policy of ethnic exclusion and 
neutralisation as Europe is reluctant, for example, to grant explicit legal recognition to 
Islamic religious practices. Thus the EU grants not only rights to individuals without 
making concessions to groups with which it may compete for loyalty, it does not need 
87 The scope of these European civil rights, as created in the European treaties include: 
1. the prohibition of all discrimination on the grounds of nationality. (Article 7 of the 
EEC treaty); 
2. freedom of movement of European citizens and workers. (Article 48 of the EEC 
Treaty); 
3. the creation of pan-European standards and conditions for social security; including 
industrial accidents, old age pension and maternity provisions (Article 51 of the EEC 
Treaty); 
4. the right of freedom of establishment; the right of nationals of a member state to take 
up and pursue activities as self-employed persons in the territory of another member 
state under the same conditions as are imposed by that state on its own nationals; and 
5. equal pay, that each member state must ensure that the principle of equal pay for men 
and women for equal work is applied. 
See Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, 1997 'Changing parameters of citizenship and claim-making: Organised 
Islam in European Public Spheres' and Antje Wiener, 'Making sense of the new geography of 
citizenship: Fragmented citizenship in the European Union.' Theory and Society 26: 509-527, 529-560. 
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to explicitly differentiate on ethnolinguistic grounds, but can do so on the basis of 
citizenship, thus reducing ethnicity as a marker of social and political difference. 88 
European citizenship, by avoiding a link with ethnicity and focusing on common 
values assumes a more universalist tone. In Europe the standardisation of difference, 
implicitly in all citizenship, is based on civic rather than ethnic criteria. 
5.15.2 European Constitutionalism and European Identity 
The effect of the entrenchment of European constitutionalism on individual and 
collective European identity is compelling. At a superficial level of analysis it is clear 
that without the European treaty system - the basis of European constitutionalism - 
that there could be no European citizenship. Without European citizenship the dense 
set of obligations and rights enjoyed by individual Europeans, and from which a sense 
of attachment to the European polity is derived, could not have come about. 
Importantly, confirming our thesis on the deliberate management of pre-existing 
elements of national and regional signifiers by the EU, as with matters of European 
citizenship, European constitutionalism, while clearly establishing the supremacy and 
direct effect of European law, does not attempt to negate the identification of 
Europeans as pre-existent national members. As Article 8 of the Act of European 
Union establishes: 
"Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. . . "89 
Accordingly the Union is composed of members - its citizens - whom, by definition, 
do not share the same nationality in common, (thus avoiding any possible fracture 
points based on ethnic conceptions of nationality) but rather share a common 
(European) citizenship. What European constitutionalism, and its resultant citizenship 
does is create a purposive framework of rules and relationships wherein commonality 
is rooted not in the 'traditional' ethnic signifiers of community such as ethine or 
language, but rather the substance of membership to the European Union. Under such 
constitutional circumstances there is, what Kymlincka refers to as a "separation of 
88 Shanahan, S. 1997 'Different Standards and standard differences: Contemporary citizenship and 
immigration debates. Theory and Society 26: 421-448. 
89 Treaty Establishing the European Community as Amended by Subsequent Treaties, Rome, 25 
March, 1957 Part Two. Article 8 in Rudden, B. & Wyatt, D. Basic Community Laws 6th Edition., 23 
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state and ethnicity."°° Such a separation reveals itself in a collective commitment to 
shared civic values, such as tolerance, rule of law, individualism and voluntarism, 
while allowing for the symbols, metaphors and narratives of nations and regions to 
continue under an umbrella of a civic constitutional order. Allowing for regional and 
national identification to coexist with supranational identity in an increasingly hostile 
environment. 91 
The Treaty documents form the constitutional infrastructure for the elaboration of 
majority objectives, such as economic and social development and also the 
institutionalisation of minority group-differentiated rights and privileges. As such the 
statement of the rights, roles and duties of the institutions and citizens of the European 
Union contained within the European constitutional order, create both a framework 
and an operationalisation of a European civic society, in which community is not 
based on real or imaginary trans-European ethnic signifiers of community, but rather 
community rooted in a cohesion made possible by the common participation in a 
uniform, rational constitutional order, and from the rights and privileges, such as 
contained within European citizenship, that such a constitutional order facilitates. A 
model of entrenched European constitutionalism and a robust set of citizenship rights 
and obligations have, as Weiler suggests, the two-fold effect of both formally 
recognising and enhancing the value of the continuance of traditional European 
national and sub-national groups by recognising national identification and cultural 
differentiation, while at the same time reducing their splintering and fracturing 
potential for European society. 92 European constitutionalism, and within it European 
citizenship is the 'civilising force' which allows for the existence of national and sub-
national signifiers without a spillover into intra-European conflict based upon such 
differing signifiers. 93 
90  Kymlincka, Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights., 138 
91  Falk has argued that the civic accommodation of cultural diversity is ultimately beneficial to the 
civic polity to the extent it; 'enhances the quality of life, by enriching our experience, expanding 
cultural resources' and in the context of 'self-destructive' modernity, such accommodation; 'may 
provide models, inspiration, guidance in the essential work of world order redesign.' See Falk, R. 1988 
'The Rights of Peoples (in Particular Indigenous Peoples)' in Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 17-37. 
92 Weiler, J. European Neo-Constitutionalism. 527. 
93 As Treisman has observed it is in those circumstances where minority nationalities and ethnic 
collectivities feel removed from the dominant constitutional order and where the y believe that the pre- 
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5.16 The Extension of Regional Rights - Institutionalised Participation of 
Regional Interests and Identities 
5.1 6.1 European Regional Participation 
As our examination of Kymlincka's thesis of civic identity formation found, polities 
that employ strategies that formalise the position of regional or minority interests and 
apportion certain rights to them, are able to develop robust civic forms of 
identification amongst their populations. Such rights vary from forms of federal self-
government rights, to less overt financial support, legal protection or special 
representation rights." Such a form of incorporation is currently practiced in the 
contemporary European polity. 95 
5.1 6.2 EU Institutional Support for Regional Interests 
Early in the process of European integration it was recognised that the increased 
competences of the European polity, would require not only a meaningful form of 
legitimacy obtainable only though popular participation, but moreover, given the 
geographic scope of the EU and its varying socioeconomic conditions, deliberate 
efforts would be required to provide substantive linkages between regional Europe 
and its core. 96 Such a process, not uncommon to the historical process of European 
existing order denies them rights privileges and recognition, that ethnonationalist activism is mobilised. 
The EU's constitutional order, by recognising diffemace ensures that it is not politically mobilised. See 
Treisman. 212. 
94  As established in Chapter Three 
95 At the institutional level, regional representation and participation is formally encouraged and 
assisted by the European Union. Such representation and participation is channelled through 
associations such as the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), the European Centre for 
Traditional and Regional Cultures (ECTARC) and the European Bureau for Lesser-Known Languages 
(EBLUL) 
96  Consociational theory provides an explanation for this stability by illustrating the role that 
national and sub-national identities continue to play in supranational European governance. 
Consociational theory offers a valid theoretical explanation of the stability of democratic governance in 
severely segmented societies such as the EU and further explains the creation of a stable setting for 
both the manifestation of pre-existing identities and the evolution of a pan-European one. 
Consociational polities at the national and supranational level, rely on four institutional practices to 
mitigate social conflict - conflict which may include tensions between competing identities. First, the 
political elites actively seek to counteract the destabilising effect of cultural (identity) fragmentation 
through inter-elite accommodation. Secondly sub-cultural segments retain the power to block any 
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state-formation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, would not only have the 
effect of ensuring that the constructed European polity moved towards socioeconomic 
uniformity, but more importantly in the context of this discussion, that regional 
constituencies were sufficiently included in the polity so as to avoid regional 
ethnonational identity mobilisation, which might result from a widely unbalanced 
European economic and social space. 97 
Notwithstanding the Treaty of Rome formally recognising states as the constitutional 
representatives of their respective national and regional groupings, the role of non-
state actors in forging the common European home is at least equally important. 98 
According to Marks and McAdam: 
"Most states in Western Europe are arenas in which diverse ethno-territorial 
groups and sub-national governments contend for authoritative 
competencies."99 
Regional movements have comprehensively mobilised around the institutions of the 
European Union. Over the last five years over 50 have set up their own offices in 
Brussels. Staffed and funded autonomously from their state of origin, they are 
attempts to eliminate or reduce their autonomy. Thirdly subcultures are proportionately represented in 
the government and other policy-making bodies and fourthly each subculture is granted autonomy in 
dealing with issues of their executive concern. The term Consociational Democracy originates in the 
work of Arend Lijphart "Typologies of Democratic Systems" Comparative Political Studies 1 (April 
1968) 3-44. The application of Consociational Theory to the European Union is addressed by Gabel, 
M. 'The Endurance of Supranational Governance: A Consociational Interpretation of the European 
Union.' Comparative Politics., 463-473. Consociational Theory represents an attempt to provide a 
workable arrangement of governance which is effective in political systems, such as the European one, 
where there is a fragmentation of political culture from pre-existing social structures. Such a process 
occurring both within and between European States, tending to contribute to political instability and 
ineffectiveness. To overcome this the sociopolitical fragmentation can be managed by a high degree of 
sub-system autonomy, interpenetration of interest groups and elites and institutionalised mutual 
tolerance of the differing sub-cultures, under the direction of an integrated elite. See Arend Lijphart 
`Consociational Democracy' World Politics Vol XXI Oct 1968-July 1969, 207-225.Examples of 
polities where culturally segmented societies are managed within majoritarian civic institutions 
include, in the European context, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland; to this list we can add the 
European Union. 
97 For a detailed examination of the development of and institutional support for regional Europe 
see; 'The European Union: reconstituting democracy beyond the nation-state' in McGrew, A. The 
Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy. (Malden MA: Blackwell 
Publishers. 1997), 171-199 
98 See Moravcsik, A. 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inter-
governmental Approach'. Journal of Common Market Studies 31 1993, 473-524 
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attempting to give themselves an independent voice and access to otherwise difficult 
to obtain information. 100 Regional governments have extended their role and 
representation in the EU and have succeeded in instituting a consultative Committee 
of the Regions composed of local and regional representatives across the Union. 
There are a number of reasons for the emergence of strong regional movements at the 
pan-European level. Importantly these reasons are analogous with our understanding 
of a sympathetic cognitive mobilisation that informs the emergence of a European 
identity. Such reasons may be divided into three areas. Firstly as the activity of the 
European Union has expanded, its effect on regional areas has grown commensurably. 
Not only do inhabitants of regional areas want to know of European policies that will 
effect them, they additionally wish to have some input into shaping European policy 
consistent with their own interests. The greater the policy competencies of sub-
national actors the more intense their need for information and influence as Marks and 
McAdam argue: 
"Regions are steered towards Brussels to gain predicability and control in their 
institutionally complex world, and in the Commission and Parliament they 
have a set of interlocutors who are happy to engage in information 
exchange." °I 
The second inducement to trans-European organisation is the maintenance of regional 
distinctiveness. Regions that have a distinctive cultural identity, such as Scotland, the 
Basque country or Wales, or which exhibit distinctive sub-state political differences 
compared with their respective national governments, such as the north of England or 
the north of Italy, are more likely to identify themselves with Europe by virtue of the 
99 Marks and McAdam, 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in 
the European Union' West European Politics vol.19 No.2 1996, 147 
100 Such organisations are increasingly raising the profile and relative importance of regional 
Europe to the Union. They provide the Union with access to information, with a regional twist, that 
might otherwise be unavailable. They survey the European arena for upcoming issues of interest to the 
regions and act to ensure that regional concerns are incorporated into EU decision making. 
lei Marks and McAdam 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in 
the European Union' West European Politics., 265 
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establishment of autonomous channels of trans-European exchange, supported by the 
EU, without necessary and constant reference to state-based channels. 102 
Thirdly, the efforts of regional Europe to gain status at a trans-European level reveals 
both their political ambitions, their fears of being out-flanked by the national 
governments of which they form a part, and the wish to enhance their regional 
identity. Aware that the EU is essentially a result of the efforts of central state 
executives regional Europe has worked hard to ensure that their political aspirations 
are not stymied by state governments at the European leve1. 103 
5.17 The Institutionalisation of Regional Interests. 
5.17.1 Regional Policy 
The European Union has skilfully linked into the regional populism that has effected 
European political life. The popular impetus for a redefinition of European political life 
from centralised forms of political and economic representation and decision making 
towards local and regional entities, which as we have earlier observed reflects a 
movement towards the reassertion of local and regional identities, has been appropriated 
by EU policy. The EU provides the basis for both European regional policy and, in its 
support for the reformation of local and regional cultural identities, provides a juncture 
for European identification in so far as Europe, not its constituent member states, 
legitimately claim to secure, represent and grant civic rights to distinct regional 
European ethnic and linguistic groups. 1°4 
102 As Wise and Gibb argue, regional representation is a key element in the articulation of a 
common European identity especially from those on Europe's peripheral. In Britain, the Welsh and 
Scottish advocates of devolution are also firm supporters of European unity. For such regionalist's, 
their form, of 'national independence' conjures up visions of 'international interdependence' within the 
protective political and economic structures of the European Union. At its root it is the argument of a 
'Europe of Regions' in which the end point is a European federation of numerous regional states. Wise 
and Gibb Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s., 39 
103 There have been some notable successes. German Lander have observer status on the Council 
of Ministers and individual Lander are now mandated by the German Government to represent its 
position on certain issues in meetings of the European Council. 
t 
104 The appropriation of regions and the reconfiguration of regional identity is well addressed by 
Woods. See: Woods, D. 'The Crisis of Center-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional 
Populism — The Lombard League' Comparative Politics, 187-203 
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Notwithstanding its rather prosaic nature European regional policy is a central element 
in the formation of a communal European identity most particularly through its 
instrumental effect of managing Ressentiment between regional and supranational 
signifiers of identity. The Single European Act of 1986 introduced a new Title called 
'Economic and Social Cohesion' The Articles concerned the development of the original 
commitment in the preamble to the EEC Treaty stating that the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social 
cohesion. These measures were further advanced by the Treaty of Maastricht. 
European regional and social policy seeks to reduce the economic and social disparities 
between the various regions while at the same time enhancing regional cultural 
distinctiveness. 105 The intention is to prevent Europe from economically and socially 
operating on two levels (such a process most commonly known as 'variable geometry' 
or 'two-speed' Europe). Such a process intended to avoid the economic cleavages that 
Horowitz demonstrates give rise to the mobilisation of ethnonationalism and to better 
integrate European populations and popular sentiment to the European project. 1°6 
Further regional policy reflects a European centred conception of European society. An 
emphasis on the institutionalisation of policies that enhance the rights and security of 
Europeans at the peripheral as well as the European core. In short, the representation and 
mutual recognition of regional identities which are institutionally supported and retain 
conceptual coherence and distinctiveness, as a consequence of such support, form a 
basis of a civic European identity. 
The specific mechanisms employed in promoting economic and social cohesion include 
the Structural Funds - (European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European 
Social Fund (ESF) and the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guarantee 
and Guidance Fund (EAGGF Guidance). 
105 Article 130a of the SEA 
106 For a discussion on the rise of ethnonationalism amongst economically disadvantaged groups 
within economically less developed regions see Horowitz, D. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: 
University of Caliomia Press 1985). 
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5.17.2 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
Formally established by the Single European Act of 1986 it is the Union's main 
structural instrument in redressing regional imbalances. The three objectives of the 
structural funds to which the ERDF contributes are: 
1. the promotion of the development and structural adjustment of the 
regions whose development is lagging behind; 
2. converting regions seriously effected by industrial decline; and 
3. promoting the development of rural areas. 
A further example, and perhaps its most well known, of institutional efforts to unite 
regional Europe within a unified European space, includes steps taken in regard to the 
implementation of supranational agricultural policy, more specifically the Guidance 
Section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund. 
5.17.3 Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund 
(EAGGF Guidance) 
The influence of agricultural policy on the nature of the EU has been paramount. 
Agricultural support, at first necessary to overcome the potential for the recurrence of 
acute European food shortages, became increasingly symbolic of a particular way of life 
- of a technical and cultural tradition, in short a central element of European identity. Its 
protection was seen as essential not only for European economic stability but as a 
cornerstone of Europeaness. 
There developed a wide range of Community legislation concerning agriculture and 
foodstuffs and the EAGGF Guarantee Section dominated the Community budget; 
between 2000 and 2006 rural areas in EU states will receive a total of 30.37 billion 
euro. 107 European subsidies for agriculture protection, relative to Europe's main 
agricultural competitors are significant, and a point of dissention in international trade 
107 European Commission, 1998 Directorate-General for Information, Communication, Culture and 
Audiovisual Media, Frontier Free Europe. October 1998Brussels, 2. 
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negotiations.108 . While atempts have been made to reform the Common Agricultural 
Policy the importance of it to community members, most especialy those newcomers of 
the 70's and 80's Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, has increased as their agricultural 
sectors represent a relatively larger part in their economies than the original members of 
the Community.1°9 Importantly, as the previous tables have shown the level of European 
identification and support for the further integration of the European polity in these new, 
relatively agriculturaly dependent states, is relatively higher than in those European 
states with a comparatively lower level of reliance upon the agricultural sector. 
5.17.4 The Representation of Regional Interests. 
Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty regional representation is institutionalised 
within the 'Commitee of the Regions' which works to ensure that regions have a 
formal consultative role in the European policy process. Beyond the Commitee 
regional governments have created a labyrinth of transnational networks linking 
regions based on a diverse range of commonalities including regions networks of 
industrial specialisation, geographical location, transnational cultural ties and 
common political institutions and roles. Such trans-European regional linkages 
include: 
1. The Association of European Regions, 
2. The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, 
3. The Association of Regions of Traditional Industry, 
4. The European Association of Border Regions; and 
5. The Union of Capital Regions. 
108 The magnitude of EU agricultural support is demonstrated by the fact that in 1998 producer 
subsidies, including the value of al protection and financial support, in the EU represented 45% of 
farm income. This compares to the United States where the figure is 22% and Australia where the 
figure is 7%. The OECD average is 37%. See Colebatch, T. 'Trade giants maintain farmer protection' 
The Age 22 May 1999 Business Section, 3. 
109 The objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy include: 
I. 	 to increase agricultural productivity; 
2. to ensure a 'fair standard of living' for the agricultural community; and 
3. to stabilise markets. 
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In addition to which there are associations covering the western, central and eastern 
Alps; the Jura, and the Pyrenees, the Association of Frontier Regions and the Coal 
fields Communities Campaign. 110 
Regional movements have proven their ability to respond positively to European 
integration and have created a sense of focus and loyalty to the European idea. 
Regions have responded to the promise of a united Europe both individually, by 
setting up European offices and co-operatively within mutually reinforcing networks 
and transnational alliances. Such actions represent a shift in the locus of regional 
policy networks and identity, from the national to the supranational. The creation of a 
European identity benefits from effective regionalist movements operating at the 
trans-European level and which are committed to the innovation and elaboration of 
regional interests at the trans European level. This is achieved in a variety of ways. At 
the most prosaic, regional Europeans are supportive of European identity, as we have 
empirically established, to the extent to which it assists them materially. Secondly the 
networks of exchange and pluralisation of regional associations constitute a element 
of identity formation, insofar as we define identity in terms of communal actions and 
collective interrelationships. Thirdly because, as we shall presently consider, 
European regional policy acts not only as the guardian of the regional economic life, 
but further institutionalises participative rights for regional identities and cultures, 
including ethnic identities, and by the very process of institutionalised inclusion and 
participation it enhances the cognitive engagement of regional Europeans. Such 
engagement is central to collective identification. 
The EU has actively encouraged the activities of regional governments at the trans-
national level. The mobilisation of regional governments is seen as a counterweight to 
state-based power bases and the EU has been eager to find an ally against the 
entrenched position of the member states. Further, regional organisations are a good 
source of information and intelligence as to the nature of European activities, and 
finally and most importantly, the regional movement is a sound catalyst for the 
funnelling and channelling of regional sympathies and loyalties to the concept of a 
supranational Europe. 
110 Marks and McAdam 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity 
in the European Union' West European Politics., 266 
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The regional networks have played an important role in developing a pan-European 
focus amongst those at the peripheral, whether economic or geographic, of Europe. 
Their participation in dense consultative and policy networks with other regional 
offices and with the institutions of the Union ensures that non-state based, 
autonomous channels of communication and information sharing is established 
between disparate organisations and peoples. This forms the basis of meaningful 
communicative action across expanded and differentiated discursive spheres which 
forms a basis of collective identification. 11 ' The contributions of regional agricultural 
and social policies has been to both add social and economic cohesion to the Union and 
to indirectly better articulate a common European unity, by the granting of specific 
benefits and economic rights to specific European (regional) minorities. 
5.18 Political Socialisation (Education, Communication and Information - Via 
an Official Language 
5.18.1 European Identity and Language 
Europeans are as a matter of practical utility, increasingly turning to English as a core 
language, however the continued place of national, regional and local languages 
remains strong.' 2 The introduction of effective strategies at the pan-European level to 
foster the enduring strength of local vernaculars is a central element in European 
identity formation." 3 
111 See Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press 1984) 
112 There are over 45 national and regional languages and major regional variants spoken by the 
peoples of the European Union. Most are Romance, German or Celtic in origin, others include Greek, 
Finnish and Basque. See Hearn, P & Button, D. (Eds.) Language Industries Atlas, Amsterdam: IOS 
Press for CEC, Brussels 
1 " The role of language in identity formation, most especially in the ethnic critique of identity, is 
central; we are what we speak, and we identify with those who share our language. As de Tocqueville 
observed; 'The tie of language is perhaps the strongest and most durable that can unite mankind'. 
Language not only allows for a common identification from amongst a named population, but also 
facilitates the polity's control and ability to manipulate and gain legitimacy from amongst its 
population. The role of language within Europe, most especially in the context of the institutional 
attempts to enhance European identity within a linguistically diverse environment is central to 
questions of identity. See Williams, C. (Ed.) Linguistic Minorities Society and Territory., 8. 
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European language policy is essentialy one of accommodation, within a practical 
context of language rationalisation. Consistent with its support for regional interests 
and identities, national regional and local language groups are materialy and 
symbolicaly supported.14 A diversity of European languages is a value institutionaly 
upheld. Given that language is essential to identity, culture and memory European 
language policy commits to the defence of linguistic diversity in order to secure 
localised identities, which in turn provides a common basis for European 
identification. The result of such a process, as suggested by Stoneham, is a unique 
'constelation' of European languages, rather than a single European language, which 
wil be institutionalised and form the core of both the European linguistic identity, and 
European civic identity as it facilitates the key civic values of the differentiation of 
diferent discursive spheres. 
Specific actions taken to enhance regional and local language groups include 
programs such as the operations of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, 
the Leonardo da Vinci, Socrates, and Leonardo I programs and the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages, which came into force in respect of the Seven 
states that ratified it, on I March 1998.15 Uniquely the Charter is the first 
international convention devoted to the protection and promotion of regional language 
in Europe. The Charter is a legaly binding document which is intended to give 
114 Examples of institutional support for a multilingual Europe include: 
I. 	 safeguarding the status of oficial languages, in accordance with rules regulating the 
use of languages in the European institutions; 
2. informing public organisations and industry of the importance of language issues in 
the information age, with a view to identifying common problems and possible 
solutions; and 
3. raising awareness and promoting a multilingual approach to the information society 
in Europe, in relation to the content, interfaces, translation, interpretation and 
language learning. See Commission of the European Communities 'The Multilingual 
Information Society' Com (95) 486., 5. 
115 Under the Socrates program support is provided for the initial and in-service training of 
language teachers and the development of new teaching materials and for joint educational projects;. 
The Leonardo da Vinci program is designed to promote the development of vocationaly orientated 
language skils through transnational pilot projects and exchange programs. Leonardo I is designed to 
"promote a quantitative and qualitative improvement in the knowledge of the languages of the 
European Union, in particular those languages which are less widely used and less widely taught" see 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Commitee on the proposal for a decision of the European 
Parliament and of the Council: European Year of Languages 2001 (COM(1999) 485 FINAL — 99/0208 
(COD) 
208 
significant protection to, and rights for users of minority languages in the areas of 
education justice, media, cultural activities and European administration. In practical 
terms the Charter is intended to ensure that member states of the EU guarantee in 
legislation and implements in policy steps favourable to minority languages. This 
involves member states formally acknowledging language groups as official national 
minorities, and the introduction of language planning targets and programs to enhance 
linguistic diversity: 16 Such actions are consistent with the security of regional 
Europeans participation and the institutional security of their civic rights including 
language rights, foundational elements in European civic identification. As Blair 
comments: 
"A mere absence of discrimination is not enough to protect languages that are 
in a weak position. The main purpose is to devise positive measures to 
promote regional or minority languages."' 17 
5.18.2 Community Action in Favour of Regional or Minority Languages and Cultures 
The EU is active in the positive support for minority languages. Such support ranges 
from the symbolic decision to designate 2001 the European Year of Languages to the 
significant financial commitment to language support. In the context of the EU being 
a protector of pre-existing identities, and of respecting linguistic and cultural 
diversity, the European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions to support 
regional or minority language communities. To support regional or minority 
languages the Commission has a budget of 3,741,000 ECU (1997 figures). The 
languages intended to benefit from this action are those autochthonous languages 
traditionally spoken by part of a population of member states of the European 
Union. I18  
The objectives are designed to encourage initiatives in the fields of education, culture 
and information, to safeguard and promote regional or minority languages or cultures, 
116 European Commission 'Contact Bulletin : The European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages' 
June 1998. Vol 14, No3, 2-3. 
117  Ibid., 1. 
118 This does not include migrants languages or artificially created languages. 
209 
to strengthen the European dimension and stimulate cooperation between all those 
seeking to preserve and promote such languages. Further the initiatives aim to 
improve the exchange of information and the transfer of experience, to systematise, 
improve and promote the teaching of regional or minority languages in all educational 
channels, from nursery school to adult training. 
Actions taken to promote minority languages and cultures include: conferences and 
seminars, cultural events, information networks and documentation centres, teacher 
and adult training, use of language through the media including the production of 
films, videos radio and TV programs and the facilitation of meetings between 
speakers of the same language who are situated in different EU countries. 119 
The key element in this European program is MERCATOR, which is an information 
and documentation network with the aim of improving the exchange and circulation 
of information on minority languages and cultures. It seeks to encourage cooperation 
and networking between institutions and universities and local, regional and national 
authorities. 120 The EU is actively pursuing policy in favour of regional or minority 
languages or cultures within Europe. 
5.19 Education and European Identity 
5.19.1 Education, Information, Cultural and Community Development 
The global society is now characterised by the almost instantaneous flow and 
exchange of information and communication. Europe is intimately involved with this 
process. These information flows which notionally order consumption and production 
also play a significant part in determining identity. We have considered earlier, 
especially in relation to the work of Anderson and Deutsch the pivotal role of 
communication and developments in information technology (such as the introduction 
119 The meetings must have a cultural content and aim at promoting and safeguarding the language. 
129 The MERCATOR Projects goal is: 
"to establish maintain and develop thematic databases (on education), legislation and 
the media) which will assist in disseminating and improving knowledge of the 
regional/minority languages of the European Union." 
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of the printing press in sixteenth century Europe) has had on not only the institutions 
of society but on the creation, and diffusion of mass cultural products and on the 
promotion of a common, state-centred 'national' identity. The process of 
informationalism, industrialism, capitalism and statism that provoked the articulation 
of state-centred identities, is little different to the potential effects of the current 
technological revolution. The Institutions of the EU have embraced advances in 
information technology and have seen the spread of information and knowledge of the 
union as being central elements in the raising of a European consciousness. 
The European Union has been extremely active in promoting Pan-European education 
and has used a variety of instruments to ensure the interchange of ideas between 
Europeans. The European polity has an active information, audiovisual and cultural 
series of policies designed to both allow for cultural interchanges across Europe and 
to more fully inform European citizens on Union procedures. The European 
information policy is designed to make the workings of the Union more transparent 
and to make decision makers and their decisions more accessible to individual 
Europeans. The Commissions office for official publications distributes a range of 
publications aimed at engendering a broader understanding of and a more sympathetic 
feeling amongst Europeans to Europe. Further the encouragement of pan-European 
education at the tertiary level as part of the Communities' education, vocational 
training and youth policies. I21 
5.19.2 European Identity and Communication 
"Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive factor in European 
Unification . . . European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want 
121 Specific policies in the training and education field utilised by the Supranational European 
polity include the active involvement of the European Commission, more specifically Direcorate XXII. 
The Direcorate manages three five-year programs; SOCRATES for education, LEONARDO DA 
VINCI for training, and Youth for Europe, a program for young people outside formal education and 
training systems. In the information and Communication field a total of 50 million ECU was made 
available in 1996 under PRINCE (information program for European Citizens). This program consisted 
of information campaigns for specific polices and has three elements. The first 'The Euro: a currency 
for Europe' (expenditure of ECU 22 million), the second 'Building Europe Together, an information 
campaign on the inter-governmental conference (ECU 22 million) and finally 'Citizens First' the aim of 
which is to provide European Citizens with Information on their rights in the internal market (ECU 6 
million.) See: European Union 1998, Financial Report 1996, (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities) 43. 
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it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as a European identity. A 
European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed." 122 
The role of communications in the creation of a communal identity has been 
established earlier in this work. Anderson comprehensively illustrated the significance 
in improvements in communications technology as a central enabling feature in 
constructing collective identity across a territorially diverse and abstracted 
community. Deutsch argues as to the importance of social communications in the 
construction of a collective identity. For Deutsch social communication is the key to 
building and sustaining communities. The EU fosters such communication by the 
establishment of appropriate policy and the funding of communication flows across 
territory. Such actions build the complex network of associations and discourses from 
which collective identification is founded; it contributes to the emergence of a pan-
European community of sentiment. Deutsch proposes that the essence of community 
is the: 
"ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, 
with members of one large group than with outsiders." I23 
The core of community is not a common ethnic origin or even a common language, 
but rather: 
"What counts is not the presence or absence of any single factor, but merely 
the presence of sufficient communication facilities with enough 
complementarity to produce the overall result." 124 
By giving access to Europeans the greatest range of television programs, the 
establishment of a common market in broadcast services and most importantly by the 
promotion of television programs with European content, the European Union is 
overtly attempting to foster an expanded but distinctively European cultural 
experience. European states have removed legal and technical restrictions which have 
inhibited wider European access to their television services. Further the European 
Union's active support for specifically European media products is creating the 
122 Commission of the European Communities Television without Frontiers: Green Paper on the  
Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting Especially by Satellite and Cable (Com 84,300 
final) Brussels.1984 , 2. 
123 Deutsch, K. Nationalism and Social Communication., 97. 
124 Ibid. 
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heterogeneous media discourses which emphasises the plurality of identities, within 
the civic paradigm of institutionaly supported mutual recognition. Thus the civic 
polity in an open and democratic information market, ensures the continuance of 
regional signifiers, which the ethnicaly-based polity would seek to limit or eradicate. 
125 
5.19.3 Institutional Provisions for the Development of European Network Society. 
The European Union has facilitated the growth of information-based transactions in 
three areas. They are: 
I. 	 the creation of the necessary infrastructure, 
2. the development of the Services using that infrastructure, and 
3. ensuring the widest possible access to those services. 
The EU has set in place policies to promote the investment required to build up the 
Europe-wide technological infrastructure within a short period. This includes the 
opening up of the telecommunications monopolies to effective competition, and 
encouraging its member states to establish the necessary state-based infrastructure and 
the establishment of independent regulatory structures. The benefits of such actions 
have been suggested in a recent report by the Federal Trust: 
125 Specific institutional action taken to create an inclusive but distinctively European 
communications sphere include: 
1. the promotion of European co-productions and making 1988 the European Cinema 
and Television year; and 
2. the drafting of an 'Action programme for the European audio-visual media products 
Industry. The action program MEDIA (Measures to Encourage the Development of 
the Audiovisual Industry) concerns the content of the media products, adopted by the 
European Council on 21 December 1990, for the period 1991 to 1995 it had a budget 
of 200 milion ECU. 
Further initiatives include the creation of a European multilingual television channel, was first raised in 
1990 and in March 1991 the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) presented its EURONEWS service. 
EURONEWS is a dedicated multilingual satelite TV news channel which is specificaly designed to 
compete with the US's CNN. (and in so doing provide a media product that differentiated Europe from 
the rest of global information flows.) 
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"The information superhighway offers a striking opportunity to enhance not 
only European competitiveness but also the understanding and participation of 
the general public in the affairs of the Union as a whole." 126 
The development of the self-titled European 'Information Society' by the Commission 
represent a tangible attempt to integrate and inform individual Europeans into the 
institutions of Europe. It is in effect an adjunct of nation -building. It has the potential 
to both inform and educate Europeans but also to reinforce the benefits of Europeans 
social and labour market policies. Such a phenomenon is another example of 
European spillover. Economic integration requiring social and labour market reforms, 
thus requiring improved access to information which in turn leads to the promotion 
and inclusion of Europeans. 
Following the development of a Green Paper in 1996, entitled 'Living and Working in 
the Information Society: people first', the EU has embarked on a program of activity 
to improve access and use of Information Technology amongst its citizens. The 
principal purpose of such a strategy was overtly to ensure that the EU economy had 
continuing growth and employment and the promotion of inclusion for people with 
special needs. Improving access to the tools of the information society is also 
considered pivotal in enhancing political progress within the union, including the 
enhancement of democracy and social justice and the Union believes it will have the 
effect of improving the working and living conditions of both men and women. 127 
Specific actions taken by the Commission to strengthen the European Information 
Society include the following: 
1. At the National and regional level the Commission will provide 
support to the member states to integrate a strong social dimension in 
the ongoing development of their information society strategies. 
2. At the Community level the Commission will mainstream the social 
dimension in all relevant employment and social policies. 
126 The Federal Trust 'Information Superhighway: Applications in Society' p.2 at 
http://www.eurplace.org/orga/londra/fedtrust/network.html accessed 26/12/98. 
122 The Commission has allocated a total of 162M ECU for the purpose of Building the 
Information Society (ADAPT-BIS) for the period 1997-99. 
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3. 	 At the international level the Commission wil promote in the 
appropriate fora the development and use of technologies 
The purpose of such a program is clear. The Commission wishes to improve 
economic and social conditions generaly but more specificaly is atempting to 
improve social cohesion by the improvement of living, learning and working 
conditions for al groups in European society. More generaly the improvement of 
access to, and use of information technology wil have the effect of creating a wider, 
more diverse field of Intra-European networks and relationships in a variety of fields 
from educational, to sporting to cultural, which may have the effect of engendering a 
stronger European consciousness. 
5.19.4 The Efect of Information Flows on European Identity Formation. 
The effect of formal and informal cultural interchange across Europe on the 
emergence of a European Identity is difficult to quantify with precision. However, its 
general efect is ilustrated by the folowing: 
"The exchange of ideas, and possibly also of artistic and literary productions is 
one of the most promising methods of fostering the development of world 
understanding and a sense of moral and cultural community among the 
peoples of the world."128 
Culturaly, the rise of a European network society has had a dramatic impact on the 
cementing of existing European cohesion and the realisation of far broader European 
relationships and associations. While technology has the potential to contribute to 
what Castels describes as the 'individualization of labor in the labor process', the 
advent of an network society wil have the effect of building dense networks of 
relationships and transactions, in increasingly more specialised fields of endeavour. 
Whilst the coordination of cultural production has been best suited to localised 
circumstances in the past, the utilisation of information technology wil have the 
effect of exploding the space of flows, so that a truly European cultural and artistic 
128 Ibid., 194. 
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community can develop. 129 One that allows for a wide variety of diverse and 
overlapping identities to coexist within a civic identity allowing for mutual 
recognition, the protection of localism and the regulatory ordering of difference. 
5.20 European Mythologisation 
The logic of traditional ethnic nationalism requires the appropriation and uniform 
application of a standard set of historical memories, traditions, vernaculars and shared 
imaginings, in short a common national mythology. Such a phenomena is not the case 
in the development of the European Supranation. European integration runs contrary 
to the experience of the process of traditional state-formation. Whereas formative 
European states took actions to 'invent' or reconfigure a common set of traditions, or 
to unify the state around a set of state-mediated cultural practices, and the suppression 
of competing proto-identities, the supranational European experience differs 
markedly. Europe supports, rather than dilutes or destroys regional mythologies, 
national languages and local traditions and symbols. Europe does not need to create 
its own mythology, it rather acknowledges the needs of its peoples and their pre-
existing identities, provides institutional rights for their practices, and creates a 
distinct and secure domain for their actualisation. Europe acts to encourage the 
enduring cultural practices and pre-existing mythologies, in a positive inclusive 
manner, so as to over come their potentially destructive effects. In such a manner a 
common European civic identity — one in which a common sense of Europeaness 
based on a positive sense of belonging to a benign tolerant polity, is emerging. As 
Kymlincka argues: 
"What is clear, I think, is that if there is a viable way to promote a sense of 
solidarity and common purpose in a multinational state, it will involve 
accommodating, rather than subordinating, national identities. People from 
different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if 
they see it as the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather 
than subordinated." 130 
129 For a detailed examination on the relationship between improvements in technology and its 
effect on work and culture see, CasteIls, M. The Rise of Network Society. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers 1996). 
130 Kymlincka Multicultural Citizenship: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights., 189. 
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The tolerance and support for pre-existing signifiers, often ethnically based, is 
complimented by the tentative emergence of specifically European traditions and 
cultural artefacts, such as the celebration of Europe Day, a European currency, the 
European Anthem and the most obvious, the European flag. As it flies alongside 
European member state flags, and is poignantly draped next to the national flag of 
member states at press-conferences and in briefing rooms, the European flag has the 
potential to act as a common symbol which compliments, rather than undermines pre-
existing symbolic identifiers. 
"Everyone nowadays recognises the sky-blue banner with 12 gold stars 
symbolising European unification, which we see more and more often flying 
alongside national flags in front of public buildings. Is there anyone who can 
fail to be moved on hearing the Ode to Joy . . . ? What community national 
does not enjoy following the 'European Community' sign in airport arrival 
halls, and passing through simply by showing the uniform passport adopted in 
1985." 13i 
However the common evocation of European symbols as a motive force for European 
identification is at best tenuous. European cultural diversity, and the liberal 
democratic nature of the EU means that finding defensible and politically neutral 
supranational symbols highly problematic, and in a very real sense unnecessary. 
Institutional attempts to create a civic European identity might well be undermined by 
heavy handed and imposed symbols of Europe which contradict or question the basis 
of the national and regional European symbols which show no sign of abating. 
5.21 Europe as a Multi-Dimensional Identity Space - The European 
Supranation as a Protector of National and Sub-national Identities 
"Europe will be stronger precisely because in has France as France, Spain as 
Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It 
would be a folly to try to fit them into some form of identikit European 
personality." I32 
Activities taken by the European Union to preserve and foster pre-existing cultural, 
national and proto-national identities form an important element in the loyalty shown 
131 Fontaine, P A Citizens Europe., (Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the European 
Communities 1991), 7. 
132 Thatcher, M. 'Britain and Europe'. Text of the Prime Minister's speech at Bruges on 20 
September 1988, (London: Conservative Political Centre), 38. 
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by Europeans to Europe. As we have observed earlier the crisis of the sovereign state 
has led to a shift in loyalties to other arenas. The construction of a politically 
integrated European Community may well be the best hope, according to Rootes: 
"of preserving national, regional and individual identities that would otherwise 
be threatened by the clash between the globalising tendencies of mass culture 
on the one hand and defensive nationalism and ethnic exclusivity on the 
other." 133 
The transfer of practical matters of state administration to the supranational arena in 
which they can be effectively dealt may result in national governments focusing more 
on social questions and the mediation of global influences with local cultures. 
Alternately such a process of globalisation may require Europe to assume sufficient 
power and discretion to protect national and sub-national identities, such as national 
languages, customs and histories. We can see both in rhetoric and policy direction the 
attempts by the European Union to protect and foster traditional signifiers of national 
and sub-national identity. In this way Europe assumes the 'commanding heights' in its 
approaches to the role of the guarantees of minority rights and security to pre-existing 
identities. 
The primacy of the development of an inclusive structure that affirms the importance 
of community, regional autonomy, language rights and social welfare has been pivotal 
in the creation of and collective attachment to a unified Europe which in effect 
becomes a civic equitable 'rights-domain' in which Europeans can make equitable 
claims on the supranational polity. 
5.22 A European Social-Cultural Space - The Creation of a 'Peoples Europe' 
The creation of a 'Peoples Europe' may be regarded as one of the most practical 
elements of the creation of a European social space. It was originally conceived to 
overcome some of the misunderstanding resulting from perceptions of a Europe 
remote, uncaring and often ignorant of the interests of its citizens. Its effect, in 
combination with the creation of other elements of the European social and economic 
space has been to deepen European identity by creating patterns of activity and 
133 Rootes, C & Davis, H. Social Change and Political Transformation  ., 2. 
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understanding over one another so as to create a deeper sense of belonging amongst 
Europeans to Europe. 
One of the more significant aspects of the creation of a 'Peoples Europe' has been the 
establishment of the right of freedom of movement for European citizens. The 
abolition of frontier controls, for example, is according to the European Parliament 
'for ordinary people a tangible sign of the existence of a true community'. Not only 
was the guarantee of freedom of movement important so as to ensure the coherence of 
the single market program but it was a central feature of creating a common European 
consciousness by creating a Europe without internal borders. The harmonisation of 
national policies with regard to the free movement of peoples, and importantly the 
establishment of uniform standards across Europe on the right of asylum and the 
status of refugees attempt to not only improve the quality of life for Europeans but 
also to provide a clear perception of commonality and shared conditions for all 
Europeans, thus enhancing a pan-European consciousness. Further a distinctive 
European boundary is established and enforced between EU citizens and outsiders. 
The creation of a functional barrier between 'Europe' and 'non-Europe' on citizenship 
grounds will greatly assist the development of a pan-European identity (as we have 
seen earlier, in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination is a central element of 
community identity formation.) 
European social policy aims to provide for full employment, the improvement of 
living and working conditions, the involvement of labour and industry in economic and 
social policy decisions and social and economic cohesion. 134 In the early years of the 
European Community Social policy was very much secondary to economic 
functionalism. Up until 1972 the only progress made was the introduction of free 
movement of labour, including social security provisions for those involved, and the 
creation of the European Social Fund. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a greater 
focus on social matters and an initial Program of Social Action was adopted on 21 
January 1974 by the Council and reaffirmed on 22 June 1984. 135 The subsequent 
134 European Parliament. Fact Sheets of the European Parliament and the Activities of the 
European Union., 337. 
135 The objectives of these action programs have been achieved in a variety of ways. The 
objectives of the action programs with regard to improving the living and working conditions of 
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reaffirmation added a degree of focus to the development of European social policy by 
virtue of the demonstrable political will, exhibited by the European Council, to move 
towards the creation of a 'European social area'. Steps towards such an area manifested 
themselves both in the adoption of provisions within both the SEA and the Maastricht 
Treaty for social objectives to be widened and for the Community to formally operate a 
policy in the social sphere. 
Such a widening of European policy represented both a reflection of the intentions of 
European elites to progress European integration from a broader, non-economic basis, 
and also the recognition of the effect of policy spillover; that effective economic 
harmonisation could only be achieved in the context of a homogenous European set of 
social conditions. As Vasso Papandreou, (then) EC Commissioner for Social Affairs and 
Employment, commented in 1990: 
"Efforts towards completing the internal market in 1992 have highlighted the 
importance of this social dimension. It is not simply a question of ensuring 
freedom of movement for persons, together with goods, services and capital. 
It also contributes to improving the well-being of Community citizens and in 
the first place workers. The construction of a dynamic and strong Europe 
depends on the recognition of a foundation of social rights. A political signal 
given at the highest level was crucial." 136 
The two most important symbols of the evolution of European Social Policy is the 
Social Charter and the TEU. 
In December 1989 the Heads of State and Government of 11 of the 12 Member states - 
The United Kingdom having opted out adopted the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social rights of Workers, or Social Charter for short. The social charter, 
described by the European Parliament as the cornerstone of the Communities 'social 
dimension' deals with rights in 12 main areas which are: 
vulnerable groups has been achieved in the form of directives in the sphere of equal opportunities and 
specific aid for the elderly, migrant workers and the elderly. The improvement of employees conditions 
has been effected by a number of European Directive, including directives limiting working time, 
collective agreements and employees rights in the event of an employers insolvency. 
136 Commission of the European Communities Community Charter of the Fundamental Social  
Rights of Workers. (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990) 
5. 
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1. freedom of movement of workers; 
2. employment and remuneration; 
3. improvement of living and working conditions; 
4. social protection; 
5. freedom of association and collective bargaining; 
6. vocational training; 
7. equal treatment for men and women; 
8. information, consultation and participation for workers; 
9. health protection and safety at the workplace; 
10. protection of children and young people; 
11. the elderly, and 
12. the disabled. 
The TEU increased the Unions in the social and employment spheres. Not simply is the 
EU's raison d'etre to improve economic conditions but also to ensure a high level of 
social protection. The treaty compelled the introduction of social welfare and 
employment policies and the scope of the social fund is to be widened and a whole new 
section inserted on education and vocational training. Importantly the scope of qualified 
majority voting will be widened increasing the supranational scope of the community in 
social affairs. The social charter introduced new areas of competencies and 
responsibility of the community. Whereas section 117 of the EEC Treaty talks about 
promoting improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for 
workers' under the Social Charter, the Community was given the responsibility for 
employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue 
between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to 
lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. Areas of cooperation requiring 
a qualified majority were extended to cover proposals for the improvement of the 
working environment and increasing opportunities for women at work and for 
information and consultation of workers and the integration of persons excluded from 
the labour market, The practical extension of QMV to these matters strengthens the 
supranational administration of the European polity. 137 
137 European Parliament. Fact sheets of the European Parliament and the Activities of the European 
Union 340 
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Thus the agreement between the European states has opened new areas of cooperation 
and the enhancement of pan-European supranational competence. Such an established 
integrated policy domain for Europe is further assisted by the decision-making processes 
which effectively make the European social policy domain supranational. European 
social policy for the Community is decided via voting by a qualified majority, this 
greatly increases the autonomy of the institutions of the community. 138 
5.22.1 European Social Policy and European Identity 
The efforts taken by the European Union not only to improve economic and social 
conditions are becoming increasingly prominent, and are having a direct, positive 
effect on European identity formation. The Single European Act and the TEU state 
that; 'in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social 
cohesion.' 139 And further that 'Member States shall pay particular attention to 
encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the 
health and safety of workers, and shall set as their objective the harmonisation of 
conditions in this area, while maintaining the improvements made'. 140 
Accordingly EU inspired action to improve living and working conditions have taken 
on a variety of forms. The Structural Funds, and most especially the European Social 
Fund represent the main instruments for the promotion of social cohesion within the 
Union. Further the Union, despite the opposition from the then British Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, introduced in 1989 a Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of Workers, which represented the judicial side of social cohesion and which 
stressed the improvement of living and working conditions; social protection; freedom 
138 Areas of policy which can be progressed by qualified majority voting include improvements of 
the working environment, equality of opportunity for men and women and information and 
consultation of workers. Those policy domains still requiring unanimity include proposals on social 
security, conditions of employment for third-country nationals and financial contributions for the 
promotion of employment Such breadth of policy decided by qualified majority voting ensures that 
individual national veto's as essentially redundant to decision-making and implementation. 
139 Article 130A of the Treaty on European Union 
149 Article 118a of the Treaty on European Union 
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of association and collective bargaining; and participation of workers; the protection 
of health and safety at the workplace; and the protection of children and adolescents, 
the elderly and the disabled. 14I 
European identification has been promoted by the integrative function that Marshall 
found to result from the expansion of meaningful citizenship rights. Such rights 
including not only the immediately obvious participative rights, but more broadly the 
economic and cultural rights that he found are often lacking in culturally diverse and 
economically inequitable states. I42 Europe has overcome the potential splintering 
effect of heterogeneous polities by providing those policy outcomes which contribute 
to communal identification. Specifically Europe has, via the expansion of a 
substantive economic reformation in order to equitably assist Europe's regions and 
thought regional, cultural, linguistic and educational policy provided the policy 
outcomes that at one and the same time have provided for economic improvements to 
overcome economic and cultural exclusion. Further it has provided group-
differentiated rights for regions and ethnolinguistic minorities, which has had the 
effect of promoting what Marshall refers to as the 'direct sense of community 
membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is common in possession'. The 
common rights of European citizenship — including economic and cultural rights are 
central to the evocation of communal identity, civic identity that takes account of 
ethnic difference. 
5.22.2 Cultural Policy 
A European civic identity, inclusive of pre-existing (ethnic) signifiers of identity is 
promoted in two ways. the product of uniquely 'European Cultural products and the 
efforts made by Europe to protect and enhance national and sub-national cultural 
products. 
While the EEC treaty does not provide for any Community action in the cultural field, 
the Treaty on European Union provides that: 'the Community shall contribute to the 
141 Moussis Handbook of European Union: Institutions and Policies., 117. 
142 Marshall, T.H. Class, Citizenship and Social Development. (New York: Anchor 1965) 
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flowering of cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and 
regional diversity and at the same time bringing their common cultural heritage to the 
fore.' 143 
Specific measures and achievements of the European Union in the field of Cultural 
Policy include: 
1. the protection of architectural assets, including the restoration of assets 
and assistance for cultural events connected with the protection of 
cultural assets; 
2. activities including the event 'European city of Culture', established in 
1985 by the ministers responsible for cultural affairs with the aim of 
helping 'to bring the peoples of the Member States closer together' (379 
fact sheets) the event 'European Cultural Month' established in 1990, 
the formation of the EC Youth Orchestra in 1985; 
3. European prizes including the EC's Europhalia Literary prize, the 
Queen Elizabeth prize, the architecture prize and the European prize 
for the literary translations. 
Other projects being implemented involve the promotion of books and reading, the 
publication of publishing statistics, the literary and translation prizes, the 
encouragement of company sponsorship and vocational training in the cultural 
sector. 144 
143 The goals of the communities cultural policies are: 
1. to preserve the memories of the European peoples by contributing to the conservation 
of cultural heritage in all its forms and by trying to increase awareness of it; 
2. to promote the establishment of an environment favourable to the development of 
culture in Europe by taking cultural aspects into account in its other policies and 
programmes and by supporting artistic and literary creation, non-commercial cultural 
exchanges and networks; and 
3. to help to promote Europe throughout the world by fostering cooperation with third 
countries. 
European Parliament. Fact sheets of the European Parliament and the Activities of the 
European Union 379. 
144 European Parliament. Fact sheets of the European Parliament and the Activities of the European 
Union 380 
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5.23 Chapter Five - Concluding Remarks 
5.23.1 The European Union and Reinforcers of Identity: A Synthesis of the Structural 
Components.  
"The EC has become the central frame of reference for an incalculable number 
of actors most of whom will hope to influence and/or gain from the eventual 
outputs of the EC's decision making process." I45 
The editors of Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 38, in 
summarising the views of the European public towards the European polity, found 
that a notable part of the European public is in favour of European unification where 
such integration contributes, in the way described below, to circumstances: 
1. where national and regional identities and cultural diversity are 
respected, protected and defended; 
2. where democratic channels of citizen influence exist and visibly 
function; and 
3. where sovereignty is pooled and exercised through common 
institutions only in such policy areas, where national or regional 
governments can no longer solve problems effectively. 
Whereas they found that the European public would be resistant towards European 
integration insofar as it: 
1. threatens national identity and cultural diversity; 
2. gives citizens insufficient democratic influence; and 
3. gives their country and its government no say in European decision-
making; 
European integration has provided for outcomes consistent with the aforementioned 
preferences — respect for pre-existing identities and participative citizenship in a 
WS Lodge,J. The European Parliament — from Assembly to colegislature. In Lodge J (Ed) The 
European Community and the Challenge of the Future. (London: Pinter Publishers. 1989), 26. 
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secure and prosperous domain with the transfer of appropriate policy domains to the 
supranational level. 
The transformation in European political life that has empowered the European polity 
has concurrently integrated the peoples of Europe. The European polity has become 
the critical set of institutions and discursive framework for trans-European identity 
formation. It has increasing competencies in areas traditionally linked to its member 
states and its leadership has provided the material and cultural environment for a 
common identity to emerge. In short we have shown that European identity formation 
has been reinforced by those elements typically associated with communal identity 
formation, writ large at the supranational level. 
The EU has instituted mechanisms and achieved demonstrable outcomes for a 
meaningful (European) social citizenship. Such a social citizenship is achievable only 
at a pan-national level as individual European states have lost their competence and 
authority in economic, social and political domains. The active involvement of the 
supranational polity in the consolidation of its territory, and in securing its boundaries 
is a central aspect of creating a substantive European identity space. European 
policies aimed at defending and promoting regional and local identities, linguistic, 
cultural and ethnic signifiers, are a considerable force in engendering a positive sense 
of Europeaness. Insofar the implementation of such policy creates and promotes an 
appropriate cluster of civic rights allowing for the practice and expression of such 
localised identities. Europe is relevant and attractive to Europeans because it fulfils 
European's economic, normative, security, and most significantly identity needs 
better than the pre-existing member states can or do. This process is accentuated in a 
period of increased global competition, and in the context of the postmodern search 
for authenticity and rootedness. 
The institutional arrangements that we have examined in this Chapter have had a two-
fold effect on the creation of a common European identity. Firstly Europe has created, 
not only as a rhetorical device but also in substance, an area of 'freedom, Security and 
justice'. An area in which right-bearing citizens can enjoy free access to education, 
employment and the rights of residence, while at the same time providing social 
security and the protection of the common European normative system regional 
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interests and environment. Europe is not only a Europe of nations, but also of sub-
nations and proto-national communities in which identity is institutionally supported 
as a mechanism to engender pan-European civic identification. Such a dynamic made 
possible because of a certain resilience of pre-existing identities and the realisation by 
the framers of the European polity that tolerance of such identities, would in itself 
create a motive-force for a common European identification. The second primary 
influences of European institionalisation on the advancement of a European 
sympathy, and related to our first, is that Europe has established a firm, distinctive 
boundary between itself and other worlds. At the most obvious level the cessation of 
intra-European conflict, and notwithstanding the Balkans, an acceptance of 
established (national) borders, is the result of this. Just as the enhancement of 
European political, economic and social life and the benefits flowing from it has 
consolidated a positive empathetic response, so too have these processes effectively 
constructed boundaries between Europe and non-Europe, reinforcing a European 
identity. Such an identity constructed between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' on essentially 
civic criteria of political social and economic development. 
The EU constitutes a powerful set of institutional arrangements which act as an 
incentive for the establishment and maintenance of civic identification. European 
institutionalism exerts a major supportive element for the achievement of societal 
security, in the broadest terms of social, economic, cultural and physical protection 
and the maintenance of a unique cluster of European privileges and rights, within its 
boundaries. As A.D. Smith remarks: 
"This dense and pervasive set of institutions and practices is one of the central 
boundary markers between the EU and its European environment."I46 
For the first time European identity is based in the European institutional promotion 
of a community of law, a community of culture and a community of security and 
prosperity. It represents and promotes civic rather than ethnic community, a feature 
that makes it attractive to groups both within and external to it. The intensification of 
institutional and legal rights amongst Europeans within the EU is both one of the most 
poignant assets in the articulation of Europeaness, and one of its most significant 
146 Ibid. 
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departure points between itself, and non-Europe. Importantly the institutional matrix 
within Europe has a positive effect on European cultural life. 
Such distinctiveness and identification expresses itself in the economic sphere as well. 
The cumulative effect of the creation of a common European customs union, the 
single market, a common migration frontier and within it an area from the free 
movement of goods persons and services has created a manifest transactional 
boundary between Europe and the other. This not only differentiates Europeans from 
the other, but has, as we will empirically examine later in this study, created a new 
positive dimension of European consciousness. While the completion of the single 
market has promoted intra-European linkages at a heightened level, it has further, via 
the creation of a free area of movement sharpened the focus of Europeans between 
their rapidly residing national boundaries when compared with the broader European 
frontier. The trans-national barriers to goods, services, capital and peoples intensify 
the boundary between Europe and the other. The process of transactional boundary 
confirmation within Europe operates at two levels, as Smith suggests: 
"The gradient between insider status in the EU and the single market and the 
many outsiders who would wish to operate on equal terms with the EU is steep 
and in many areas well guarded." 147 
We shall, in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, consider the empirical manifestation of 
European identity, however in our next chapter, Chapter Six, we shall review the 
retardants effecting the manifestation of a European identity. 
000000 
147 Ibid., 17. 
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Chapter Six 
Retardants To The Development Of A European Identity 
"The European Union has proved itself to be nothing more than a talking shop 
for failed politicians." 
6.1 	 Introductory Remarks 
At the end of the milennium the forms and structures of European politics, 
economics, society and identity itself are changing What is new, now, is the 
accelerated development of autonomous, non-state mediated economic social, cultural 
and regional networks of relationships and dependencies. This process should be 
considered criticaly in the context of fundamental changes in the relationships 
between individual and colectivity, and more fundamentaly by a reappraisal of the 
notion of self, and self-representation.2 While some of these factors are creating 
conditions favourable to the configuration of a European identity, others are inhibiting 
the development of a European consciousness. These inhibiting factors wil be the 
subject of analysis in this Chapter.3 
There is evidence of indiference from amongst a number of Europeans to the concept 
of a unified Europe. As Europe becomes more centralised there is a quantifiable level 
of concern as to the perceived distance between Europe and Europeans. Recent data 
suggests this scepticism to the European project. As recently as 1998 Leonard 
demonstrated this level of ambivalence. He found: 
1. 	 only 46% of Europeans support their country's membership of the EU; 
i Maguire, M. 1997 Quoted in BBC News 'Talking Point' I May 1998 at 
htp:/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking_point/newsid_84000/84420.asp accessed 29 October 1998. 
2 See Castels M. The Rise of the Network Society and Rootes, C. & Davis H. (Eds) Social 
Change and Political Transformation. 
3 We use the term retardant cautiously. I wish to emphasise that the social, economic and cultural 
factors that the Chapter considers are acting to retard — that is to slow and to delay the accomplishment 
of a communal form of European identification. Such factors, it is argued, while impeding the 
manifestation of a European identity, are not suficient to negate its onset altogether. 
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2. only half EU citizens feel European, just 10% place European identity 
above national identity; 
3. only 41% think their county benefits from EU membership; 
4. only one in 50 Europeans claims to be 'very wel informed' about the 
EU; and 
5. the EU devoted more time and resources to the Common Agricultural 
Policy and the EMU than any other issue - but these are priorities for 
only nine percent of Europeans.4 
While it is possible to be selective with such statistics, these results suggest a high 
degree of uncertainty as to the form and nature of the European project, amongst 
significant numbers of Europeans. As Howe writes: 
"The last 35 years may have seen an entrenchment of the European 
Community, but it is evident that there has not yet been a paralel forging of a 
community of Europeans."5 
The intention of this Chapter is not to atempt to quantify precisely the retarding 
factors inhibiting the growth of European identity. Such a process is implausible 
given the subtlety and complexity of a number of the variables that this Chapter wil 
address. Rather, this Chapter ilustrates the key factors that may, based upon a 
qualitative analysis, inhibit the emergence of a communal European identity. 
The current European political and economic order has contributed to a range of 
retardants to European identification - cultural, economic and institutional. Such 
retardants wil be considered in this Chapter according to the folowing classificatory 
schema: 
1. 	 6.2. 	 Non - Institutional Retardants; 
a. 	 6.2.1. The Emergence of a Massified European Society; 
4 Leonard, M. 1998 Making Europe Popular: the search for a European Identity. at 
htp:/www.demos.co.uk/popularity.html  p.1 accessed 16 October 1998. 
5 Howe, P. "A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings", Journal of Common 
Market Studies. 33, No.1, (March 1995) 27-46, 28. 
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b. 6.2.2. EuroSceptism; and 
c. 6.2.3. Radical Nationalism, Racism and The Resurgence 
of the Extreme Right. 
2. 	 6.3 	 Institutional Retardants; 
a. 6.3.1. Supranational Europe — Developmental Problems; 
b. 6.3.2. The Democratic and Information Deficit; 
c. 6.3.3. The European Decision Making Processes; and 
d. 6.3.4. The Economic Failures of Europe 
6.2 	 Non-Institutional Retardants of European Identity 
6.2.1 The Emergence of a Massified European Society 
The emergence of a massified European society poses a direct threat to the emergence 
of a common European consciousness.6 The 'massification' of society is associated 
with a range of socio-political trends; an atomised public with few of the networks or 
traditions of civil society, susceptible to popularism politics and hostile to European 
integrating processes.7 
The application of mass theory of European life has a wide basis, both within classical 
social theory and from contemporary theorists. It is informed by the tenets of 
Gemeinschaft/Geselschaft expounded by Tonnies and Weber, and Durkheims's work 
on anomie and alienation. 
Hannah Arendt's seminal work, 'The Origins of Totalitarianism'8 remains today as a 
foundation-stone of critical thought on the difficulty of sustaining a communal 
European society in the face of high levels of anxiety and uncertainty. She considered 
communal fragmentation as manifested in political extremism to be a particularly 
6 By 'Mass Society' we mean: "A society in which primary-group, community based, tradition-
orientated relationships have been largely replaced by contractual, secondary-group, utilitarian 
relationships; characterised by anonymity, mobility, specialisation and individualism." See Horton, P. 
& Hunt, C. Sociology (3rd Edition) (New York: McGraw-Hil Book Company), 556. 
7 See Waever, et al Identity Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. 
8 Arendt, H. The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958). 
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European phenomena. As Arendt argues, the decline of the nation-state, with its stable 
legal and territorial structures and the breakdown of class bonds in favour of racial 
and ethnic identification, set the stage for the formation of the European "mass man". 
Such a phenomenon, initially linked to the rise of the far-right in pre-war Europe, has 
direct application to contemporary European society. Elements of which, such as the 
unemployed, the underclass and the economically and socially disenfranchised lack 
the integrative, social economic and political linkages to an inclusive society that 
would normally allow for the development of a common sense of identity. 9 
This basic hypothesis has been adopted and applied to the European landscape by a 
range of contemporary theorists. According to Touraine, modernity endorsed the 
discipline of industrialisation, economic rationalisation, enforced laws and 
bureaucratic authority. It also encouraged and rewarded the adoption of social 
identities as citizens or workers. European society was essentially 'national' ensuring 
the survival and legitimacy of the state. I° Society's relationship to the state is now no 
longer so certain. The global market and mass global culture define individuals more 
so than do traditional 'national' societies. 
"Society is no longer national, and the actor is no longer a citizen or a 
worker." 1 
According to Giddens, the forces of the marketplace replace the primary influences of 
the nation and the state. National and social identifiers are subordinated to individual 
creativity and reflexivity. Assumptions about the bounded nature of 'society' and its 
alignment with the nation-state epitomise a phase in modernity which we are now 
transcending. Just as economic interactions, security arrangements and value systems 
have largely liberated themselves from the state and from the myth of the nation, so 
too has there been a liberation of desire, impulses needs and loyalties; transcending 
9 See: Strobel. P "From Poverty to Exclusion: a wage-earning society or a society of human 
rights?" International Social Sciences Journal 148 (June 1996), 173-191. 
10 Tourlaine, A. Critique of Modernity, (Oxford: Blackwell 1995) 15. 
i 1  
Ibid.,18 
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the myth of nation and the need for nationalism and national identity. 12 Such 
influences while providing a positive impetus for some is also creating widespread 
uncertainty and situational ambiguity for others. 
The impact of the globalisation of markets and cultures and the splintering of civil 
society from the state has led to the decentering and massification of the subject and 
the subsequent deconstruction of metanarratives of forms of collective identity central 
to the mythology of modernity, such as nation and collective identity." The 
public/private distinction that relegated questions of non-political belonging and 
loyalty to the private sphere and promoted the mono-culture of public 'national' 
identity is now uncertain. 14 
In such an environment the integrative and collective process of symbolic identity 
formation with Europe becomes highly problematic. 15 Such a theoretical setting 
compliments our earlier argument as to the central role of security, or the avoidance 
of insecurity in the development of identity. 
6.2.2 EuroScepticism 
'The European Union is a well-oiled machine without a soul' 16 
While there is considerable rhetorical embellishment associated with the anti- 
European movement, popular disquiet with the process of European integration is a 
readily identifiable phenomenon. 17 This discontent comes from a variety of sources. 
12 
See Giddens, A. 1984 The Construction of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1984). 
13 The literature on the deconstruction of the subject is broad see Castells, M. The Power of 
Identity. and Woodward. K. (Ed.) Identity and Difference (London: Sage Publications 1997). 
14 
Black, A. (1993) `Nation and Community in the International Order', Review of International 
Studies 1993,   19, 81-89. 81. 
15 Such a phenomena being experienced at and beyond EU's frontiers, such as the states of 
Yugoslavia and those of the former Soviet Union. 
16 
Father Harry Bohan, Irish Priest, 1996 reported in Leydon, M. 'Maternialist Union that leaves 
the spirit unfed' The European 4-10 July 1997.,4. 
17 
Ranging from French Farmers publicly protesting CAP reform to the more widespread 
European resistance to the unresponsive 'Eurocrats' in Brussels. 
233 
Firstly, from those who feel politically excluded from the decision making process 
leading to integration. Secondly, from those who believe that European integration is 
a sub-text for the decline of member state sovereignty. Thirdly, from those who see 
the costs to the majority of Europeans being greater than the benefits granted to 'a 
select few'. 18 Such a coalition of concern dealing more in populist suspicion than 
demonstrable fact, has crystalised itself into the loose alliance of movements known 
as the "Eurosceptics". The most adamant of the Eurosceptics has been the British 
Conservative elite, whose views are not entirely coherent or consistent. However, 
their main arguments suggest that they view Europe as both a threat to British 
sovereignty and a passport to Franco-German European economic and political 
hegemony that is advanced by stealth and is inherently undemocratic and corporatist. 
Popular novelist Frederick Forsyth, a committed British Eurosceptic, says: 
"Euro-federalism in Britain therefore has always advanced its cause on a 
programme of stealth, guile, deception, dissimulation, evasiveness and 
occasional outright mendacity." 19 
One of the difficulties with the European polity is that it cannot be framed within any 
one of the conventional frameworks of political or economic convergence or 
integration. 20 Accordingly, there is sufficient political and rhetorical space for those 
who fear a federal model of Europe to articulate such concerns, and to leverage on 
peoples uncertainties. In raising these issues they attempt to influence popular opinion 
against further European integration. This process is clearly detrimental to the process 
of the formation of a positive European consciousness amongst European citizens. 
Without clear leadership from influential political, economic and cultural elites, the 
emergence of a collective form of identification is difficult to achieve. 21 
18 
See Rootes, C. & Davis H. (Eds) Social Change and Political Transformation. 
19 Forsyth, F. "The Choice: nation state or superstate." The European 26 January - 1 February 
1998., 54. 
20 
Gowan, P 1997 'British Euro-solipsism' in Cowan, Peter et al, The Question of Europe., 91- 
104, 91. 
21 
The dominance of British Eurosceptics may, in part, be attributed to the concept of Anglo-
Saxon exceptionalism, which according to Wallace, deeply influences Britain's conception of and 
degree of integration with the European polity. See: Wallace, W. 'Foreign Policy and National Identity 
in the United Kingdom; International Affairs 67 No.1 1991, 65-80. 
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Anti-European movements emphasise the internal differentiation between the plans of 
the EU and the views and aspirations of what are pejoratively referred to as 'ordinary' 
Europeans. Such differentiation is at odds with the process of communal 
identification, as we have defined it, as it undermines the formation of a common 
cognitive boundary and a collective consciousness and self-description. These are 
qualities that are central to communal identity formation. This sentiment has arisen 
out of a network of anti-integration bodies, with views as diverse as the wholesale 
rejection of the TEU to opposition to further incursions into European rural areas of 
motorways. 
Institutionally the movements take a variety of forms, as does the subject matter of 
their opposition to further institutionalisation. They include the Campaign against 
Euro-federalism and the European Anti-Maastricht Alliance. Issues addressed by 
these bodies include the recurring theme of the practical costs and welfare shrinkage 
associated with the 'Euro-austerity' drive for national economic readiness for EMU. 
Issues associated with this include the reduction in government benefits to a range of 
groups within the community including the elderly, and the unemployed occurring at 
the same time as an increase in 'middle class welfare' such as child support. 22 
6.2.3 Radical Nationalism, Regionalism and The Resergence of the Extreme Right.  
The Return of the (Ethnic) Nation - The less capable of managing the 'national' 
question individual European states become, the more sociopolitical space is made 
available for both the re-emergence of proto-national identities and for a rise in 
awareness amongst populations of their 'authentic' histories. Europeans are 
concerned with not only their respective state's eroding sovereignty, but also of losing 
their often ethnically configured 'national' identity. While some welcome the 
ambiguity of 'nationality', there are many who are responding to dissolving state- 
22 
'Welfare State and NHS or Single Currency and Cuts' at http://www.poptel.org.uk/against-
eurofederalism/d28frnt.html accessed 29 October 1998. 
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signifiers, - political, economic, legislative and cultural - by attaching to 
fundamentalist, racist and extremist groups. 23 
We identify three key factors explaining the rise of nationalism in contemporary 
Europe. They are: 
1. The crisis of the state and the rise of regionalism; 
2. The attraction of the 'ethnic nation'; and 
3. The resurgence of the extreme right and its resistance to 'outsiders' 
from 'insiders' - migrants and asylum seekers. 
The nationalist backlash amongst certain national members against the globalisation 
of culture and the market place is observed by a number of theorists. Morris considers 
the cultural crisis emerging from the homogenisation of sovereign states. Hall notes 
that in response to the erosion of the state, most particularly state economies and state 
cultures that a defensive and regressive exclusionism is emerging, mostly apparent in 
policies and attitudes concerned with immigration. 24 Similarly Smith writes: 
"Fears of immigrant waves have fuelled resentments and spurred renewed 
interest in cultural identity, national solidarity and defence of national 
interests." 25 
Individual European states grew around four central principles; political sovereignty, 
military assertiveness, economic self-determination and the 'myth' of cultural 
homogeneity, (no matter how contrived or forced such homogeneity was). As global 
forces are perceived as distorting and diluting the first three it is not surprising that the 
23 
i It s i mportant to note that there are a variety of "nationalisms" within Europe. Examples such 
as the regionalism of the Northern League, the nationalism of the Basques, the racism of the French 
National Front are the most public examples of the return of the ethnic nation. The more subtle, but still 
powerful, call to 'nation' by conservative governments. (The British Thatcher government being the 
most obvious example) and the increasing calls by mainstream political parties for greater controls on 
immigration, asylum seekers and a return to economic nationalism all have the potential to threaten the 
emergence of a Euro-nationalism. 
24 See Morris L. 'Globalization, migration and the nation-state: the path to a post-national 
Europe?' The British Journal of Sociology, vol.48 No.2, June 1997, 192-207. See Hall S. 'The Local 
and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity' in King, A. (Ed.) Culture, Globalization and the World 
System., (London: Macmillan). 
25  Smith. A. D. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Blackwell 1995) 
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fourth is also under atack. There are Europeans who have become increasingly 
resistant to further economic or political liberalisation in fear that it may further 
undermine their 'nation' and simultaneously undermine a prime determinant of their 
own identity.26 
The highly sophisticated form taken by European political integration, and its 
perceived detrimental effect on state sovereignty and autonomy has created a 
significant revival of the nation as a backlash against an increasingly powerful 
supranational set of European institutions. As Janning has suggested, integration of 
European political structures give: 
"Nations more weight. Global interdependence, which needs to be recognised 
and worked for as a result, is too abstract to meet the social-psychological 
identity needs. The nation remains as a framework of identity. The European 
integration relativises the role of each nation state by transferring sovereignty 
to supranational institutions. The need for national identification and 
sovereignty grows at the same rate as the process of political and economic 
leveling intensify."27 
The strengthening of European unity through the European Treaty System, most 
notably the TEU and the Treaty of Amsterdam, has done much to contribute to 
supranationalism in Europe. So too has policy convergence in a myriad of areas most 
especialy in economic and monetary union. However, the treaty system, the plans for 
monetary union and the perceived invasive nature of European policy have received 
significant opposition from 'national' forces and defenders: 
"The opposition argued that the [Maastricht] treaty was conceived of by 
remote and detached politicians such as French President Francois Miterand 
and German Chancelor Helmut Kohl and by Brussels bureaucrats, out of 
touch with the realities of their countries."28 
26 Such fears are evidenced in the EU data outlined in Chapter Two, wherein Europeans resist 
further political and economic integration within the EU insofar as it is perceived as having the 
potential to threaten pre-existing national and cultural identities. 
27 	 'Beyond Beyond Sovereignty? The Making of Foreign Policy and Security in Europe after 
Maastricht' Quoted in Jacobson, D.  Old Nations, New World: Conceptions of World Order 
(1994).,118. 
28 Jacobson, D. Old Nations, New World: Conceptions of World Order., 116. 
237 
The rapid rise of regionalism, at the expense of the state, is indicative of the crisis of 
the European state. The crisis of the modern European state is caught up in 
contradictory polices. On one hand, as Hueglin argues, European states are: "trying to 
cope with the imminent turbulence of scarcity, hieraticaly centralised systems." On 
the other, the problem of economic and social redistribution: "The resulting financial 
and administrative impasse may then trigger revolts against the system where the 
demerits are felt most strongly, at the periphery."29 This rejection of the state is 
further accentuated by the growing significance of trans-national processes which 
give regions opportunities to achieve greater independence.30 Regional movements 
and the advocacy of their form of nation are a product of the contradictory processes 
of centre-periphery integration. On one hand such a process lead to the concentration 
of political and economic resources at the centre, while at the same time the modern 
state engendered the perception of: "geo-political distance, sociocultural difference 
and socioeconomic dependence."3I As Hueglin states: 
"Regionalism appears as a protest movement against political-administrative 
and socioeconomic centrality. It is not so important its goals are socio-cultural 
autonomy, political federalism or outright separatism, whether its driving 
force is a smal intelectual elite or politicaly organised party, nor whether its 
motives are predominantly cultural, economic or political. . . . Its rationale is 
not to impose an alternative set of postmaterial values on the social system, 
but the establishment of value diferentiation as a strategy against the selective 
responsiveness of systemic centrality."32 
The economic and political process that had dominated national life in areas such as 
northern Italy and pockets of France, Belgium and Spain ignored the effects of 
unequal distribution of economic and political goods away from regional groups and 
regions. Such inequalities provided fertile soil for the articulation of a populist 
29 Hueglin, T. 'Regionalism in Western Europe: Conceptual Problems of a New Political 
Perspective', Comparative Politics, 19, July 1986, 455. 
30 See Woods, D. 'The Crisis of centre-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional 
Populism', 188. 
31 	 . Ibid. See also Thompson, M. The Dissatisfactions of a 'Satisfied Minority': Val D'Aosta and 
Ethnic Nationalism in the European Community' History of European Ideas. 1994, Vol 19, Nos 4-6, 
663-668. 
32 Hueglin, T. 'Regionalism in Western Europe: Conceptual Problems of a New Political 
Perspective', 448-449. 
238 
ideology of regionalism as a viable alternative to the perceived deficiencies of the 
state. Regionalism seeks to redefine modernity away from centralised forms of 
economic and political representation towards regional and local forms. Within 
regional movements are the rhetorical devices of the virtues of community, tradition, 
and of identity based on the known, local and similar. Within this limited paradigm 
such virtues are considered: "The essential foundations of the functioning of modern 
societies."3 
While the composition of regionalism varies according to particular circumstances, a 
key element of regionalism core identity derives from a successful juxtaposition 
between 'us' and 'them'. Such stereotyping, centraly important to identity formation, 
alows for the cementing of local, regional identities of the 'people', versus, and in 
open opposition to, large-scale cosmopolitan capitalist industries and bureaucratic 
elites who are perceived as not understanding the real needs and interests of the 
'people'.34 This outcome results in a cognitive boundary being created between 
Europeans and the European project. Regionalism is politicised into a national 
movement insofar as it seeks to publicly articulate its own mythology of customs, 
traditions and identity in opposition to the pre-existing centralised political 
institutions.35 To the extent that the EU seeks to promote regional policy such as a 
'Europe of the Regions' the opportunity for European heterogeneity may increase. As 
Malcolm argues: 
"A federal Europe would revive the nationalist hostility and resentment."36 
The Resurgence of the Extreme Right - The resurgence of the European right is 
another manifestation of the resurgence of ethnic signifiers of identity. The discourse 
33 	 . Ibid., 195. 
34 Worsley, P. "The Concept of Populism" in Woods, D. 'The Crisis of centre-Periphery 
Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism', 195. 
35 It is important to reinforce the artificial nature of regional identities. They are as contrived and 
imagined as those applicable at the state level. The claim for regional autonomy and identity lies not in 
some primordial truth, but in the creation of new identities, every bit as manufactured as the identities 
of the centralised system of governance and administration, that they are contesting. 
36 Malcolm, N. "The Case Against 'Europe'." Foreign Afairs March/April 1995 52-68, 64. 
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of ethnic purification, nationhood based on blood and culture and opposition to 
outsiders on ethnic and cultural grounds, represents an opposition to assimilationism 
and a return to (ethnic) belonging and exclusion on regressive nationalist grounds. 
The most notable example of this phenomenon is the success of the Freiheitliche 
Partei Osterreichs (FPO) in Austria. However the continued successes of the Front 
National (FN) in France and the Moveimento Sociale Italian° (MSI) in Italy, amongst 
others also highlight the enduring attraction and support for the far right in Europe. 
The resurgence of right-wing, nationalist, populist neo-fascist movements in Eastern 
Europe mirrored the rising prominence of the ultra-right political parties in Western 
Europe. 37 Rather than embracing the ideas and values of a united civic and liberal 
Europe the far right unambiguously articulated an ethnic conception of nation, 
exclusiveness, a return to 'organic' society and ethnic purity through the use of 
violence. 38 
The reasons for the return of the far right are complex and multi-dimensional, and 
include economic, social, political and psychological factors. 39 Perhaps the most overt 
factor is the increase in European migration and its perceived relationship to increased 
unemployment and social fragmentation. 4° For the European extreme right the wave 
37 The increasing popularity of the Communist Party in the states of the former Soviet Union, 
most particularly the Russian Federation, is evidence of this trend. 
38 There is an increasing literature on the return of neo-fascism in Europe; the more recent of 
such texts include Cheles, L. Ferguson R. & Vaughan, M. (eds.) 'The Far Right in Western & Eastern  
Europe'. (Addison-Wesley Publication 1995), Laqueur, W. Fascism; Past, Present, Future. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1996), and Lee, M. The Beast Reawakens. (Little Brown & Company 1997). 
39 Such factors include; a rapid structural decline in economic conditions leading to the 
emergence of an economically marginalised group allowing for a shift in political preferences to 
'protest' parties of the right promising to protect their economic condition. Associated with this is the 
engendering of an exclusionary attack upon social, ethnic or racial minorities for their perceived 
economic effects. The emergence of groups incapable of coping with change and modernisation, 
hostile to development and an associated romanticism for the past and a yearning for mythical values 
of family, Volk and nation. Psychological elements observed include the existence of a particular pre-
political personality type - the Authoritarian personality - which is highly susceptible to fascist 
ideology and practice. For a more detailed examination on the rise of Fascism in Western Europe see 
Grover, A. 'A Generic Fascism: Towards an integrated Typology of the causal elements of Fascism and 
Neo-Fascism, University of Tasmania Honours Thesis, 1994. 
40 
The reality of the relationship between immigration and unemployment is overlooked by the 
extreme right. Increased immigration can occur, as it has in the United States, in an environment of full 
employment. Since 1973 the American economy has created 40 million new jobs while taking in about 
1 million immigrants a year. Further in an environment of rapidly declining fertility rates in Europe, 
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of immigration from the South and East represents the introduction of alien and 
unwanted ethnic and cultural influences into the European world.41 The return of 
Fascism with its central ideology of blood ethnie and nation is proving to be a direct 
and increasingly prominent threat to both the civil state and to a civic notion of 
colective European identity. 
Voting paterns reveal support growing for the extreme right at the expense of the 
centralist parties. In France in 1986 the Front National took just under 10% of the 
total national vote in the first round of voting; in 1997 it took 15%; the total orthodox 
right's vote in France declined from 45% to just over 35% in the same period. In the 
Austrian national election held on 8 October 1994, the Austrian extreme right party, 
the FPO obtained over twenty percent of the National vote and in effect became the 
main opposition party to the ruling Social Democratic Party.42 The inclusion of four 
neo-fascist Ministers in the Berlusconi Cabinet in Italy in the same year should also 
be noted.43 These results are replicated, albeit to a lesser degree, in most European 
states.4 
Beyond voting paterns, the values and atitudes of Europeans demonstrate the nature 
of European exclusion. a Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 
survey conducted in 1997 demonstrates a high degree of xenophobia and racism in 
(most especialy southern Europe) unless there is significant migration in the next half century then it is 
predicted that the European economies wil become unable to compete in the global market place and 
to pay for the social benefits of a aged population. . See Dickey, C. & Warner, J. 'Alien Europe' The 
Buletin/Newsweek December 16, 1997. 49-52, 52. 
41  Ibid. 
42 More recently 27.2% of the Austrian electorate in national elections in October supported the 
FPO. As the front-page headline of Israel's best-seling newspaper the Yediot Aharonot declared " One 
of Every Four Austrians Voted For Neo-Nazi Chancelor". See: Kitney, G. 'Pol Coup for the Far 
Right'; The Age 5 October 1999. 
43 See Grover, A. A Generic Fascism? A Typology of Causal Elements of Fascism and neo- 
fascism. 
44 The curent European states in which the extreme right has increased its electoral success in 
the last decade include Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany — see 'Fascism resurgent?' The 15th Economist October 9th - 	 1999, 61. 
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Europe.45 In spring 1997 33% of European respondents described themselves as 
'quite racist' or 'very racist'. Further only one in three of those interviewed felt that 
they were 'not at all racise.46 Paradoxically, the feelings of racism coexist with a 
strong belief in the democratic system and respect for civic-based fundamental rights 
and freedoms. Such a degree of exclusion may have more to do with the fear of the 
diminution of pre-existent European rights and security, rather than with an absolute 
rejection on enthnolinguistic grounds, of the 'other'!" As the EC found, the 
expression of this degree of exclusion is attributable to fear of unemployment, low 
confidence in political authorities and insecurity about the future. 48 
The Effects of Globalisation on Localism/Nationalism - Globalism influences the 
return of ethnic conceptions of nation in three main ways. Firstly it enhances the 
nation by accentuating people's needs for a heightened tangible and local form of 
cultural or enthnolinguistic identification. In this way, the Welsh and Scottish in the 
United Kingdom or the Northern League in Italy reacted to the perceived diffusion of 
their culture under the forces of increased interaction with other cultures and 
economies, by appealing to a common cultural identity. This articulates itself in calls 
for independence, separation and political sovereignty to reflect the perceived cultural 
independence of their respective regions. 
Secondly, ethnic nationalism emerges as a means of gaining control in a global 
climate in which economic and political factors are beyond the practical control of 
individual states, let alone smaller regional groupings or ethnic communities. Thus the 
Northern League want to 'go it alone' within the context of membership of the 
45 See European Commission, Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs Directorate 
(DGV) Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1 
46 Ibid. 
47 The basis of European exclusion, which we argue is rooted in economic and security grounds, 
will be further explored in chapter nine. 
48 
Those directly hostile to other groups are hostile for economic, not ethnic or linguistic grounds 
thus demonstrating our argument of the correlation between security and identity in contemporary 
Europe. 
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European Union convinced that the rest of Italy is restraining the region from its 
rightful economic prosperity and cultural flowering.'" 
Thirdly, globalisation alows greater, not lesser identification with ethnicity and other 
forms of identity through communications technology such as the Internet, low cost 
computer publishing, lower-cost telecommunications and specialist ethnic pay 
television. The use of these media to generate nationalist sentiment has also been 
significant.5° 
6.3 	 Institutional Retardants of A European Identity 
6.3.1 Supranational Europe - Developmental Problems 
The evolution of a pan-European sense of community and solidarity, is, as we have 
argued, dependant upon the development of efective pan-European institutions, 
European policy, and practical, positive outcomes which are directly relevant and of 
direct interest to Europeans. Both the dificulties in achieving a suitable 
administrative structure, and the highly public tensions between elements within the 
European polity, dilute the credibility of the polity and, most significantly, undermine 
a sense of belonging necessary for the articulation of European identification.51 
49 Clearly such an accentuation of localism in the context of a supportive EU may have the efect 
of engendering a European identity under circumstances where resistance to the state is greater that 
that of the supranation. See Hofmann S. 1966 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of The Nation-State 
and the Case of Western Europe' Daedalus, Vol 95 No.3 Summer 1966, 862- 915. 
50 Barber, B. Jihad vs McWorld. Reproduced in School of Government, Introduction to World 
Politics (reader) (Hobart: University of Tasmania 1998), 18. 
51  It is paradoxical to note that the very process of European integration is acting to create socio-
political space for new configurations of identity to emerge, some of which are incompatible with the 
emergence of European identification. We have noted that the integrative process associated with 
capital, culture and security arrangements in the post-war period has acted to significantly 
disenfranchise the modern repository of communal identity - the state. The process of economic 
interdependence, social interpenetration and trans-state strategic engagement has presented difficulties 
for European states in their atempt to maintain loyalty and a sense of identity from amongst their 
populations. The process of European economic, social, security, administrative integration, in concert 
with the non-institutional factors discussed earlier in this Chapter, has largely decoupled the 
relationship between state and society from which colective identity is derived. If it is accepted that 
states depend upon their paramount economic, coercive, and administrative powers to engender a sense 
of nationhood and national identity, then their curent manifest failures in these areas are creating room 
for new modes of sub-national and supranational identity to emerge. Examples are not hard to find, 
previously submerged proto-nations such as the Scots, the Basques and the Catalans have asserted their 
cultural independence within the European polity. Other clusters of identity, the environmental 
movement, the Women's movement and even the anti-Europe movement are finding legitimacy in the 
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European integration is faced with a number of critical problems, which, if not fully 
addressed, may make the hope of closer union unattainable. Questions central to the 
development of the European polity are unresolved - European enlargement, the 
related issue of the reform to the CAP, the question of cross-border crime and illegal 
immigration and a meaningful common security policy are examples of the impasse in 
much of European policy dialogue. 52 This invokes incredulity and feelings of 
insecurity from amongst ordinary Europeans. 53 The implications of such an impasse 
are two-fold. Firstly, unless current European developmental problems can be 
overcome the Union will not move towards a more state-like structure and in essence 
would become a loosely knit grouping of states restricted to essentially economic 
policy. Secondly, and more importantly, Europe would remain a collection of sub-
groups with sub-loyalties and allegiances, thus denying a sense of collective European 
identity. Some of the main developmental issues include: 
1. The EU's institutions are over-extended. Originally set up for six 
member countries, they must now cater for a membership of 12, which 
may soon rise to 20 or 25; 
2. A growing differentiation of interests between member states, fuelled 
by differences in the level of socio-economic development, which 
threatens to obscure the basic commonality of interests and which may 
result in a two-speed or variable geometry Europe; 
3. Different perceptions of internal and external priorities in a European 
Union which is geographically divergent; 
space between the increasingly discredited and redundant European states and the still formative 
European supranational polity. For a examination of the re-emergence of identity in a European 
environment of institutional co-dependence, see Horsman, M. & Marshall, A. After the Nation-State:  
Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder (London: Harper Collins 1994) and Therborn, G. 
European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies 1945-2000. (London: Sage 
Publications 1995). 
52 See Crouch, C. & Marquand, D. (Eds.) Towards Greater Europe? A Continent Without an Iron 
Curtain. ( Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1992) 
53 As demonstrated in the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer Survey 
results which consistently outline Europeans unease with institutional integration. 
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4. The process of profound structural economic change, including mass 
unemployment, overextended social welfare systems and the more 
general massification of European society; 
5. An increase in regressive nationalism in most member countries, which 
results from deep-seated fears and anxieties caused by the perceived 
failure of modern society to protect values, provide economic security, 
and to restrict access by 'the other' (mostly taking the form of 
resistance to migration) The nation-state and the myth of nation are 
seen as solutions to such problems; and 
6. The highly debilitating effect of the enormous demands placed on 
National governments and their seemingly inability to deal with such 
demands, while at the same time playing the 'national self-
determination' card against European integration. 54 
While many Europeans are eager to accept the benefits of a further integrated Europe, 
they are less interested in the tension between the elements within the EU. 55 
Unresolved questions of institutional reform have been most recently illuminated by 
the political impasse between the European Commissioners and the European 
Parliament. Superficially over the matter of corruption amongst European 
Commissioners, but fundamentally concerned with the issue of the Parliament's 
actual and moral power to remove individual Commissioners, it revealed not only a 
fracture in European institutionalism, but more significantly gave ammunition to 
those sceptical of the European polity. Similar institutional and structural difficulties 
such as the reform of the CAP, the impasse over foreign and security affairs and 
unemployment further illustrate the significant challenges facing supranational 
Europe and the present lack of institutional 'fit' between the institutions, their powers 
and substantive pan-European issues. 
54 See Lamers, K. 1997 'Strengthening the Hard Core' in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. The Question 
of Europe., 104-105. 
55 We have to look only to the generally favourable response that the euro has had from amongst 
European citizens and contrast this with the generally negative reaction to the absence of substantive 
democratic mechanisms over the European Executive - the European Commission, to illustrate this 
difference in perception and attitude. 
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Europeans have demonstrated that in those circumstances where the Union has 
successfuly implemented policy with the active cooperation of al the institutions, 
such as in the case of the Single Market, support for the European project has been 
positive. This can be contrasted with those instances where there has been a 
perception that the Union has proven institutionaly deficient to deal with substantive 
pan-European problems — and support for European institutions and integration has 
declined.56 Rather than Europeans turning to identify with Europe as a consequence of 
its functional efficiency and institutional harmony, they are, in part, turning away 
from it in contempt at the politics of integration. As Mace remarks: 
"The EU is like any huge political machine - out of touch with the people. But 
much bigger than most, the neglect and ineficiency is much worse too. I want 
to be part of Europe but quite frankly find it a terifying experience because of 
the dislocation and lack of understanding of those in charge."57 
6.3.2 The Democratic and Information Deficit 
"..the EU is basicaly out of touch, because it's only realy interested in 
talking to those who are already convinced of the rightness of Brussels' vision 
of Europe. If you are not convinced of the basic wisdom of Brussels, then 
Brussels is interested neither in talking to you or hearing from you .."58 
The Democratic Deficit - We considered earlier in this work the positive effect of 
meaningful participative and representative mechanisms on the development of 
communal identity. The absence of democratic participation in the European Union, 
notwithstanding the development of European citizenship, significantly detracts from 
56 See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 40 December 1993, VI —X. 
57 BBC 'Talking Point' 1 May 1998 at 
htp:/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking_point/newsid 84000184420.asp, p2. 
58 	. Livesay, J. BBC News 'Talking Point' 1 May 1998 at 
htp:/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking_point/newsid 84000184420.asp, p2. Such a view of the 
democratic process can be measured against, that which we suggest is a foundational expression of it, 
from Hobbes: "A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of Men do Agree and 
Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men shal be given by the 
major part, the Right to Present the Person of them al, (that is to say, to be their representative;) every 
one, as wel he that Voted for it, as he that voted against it, shal Authorise al the Actions and 
Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, 
to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men 	 From this Institution of 
a Common-Wealth are derived al the Rights and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne 
Power is confered by the consent of the People assembled." See Hobbes, T. The Leviathan (1651) 
Chapter XV1 1 1, 228-229. 
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the development of a strong sense of European belonging amongst Europeans. It has 
been widely argued that the EU institutions that have emerged since the end of the 
Second World War suffer from a profound 'democratic deficit'. 59 
Progress towards the integration of Europe was, in part, an elite driven process in 
which the active and sustained consent and involvement of the people was neither 
sought nor necessarily welcomed. However, with the deepening of European 
integrative processes the scope of decisions taken, and the number of individual 
Europeans effected by such decisions, calls for legitimate popular participation 
increased. Despite the fact that increased efforts have been made to improve the 
amount of information available about European policy, little has been done to 
increase the power of individual Europeans to influence such policy. While the 
European Commission has argued strongly that its decisions are in the interests of the 
European citizen, critics suggest that there is a strong element of hollowness and 
paternalism in these claims. This is particularly so in circumstances where individual 
citizens are denied the opportunity to actively participate in the decision making 
process and to give supranational Europe an aura of democratic legitimacy. 6° 
The cause of the 'democratic deficit' is the nature of governance upon which the initial 
process of European integration was based. Decision-makers within the system are the 
member states, not individual Europeans. The European Council has largely taken 
decisions on policy with little input from individual citizens. Despite the fact that the 
citizens of the Union have directly elected the European Parliament since 1979 its 
functional impotence has simply highlighted rather than lessened the perception of 
institutional Europe being controlled and moulded by unaccountable elites. 61 
The limited jurisdictions of the European Parliament, notwithstanding the co-decision 
reforms, lessen the linkages between European citizens and the European political 
59 
A leading example of such an argument is given by Williams, S. 1991. 'Sovereignty and 
Accountability in the European Community' in Keohane, R. & Hoffmann, S. The New European 
Community: Decision making and Institutional Change., 155-176. 
60 
See: 'A Survey of Europe — A work in Progress' The Economist  October 23rd- 29 th 1999 
61 Reforms resulting from the Parliament's actions against the European Commission in early 
1999 may mitigate against this in the long term. 
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elite. The locus of power within supranational Europe, at least up until the reforms in 
1999, has been the unelected Commission, not the popularly mandated Parliament. 
While the introduction of the co-decision procedure (article 189b of the EC Treaty) 
attempted to overcome the substantially undemocratic nature of much of European 
decision making, there still exists a wide range of policy areas where consultation 
between the Council and the European Parliament remains optional. Beyond matters 
associated with the single market, the Council remains unaccountable to the citizens 
of Europe. This lack of accountability, as a consequence of the 'democratic' deficit' 
significantly dilutes the opportunity for the creation of a sense of loyalty and affection 
for Europe amongst Europeans. 62 
In this context it is not surprising that Europeans believe that Europe is unresponsive. 
In a recent survey, conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation in response to 
the question; 
'Is the European Union sufficiently answerable to its citizens?' 
Only 12% answered in the affirmative, the balance in the negative. The absence of a 
perception of democratic accountability is strong. As one respondent to the survey 
commented: 
"The European Union needs a good dose of democracy with a strong 
democratic European Parliament. It is wrong that decisions affecting nearly 
400 million people should be made by non-elected bankers or a small group of 
ministers from each member state. Governments are afraid of losing power to 
a strong European Parliament that might do things that the people of Europe 
really want. Roll on a truly federal and democratic Europe."63 
Without the legitimising and broadening effect of meaningful popular participation 
and democratisation the emergence of allegiances to, and affections for, supranational 
Europe from its citizenship is unlikely. Without inclusive participation a boundary 
will be established discriminating between European apparatchiks and ordinary 
European citizens. Just as in the experience of individual sovereign states in the 
nineteenth century, the realisation of practical democratisation amongst states 
62 Commission of the European Communities Europe from A to Z: Guide to European 
Integration., 184. 
63 
Barry, M. BBC News 'Talking Point' I May 1998 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking_point/newsid 84000/84420.asp, p.2 
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incrementally improved the legitimacy and loyalty to them from amongst their 
populations.64 
Both the reality and, perhaps more significantly, the perception of the democratic 
malaise of European integration poses a direct threat to the emergence of a European 
sense of community and belonging. Firstly as it is perceived as being exclusionary to 
the European citizen body and secondly to the extent to which public Eurosceptics are 
able to manipulate their national constituents against the Union and the ideal of 
union. 65 
Union governance, according to its critics, distorts the traditional balance between the 
executive and legislative arms of government. In so doing it prevents the effective 
representation of individual interests. A key feature of the classical democratic 
process within the state system is that the executive branch of Government is 
responsible to a Parliament and the Parliament then is accountable to the people. 
When policy requires legislation it must work through the 'public space' of 
Parliament. Further the Parliament, theoretically, gives the people a forum for the 
sharing of information, communication and provides the ultimate legitimisation and 
reference point between the people and institutional political elites. Such a model of 
democratic representation is at odds with the structure of Union governance. 
The executive branch of the Union, The Council of Ministers, has an ever-widening 
jurisdiction over European public policy. The legislative arm of the Union, the 
64 The reality of the absence of democratic control over the European executive has developed its 
own mythology, skilfully exploited by the Eurosceptics, of whom a notable example is the British 
author and avowed Eurosceptic Fredrich Forsyth: 
"In the EU more and more real, effective power is passing steadily from national governments 
to the Commission in Brussels, the judges of Luxembourg and (soon) the bankers of 
Frankfurt. In the proposed governmental structures, parliamentary democracy is not even on 
the menu. Ten, 15 years from now there will be nothing for the elected regional governments 
to do but collect the traffic fines, rearrange the park benches and obey the orders passed down 
from the apparat." . . . "The new order may be efficient (which I doubt) but it will not be a 
democracy and not a state most of my fellow Countrymen wish to live in." see Forsyth, F. 
"The Choice: nation state or superstate.", 55. 
65 The effect of the British Eurosceptics, including not an inconsiderable number within the Tory 
party, and their effect on British resistance to European integration, most particularly during the 1980s 
and first half of the 1990s is the most obvious example of this process. 
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European Parliament, does not however reflect the powers of a national counterpart. 
Not only is the Parliament relatively powerless to effect the decisions of the Council 
or the Commission (although this situation has improved in recent times) 66 the 
technical ability of Members of the European Parliament to represent the views of 
their constituents is compromised by the large size of the EP. 
The Union, especially in the period leading up to the TEU, has suffered from serious 
democratic deficiencies in its mode of governance. The cleavage between the 1992 
plan and the Single European Act on one hand, and on the other, a general acceptance 
of Europe, but a lack of commitment and understanding has lead to that which Weiler 
has described as a: "transnational psychosis". This phenomenon is created by the 
cleavage between formal legal legitimacy and general popular participation and 
acceptance. Since Maastricht the legitimacy/illegitimacy debate has altered the 
prospects for a European identity for the worse. There is clear evidence, most readily 
observable in the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer series, 
that general public opinion has taken a far more sceptical and critical approach to the 
creation of the European supranation. 67 
The European Information Deficit 
"A lot of people throughout Europe have suddenly realised that they know 
hardly anything about the Maastricht Treaty, while rightly sensing that it could 
make a huge difference to their lives."68 
The development of a communal European identity is also weakened as a result of the 
perceived obscurity and remoteness of information concerning the European project. 
66 The wholesale replacement of the Commission as a consequence of the lack of confidence 
expressed in it by the European Parliament in 1998, may be the decisive turning point in the 
affirmation of the powers of the European Parliament. 
67  
Evidence of this can be found in European unhappiness with the amount of information 
available to them, lower levels of trust of EU institutions than national ones and ambivalence to a 
number of non-economic policy initiatives. See Commission of the European Communities 
Eurobarometer 48 and 49 in particular 
68 Godley, W. 1992 'The Hole in the Treaty' in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. The Question of 
Europe., 173. 
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In short information made available to Europeans, according to many Europeans, 
needs to be simpler and clearer. 69 
Empirical evidence suggests an information disjuncture between European institutions 
and European citizens. Europeans are less well informed about the workings of the 
European Union than they are about their own national government. When asked the 
identical question referring to the (national) government and then to the European 
Union the following results have been obtained: 
Table 6.1 Feeling Informed About National Government and European Union 
Institutions 




Very Well 5 2 
Quite Well 40 18 
Not Very Well 39 39 
Not at all Well 14 29 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, 47 
While few people claim to know either their own government or the European Union 
'very well', it is clear that nearly half of all respondents have a reasonable knowledge 
of their own country's government. However only one in five have the same 
confidence in their understanding of the European Union. If we consider further 
results from the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer series we 
find that a very high percentage of Europeans feel that they need to know a lot more 
about Europe. As the figure below outlines: 
69 Commentators on the absence of substantive information on the process of European 
integration include; Ash, T. G. 'Catching the Wrong Bus?' in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. The Question  
of Europe., 117-126 and Weiler, J.H.H. 'Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance' in 
Edwards, G. & Pijpers, A. (Eds.) The Politics of European Treaty Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference and Beyond., 249-287. 
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Figure 6.1 Perceptions of Knowledge of EU Amongst European Citizens 
The European Information Deficit 
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Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49, p.B.2 
The desire to know more was strongest in France, Portugal, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. Countries which stated that they were happy with the information that they 
already had were Belgium, Ireland, Austria and Germany — such States having higher 
than average levels of belonging to Europe. In the group claiming to 'feel informed' 
there was an even stronger demand for additional information (44% for the informed 
as opposed to 39% for the not informed). Further, there was a greater desire to learn 
more amongst those groups that had a positive atitude to their country's membership. 
Analysis shows a corelation between those who seek more information are those who 
have been come to be seen as more 'pro-European': the beter educated, managerial, 
those to the left of the political spectrum and opinion leaders. Interestingly, low media 
users do not feel that they need any additional information as they are happy with the 
level of information that they already have.70 
European youth display a similar degree of ignorance on European maters. When the 
question is put to them: "Al things considered, would you say that people like 
yourself are suficiently or are not suficiently wel informed about the problems dealt 
with by the European Community?" 71% of those 15-19 year olds said that they were 
not sufficiently wel informed. It was concluded by the European Commission that: 









'Their feeling of being not sufficiently well informed seems to be directed against the 
information itself and is not derived from any intellectual laziness on their part.' 71 
A further study found that only one European in four felt that they had a good grasp 
of the EC. A further indication of the information (and thus credibility) gap amongst 
Europeans was the absence of any answer from amongst 70 percent of respondents as 
to their impression of the Commission. 72 Hewstone concluded that: 
"Overall, few respondents mentioned the more specific ideas behind the 
Community. Very general ideas predominated and are found in nearly half the 
respondents, but more exact information is held only by a minority of 
respondents and its content varies across countries."73 
The results of these studies provide striking evidence of a lack of knowledge within 
the respondent's cognitive map of the Union. 
Reasons for such a low level of European awareness and consciousness may be 
explained with reference to four factors. Firstly, knowledge of politics and political 
processes is generally low amongst Europeans, without fundamental civic education it 
is not surprising that there is a low awareness. Secondly, as Europeans are limited in 
their practical and direct participation in European decision making their 
consciousness of Europe is correspondingly low. Thirdly, according to Dekker, 
opinions and attitudes with regard to the European Community are not favourable for 
the acquisition of additional knowledge. 74 Fourthly, there are only limited 
opportunities for people to have their consciousness raised on Europe and European 
matters. It is not surprising that European awareness is low in the circumstance where 
they have not had any direct 'European' political socialisation (whether in the form of 
formal education or state-sponsored media or communication). 
71 Commission of the European Communites The Young Europeans TYE82 (Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1982,) 129. 
72 
Hewstone, M. Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: a social-psychological 
study in four member states. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986), 104. 
73  Ibid., 104. 
74 Dekker, H. Perceptions of the European Community. at http://www.bis.uni -
oldenburg.de/bisverlag/mevper92/inhalt.html, 130. 
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6.3.3 The European Decision Making Process 
Where global influences are towards simplifying and streamlining decision making 
processes, the growth of the European Union has paradoxically necessitated a far 
more complex and intricate set of decision making processes, to deal with the 
complexities of enlargement and the differing political motivations and aspirations of 
member states. The five largest states (Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Spain), 
contain 80 percent of the population of the Union, but have only just over half of the 
votes in the Council:75 If the current applicants for membership to the Union were 
admitted without a revision to voting weights, the influence of these key states would 
fall further. It would resultant in the paralysis of decision-making procedures, with the 
possible effective disenfranchisement of the larger, more populous and economically 
significant European states, with a resultant lessening of European identification. 
Additionally, as greater numbers of non-core (at least in economic terms) states join 
the Union those poorer European states receiving capital transfers from the larger, 
more affluent, core states will shift from four out of the present 15 to a majority. The 
long-term sustainability of this outcome is doubtful. It may lead to resentment from 
amongst the populations of the larger European states to the newer, weaker members 
of the Union, and also more significantly, to raise questions as to the value and 
cohesion of the Union in its entirety. 
Adjustments to the voting weight of member states in the Council is overshadowed by 
the weight of numbers. If the Union enlarges to the East and South East then the 
balance and symmetry of the European polity will be effected. The former communist 
Europe contains almost as many states as the traditional capitalist states of the West. 76 
This growth would, without revision to the current decision-making and voting 
regime, lead to institutional deadlock. This would in turn threaten the positive 
affection and identity with Europe from amongst its citizens. Europe, at the 
75 
Anderson, P. 'The Europe to Come' in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. The Question of Europe. 
(London: Verso 1997), 143. 
76According to Anderson, sixteen in the 'East' and seventeen in the 'West' if Switzerland is 
included. Ibid. 
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institutional level, could grow to assume absurd and completely unworkable 
proportions. 77 As Anderson suggests: 
"The legendary complexity of the already existing system, with its meticulous 
rotations of commissarial office, laborious intergovernmental bargains and 
assorted ministerial and parliamentary vetos, would be overloaded to the point 
of paralysis."78 
The effect of these potentially cumbersome political arrangements on the evolution of 
a sense of European loyalty is negative. EU widening, without institutional reform to 
turn the Union into a 'tighter' and more coherent polity, may lead to functional 
unravelling and the acceleration of the negative perceptions amongst Europeans as to 
the administration and purposes of the European polity. Europeans already find the 
political processes remote and cumbersome. Only 37% of Europeans for example 
believe that the European Parliament has the ability to protect citizens rights, this 
result reveals a basis weakness in the institutions of the EU considering that the 
European Parliament is the most respected of the institutions of the EU. 79 Europeans 
might find the over-politicisation and weakening decision making difficult to support 
and would be less sympathetic to the institutional elements of Europe, and possibly, 
given the correlation between European enlargement and the sense of ambivalence to 
European integration, to the whole European ideal itself. 8° At a time when the 
evolution of governments and administrative apparatus are supposed to be becoming 
smaller, more efficient and more resourceful, the perception of a bloated, ineffective 
and indecisive European Union has the effect of ostracising Europeans from the 
European project. 81 
77 As Anderson points out, the European Parliament could grow to eight hundred deputies, and 
the number of Commissioners would grow to forty. A ten minute introductory speech by each Minister 
attending a Council meeting could last five hours. Only then would substantive business commence. 
78 Anderson, P. "The Europe to Come" in The Question of Europe, 143. 
79 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 84. 
80 Such an argument is based upon Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 
survey results which demonstrate Europeans ill-ease with increased institutional complexity and 
unaccountability. 
81 As Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer has found the European public 
perception is that the largest percentage of the EU budget is expended on decision making processes, 
paying for officials and the administrative infrastructure of the EU. In reality the administration of the 
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Europeans are united in their suspicions of European economic policy and decision 
making processes being removed from their influence. Seventy Three percent of 
Europeans believe that the European Central Bank should be accountable to the 
European Parliament for its decisions. The same percentage believes that the 
European Commission (President and Commissioners) should have the Parliament's 
support or resign. 82 These results confirm the importance to Europeans of 
transparency and accountability in decision making and the erosive effects of the 
absence of such qualities on European community building. The more states enter the 
European polity, without commensurate institutional and decision-making reform, and 
the degree to which the European Commission and its Commissioners are perceived 
as being removed from democratic accountability, the greater the likelihood of 
distorted outcomes and profound indeterminacy, and the greater potential for 
antipathy amongst European citizens. Europeans have shown over an extended period 
of time, to be willing to disengage from 'Europe' if they perceive that its decision 
making processes are flawed. The continuing low level of support for the European 
Commission, relative to the other institutions of the EU, and the increasing support 
for institutional reform demonstrate this. In spring 1999, 52% of EU citizens believed 
that reform of EU institutions was a priority, an increase over the preceding period of 
3 percent. Further, Europeans express considerably more trust in the (democratic) 
European Parliament (50%) than they do in the European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers (30%) — the traditional target for criticism over closed and 
fragmented decision making in the EU. 83 
The paradox of increasing regional potency, the practical absence of democratic 
processes and the sense of individual disempowerment have had a number of practical 
effects. Firstly it contributes to the phenomenon of institutional delegitimation. The 
unaccountable European polity, as it takes on classical symbolic 'state' functions 
without popular representation, results in the phenomena in which Europe is seen as 
Union represents five percent of the Budget. 81 The largest component of EU expenditure is the CAP 
(42%). See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 16. 
82 
Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 57. 
83 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, iii. 
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foreign and out of touch with everyday living and working conditions. Secondly, the 
perception of an unaccountable Europe in which EU policy influence in 'domestic' 
spheres appear to be increasing, create a perception, in the absence of democratic 
processes, that there is no effective limit to the ability of the Union to reach into areas 
which were once considered the preserve of the state. This scenario makes the 
resolution of a European identity with a pre-existent national identity difficult, as 
empirical evidence suggests that Europeans are resistant to Europe insofar as it is 
perceived that Europe threatens pre-existent states and state-mediated national 
identities." 
6.3.4 The Economic Failures of Europe 
Europe's Underclass and European Unemployment - There exists today in Europe a 
generation that was born and has matured in an environment of systemic 
unemployment. In the first 25 years after the end of the Second World War, Europe 
was characterised by high growth and full employment. A period that has been 
referred to a: "mystical golden age of welfare capitalism." 85 
Full wage employment, welfare provision and the norm of a nuclear family with a 
single bread-winner has given way to significant economic and social disruption and 
growing insecurity. This phenomenon is particularly acute in those core European 
states, including Germany and France, where strong growth and full employment 
characterised the three decades after the end of the Second World War. Since the 
1970s a fundamental change has occurred in Western Europe. The reorientation of 
Europe to the global economy, trade liberalisation, inflation maintenance and the 
reduction of social infrastructure has had significant social-economic effects. Social 
welfare, the maintenance of an economically unified and resilient community, via 
government interaction, while still the rhetorical objective of national governments, 
has been subsumed by Governments eager to roll back welfare and protective 
provisions to better' compete' in a global market. As Standing remarks: 
84 
Refer to Chapter Two. 
85 
Standing, G. 'The New Insecurities' in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. The Question of Europe., 
203. 
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"Those looking back on the history of the second half of the twentieth century 
will note that the cherished social objectives in the postwar era became 
perceived by mainstream policy-makers as 'costs' to be avoided in the last two 
decades of the century." 86 
The agenda of flexible labour markets, global best practice and the 
internationalisation of economies, is leading to the greater casualisation of the 
European labour market. Intermediated labour-force participation, especially amongst 
women, the erosion of the union movement and the tacit acceptance of inter-
generational unemployment by political elites have had corrosive effects on personal 
security and identity. 87 Insecurity corrodes morale and at worst induces anomic 
despair in those not blessed by good education, good contacts, youth or those who are 
members of a minority. We have remarked in Chapter Two as to how, in modern 
industrial society, identity is centrally linked to occupation. For that increasing 
proportion of Europeans without work, or in a position of marginal employment, 
collective identity creation and maintenance becomes problematic. Further the 
unemployed (or underemployed) are often excluded from social life as result of their 
reduced consumption patterns, their inability to secure adequate education, health and 
housing and their marginal attractiveness to mainstream political groups. Such 
exclusion is contrary to the collective intergroup interaction and collective sense of 
belonging. This phenomena is most acutely experienced amongst Europe's 
'underclass'. 
The emergence of an economic and social "underclass" has been promoted by 
incidence of long-term unemployment, prolonged periods of low economic growth, 
the reduction in real wages and the polarisation of the socio-economic fabric of 
86  Ibid., 203. 
87 As E. Fitzgerald, the Irish minister of Labour Affairs, remarked in 1996: 
"You can go to any school in Ireland and mark out certain four-year-olds with long-term 
unemployment written all over them." 
Opening speech to 'Beyond Essen: Active Employment measures for Disadvantaged Groups' Brussels 
17 October 1996 in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. 'The Question of Europe'., 208. 
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society. 88 The economic and social cohesion, which predominated in the Europe of 
the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, is giving way to one in which extremes of 
economic, political and social opportunity and influence are being exhibited. 89 
There is a direct relationship between European macro-economic change - primarily 
de-industrialisation, the shift to knowledge-based service industries and the growth of 
the urban underclass. Due to a range of sociopolitical changes during the 1980s there 
has been a threat to the ideals of participatory citizenship. 9° Such a threat is 
heightened by the EU's perceived remoteness and lack of access for the majority of 
Europeans- most especially those in the lower socioeconomic groupings. 
Despite the increasing creation of goods and services many members of European 
society have lost practical access to them. There has been rapid growth in neo-liberal 
political ideology, most recently demonstrated in Austria, creating justificatory 
regimes for placing restrictions on entitlements to social services. These have 
produced an underclass of economically disadvantaged, of permanently unemployed 
and underprivileged groups. Significantly these characteristics are disproportionately 
represented in European ethnic minorities. 91 These people have lost regular and 
guaranteed access to the labour market, to the political community and to networks of 
legitimate social ties. Western society has become progressively more exclusionist 
88 
The term "underclass" lacks precise definition. It alternatively has been described as the: 
"estranged poor" and encompassing a situation where a group of people from a common ethnic and 
cultural background are excluded from the labour market. They have little prospect of finding 
employment and show no sign of intra or inter-generational upward mobility. There is some difficulty 
in assessing the precise development or characteristics of the European underclass. It is associated with 
the reduction in social, economic and effective civil rights caused by the massive transfer of wealth 
from the poor to the rich during the last ten years. See Omatsu, G. Amerasia Journal - 1991 Selected 
Bibliography. 17, No. 3, (Fall 1991), 83-169. 
89 A recent exposition of this process is given by MacDonald et al in Youth, the 'underclass and 
social exclusion. (London: Routledge 1997). 
90 See Morris L. Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship. (London: Routledge 
1994) 
91 
Such neo-liberal ideology is an amalgam of economic and socio-political narratives which, 
according to Bosanquet, champions the integrating effect of the market within society, producing order, 
justice, economic growth and constantly rising incomes, including those of the poorest. According to 
this paradigm inequality is the inevitable (and beneficial) outcome of individual freedom and interests. 
see Bosanquet 'After the right' quoted in Levitas, R. The Ideology of the New Right. (Oxford: Polity 
Press 1986), 2. 
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and has intensified the marginal socioeconomic position of these peoples. 92 Further, 
the efforts made by the European Union member states to align their macro-economic 
outcomes with the convergence criteria necessary for the single currency has resulted 
in the decline in living standards for those most reliant upon diminishing member 
state expenditure. Such a process being described as "Human set-aside." 93 Making 
Europe fit for EMU has had the effect of reducing the economic security of many 
Europeans. In such a context of instability, identification with Europe is highly 
problematic. 
The underclasses lack of broad social, political (and by definition economic) 
assimilation provides a serious challenge to the emergence of a European identity. 94 
Communal identity formation is, in part, dependent upon cooperative intergroup 
interaction, in-group favouritism and a sense of communal belonging. The underclass 
do not exhibit the range and intensity of social, political or economic interactions with 
the wider European community. They are part of an economic and social 'out-group' 
and they lack the integrative sense of belonging that defines a common community 
and common identity. Further while the development of economic, social and political 
security and rights enhances common collective identification the absence of such 
rights and security diminishes communal identification. Why would those who are 
structurally prevented from exercising their economic or social rights, in effect 
becoming second class citizens, seek to positively align themselves with political and 
economic structures that appear to exclude them?95 The failure of the institutional 
92 
See Dahrendorf, R. "Citizenship: A New Agenda For Change", 7-18., and Newman, K. 
"Culture and Structure in the Truly Disadvantaged", City and Society. 6, No. 1. (June 1992), 3-25. 
93 
See 'Human Set-aside; Sacrificing the poor and disabled' at http://www.poptel.org.uk/against- 
eurofederalistn/setaside.html accessed 29 October 1998 and 'Welfare State and NHS or Single 
Currency and Cuts' at http://www.poptel.org.uk/against-eurofederalism/d28ftnt.html  accessed 29 
October 1998. 
94 
New technologies, shifts in global economics and the transfer of information have further 
reinforced the exclusion of the European underclass and revealed the fragmentation of traditional 
allegiances and identities. Evidence of this process is found in various manifestations. The increased 
technological competence and social mobility of economically active Europeans has reinforced 
European identity amongst such groups as identity in the social world is defined by the intensity of 
social, political and economic relationships as subject, consumer and national member. 
95 
Auletta has identified four primary underclass groups; 
1. The passive poor, usually long term welfare recipients 
2. The hostile street criminals, drop-outs and drug addicts 
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apparatus of the emergent European supranational polity to provide the underclass 
with a sense of inclusion and practical economic participation creates the potential for 
a backlash against the European project and active resistance to it amongst significant 
numbers of Europeans 
Let us look in greater detail as to the nature of European unemployment. In 1997 
more than 18 milion people in the European Union were unemployed. More 
concerning is the fact that 40% of those 18 milion have been unemployed for more 
than a year. (This figure compares with the United States where only 11% are in a 
comparable position.)96 As the figure below ilustrates, European unemployment 
while remaining benign during the period of rapid growth up until the early 1970s has 
growth rapidly since then, It has only been since the mid-1990s that  the rate of 
unemployment in Europe has stabilised, but at a rate far higher than previously 
experienced in the post—war period, and significantly considerably higher than 
Europe's main trading competitors. 
Figure 6.2 Trends in European Unemployment 1960-1997 
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Source: European Commission: European Economy 1997. no 64 pp68-69 
3. The hustlers, dependant upon the underground economy, but rarely involved in 
violent crime 
4. The traumatized drunks, homeless bag ladies and released mental patients. 
96, 	Politics of Unemployment' The Economist, April 5 1997, 17. 
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In 1960 the unemployment rate across those states which now make up the European 
Union states was just over 2 percent. In 1995 it averaged 10.9%. 97 The effect of this 
has been to curb collective European identification most particularly in those heavily 
industrialized states, such as Germany and France in which the effects of 
unemployment and economic restructuring have been most acutely felt. While the 
efficiencies flowing from the integration of the European economic space are having a 
positive effect on the European marketplace, certainly insofar as it is internationally 
competitive, the unemployment problem, most especially in those 'core' European 
states such a Germany and France, has reduced the shift to European consciousness. 
Focusing on the German and French examples to demonstrate the correlation between 
increased economic insecurity, manifested in escalating unemployment, and support 
for European integration and European identification. During the 1950s and 1960s 
both Germany and France led European post-war reconstruction and economic 
growth. Germany's growth was 4.3% during the 1961-1973 period, while growth in 
France was 5.4%. Employment was strong, and unemployment was inconsequential 
(Germany's unemployment rate averaged 0.7% and Frances 2.0% during this period). 
In the two decades following the oil crisis of the early 1970's the French and German 
economies went into relative decline. Growth in Germany fell to 1.7% and 
unemployment grew to 4.4% and in France growth slowed to 2.2% and 
unemployment grew to 6.4% in the decade 1974 — 1985. 98 Neither recovered the 
resilience in economic or employment growth that they had enjoyed in the immediate 
post war period. Mirroring this economic slow down, support for Europe and 
European identification likewise stabilised. As the figures below demonstrate neither 
the Germans nor the French when compared with the rapidly growing economies of 
peripheral Europe have maintained their level of support for Europe not their sense of 
0 
communal identification. 
Considering first the relationship between European unemployment and perceptions 
of benefit amongst Europeans from EU membership there is an inverse correlation 
97 European Commission. Directorate- General for Economic and Financial Affairs European 
Economy Number 65 1998, 194 & 206. 
98 European Commission. European Economy No 68( Luxembourg: Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs 1999 
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between unemployment and perceptions amongst Europeans of benefit from EU 
membership. In France and Germany as unemployment increased between 1983 and 
1998 perceptions of benefit from EU membership fel. Whereas in the peripheral 
European states, such as Greece and Ireland, as unemployment fel during the same 
period, positive perceptions of Europe increased. Thus European unemployment can 
be seen as detrimentaly efecting support for the European project. 
Figure 6.3 European Unemployment and Perception of European Benefit 
Germany 	 France 	 Ireland 	 Gree,e 
EU State 
Sources: European Commission: European Economy 1999  Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Afairs & Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 42,44,46.47 &48 
Considering the relationship between European identification and European 
unemployment we find that as unemployment in Europe intensified  in the core 
European states in the 1990s feelings of European identity fel in those states. 
Whereas in Ireland where unemployment fel during the same period,  such European 
identification remained relatively stable. As the figures below demonstrate: 
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Figure 6.4 Germany — European Identification and Unemployment 1995-1998 
year 
Source: Sources: European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
European Economy 1999 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 42,44,46,47 &48  
Figure 6.5 France — European Identification and Unemployment 1995-1998 
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Figure 6.6 Ireland — European Identification and Unemployment 1995-1998 
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Sources: European Commission: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs European 
Economy 1999 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 42,44,46,47 &48  
European Economic Convergence - EMU and Other Concerns - The European Treaty 
focus on economic convergence and the reduction of European inflation at al costs is 
proving to by socialy dysfunctional. The political resources of the EU are being 
directed on a fight against inflation and public debt at a time when inflation has 
ceased to be a major problem in most European countries and public debt only 
slightly more so. The result of the almost exclusive focus on the convergence criteria 
for economic prosperity may prove to be self-defeating insofar as economic progress 
towards the European project, no mater how superficialy impressive, may have 
significant social costs that contribute to atitudinal fractures within the common 
European Home. 
By focusing on economic policies and narrowing social objectives to fit within these 
policies, a widespread anti-European backlash, as experienced most publicly in 
France in the mid-1990s has occurred. The most important example is the atenuation 
of the employment strategy developed by the Commission in 1994. The failure to 
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carry through such measures carries major political and conceptual difficulties for the 
Union. Europeans, most notably the French, have experienced the detrimental effect 
of the convergence program on employment, welfare and social stability. In this 
context of perceived economic myopia where the construction of the politico-
economic edifice of Europe is perceived as being removed from the concerns and 
anxieties of ordinary Europeans, then 'Europe' itself will threaten individual loyalty 
towards it. 
Demonstrating the corrosive effect of the costs of convergence on support for the 
European project is straightforward. We have only to look to reactions to a 
hypothetical abandonment of the EU amongst states between 1971 and 1993 to 
demonstrate the increasing dissatisfaction, most particularly from the core EU states, 
where the costs of the Union are centered. While in 1971 five percent of the French 
would have been relieved if the EC had been abandoned, by 1993 this figure had 
increased by 280% to 14% of the French population surveyed. In Germany the figure 
increased from seven to nine percent. This contrasted with the peripheral of Europe 
where economic redistribution from Europe had been principally experienced. In 
1981, 18% of Greeks surveyed would have been relieved if the EU had been 
abandoned, whereas by 1993 this figure had reduced to only 5 percent. In Ireland the 
reduction was from 17 to five percent and in Portugal from eight to seven percent. 99 
Thus in those states where the 'costs of Europe' have been perceived as outweighing 
the costs of non-Europe support for the European project has faltered, as has the 
consolidation of European identification, as we examined earlier. 
The speed with which European economic convergence is occurring and the inability 
of considerable numbers of European citizens to recognise the value of the process is 
aptly described in a letter written by a 'ordinary' European citizen to The European in 
late 1996: 
"Our leaders may wish to go down as the first men to unite Europe since 
Charlemagne, but is it reasonable to expect 350 million people to suffer for 
their ambition? To achieve the convergence criteria for a single currency 
would cost millions of jobs; there would be far fewer people paying taxes - or 
99 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 39, June 1993, A16. 
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buying the goods and services produced by the fortunate few stil in work. 
Public services would be reduced and social unrest and crime would increase 
100 considerably. 
The increasing phenomena of trans-national economic mergers and rationalisations, 
were actively facilitated by the single market, exemplified by Renault's European 
actions in February and March 1997 which lead to the loss of 3,100 automotive jobs 
in Belgium alone. These policies are stimulating a backlash against the economic 
imperatives of Europe. As Commission President Jacques Santer, commented that in 
the haste to create a single market, the EU had left other vital concerns such as social 
cohesion by the wayside: "with dramatic implications at times."1°1 The persuasive 
sense of economic insecurity created by the required efficiencies of the single market 
spreads beyond any single industry and efects much of Europe's industrial heartland. 
The rapid decline of the coal industry in Germany which curently receives significant 
subsidies, and which in Germany alone, employ 90,000 is another example.1°2 
The perceived failure of European leaders to adequately take account of the concerns 
of increasingly economicaly vulnerable Europeans as part of the integration process 
has the effect of limiting the positive a consciousness that Europeans wil have of the 
single European Home. As Christian Democrat MEP Raphael Chanterie commented: 
"An economic and monetary union without a social dimension is not 
acceptable to our citizens. Europe is already lagging a decade behind the 
single market in social terms"103 
The dynamics of Economic convergence and the potential for a European Identity — 
What do these economic failures of supranational Europe tel us about the possibility 
of the emergence of a positive European sentiment amongst European citizens? One 
100 	 . Gil, R. 1996 Leters to the Editor. The European 17-23 October 1996, 11. 
101 Santer, J. 1997 quoted in 'Euro-Strikes loom as job cuts multiply'. The European 13-19 March 
1997, 1. 
102 Under the German Government's plans, subsidies would be halved to the coal industry over 
an eight year period from Dm 10.1 bilion to Dm 5.5 bilion. The German coalminers Union; IG 
Bergbau, have estimated that such measures would result in the closure of seven of the existing 19 
German coal mines and the loss of 55,000 jobs by the year 2005 from Paterson, T. 'Miners heap scorn 
on Cuts' The European 13-19 March 1997, 4. 
103  Ibid. 
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of the most palpable consequences of the differing economic circumstances of 
European states is the level of support or lack thereof, for further European 
integration. 
The French experience is the clearest example of the European project souring as a 
result of the narrow drive for European economic convergence. It is ironic that 
France, one of the original champions of a united Europe should have experienced 
painful and disruptive effects of economic convergence. The election of President 
Jacques Chirac in 1995 saw the most rigorous attempt to prepare France for monetary 
Union by virtue of the introduction of stringent monetary policy. Economic 
performance stagnated, unemployment increased and social tensions became more 
apparent. This provoked a significant protest movement. Domestic economic policy 
was left little room to manoeuvre. The austerity programs introduced appeared to 
work only in favour of the French Extreme right-wing and anti- EU camps, which 
during the 1990s have steadily increased in size and influence. 104 . 
The divisive effects of monetary integration are significant to the potential realisation 
of a common European consciousness. It was predicted that EMU in 1999 would split 
Europe into two zones, according to whether countries had met the convergence 
criteria or not. It is still too early to conclude whether this prognosis is correct, 
however if there were to be a slowing of the European economy it might be expected 
that the historical economic 'fault lines' between core and peripheral European 
performance might remerge. This situation will place demands not only on economic 
convergence, but more significantly on social cohesion and will detract from a 
communal sense of belonging. The divisions between EMU and non-EMU states will 
not only effect commercial and political relations but will create friction between 
EMU 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. This will occur at the inter-state level, as was the case 
with the process of negotiations leading up to the introduction of the Single Market. It 
will also have an effect at the regional level as it does presently in states such as Italy, 
and the United Kingdom, where economically prosperous regions stereotype and 
disparage economically weaker areas. 
104 Grover, A. A Generic Fascism? A Typology of Causal Elements of Fascism and Neo-fascism. 
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The quest for economic convergence may have two detrimental effects on the 
potential for the emergence of an inclusive European identity. Firstly on the internal, 
state axis tensions within national communities wil accentuate social and economic 
exclusion as states struggle to reorientate their economic policies in order to become 
eligible to join the EMU 'club'. Secondly, as states strive at the inter-state level to 
qualify for EMU, those healthy and more robust (at least in economic terms) states 
wil assume a greater sense of importance. Those non-participating states, and the 
citizens within those states, may wel be stigmatised as less productive, economicaly 
stable and less progressive - even less "European".I05 
The atempt by smaler, less affluent states to meet convergence criteria by restricting 
public spending and deficits, do not simply aggravate social tensions, but provide a 
decisive point of disjuncture between European's 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. As such 
the emergence of a common European identity and affinity in a two-tier Europe, with 
increasing internal and external monetary exclusion and a widening gap between 
affluent and poor at the individual and the state level, wil largely negate the 
possibility for a sense of common European cohesion. Such a phenomena wil be 
most publicly highlighted during periods of economic recession, where the stronger 
states wil not only be able to maintain economic security and social protection while 
the peripheral European states, unless they receive ongoing support from the EU wil 
languish, albeit in relative terms. 
Reflecting the public alienation that such a process involves are Renwick's 
comments: 
"The euro wil be an uter disaster for al those who atempt to join. How can 
nations as strong as Germany and France grow at the same rate as Greece or 
Spain? This lunacy wil end in tears on a grand scale. Al countries wil lose 
their own right for self determination, we wil have no control over our interest 
rates, over exchange rates and inflation control. Each country wil have to 
folow the leader - a strong country - which wil ultimately mean Germany. 
Within only a few years fiscal control policies wil be placed on countries' 
income policies and what each Government can do to set its own budget. 
Before long, each country's parliament wil be like a parish council, populated 
by stufed suits on the gravy train, with no more power than where to plant the 
105 	 .s stigmatisation Thi 	may occur in the same way as those in Southern Italy are treated as less 
Italian and outsiders by those in the prosperous North of Italy. 
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national flower bed. When this happens, there wil be no more United 
Kingdom, no point in electing people to Westminster, no national pride, no 
England footbal or Cricket teams, no Monarchy, no Britishness. Just an 
extension of the continent, lead by men with no merit intruding on the way the 
British people live their lives."I06 
6.4 	 Chapter Six - Concluding Remarks 
In Chapter One we considered the nature of communal identity. We argued that 
identity exists where individuals categorise themselves as part of a colective based 
upon favourable comparisons with the in-group (and unfavourable comparisons with 
out-groups) Further communal identity is displayed by a common sense of belonging, 
cooperative intra-group interaction and functional relations. This Chapter has argued 
there are a range of political, economic, cultural and social factors —what we refer to 
as retardants, which are inhibiting the emergence of a European identity. This 
examination has outlined the factors as seemingly diverse as economic exclusion, 
institutional remoteness, the return of the ethnic nation and ideological divisions do 
that act to inhibit European identification. In those circumstances where there is real 
scepticism towards the European project, where large numbers of Europeans are 
substantialy economicaly socialy and politicaly disenfranchised, there is litle 
doubt, based upon the material presented in this Chapter, that the evocation of a pan-
European identity wil be problematic. 
The factors inhibiting the emergence of a European identity are both subtle and 
complex. Notwithstanding the institutional and non-institutional retardants outlined in 
this Chapter, the lure of the ethnic may be the most powerful. Smith, reinforcing his 
argument that communal identity is possible only from a basis of a common 
communal cultural or symbolic basis, has suggested that in the absence of a common; 
'intense and durable' pan-European cultural identity, that a common form of European 
identity is unlikely. Smith argues: 
106 BBC NEWS 1998 'Talking Point' 
htp:/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/talking%5Fpoint/newsid%5F88000/88134.asp, 10-11, accessed 29 
October 1998. 
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"There is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European 
ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of Kings or saints. When 
it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no 
European equivalent of national or religious community." 107 
At the non-institutional level there appears to be both the disintegration of integrative 
societal forces of community, as evidenced in the massification of society, the 
development of an underclass and the decentring of the subject. The return to 
seemingly more 'authentic' indicators of identity, such as race, language or sexual 
orientation are being tracked by a general disentanglement of all metanarratives of 
community and the potential for the emergence of a nihilistic death of the subject 
itself. Cultural and consumer products, that may have historically provided a basis for 
collective mythologisation, are being distorted and manipulated by trans-national 
economic forces and their reconfigured state confirm the postmodern critique of 
double-coding, irony and dispersal both in objects as well as subjects. 
On a more tangible level ambivalence towards the process of European convergence, 
and hostility to the emerging European political and economic elites, further make the 
advancement of a common European empathy uncertain. The very process of 
convergence may form a constellation of resentment towards Europe. As Ash 
suggests: 
"The rationalist, functionalist, perfectionist attempt to 'make Europe' or 
'complete' Europe through a hard core built around a rapid monetary union 
could well end up achieving the opposite of the desired effect. A procedure 
aimed at finally overcoming the bad old European ways of competing nation-
states and alliances risks hastening a return to precisely those bad old ways. 
Press the fast-Forward button and you go backwards." I°8 
000000 
107  Smith, A. 1992 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity' International Affairs 68: 1., 
55-76, 73. 
108 Ash, T. 'Catching the Wrong Bus' in Gowan, P. & Anderson P. The Question of Europe., 124. 
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Chapter Seven 
Towards A Civic European Identity 
7.1 	 Introductory Remarks 
Over the course of the preceding Chapters we have established that supranationalism 
and identity are central concerns in late modernity. These issues are nowhere more 
pronounced than in contemporary Europe. Increasingly conspicuous in the 
international arena, and relevant to its citizens, the European polity is subject to two 
separate, yet related, phenomena. Firstly, an increase in the expression of popular 
nationalism, often ethnicaly based and intrinsicaly exclusionary, which is narowing 
the scope of communal identification for a significant number of Europeans. Running 
paralel with this process is the development of a distinctive pan-European identity; 
characterised by its inclusive civic characteristics. An identity, as detailed in Chapter 
Five, influenced by the institutions and policy domains of the European supranation. 
Such a pan-European identity, as we shal consider in this Chapter and the folowing 
two, reflects a heightened sense of self-awareness amongst Europeans as being 
Europeans, and displaying itself in colective behaviours, values, symbols and pre-
dispositions, which are distinctively European in nature. 
This Chapter, in association with Chapters Eight and Nine, demonstrate that the 
combination of a communal European consciousness, normative convergence, the 
colective recognition of a common set of European symbols, colective European 
interaction and relationships and a common European cognitive boundary form a 
coherent patern of European identification. We shal operationalise the pre-
established model of identity, as established in Chapter One, and demonstrate that 
there is a distinctive communal identity in contemporary Europe. 
Two points must be emphasised prior to a detailed examination of European 
identification. Firstly, as our argument ilustrates, identity is operationalised on a 
number of levels, and in a variety of ways. Communal identity is demonstrated not 
only in a colective form of self-description and communal expression of belonging, 
but it is also demonstrated by communal behaviours and the values and symbols that 
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underpin and support them. Identity is further demonstrated by the collective 
exclusion of members of a defined 'out-group'. Accordingly this examination of 
identity is informed by a variety of data, and not limited to straightforward utterances 
of "Europeaness" from amongst contemporary Europeans. Secondly, it should be 
noted that we do not intend to establish the existence of an exclusive European 
identity, one that is exclusive of other signifiers, such a task is beyond the scope of 
this thesis (and probably unattainable). Rather we will demonstrate that a European 
identity exists amongst other nation, regional, local and social identities and that its 
existence is reliant upon the institutional management of the Ressentiment between 
the pre-existent constellation of identity. As Chris Rootes argues: 
"The promise and the challenge of European integration is to build a new, 
European identity that will not replace but supplement existing national 
identities and that will make Europeans less anxious to cling to exclusionary 
national and ethnic identities whose existing political representations are less 
and less effective in protecting their interests in the modern world." I 
We argue that the resentiment, between the varying constellations of identification 
within Europe — regional, national and supranational, - is managed peacefully only 
because of the deliberate and systematic intervention of the institutions and policy 
domains of the European polity. European identity is characterised by a number of 
enduring characteristics. Firstly European identity is primarily functionally driven and 
structurally supported. Common European actions, values and a common European 
language, are, in practice, necessary in order for Europe to remain internally coherent 
and to effectively engage in a highly competitive global arena. Secondly, the form and 
structure of European governance has closely shaped and determined the nature of 
much of the European identity that we shall examine here. European self-awareness 
has been assisted by a common European political culture which itself has been 
facilitated by the dynamics of democratisation in Europe. Further, European identity 
has been positively effected by the nature and intensity of European linkages and 
relationships that have been made possible only by the liberalisation of European 
economic and social policy. The institutionalisation of the Four Freedoms and the 
active intervention of EU policy domains, in particular EU economic, social, regional 
1 
Rootes, C. & Davis, H.Social Change and Political Transformation., 3. 
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and youth policies, have colectively mediated and accelerated the growth of intra-
European networks. 
This Chapter, in concert with the next two chapters, wil demonstrate that while 
Europeans' articulate a weaker sense of Europe identity than they do to their state of 
origin, that European identity, expressed in terms of a generalised European value 
system, a colective European political culture and through a dense network of 
European interactions and relationships, is both apparent and distinctive. Importantly 
such a communal identity is significant in the context of a generalised decrease in 
national political participation, trust in political institutions and elites and a decline in 
formal normative convergence, and overal political literacy within contemporary 
Europe.2 Notwithstanding a lesser supranational, as opposed to national, identity 
Europeans are increasingly conducting themselves as a colective. Europeans are 
developing close trans-European relationships based upon a distinctive European 
value system. Further, Europeans are increasingly relying on European institutions to 
provide solutions in ever wider policy domains, and actively engaging in common 
European political activities. However, common European symbols do not appear to 
be having a similar integrating efect. 
7.2 	 Identity - a Definition (Reprise) 
In Chapter One we established communal identity in the folowing terms: 
Identity is best understood as a sense of belonging; to feeling part of a colectivity. It 
is associated with a readiness to adopt certain self-descriptions. 
Identity formation is a process of community formation in which membership and 
association is based on a set of criteria which have both subjective and objective 
2 The importance of the contrast between an increased European identity in the context of a 
decline in state-based trust in political institutions and popular participation in the political process 
cannot be overstated. European identity has arisen at a time when identification with state-mediated 
political institutions, and the state-mediated nation itself has come under serious review by national 
members. In such a context the rise of European identification is a remarkable achievement. See 
Dalton, R. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United 
States, Great Britain, West Germany and France. (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc. 1995); 
Dogan, M. 'The Decline of Nationalisms in Western Europe' Comparative Politics April 1994 & 
Dogan, M. 'The Decline in Religious Beliefs in Western Europe' International Social Science Journal  
September 1995. 
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characteristics. Such as the characteristics of ethine or language, as in the case of 
'ethnic' identity or the features of citizenship, individualism and equality - as in the 
case of 'civic' identity. Identity is enabled by individuals, who by making favourable 
comparisons with the in-group and unfavourable comparisons with out-groups 
colectively categorise themselves as part of the colective. Communal identity is 
displayed in cooperative intra-group interaction, normative convergence and 
functional relations. 
Identity exists where individuals identi& with and wish themselves to be identifiable 
as members of distinct social categories such as nations, ethnic groups or societies. 
The key characteristics of communal identity are: 
1. a sense of belonging, colective consciousness and self-description; 
2. shared values; 
3. common symbols; 
4. common actions and the development of intra-group relations; and 
5. common cognitive boundary. 
The aim of this Chapter is to demonstrate the paterning of such identity consistent 
with characteristic one. Chapter Eight wil consider the manifestation of a communal 
European identity as demonstrated by shared European values and common symbols. 
Chapter Nine wil consider the relationship between commonality of action and 
European identity and wil demonstrate that there exists a common European 
cognitive boundary which reinforces a communal expression of European 
identification. 
7.3 	 Establishing European Identity - The Empirical Evidence 
7.3.1 A European Sense of Belonging 
Identity manifests itself as a colective cognitive disposition and group self-perception 
(variously described as a sense of belonging, loyalty, or a communal sense of 
difference) toward a group such as the nation or society, and a common medium of 
expression, most particularly language. Applying such an understanding to 
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contemporary Europe we are essentially interested in examining the extent to which 
Europeans articulate a feeling of belonging to Europe. 
The European Individual and the European Collective - Europeans come together for 
a wide variety of reasons, to play sport, work, to establish a family and to create 
wealth. Out of associations such as these Europeans develop a sense of identity, 
expressed, in part, as a self-conscious sense of belonging, to those with whom they 
share common characteristics or interests. This sense of commonality is possibly 
transitory or revealed only by point of contrast with those outside the collectivity. 3 
There are a number of key variables that determine the degree of European 
identification. The larger the group, and the lesser the organic face-to-face interaction, 
the more difficult it is to sustain a sense of belonging from amongst the group's 
members.4 Interactive behaviour and support has a positive effect on group and 
identification, as does the sharing of a common language, a common set of values and 
in some cases a common mythology or customary practice. 5 Identification is further 
enhanced in those cases where there is tangible reward for such a collective 
orientation, or where there may be sanctions against non-members of the collective. 
Cultural considerations are significant determinants of communal identification. In the 
European context most particularly the commonality of a European political culture. 
We agree with Almond and Verba that a political culture is such that it provides a 
systematic structure of values and controlling guidelines for political behaviour. 
Political culture defines the various roles that the individual takes up in society and 
the structural effects on the individual and thus, contribute to defining both individual 
and communal identification. ° 
3 See Hogg, M and Abrams, D. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Relations and Group Process (London: Routledge, 1988) 
4  Shils, E. & Janowitz, M. 'Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II' 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 1948, 12, 280-313. 
5 As established in Chapter One 
6 See Pye, L. & Verba, S. Political Culture and Political Development. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.) 
Figure 7.1 Level of Attachment to Europe - 1999 
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Feeling European - European and National Identity - The nature of communal identity 
as demonstrated by the articulation of a sense of belonging is operationalised by 
reference to an examination of the views expressed by Europeans as to their sense of 
feeling European compared to their expression of their national identity. Utilising data 
from the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer series produced 
by the European Commission, we find that there is a considerable level of 
"Europeaness" shared between Europeans. However national identification remains 
the most significant form of communal identification. As the data below ilustrates. 
7.3.2 With What do Europe's Citizens Identify Themselves - Their Nation or the 
Supranation?  
If we consider the latest available data we find that Europeans predominantly identify 
with their nation, rather than with Europe. Such a straightforward  indicator of 
communal identification can be demonstrated by reference to two instruments, 
questions relating to an empirical analysis of the extent to which 'atached' Europeans 
feel to Europe and the occurence of European and/or national identity. 
Source Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.9 
277 
These most current results reveal that the Swedish, Danish and those from 
Luxembourg feel most atached to Europe. Those in the United Kingdom are the least 
atached. Importantly, and confirming the predominance of national identity, when 
questioned Europeans feel significantly more atached to their country (89%), and 
their town or vilage (87%) than they do to Europe (56%).7 Two points should be 
noted. Firstly more than half of Europeans surveyed have a feeling of atachment to 
Europe, demonstrating the importance of Europe to Europeans. Secondly, regional 
atachment and identification is almost of equal value than is national identity, this is 
most strongly experienced at Europe's periphery — in Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
This fact demonstrates two points, firstly the growing importance of local 
identification to Europeans. Secondly the level of atachment at Europe's periphery 
reinforces the strategic importance of EU regional and ethnolinguistic policy in 
positively effecting a sense of atachment to Europe, via the promotion of regional 
and enthnolinguistic rights. Accordingly to the extent that Europe enhances the 
standing of the regions - economicaly and culturaly, a greater atachment to Europe 
might be anticipated. 
However, considering specific data related to Europeans' perceptions of their 
European and/or National identity we find that Europeans remain most centraly 
atached to their nation. While there is strong European identification it does not 
overwhelm pre-existing national identity. 
Figure 7.2 	 European and National Identity — 1998 Results 
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7 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 8. 
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Demographic analysis of the above data demonstrates that younger Europeans, 
tertiary educated Europeans and Europeans in the 'managerial' class are more likely 
to feel European. Those Europeans with a comparatively lower level of education, 
those who are less economicaly active and those who are older are most likely to 
identify solely with their own nationality. Such a demographic confirms our earlier 
discussion as to the positive correlation between the promotion of a secure and right-
bearing European domain in which economic liberalism, political  participation and 
the enjoyment of educational, cultural and economic networks and benefits would 
engender a stronger sense of European identification, it is Europe's economicaly 
active and educated youth who predominantly benefit from this domain. 
Notwithstanding the predominance of national identity, it is important  to note that 
there are seven EU states in which citizens who feel to some extent European 
represent a majority. As the Commission of the European Communities 
Eurobarometer authors comment: "Although one can stil not speak  of a truly 
European identity, the majority of EU citizens feels to some extent European."8 
A longitudinal analysis of the expression of European identity between 1994 and 1998 
confirms the enduring nature of national identity relative to European identification. 
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Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49 p. 41 and Commission of the 
European Communities Eurobarometer 50 p.59 
8 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50, 59. 
Source:turobarometer 46 8.46 
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The contrast between 1992 and 1998 is such that a sense of solely national identity 
across European member states has increased significantly from 38% to 43%. 
Whereas exclusively European identity has remained static at four percent. The data 
does suggest that the persentage of Europeans expressing European as wel as national 
idneity is significant. Throughout the seven year period under review such a figure 
was no less than a total of 46% of the population surveyed (1996/97) and was as high 
as 55% in 1992. Considering specific periods, in 1997, 45% of those surveyed 
described themselves as 'nationality' only, 40% as nationality and European, six 
percent as European and nationality and a further five percent as European only. 
These figures have shown a downward trend of feeling European since the Autumn of 
1995. The figures demonstrate that while comparatively few Europeans feel 
themselves to be exclusively European, around half, on average, feel some sense of 
dual loyalty. This notion is most prevalent in France, Italy and Ireland, and is least 
true in Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom. 
While Europeans predominantly identify with their state their active expression of 
European identification is significant. Such a sense of identification is reinforced and 
reflected in the level of trust expressed in each other amongst Europeans. Europeans 
share a common sense of trust in each other. This trust, most particularly amongst 
those peoples of the European Union, demonstrate a distinct sense of belonging and 
atachment to each other and to Europe. When Europeans of the fifteen member states 
of the EU are asked how much trust they have in people from various countries, they, 
almost without exception trust felow EU citizens more than Europeans outside of the 
EU or other nationalities, as the figure below outlines. 
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Demographic variables of an articulated European sense of Belonging - Demographic 
analysis of the Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer data 
demonstrates that: 
1. while currently more men than women feel European, that less recent 
survey material suggests that the sex of the respondent did not 
correlate with nationalism or Europeanism; 
2. there is an above average sense of Europeaness amongst Europe's 
youth; 
3. Europe's late-middle aged and aged population display a higher degree 
of national rather than European identity; 9 
4. a sense of belonging to Europe increases with socio-economic profile; 
more managerial and white collar Europeans, as a percentage of their 
demographic feel European, than the blue collar and manual workers; 
5. education has a significant effect on Europeanism, and national 
identity; Europeans educated to a tertiary level show less national 
patriotism and national pride, and greater acceptance of Europeanism 
and of foreigners from differing ethnic groups; 
6. the size of the community in which an individual inhabits correlates 
with the dimensions of Europeanism and national pride; the smaller the 
community where an individual lives the higher the level of his or her 
national identity and pride; and 
7. consistent results demonstrate that European unemployed feel the least 
European. I ° 
It is significant that while Europeans are less inclined to openly express exclusively 
European identity, they are, as we shall consider later in this study, closely interlinked 
9  
This has been discussed by Haller who concludes that as this demographic has contributed more 
actively to the achievements and the present position of their respective nations, they have a greater 
national identity as a result. That they have; 'invested their lifetime into improving and consolidating 
the situation of their families and often have also participated in semipublic and public life and affairs 
in their neighbourhoods, communes and society as a whole'. Haller, M. 'National Identity and National 
Pride in Comparative Perspective'. Paper presented at the 3rd Conference of the European Sociological 
Association 27-30 August 1997, University of Essex. 
10 
See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49 and Haller, M. 'National 
Identity and National Pride in Comparative Perspective', 22. 
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in dynamic social, economic and political interaction within a common institutional 
framework. Such an interlinking demonstrating the evocation of a common and 
distinctive European identity. 
7.3.3 Colective Consciousness and Self-Description (via a Common Language) 
In Chapter One we established that an element of communal identity is the 
development and display of a common consciousness and colective self-description 
expressed through a common language. In short we found that colective identity 
manifests itself where there is: 
"Group self-perception/ self-consciousness - colective self-awareness as being part 
of a colective, and self-description as a member of the colectivity."1 
Introductory Remarks - Identity can be viewed as being reflexively constituted in two 
key narratives, either ethnic 'nation' or 'civic' society. Included in the case of the 
former are conceptions of exclusivity based in blood, ethnicity and traditions in which 
peoples are linked and colectively describe themselves as common members of an 
enthnolinguistic national community within a given territory. In the case of civic 
identity, colective consciousness is operationalised in terms of a colective sense of 
belonging to a colective of free, right-bearing citizens. Civic identity includes a 
colective confidence in other citizens based on a common participation with the civic 
institutions within a given territory, delineated from others by a particular civic and 
liberal legal and institutional framework. Notwithstanding the different objects of 
these differing conceptions of identity there are two common elements. Firstly 
community, for a communal identity to establish there needs to be a community spirit, 
civic or ethnicaly derived, and secondly a common consciousness amongst the 
colective of a sense of colectivity; the 'us' rather than the 'I'. In this section we shal 
consider the emergence of a colective civic European consciousness as it manifests 
itself in civic terms. We shal consider the detail of European consciousness in the 
folowing manner: 
1. 	 General European civic consciousness; and 
Refer to Chapter One for the definition in ful. 
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2. 	 European youth consciousness. 
Europeans are increasingly aware of the European polity of which they are members; 
the rights and benefits they derive from it and their place within it, and the 
distinctiveness they derive from its unique institutional and policy structure. They 
demonstrate a developing knowledge of its functions and institutions, are aware of its 
importance to them and consider their state's membership of the EU positively. 
Europeans are active in gathering information about the EU and there is evidence that 
they can see the advantages of membership to both them personaly and to their state. 
We suggest that a common European consciousness, insofar as it takes a civic form, 
can be demonstrated in three ways. Firstly Europeans' consciousness and interest in 
their civic rights, secondly Europeans' support for common policy issues and their 
level of support for their state's EU membership. 
European Consciousness and Citizenship  - Citizenship forms the heart of civic 
identity, it is the common thread that binds al members of a political community 
together, to the extent that its constituent elements are valued by Europeans we can 
establish one of the main elements of European civic belonging. 
Europeans demonstrate a strong commitment to, and interest in, the central elements 
of a civic Europe, such a colective sentiment and commitment demonstrates a 
communal European civic identity. Europeans are united in a communal commitment 
to the underpinning's of a civic society; 81% believe that the EU should be active in 
guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy 
in Europe.12 Europeans colectively are commited to action at the pan-European level 
that guarantees peace and security in Europe (89%). Europeans colectively share a 
civic consciousness insofar as they are commited to equal treatment at work (45%), 
the ability to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections (26%).13 Further 
demonstrating a common European civic orientation, 88% of Europeans believe that 
fighting poverty and social exclusion should be a priority of the EU. 
12 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51, 56. 
13 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, 62. 
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A clear indicator of a shared European civic consciousness is provided by the extent 
to which Europeans display knowledge of EU institutions and atribute importance to 
the 'Europeanisation' of policy domains. Europeans are increasingly focusing their 
atention on the common European polity, and its interventionist policy domains for 
the resolution of common European issues, this is suggestive of three phenomenon. 
Firstly the success of the European polity in actively intervening in European political 
economic and social life, secondly it confirms the increased acceptance amongst 
Europeans as to the legitimate role of the EU in their afairs. Thirdly it is an indication 
of a common positive sympathy amongst Europeans towards the European polity. 
Issues considered particularly relevant which have the potential to be instruments in 
the engendering and maintenance of a European identity include common foreign and 
defence policies, and support for curricula relating to the operations of Europe in the 
school curiculum. 
Table 7.1 	 Awareness of EU Institutions 
Question: 	 Have you ever heard of? 




The European Parliament 89 8 
The European Commission 79 17 
The European Central Bank 70 24 
The Court of Justice 63 31 
The Social and Economic 
Commitee 
34 56 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50/51 p.102 
Considering the nature of European support for specific policy domains we find 
widespread commonality of acceptance of the 'Europeanisation' of what were once 
the policy domains of the European sovereign states. 
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Table 7.2 	 National or Joint EU Decision Making? 
Policy Domain % Supporting European 
Union Jurisdiction 
% Supporting Member State 
Jurisdiction 
Foreign Policy 62 23 
Fight Against Drugs 66 30 
Single Curency 61 31 
Fight Against 
Poverty and Social 
Exclusion 
60 35 
Protection of the 
Environment 
55 40 
Immigration Policy 54 39 
Education 29 66 
Source Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 51 p.54 
Historicaly, the growth of interventionist state policy domains has led to an increase 
in national consciousness, as populations become increasingly reliant upon the 
intervention of the polity to provide structural and material support for the community 
at large14. In a similar manner Europeans are colectively welcoming those steps that 
wil heighten European institutionalisation and as a result of such a process are 
displaying a common European consciousness, derived from the key social, political 
and economic functional and structural imperatives- which take a civic form - of the 
European polity.I5 
Europeans are displaying a colective sense of support for common European actions, 
such as the fight against drugs and foreign policy. European citizens are most likely to 
want decision-making to take place colectively at the EU level, including social 
14 See Poggi, G. The Development of the Modem State: A Sociological Introduction (London: 
Hutchinson 1978) 
15  Reinforcing the central role that the institutions are playing in the development of a European 
identity are the results of a Europinion survey which reveals the focus of European maters in voting 
deliberations . In response to the question: 
If you are voting in the general election, wil your views on Europe play a significant part in your 
decision? 
No 	 26.6% 
Yes 	 73.4% 
285 
protection, economic policy, regional aid and protection of the environment. I6 Such a 
convergence of opinion of policy priorities and in the 'Europeanisation' of 
jurisdictions demonstrate the emergence of convergence in European consciousness, 
to the extent that Europeans collectively identify some policy domains as more 
suitably dealt with at the European rather than the national level. 
7.3.4 The Success of Europe and the Evocation of a European Consciousness 
As we considered in Chapter Five, European consciousness is correlated with 
increased financial support from the institutions of the EU. Put simply by Milward 
this means that: "French and German voters, like those in the rest of the Union, offer 
their allegiance to government - national and supranational, by deciding how its 
actions will affect their long-term family-income prospects." I7 The emergence of 
successful European apparatus for economic and political administration and policy 
formulation and implementation can be seen as having parallels to attempts by 
nineteenth century nation-builders to secure 'the government of men by means of the 
administration of things'. I8 The objective of providing the conditions for the exercise 
of government over an enlarging economic and social space has similarities to the 
development of European state formation in earlier periods. States emerged in order 
to provide predictability in the administration of markets, and to provide coherence 
and certainty to security arrangements, from which nations were empowered in order 
to legitimate the apparatus of the state. The convergence of social, economic and 
security policy and apparatus at the elite level has engendered a discernible affection 
and loyalty to Europe and to European institutions as a consequence of its application 
of economic rationality and administrative achievements. 
If we consider the level of support for EC/EU membership in 1973 - and compare it 
with 1998 - we find that those states which have materially benefited more from the 
EU, relative to the size of their domestic economies, are those which exhibit a greater 
16 
Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49, 76. 
17. Milward, A. The Social Bases of Monetary Union? in Gowan, P. and Anderson, P. The 
Question of Europe., 157. 
18 
Rootes, C & Davis, H. Social Change and Political Transformation., 5. 
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increase in level of support for European membership. Of the original nine EEC states 
the level of support for membership has increased in Ireland from 56 to 79%, in the 
Netherlands from 63 to 75% and in Denmark from 42 to 56%. During the period the 
level of financial support granted under EU programs to these states has increased 
rapidly. Whereas in those states which have predominantly funded the integration of 
Europe — most notably France and Germany — the level of support for EU 
membership has significantly declined over the same period. In the case of France 
from 61% support for membership to 52% over the 25 year period, whereas in 
Germany it dropped from 63% to 51%. 1° Further, it is in those states which were 
economically peripheral to Europe, and which have received a proportionally larger 
injection of European funding including Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal where 
their respective populations consider that their states have benefited the most from EU 
membership and where articulated feelings of European identification are higher. 
Considering more recent results, between 1997 and 1998 support for EU membership 
has increased 10% in 12 months across Europe (European average: Spring 1997, 41% 
Spring 1998 51%). Since 1997 support levels had increased in 9 of the 15 member 
states. Increased support for the EU is most pronounced in those states which have 
benefited most from EU financial and social intervention; Italy (an increase of eight 
percent) Portugal (plus seven percent) and Ireland(plus eight percent). 2° This increase 
is attributable to both an increase in confidence in the operations of the single market, 
and as a result of a generalised upturn in European economic conditions. As 
Fullinwider argues: 
"To the extent that individuals find the larger system of institutions permits 
them to achieve their chosen ends and supports their causes, and that it is 
predicated on an unconditional respect for their choices and causes, not on 
19 
Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50, 18. 
20 Analysis reveals that men (56%) are more likely than women (47%) to regard their country's 
membership as a good thing. The longer one is in full time education, the more positive sentiment 
towards membership, More managers than the unemployed, on average, support membership (63% as 
opposed to 43%). Support levels for Europe's youth are higher than those of older Europeans (54% to 
46%). Reinforcing the importance of education as a catalyst to identity formation, the people with a 
greater knowledge of the EU were significantly more likely to regard their country's membership as a 
good thing, when compared to those with a lower knowledge of the EU (65% to 41%) 
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some overriding social goal that their choices just happen to further, they will 
come to value the system as good in itself'21 
7.3.5 European Youth and a Euro_pean Consciousness - The Development of a 
Distinctly European Youth 
It is amongst Europe's youth that the strongest European consciousness is exhibited. 
In response to a poll published in 'The European' newspaper in 1996, 62% of British 
parents surveyed believed that their children would grow up feeling more a part of 
Europe than they (the parents) do. 22 In contrast to their parents, young Europeans are 
demonstrably less resistant to European economic integration, see greater 
opportunities that a single European social space will bring and see little threat to their 
respective national identities (Interestingly only a very small percentage (eight 
percent) of youth in Europe see a supranational Europe as a threat to pre-existing 
cultural diversity or national identity). 23 Resistance to Europe seems to increase with 
age. In 1996 only 28% of the 18-24 age group wanted to leave the European Union, 
compared with over 40% of the total adult population. While in 1996 a narrow 
majority of 18-24 year olds were against the single currency, the resistance rose to 
three-quarters amongst the over 65 year-olds. Anecdotal evidence further suggests 
that it is Europe's youth that forms the vanguard of an inclusive European 
consciousness. According to the Marketing Director of MTV Europe: 
"Young people are more accepting of cultural differences . . . the 
psychological barriers have come down, in mobility, leisure, travel". 24 
Sales of inter-rail cards across Europe, predominantly utilised by students, have risen 
by five percent a year since 1994. In Britain, perhaps the most sceptical European 
state of all, the numbers of students taking A-level German and Spanish have grown 
by 37% and 43% respectively since 1989, demonstrating a growing openness and 
21 Fullinwider R. 'Citizens and Welfare' in Gutmann (ed) Democracy and the Welfare State. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988), 278. 
22. Milne, K 'Europe's MTV generation', New Statesman 13 December 1996, 12. 
23 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, 57. 
24 Nazerali, S. in 'Europe s MTV Generation', 12. 
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awareness of and to Europe from amongst British youth.25 The European Movement 
has an active junior wing, the Young European Movement, which is active in 
integrating a communal European youth consciousness. Its President has stated the 
practical interests of European youth: 
"My experience is that young people are not interested in technical or 
political issues, in whether the European Parliament should have more power, 
they're interested in European languages, school exchanges and the European 
job market."26 
Notwithstanding its support for a common Europe, European youth has proven to be 
highly critical of perceived deficiencies in the process of European 
institutionalisation. More specificaly, the absence of meaningful democratic 
representation and the absence of substantive information on European convergence 
is, as we shal consider here, an inhibiting factor in the emergence of a meaningful 
and enduring European consciousness amongst European youth. 
European Youth Opinions - European Youth is highly consciousness of the positive 
aspects of European integration. When asked to choose a set of features that best 
characterise Europe their choices are weighted towards positive concepts, with the 
folowing aspects featuring most prominently: 
1. 'Go wherever I Like' 	 34.8% 
2. 'A beter future' 	 34.2% 
3. 'A beter economic situation' 	 34.3%27 
Twice as many European youth think that an integrated Europe wil, 'provide more 
employment opportunities (29.9%), than believe that Union wil lead to higher 
26 Hargraves, J. in 'Europe's MTV generation', 12. 
27 htp:/europa.eu.intien/comm/dg22/youth/research/surv-en.html  , p.1 accessed 30 October 
1998. 
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unemployment (14.6%). Associated with the positive aspects of European integration 
is the positive impact that the consolidation of the European polity has had on their 
ability to move across European (internal) borders. When asked about their perception 
of European citizenship most young Europeans stress the notion of mobility. The 
three main issues uniting European youth are: "Being able to work anywhere in the 
Union" (62.4%). Secondly: "Being able to establish oneself anywhere in the Union" 
(51.5%) and thirdly: "Being able to study in any country in the Union" (45.7%). The 
value of pan-European social protection is an important component of a common 
European sympathy, with access to health care and social protection being considered 
as an essential component of European citizenship amongst 34.6% of European 
youth. 28 Importantly European youth do not view further European integration as 
being a threat to pre-existent national identities - questions of employment, mobility 
and rights predominate. 29 
Demonstrating the concept of a communal European youth identity, rooted in civic 
criteria, is the high degree of involvement in European associations or organisations. 
Just over half of Europe's youth belongs to an association, whether politically, 
socially, culturally, artistically religiously or sporting orientated. Further, young 
Europeans are not overtly conscious of ethnic differences based on race religion or 
culture. 48% of European youth say that they feel entirely at ease with peoples of 
another nationality, race, religion or culture or those who display different behaviours 
such as homosexuals, the disabled or the homeless. Young Europeans are more 
interested in Europe as an avenue for greater material, cultural and intellectual 
fulfilment, rather than Europe being an ethnically homogenous fortress. Such a 
phenomenon is consistent with a civic basis of European identification. 
28 European Union 'Young People on the Threshold of the Year 2000' 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg22/youth/research/surv-en.html  accessed 30 October 1998. 
29 Ibid. 
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7.3.6 Self-description via a Common Language3° 
English is the lingua Franca of the European Union: 
"As the twentieth century winds down, English is the closest thing to a world 
language that the earth has ever had."31 
By the end of the year 2000, an estimated one and a half bilion people — a quarter of 
the world's population - wil speak English. For 1.1 bilion of that number English 
wil be a second or third language, functionaly necessary for professional and 
personal life.32 It is paradoxical that while European public policy promotes language 
diversity, Europeans are shifting, in much of their public lives, towards language 
unification.3 Within Europe minority languages receive public support and minority 
language speakers are institutionaly protected.34 Consistent with civic inclusiveness 
European funding ensures that the decline in minority language usage is stemmed, 
whether it is Swedish in Finland, Welsh in the United Kingdom, South Tyrolean in 
Italy or Catalan in Spain. The European polity is actively supporting the linguistic 
minority as a central element of Europe's linguistic diversity within a civic model of 
inclusion. Such a process prevents the political mobilisation of minority language 
groups against Europe as a result of the loss of their language rights. Notwithstanding 
30 The importance of Language as a companion of power and identity is best summarised by the 
Spanish Linguist Nebrija, who, in presenting a Castilian grammar to Queen Isabela of Spain in 1492, 
inscribed in it: 
"Your Majesty, language is a perfect instrument of rule, a means toward external conquest, 
and internal suppression of undesired languages. Language was always a companion of power 
and it wil remain its companion in the future." 
from Hauchler, I. & Kennedy, P. Global Trends: The World Almanac of Development and Peace. 
(New York: The Continuum Publishing Company 1994), 348. 
31 	 . . 	 . British Airways 'Highlife' Magazine May 1992, 102-112. 
32 Geary, J. 'Sowing the Seeds of Speech Time July 7 1997, 55. 
33 While accepting that language is a key ethnic signifier of identity, it is additionaly a vital 
mechanism in the civic mode of identification insofar as it alows for the transfer of civic norms, alows 
for a civic education and forms a point of commonality for civic relationships and transactions. As such 
it is appropriate to consider language as an element in the formation of a common European civic 
identity. 
34 As discussed in Chapter Five, the institutional protection of European languages is a central 
element in the integrative effect of the creation of a civic-based security and rights domain within 
Europe, one which promotes communal identification. 
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linguistic diversity and the elements supporting it, Europe is increasingly dominated 
by English. It is the language of commerce, it is increasingly the language of culture 
and mobility and it is certainly the language of European youth. Languages of nation 
and region remain important signifiers of localised identity, however English is 
increasingly the mesh uniting Europeans and providing a central element of a 
common European identity. 
As Schroder notes, with the exception of Latin, English is probably the only language 
in world history in which those utilising it as a lingua franca outnumbers the number 
of native speakers. 35 Accordingly while European initiatives are focused on creating a 
European multilingual space, Europeans are increasingly conducting themselves in 
English as a unifying European language. 36 
Demonstrating the importance of English, when recently asked, 69% of European 
respondents considered English as the most useful language to know other than their 
mother tongue. With the exception of Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, 
English is the most widely spoken language spoken apart from the respective mother 
tongue in all EU states. 37 Deutsch, amongst others, as we considered earlier, have 
shown the central role of language as a unifying force in the creation of a communal 
identity. 38 
35 Shelley, M. & Winck, M. What is Europe? - Aspects of European Cultural Diversity. (Milton 
Keynes: The Open University 1993), 18. 
36 Take for example the suggestion for foreign-language teaching as found in Article 2 of the 
1954 European Cultural Convention, which states: 
"Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its 
members for the purpose, among others, of safeguarding and realising the ideas and principles 
which are their common heritage, considering that the achievement of this aim would be 
furthered by a greater understanding of one another among the peoples of Europe ..." 
Each Contracting Party shall, insofar as may be possible, 
(a) encourage the study by its own nationals of the languages, history and civilisation of the 
other Contracting Parties and grant facilities to the nationals of those Parties to pursue such 
studies in its territory . .. 
37 French was nominated as the second most useful language to know apart from your mother 
tongue by Europeans. See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 50, 111-113. 
38 See Deutsch, K. Nationalism and Social Communication. and Anderson, B Imagined  
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.  
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English has come to dominate economic, political and increasingly social transactions 
in Europe. Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer surveys 
demonstrate that 51% of European Union citizens report knowing English, 
overshadowing their language competencies in French (42%) and German (33%). 39 
Further the knowledge of English within the EU has grown far faster than for any 
other language group over the last decade. 49 In a quantitative study of the European 
language constellation, De Swaan distinguishes the benefits of learning a language 
that would enable either direct communication (that is, with native speakers of that 
language) or indirect communication (ie, with people who speak it as an auxiliary 
language). The power of English, he found, is in the latter category. De Swaan 
concludes: 
"[In the constellation after the United Kingdom's entry into the European 
Union,] English now was the most attractive single language for outsiders, and 
what is more, the speakers of all other languages in the constellation preferred 
English as an additional language over any other. Since any speaker could 
therefore expect all other language learners in the constellation to prefer 
English, they had every incentive to choose English. Only the English had an 
incentive to learn German or French as their first foreign language, but they 
might refrain from any languages at all, confidently waiting until the rest of 
the constellation had joined them."41 
The central position of English is confirmed by the importance of English learning 
programs in Europe. In a study supported by the European Commission, it was found 
that 83% of secondary school students in the European Union were learning English 
as a foreign language, compared with 32% learning French and 16% learning 
German. 42 Even in a country such as Estonia, which had a German ruling class for 
nearly a millennium, independence from Soviet control has resulted in a shift towards 
English as the language of international communication. In a 1993 survey of 1,454 
Estonian respondents to the question of which language is most important for foreign 
39 Stoneman, 'The Cultural Identities of a European State' Politics and Society September 1997 at 
http://construct.ha I ta.ac.11/-damlelp/soc/la It 1 n.htm, accessed 16 October 1998. 
40 
Across the EU the knowledge of English as a second language has grown from 23% to 31% 
between 1990 and 1998. Whereas knowledge of French has only marginally grown from seven percent 
to eight percent and German from seven percent to eight percent. See Commission of the European 
Communities Eurobarometer 50, 111. 
41 




business contacts, 90% said English and only 7.9% indicated German. 43 Thus even in 
a predominantly German-language European state, English is the dominant second 
language, and the dominant language of politics and trade. Significantly the new 
relative prominence of German in Eastern Europe seriously weakens the role of 
French in wider Europe. A further indicator of the increasing role of English as 
Europe's lingua Franca is found in the dominance of English as the language of 
translation for European books of other languages - in figures released in 1991, 59% 
of Austrian, 64% of Norwegian and 61% of German books translated from their 
respective languages were translated into English. 44 
One of the most convincing indicators of the shift towards English within Europe is 
the fact that Europeans are willing to pay for its acquisition. 'English as a foreign 
language' is a major European industry. The United Kingdom alone earns about 6 
billion pounds annually on language exports. In defence of their own languages, 
according to Coulmas, Germany spends about 450M Deutsche Marks to promote 
German culture overseas, a significant component spent on language, while France 
expends as much as 1.5% of its gross national product on the defence of French. 45 The 
cumulative outcome, paradoxically, is the entrenchment of English, despite the 
national and supranational attempts to promote increasingly minority German and 




Calculations from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1991 quoted in Therborn, G. European 
Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies 1945-2000., 219. 
45 Ibid., 27 
46 
Despite the clear dominance of English as the lingua Franca of Europe, given the sensitivity of 
language as a signifier of local and national identity, the EU has actively sought to promote such 
language groupings. European Union actions to promote state and local languages includes ERAMUS 
and the efforts of the Bureau for Lesser Used European Languages. Accordingly despite the dominance 
of English there is no evidence of any trend away from state languages within member state 
boundaries. In all EU states children learn their national languages first and go to school, in which 
schools remain the principal media of instruction. As Laitin suggests: "Newspapers, TV, leisure-time 
reading, advertising and official local and state services all continue to operate in the state languages." 
Further European commitment to regional and local languages connects speakers of such languages, 
both to prime signifiers of their local identity, but additionally helps upgrade the relevance of and 
loyalty to Europe. Such an outcome the rising role of English, within a context of institutional support 
of, and use of local languages clearly reflects the liberal, pluralist 'civic' ethos of the EU. 
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"People are wiling to pay high personal costs to learn English; they have to be 
bribed to learn French or German. The microeconomic handwriting is on the 
By the year 2000 more than 60% of al peoples in the European Union are expected to 
be doing largely information-orientated work and be connected to the 
internationalised telecommunications net, the principal language of which is English. 
The colapse of the former Eastern European block has brought with it the training of 
an estimated 10,000 English teachers for an estimated 30 milion learners in Eastern 
Europe.48 
English is becoming the dominant language in Europe. English has developed into the 
language with the greatest market value, and dominates the European 
telecommunications market in advertising, telecommunications, information 
technology, entertainment and news media. Further the exponential growth of the 
Information superhighway, European's utilisation of technologies associated with it 
and the fact that English predominates on it, has further entrenched English's 
dominant position. Its hegemony is accelerated by the political and economic 
integration of Europe, which, in accordance with the efficiency paradigm, functions 
best through a common language - English being such a language. 
7.4 	 Chapter 7 — Concluding Remarks 
A General European (Civic) Consciousness - Empirical studies demonstrate that 
Europeans stil feel their national identity to be stronger than their European identity. 
Support for the euro is variable and strongest in those European states where the 
perceived benefits of economic and monetary integration is greatest. Support for 
European policy domains is strongest in fields which, as we have previously 
suggested, offer to secure the rights of Europeans such as European education, the 
fight against crime and the common defence and security policy. While Europeans do 
not feel wel informed on the nature of European integration, a majority of Europeans 
have a good knowledge of their European-derived citizen rights, such as trans-
national work and residency rights. 
47 	 . Laitin, D. 9. 
48  Ibid., 351. 
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European Youth Consciousness  - Europe's youth appears to be at the vanguard of a 
pan-European consciousness. Their knowledge of European affairs is higher than 
those in older age groups, as is their willingness to travel and work across Europe. 
There is an increasing perception that involvement in the EU was a positive 
experience and that they, and their respective states have benefited from such an 
involvement. There is an increasing sentiment that the EU has a role to play in 
traditionally national affairs such as education and consumer law and that the process 
of European unification is a positive one. Europe, for Europe's youth is important 
because it allows for free movement, it means more jobs and an improved economy. 
Very few European youth suggest that trans-European unification will compromise 
pre-existing cultural or political identities. However much of Europe's youth do not 
feel themselves to be sufficiently well informed on matters relating to the European 




European Identity and Shared Values 
(Situational) normative convergence - shared values, ideas and culture, including 
political culture. 
8.1 A Common European Value System 
8.1.1 Introductory Remarks 
European values are at the epicentre of European identity. The development of the 
European polity has only been possible as a consequence of an enduring and 
commonly accepted set of key European values, beliefs and norms. Such normative 
convergence ranging from, at the most prosaic level, a common acceptance of the 
appropriate mechanisms of democratic political processes, to the more abstract, yet no 
less significant core set of civic values relating to individualism, the role of the free 
market and social justice. Further, as this chapter will demonstrate, the spatiality of 
Europe is defined, in part, by the realisation of a distinctively European value set. 
Europe is separated from non-Europe not by ethnicity, language nor custom, but 
primarily by values - essentially civic in nature. 'Europe' is made distinctive as a 
separate entity and a meaningful field of study by both the actualisation of such values 
and by the self-conscious assertion of them by Europeans: An Examination of 
European identity reveals that that which defines Europe is a core set of dominant 
normative civic reference points; the separation of spiritual and temporal powers, the 
allocation of specific rights to individuals and a separate social sphere. Such civic 
values have historically informed Europe and are both shared amongst and acted out 
by, contemporary Europeans. 
The European value system owes much to the unique historical evolution of European 
political economic and social life and has been variously observed. Huntington 
identified European values with the separation of spiritual and temporal power, social 
t Examples of the assertion of European values at the intra-European level includes the struggle 
against fascism in the Second World War, and at the extra-European level, the European support for 
civil rights in the developing world. 
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pluralism and the development of an autonomous civil society. 2 Roberts argues for the 
independence of a broad range of European values, including an innate faith in human 
progress the development of a separate civic culture and a rejection of despotism and 
a unique political ideological framework. 3 The key elements, of the European value 
system are best stated by Meyenberg, who suggests the following five points are 
constitutive of the European value system; 
1. Early on western Christianity began to concentrate on the problems of 
a morality which was to prove itself in this world, not in the next. 
2. Very soon the magical elements of faith were repressed in favour of 
reason as a key to understanding the world. 
3. Early on the contrast between freemen and slaves, Jews and heathens 
were reduced in favour of a society to be formed voluntarily. 
4. A state of awareness developed which brought about the central 
significance of a system of laws delimiting the spheres of the 
individual and society. 
5. A value-orientated relationship towards work developed, which in the 
convents was expressed in terms of the two equally important demands 
made on the monks "ora et labora". 4 
The European civic value set has been played out through European history and has 
been operationalised to differing degrees in different European geographic spheres. 
The Roman papacy, the medieval political order, the Renaissance, the scientific 
revolution, the 'New World' discoveries, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, 
industrialisation and the arrival of the information revolution, have changed Europe 
and had a formative influence on European values, and in turn, European identity. 5 
2 
See Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order. 
3 However he is acutely consciousness of the Asian and African ideas which formed the basis of 
much which we understand as 'European' see: Roberts, J. A History of Europe. (Oxford: Helicon 
Publishing Ltd 1996), 579. 
4 See: Meyenberg, R, 1996 'The Political Identity of Europe as a whole' in http://www.bis.uni- 
oldenburg.de/bisverlag/meyper92/inhalt.html, p.15 accessed 11 June 1998. 
5 The fact that such values have been adopted, to a greater or lesser degree, by other states and 
peoples, might appear to dissipate the 'Europeanness' of such value sets, but as Schlesinger states: 
"The source - the unique source of the ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and cultural freedom . . . These are European ideas, not Asian, not 
African, nor middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption." 
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These influences, which have infused European cultural and political life and 
informed the core civic European values, persist, notwithstanding the encroachments 
of globalised cosmopolitanism. One of the clearest contemporary affirmations of 
European civic values has been made in the 'Document on the European Identity', 
declared at the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973: 
Cf 
. . . a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the 
individual , they are determined to defend the principles of representative 
democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice - . . .and respect for human 
rights. Al these are fundamental elements of the European identity."6 
We ilustrate the central elements of the European civic value set by reference to two 
factors which are: 
1. European human, social and political rights - A commonly shared 
European humanitarianism; and 
2. A common European political culture and political ideology. 
8.2 	 European Human, Social and Political Rights 
The protection of human rights represents a cornerstone of European civic values. The 
European foundation of human, civic and personal rights can be traced back to the 
Magna Carta of 1215 in the English context, and in the French, the Declaration des 
Droits de L'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789.7 The most important contemporary 
expression of the European value set is expressed in the European Convention on 
Human Rights of 1950. The centrality of maters relating to human and civil rights is 
so essentialy Eurocentric, that opposition to the maintenance of such values, by those 
beyond the European hemisphere, is often justified on the basis that it is improper to 
See Schlesinger, A. The Disunity of America (New York: W.W. Norton 1992), 127. 
6 Duparc, C. The European Community and Human Rights (Brussels: Commission of the 
European Communities 1992), 30. It is possible to point to a plethora of other European documents 
which declare the significance of civic values including human rights, liberal participative democracy 
and the value of the social, including the Paris Summit declaration of 1972, the joint Declaration on 
Fundamental Rights 1977 and the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 1989, it is in the 
common defence of such principles, that we are best able to ilustrate the common European value 
system. 
7 Humana, C. World Human Rights Guide. (New York: Oxford University Press 1992), 4. 
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atempt to universalise such rights when they are more properly seen as products of a 
unique and particular Western liberal tradition.8 
The specific European rights to which we refer are diverse, and have evolved over 
time. In the contemporary context our understanding of such civic rights include 
factors such as the freedom to travel, publish and educate, freedom from slavery, 
forced or child labor. It further includes the independence of the media and political 
movements, openness to competing ideologies, equality of the sexes and of religion, 
freedom from state intervention into private affairs and the protection of religious, 
ethnic and linguistic minorities.9 
Such is the abstraction of the free society and the value pluralism that European 
humanitarianism suggests, it is al too easy to talk in platitudes of the rights and 
liberties of societies. We need to familiarise ourselves with both the degree to which 
'individual Europeans hold such values, and the extent to which Europe acts them out 
in order to operationalise and demonstrate a key element in the common European 
identity. 
8.3 	 The Institutionalisation of Human Rights in Europe 
On the fourth of November 1950 the foreign ministers of the member states of the 
Council of Europe met to sign the European convention on Human Rights. Their aim, 
according to Ryssdal was: 
"to lay the foundations for the new Europe which they hoped to build on the 
ruins of a continent ravaged by a fratricidal war of unparaleled atrocity."I° 
The success of that work is readily apparent. The Convention, now simply one of a 
number of such declarations of the centrality of human rights in the 
8 See Haler, M. & Richter, R. Towards a European Nation: Political Trends in Europe East and 
West. Center and Periphery. (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe. 1994) 15f 
9 Human, C. World Rights Guide., 19-22. 
10 Rolv Ryssdal, President of the European Court of Human Rights, speaking on the occasion of 
the fortieth anniversary of the European Convention on 5 November 1990 quoted in Robertson, A & 
Merils J. 1993 Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. P.1 
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institutionalisation of Europe has been reinforced by the work of the European 
Commission and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR, since 
its inception, has shown considerable vigour in its championing of European human 
and rights. It has acted to ensure that the actions of European states, individual 
European citizens and the application of Community law, have been consistent with 
its understanding of basic European rights 
The extent of rights and freedoms guaranteed in the initial ECHR Protocol have 
been significantly extended in the nine Protocols subsequent to it. Increased 
competencies in the field of human rights include such maters as the non-expulsion 
of nationals from states of resident, the right of liberty of movement and residence 
for national members, the prohibition of the colective expulsion of aliens and the 
abolition of capital punishment. 
The extensive case law of the European Court of Human Rights reflects and 
enhances the central position of normative considerations within the European 
polity, and as with the activities of the other arms of the European judiciary, has 
enhanced the supranational qualities of the European polity. I 
8.4 	 European Attitudes on Human, Social and Political Rights 
8.4.1 Respect for Civic Rights and European Racism 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that individual Europeans are united in their strong 
articulation of civic rights, as the data below confirms. 
In December 1990 Europeans were asked by the European Commission to rank 'great 
causes' worth fighting for. The results demonstrate that there is a core set of European 
values that are based in civic qualities, and which do not support ethnic or even 
nationalist aspects. In order of ranking, Europeans considered the folowing causes 
worthy of fighting for: 
i For a detailed examination of the institutionalisation of Human Rights within Contemporary 
Europe see; Robertson, A & Men-ils J. Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1993). 
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1. Human Rights 
2. Peace 
3. Protection of nature 
4. Fight against poverty 
5. Freedom of the individual 
6. Fight against racism 
7. Defence of the country 
8. Defence of religious faith12 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 34, .19. 
It is noteworthy that Europeans considered the physical struggle in protection of either 
their own state, or of their religion — two key features of ethnic identification — to 
have lesser worth when compared with the central civic values of individualism, 
human rights and the struggle against xenophobia. Europeans demonstrably place a 
high value on civic values, humanism, liberalism and the defence of individual rights, 
more so than the articulation of national and ethnic values and pre-dispositions. 
Further demonstrating a convergence of European values, Commission of the 
European Communities Eurobarometer  tested the European respect for particular 
rights and freedoms. As the Table below demonstrates European are united in valuing 
civic elements. 
Table 8.1 	 Responses to Questions on Rights and Freedoms 
Question: 	 For each of the folowing rights and freedoms, could you tel me whether you think they should 
be respected under al circumstances, or whether, this depends upon circumstances? 






The right to education and training 90 8 
The right to live with one's own family 84 13 
The right to legal protection against discrimination 83 12 
The right to housing 83 14 
The right to one's own language and culture 80 17 
Religious liberty and freedom of conscience 79 17 
Freedom of speech 79 18 
The right to vote and be a candidate in political elections 62 32 
Freedom of Association 60 34 
Source Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47, . 65. 
12 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 34. December 1990 
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These results is ilustrative of two points, firstly that the protection and security of 
persons, their property, lifestyles and private religious, political and social 
orientations is a uniting element in the expression of a substantial horizontal fraternity 
amongst Europeans that has substance as wel as symbolism. Secondly, Europeans are 
united in their colective support of civic rights, such as the right of freedom of speech 
and protection against discrimination. Such shared values provide a direct sense of 
community membership to al Europeans based on a common normative position and 
a loyalty to a political cultural and set of European political institutions of which they 
are in common possession, which institutionalised such values and provided security 
of civic rights. 
8.5 	 The Operationalisation of European Human, Social and Political Rights 
While the above data suggests that Europeans share a common civic value system 
with respect to human and social rights, we need to establish if Europeans act on such 
values. We note that the rhetoric of humanitarian values have not always been 
observed. Europeans, notwithstanding the championing of human rights, social 
protection and individualism are condemned never to leave behind the barbarity of 
two world wars, which were European and which, most especialy in the Holocaust, 
opposed the central normative traditions that we propose as being the foundation of 
European identity. 
We can establish to what extent Europeans share in a common civic value system by 
the extent to which they act on the social and humanitarian values that they consider 
important. Utilising data colected as part of the Freedom House survey of human 
rights we find that there is a natural community of Europeans and European states, as 
demonstrated by their respect for political rights, civil liberties and in their relative 
absence of human rights violations. If we first consider those states comprising the 15 
member states of the European Union.I3 
13 The concepts employed are taken from Freedom House: 
Political Rights (PR): Free and fair elections, a major role of the elected parliament in the process of 
political decision-making, open competition between political parties, freedom of association, 
protection of minorities. 
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Table 8.2 	 Human Rights in the Member States of the European Union 
Country PR CL Freedom House Rating GHRV 
Austria 1 1 Free 1 
Belgium 1 2 Free 1 
Denmark 1 1 Free 1 
Ireland 1 1 Free 1 
Finland 1 1 Free 1 
France 1 1 Free 1 
Germany 1 2 Free 1 
U.K. 1 2 Free 2 
Greece 1 3 Free 1 
Italy 1 2 Free 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 Free 1 
Netherlands 1 1 Free 1 
Portugal 1 1 Free 1 
Spain 1 2 Free 2 
Sweden 1 1 Free 1 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1999-00 at htp:/www.freedomhouse.org/ratings.html 
Civil Liberties (CL): Freedom of religion, the press, association and meeting, trade unions; the right to 
property and equality before the law; protection from political teror and from coruption of the 
government. 
Ratings 1 = best, 7 = worst 
Evaluation (weighted from PR and CL ratings): 
"Free" 	 = 1 to 2.5 
"partly free" 	 = 3 to 5.5 
"not free" 	 = 5.5 to 7 
This scale is taken from the Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' report. 
Political Teror Scale - used for assessment of Gross Human Rights Violation Scale. 
Level 1: In countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views. Torture is 
rare or exceptional, political murders are extremely rare. 
Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. Few persons are 
afected, torture and beating are exceptional, political murder is rare. 
Level 3. There is or recently was extensive political imprisonment. Execution or other political murders 
and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is 
accepted. 
Level 4. The practices of level three are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances. and 
torture is a common part of life. The teror afects primarily those who are interested in politics or 
ideas. 
Level 5:The terors of level four have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these 




It is important to note the strength of the convergence of human rights observance 
amongst those states which comprise the EU. This, we argue, demonstrates the unity 
and commonality of the populations of the EU states. Further it suggests the 
alignment between institutional convergence and normative convergence; as 
European states have institutionally aligned they have moved to share in common 
normative reference points. 
We can compare the normative alignment amongst EU states with the observance of 
human rights within other states within the Western and central European hemisphere: 
Table 8.3 Human Rights in Europe (Excluding EU States and Those Which 
Succeeded the Soviet Union) 
Country PR CL Freedom House Rating GHRV 
Croatia 4 4 Part Free N/A 
Czech Republic 1 2 Free 1 
Finland 1 1 Free 1 
Hungary 1 2 Free 1 
Iceland 1 1 Free 1 
Norway 1 1 Free 1 
Poland 1 2 Free 1 
Turkey 4 5 Part Free N/A 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1999-00 at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings.html 
There is a broad normative convergence amongst these states, with the exception of 
Turkey, suggesting that they are common participants in the European value set. Such 
a community of Europeans, within a normative framework, can be readily 
distinguished from those states that succeeded the former Soviet Union where the 
adherence to a common normative framework is lacking. 
304 
305 
Table 8.4 Human Rights in the States that Succeeded the Soviet Union 
Country PR CL Freedom House 
Rating 
GHRV 
Armenia 4 4 Part Free N/A 
Azerbaijan 6 6 Part Free N/A 
Belarus 6 4 Not Free N/A 
Estonia 1 2 Free 1 
Georgia 3 4 Part Free N/A 
Kazakhstan 6 5 Not Free N/A 
Kyrgyz Rep 5 5 Part Free N/A 
Latvia 1 2 Part Free 2 
Lithuania 1 2 Part Free 2 
Moldova 5 5 Part Free N/A 
Russia 4 5 Part Free N/A 
Tajikistan 6 6 Not Free N/A 
Turkmenistan 7 7 Not Free N/A 
Ukraine 3 4 Part Free N/A 
Uzbekistan 7 6 Not Free N/A 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 1999-00 at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings.html  
We find that respect for human and social rights is not only a core European value but 
it is broadly operationalised. Positive European sentiment regarding human and social 
rights is linked to their protection. The common maintenance of political rights, civil 
liberties and the avoidance of human rights violations are demonstrated by the 
majority of Europeans and reflect their shared values and beliefs and thus their 
common solidarity and identity. However the clear schism in behaviours between east 
and Western Europe, notwithstanding the end of the cold war divide, remains. 14 
14 As suggested above, to the extent that there have been occurrences of Human rights violations 
in certain territorial elements of Europe we can configure a European normative spatiality, with 
definitive boundaries. Actions which have had the effect of decisively altering and defining the 
frontiers of the European normative space during the 1990's include the folowing; 
I. 	 Extrajudicial executions or possible extrajudicial executions by government forces or 
their agents in at least nine eastern and southern European countries including 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Russian Federation and Turkey. 
2. Torture or il-treatment, including rape, took place in at least 33 European countries 
including Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
3. Prisoners of Conscience - several hundred prisoners of conscience were held in 17 
European States including Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Greece, Russian 




The example of Kosovo provides not only the best (or worse) example of the enduring 
tension between ethnic and civic identification in contemporary Europe, but more 
significantly is evidence of a common European value set. 
That the European polity, with the support of its population, has been actively 
involved in the defence of civic conceptions of community and identity in Kosovo is 
highly suggestive of the vitality of a common European normative set. The European 
intervention to effectively control ethnic preconceptions of community and identity 
advancing unchecked provides not only a clear spatial divide between (civic) Europe 
and the ethnic other, but demonstrates a fully developed sphere of European 
identification along civic criteria. The support for the defence of civic notions of 
community is significant, and provides evidence of a communal European civic 
orientation. 
Table 8.5 Percentage of Europeans Supportive of NATO Actions Against 
Serbian Forces in Kosovo  
State Percentage Level of Support 





Czech Republic 57 
Source:: "NATO, Defence and the War" The Economist April 24 1999, p.54. 
Such can be contrasted with the opposition to such military intervention amongst the 
Russian population - 94% against and in the Ukraine - 89%. 15 
4. Death Penalty at least 471 executions were carried out in nine European countries; 
Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
5. Rape, institutional denial of basic civic and social rights, executions and forced 
relocations associated with the Serbian 'Ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo. 
Further instances include the detention of opposition activists in Albania in the run-up to the May 1997 
elections, The attacks on displaced peoples and refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the imprisonment of 
conscientious objectors and their torture and ill-treatment in the Russian Federation and the torture and 
ill-treatment of peoples by police in Bulgaria, act to construct the boundaries of a normative map of 
Europe. For a more detailed analysis see Amnesty International 1997 Annual Report at 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar97/stats.html   
15 
Angus Reid Group www.angusreid.com/studies/pr990422_2.html  accessed 4 May 1999. It is 
important to note, as Table 8.5 demonstrates, that the percentage of Europeans supportive of NATO 
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The level of support for military action expressed within Western European states is 
both a reflection of a common European wilingness to defend Kosovo, but more 
significantly, given the clear ethnic basis of the conflict, it is a demonstration of a 
cohesive form civic community, within western Europe. 16  
8.6 	 European Humanitarianism - Concluding Remarks 
Not only are (West) Europeans united in their respect for human rights they act on 
their convictions. 
While the centrality of humanitarianism and civic rights as a indicator of a shared 
European identity cannot be overemphasised, the elaboration of such rights are 
circumscribed. The European normative hemisphere is not unified. Southern and 
Eastern Europe have proven to be less capable of displaying the behaviour necessary 
for the ful operationalisation of the European humanitarian value set. Whereas those 
states in the Western hemisphere appear to have upheld humanitarian values, those 
states within Eastern Europe, notwithstanding the political liberalisation folowing the 
end of the Cold War, have not adopted and implemented the normative framework 
typicaly characterised as being central to the European identity. 
The European normative landscape continues to reflect the ideological spit imposed 
upon it as a result of the cold war. Western European counties have democratic 
governments, alow adequate representation of al ethnic groups and alow for 
freedom of expression, association and petition. Further the West's press, while 
increasingly centralised, is free from government controls. Notionaly western 
Europeans have a court independent of the national courts, which has direct effect 
upon them and their citizen bodies. 
actions against Serbian forces in Kosovo does show considerable variation, even amongst European 
states with a 'Civic' orientation. 
16 Such figures are impressive especialy in the context of a rising tide of European anti-
militarism, as evidenced in the European desire to reduce the size of their military forces, with support 
for defence spending cuts at 33% in France, 29% in Germany, and 34% in Italy. See The Economist 
April 24 1999 54. 
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8.7 	 A Common European Political Culture and a Common Political Ideology 
The forms of European political association, the preferences for democratic political 
regimes, the trust shown in political actors and institutions and the value placed on 
citizenship are al informed by, and form the basis of, a distinctive European political 
culture, which is an element of European civic identity.I7 Within contemporary 
Europe, there exists a strongly democratic, pluralist and inclusive political culture. 
Such a culture is demonstrably consistent with civic rather than ethnic forms of 
communal European identification, as it connects Europeans together on the basis of a 
stable, inclusive and right-bearing series of political ideas and aspirations. 18 Let us 
consider the elements of the common European political culture. 
8.7.1 A European Liberal Democratic Political System 
We have observed earlier that one of the defining characteristics of Europe and 
European modernisation has been the development of an ideology centred on the 
discourses of liberalism, individualism and popular participation in the social contract. 
In short, the development of a common political culture within a state-transcendent 
European civic society. Further to this ideological discourse has been the practical 
implementation of liberal democratic political regimes and institutions throughout 
Europe, albeit at difering periods, and with varying degrees of success. 
The modern age was established by the uniquely European axiom (of the French 
Revolution) 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity'. This phrase signifies not only three values 
cherished by Europeans, but in part, define Europe itself. The historical 
17 Almond and Verba define Political culture as: "a systematic structure of values and controling 
guidelines for political behaviour." while Budge and Newton define it as: "the whole mass of shared 
atitudes, amongst a given population, towards political authorities, law and government." See Almond, 
G. and Verba, S. The Civic Culture: Political Atitudes and Democracy in Five Nations — An Analytic  
Study .(Boston: Litle Brown 1965). and Budge, I & Newton, K. et al 1997 The Politics of the New 
Europe. (Essex: Addison Wesley Longman Limited 1997), 123. 
18 The actions taken by the states of the EU to exclude and ostracise Austria as a result of the 
involvement in the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) in a coalition Government is a clear demonstration 
of the significance of a common European political culture and the wilingness of Europeans to exclude 
those who appear to compromise Europe's civic democratic and tolerant political culture. As the 
Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guteres said: "A whole range of values which underpin our 
civilisation are at stake. We wil pay maximum atention to the actions of the Austrian Government." 
See Kitney, G. 'Austria facing Isolation' The Age World, 5 February 2000, 19. 
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implementation of these principles, often through revolution, largely defined the 
beginnings of a unified European normative space, which alowed for efective social 
and economic convergence. The principle of social organisation that alows for a 
division between civil and political society, the freedom of the marketplace, and the 
realisation of the individuals choices within a communal seting generated a unique 
European society, a uniquely European set of social and political rights, and a 
communal bond uniting Europeans.I9 
While it is not our intention to exhaustively map-out a typology of European civic 
values and their related institutional forms, we can refer to a set of factors that reveal 
the significant aspects of European political theory, these being: 
I. 	 Individual liberty is the paramount value; 
2. Equality and fraternity are important but secondary values; 
3. Spontaneous alocation of resources, markets and free exchange; 
4. Social transactions and cultural configurations should develop 
organicaly, without state involvement: the advent of a civil society; 
5. Political action should be both representative and inclusive; 
6. Political mobilisation and political preferences should be voluntary; 
7. The purpose of the state is limited to physical security and to assist 
individuals to maximise their control over property and income; and 
8. The state is the servant of the citizen. 
An examination of European values, and their manifestation demonstrates the shape 
and frontiers of a European normative landscape, and the nature of European civic 
identity. We suggest the folowing evidence demonstrates a common European civic 
political culture. 
19 	 . Kitschelt, H. The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 9. 
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8.7.2 Empirical Level of Support for the European Political Culture. 
To the extent that Europeans respect and uphold the liberal, participative European 
political values, it is possible to argue for a common European political culture, civic 
in nature, which is indicative of a common European identity and which unites 
Europeans as part of a common political community. 
Figure 8.1 	 Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union 
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Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 47 & 48. 
Perhaps the simplest and most important empirical verification of a common 
European civic culture is satisfaction with the cornerstone of such a culture - 
democracy. 
Europeans are united in their opinion that democracy is the most legitimate basis of 
government. No less than 93% of Europeans expressed this opinion in every member 
state of the European community in 1998.20 This level of unanimity is significant 
given the late modern colective dissatisfaction with democratic practice. 
20 Cited . Ci n Budge, I & Newton et al The Politics of the New Europe., 130. It is important to note 
that while Europeans are united in their support for democracy, large elements amongst the population 




Considering European's long-term satisfaction with democracy, over the last 25 years 
satisfaction with democracy has remained consistently high, with the exception of the 
period 1990 - 1993 when satisfaction with democracy fell in all EU states. 21 This 
period paralleled an episode of economic decline for many advanced industrialised 
states and was associated with the rise in support for more extremist far-right and anti-
democratic political influences in Europe. 22 
In contrast to the experiences of individual advanced industrialised states where the 
late modern 'crisis of democracy' has resulted in large sections of populations losing 
faith confidence in the institutions and practices of participative democracy, the pan-
European experience runs contrary to this trend, notwitstanding the fact that 
Europeans are less overt in their feelings of national pride and allegiance when 
compared with other nationalities. 23 This has reflected an enduring commitment to, 
and common participation in a distinct European political culture.24 Notwithstanding 
that the level of satisfaction with democracy fluctuates between individual European 
states, there has been a two to three percent increase in satisfaction over the period 
1976 to 1991 across the whole of Europe, with pan-European democratic practice. 25 
21 
Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 20 th Anniversary Trends 1974-  
1993, 34-36. 
22 
See Grover, A. 'A Generic Fascism: Towards an integrated Typology of the casual elements of 
Fascism and Neo-Fascism. 
23 
We observe that the development of European identity is particularly significant in the context 
of Europeans having a lower overall sense of communal identification than other political 
communities. While the United States stands out as the state with the highest level of national pride 
amongst its citizens (83% of respondents are proud or very proud of their country) Europeans, by 
contrast are far less demonstrable about their own level of national identity, and as Haller argues, 
confirming the earlier findings of Dalton, Europeans are less likely to overtly demonstrate a form of 
communal, supranational identification. Accordingly the relative position that European identity holds 
in the consciousness of Europeans is significant given the cultural predilection amongst a large number 
of Europeans to articulate only limited national, let alone supranational, identification. See: Haller, M. 
National Identity and National Pride in Comparative Perspective Paper presented at the 3 rd Conference 
of the European Sociological Association 27-30 August 1997, University of Essex., 25 and Dalton, R. 
Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, 
Great Britain, West Germany and France., 237. 
24 
See Dalton, R. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in 
the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and France. 
25 
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Further, evidence suggests Europeans have almost as much confidence in democracy 
in the European Union as they do in their national democracies, which in the context 
of the institutional retardants of European identification, such as the democratic 
deficit and the perceived remoteness of European political elites and institutions, is a 
notable achievement. Demonstrating the strength of communal civic identity in 
Europe. The figure below demonstrates the increasing resilience of Europeans' 
satisfaction with pan-European democracy. 
Figure 8.2 	 Satisfaction With European and National Democracy 
Level of Satisfaction 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer No's 43-49 
8.8 	 Unwilingness to take Non-Democratic Action or to Engage  in Political 
Violence 
Further evidence of a communal civic identity is the colective European 
unwilingness to take revolutionary non-democratic action or to engage in political 
violence (action which we suggest is contrary to the prevailing European political 
culture). An analysis of the Commission of the European Communities 
Eurobarometer  series demonstrates that, since 1976, not more than 8 percent, (and 
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usually only between 5 and 6 percent) of Europeans would act in an undemocratic 
manner. Between 55 and 70% of Europeans prefer democratic reform rather than 
revolutionary change. 26 There is evidence suggesting a correlation between economic 
performance and satisfaction with democracy in Europe. Those advocating 
revolutionary change totalled 8 percent in 1976, at a time of increasing European 
economic slow down, while the figure dropped to four percent in 1990 just prior to 
the end of a period of sustained economic growth in Europe. It would appear that 
Europeans are both increasingly satisfied with democracy and increasingly less likely 
to take radical action to undermine it. 
8.8.1 (The Absence of) European Political Violence 
As we observed in Chapter Five, the realisation of the purposelessness of intra-
European war, and the enormous physical cost of it, led European states to realise that 
they had more in common as a community than they had apart. Close institutional 
engagement and common political structures enhanced the common European 
interests of peace, security and individual prosperity. 
In the context of both the common agreement to engage politically, and the 
establishment of the machinery for such engagement, Europe has become more 
pacific. Acts of political violence between European states have become exceptional. 
8.8.2 European Political Violence - Between the States 
The one and a half generations that were born in the period immediately following the 
end of the Second World War were born into an environment of unprecedented threat 
of political violence between two superpowers, who were in effect utilising Europe as 
the most suitable potential battleground. While the threat of total violence between the 
two superpowers was never realised, the polarisation of enmity between the two, had 
the effect of cementing a posture of extreme political violence between two clusters of 
European states. While there were instances of the Cold War deteriorating, such as the 
Berlin airlift and the Czech uprising, there was no major conflict between the two 
26 Ibid., 131. 
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European groupings within the forty-five year period. Likewise within the two 
hemispheres of European states, most especially when contrasted with their historical 
antagonisms and violence, there was a negligible level of inter-state political violence. 
The situation at the end of the Cold War did not differ significantly in the West, while 
Eastern Europe saw a high degree of violence between the States of the Russian 
federation as demonstrated in Russia's war in Chechnya. 
8.8.3 European Political Violence - Within the State 
While Political violence between European states is relatively uncommon, the level of 
political violence within political states has, at least until recent times been far more 
pronounced. Between the mid-sixties and the mid-80's four European states have 
experienced profound levels of anti-state political violence. In Spain the Basque 
movement, In Italy the left-wing terrorist movement, In west Germany the Red 
Brigade, and in Northern Ireland the struggle between the British state and the Irish 
Republican Army. 
While the Spanish have, in common with other Western European states, the right to 
change their governments democratically, they are not constitutionally free to reject 
the system and nature of national governance itself. Determination for political 
autonomy, reflecting pre-existing ethno-linguistic and cultural, has been resisted by 
the Spanish state resulting in considerable political violence. Basque separatism is a 
serious source of Spanish, and European political violence. ETA (the Basque acronym 
for Land and Liberty) has carried out terrorist attacks for many years, and over 700 
people have died in ETA attacks since 1968 27 The Italian and German experience 
with the extreme left - the Red Brigade, has been no less violent. In Italy extreme 
terrorist activity aimed at splintering mainstream political activities, and 
destabilisation of the apparatus of the state was most widespread in the 1970s, 
however insurgent activities continue. The most recent example of extremist violence 
was the bombing of the Uffizi Gallery in May 1994, resulting in six deaths and the 
destruction of cultural artefacts, and the July bombings in Rome and Milan reveal the 
27 Freedom House. Freedom in The World. 1993-94, 511. 
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ongoing role of political violence in Italy. 28 Further the experience with the extreme 
right in Germany and to a lesser extent Italy has revealed a constant level of 
politically inspired crimes including fire-bombing against immigrant's 
accommodation, murder, and other racially motivated attacks, which, in the case of 
Germany registered a total of 2,366 attacks in 1992. The idealism struggle with 
entrenched corruption, and the prominent, if not pivotal position of the Mafia in 
Italian political and economic life, and the attempts made to dislodge it, have led to 
graphic, infamous and bloody acts of political violence. The shift to the right 
politically in both Germany and Italy, at least until the late 1990's reveals a degree of 
intolerance of existing pluralist, and pacific political practices, and a willingness, 
albeit from amongst minorities within the respective populations, to condone political 
violence. 
More recently developments such as the rise of the Revolutionary Organisation '17 
November' in Greece, and the Kurdistan Worker's Party in Turkey, demonstrate the 
willingness of terrorist organisations to take action against European states. The joint 
developments of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, and the struggle within the states of 
the former Soviet Union are blunt and powerful reminders of the dramatic effect of 
political violence when inflicted upon a population by others within its community It 
contrasts with the relative calm and absence of political violence within the western 
European political hemisphere. 
8.8.4 Political Violence - Aimed at the European Supranation 
Surprisingly, given the scope of European integration, and the general level of societal 
insecurity associated with late modernity, there has been little political violence 
directed at the persons or institutions of the European supranation. As the origin of 
much of European political violence is associated with attempts to secure political and 
cultural self-determination for minority groups within pre-existent European states, 
the European Union has been viewed ambivalently by such groups. On one hand, the 
EU has intentionally created the conditions within its boundaries for the promotion of 
regional and local identities, and thus is implicitly sympathetic to the broad aims, if 
28 Freedom House., Freedom in The World. 1993-94 325. 
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not the means of many of Europe's separatist organisations. On the other hand, the EU 
is considered by some movements as a further layer of political opposition denying 
the opportunity for radical and substantial political reformation in Europe. Thus while 
the Basque movement is sympathetic to the EU, organisations such as the Greek 17 
November organisation are firmly anti-European, anti-NATO and have taken action 
since 1990 to target EU facilities in Greece for physical atack.29 Interestingly, while 
Europeans appear far less interested in the utilisation of political violence at the 
supranational level, the degree of violence aimed at the state itself has increased, as 
manifested in the rise of terorism and civil conflict in the post cold-war period. 
8.9 	 European Support for Individualism. 
A further test of a common European civic identity is European's support for 
individualism — a cornerstone of al civic polities. Evidence demonstrates that the 
civic values of individualism and individual self-development are valued highly by 
Europeans. We earlier considered the greater wilingness of Europeans to fight for 
"human rights" and the "freedom of the individual" rather than for the state or 
religion. Demonstrating the colective importance placed on the individual within 
European society are results of further Commission of the European Communities 
Eurobarometer  surveys. When surveyed, 87% of Europeans feel it important to 
'discover new things about themselves' and 79% feel it 'important to put more time 
and effort into their own personal development'. A comparison of the country results 
ilustrates that discovering new things about oneself is considered particularly 
important in Portugal (89%), Greece and Spain (both 85%). The Spanish are also 
most likely, together with the Italians, to value the importance of puting more time 
and efort into their own personal development.30 While individualism is important to 
Europeans so too is the respect for other individuals in civil society. The European 
Union's Continuous Tracking Survey (CTS) suggests the importance of societal 
protection.31 Europeans are very interested in their felow citizens with more than 9 in 
29 Political Terorism Database: A world wide web database on political terorism and violence 
htp:/pol 1 sci.hime.mindspring.com/ptd_europe.html, p.4 accessed 7 February 1999. 
30 Ibid., 6-9. 
31 See Europinion #13,November 1997 'Results of 'Continuous Tracking' surveys of European 
Opinion (September and October 1997) at htp:/europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg10/infcom/epo/eo/eol3/13-  
txt en.html, accessed 30 October 1998. 
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10 feeling that it is 'extremely or 'very' important to help others and to value people 
for who they are. Further, more than 8 in 10 Europeans believe it is important to be 
involved in creating a beter society. These core values are held fairly uniformly 
across Europe.32 
The perceived role of women in society is also ilustrative of a communal liberal 
European political culture, most especialy in northern Europe. Only 25% of 
Europeans agree 'that a husband's job is to earn the money and a wife's job is to look 
after the home'. Interestingly patriarchal values are most prominent at Europe's 
teritorial periphery in Greece (88%) and the least common in the Netherlands (53%), 
Denmark (58%) and Sweden (59%)•3 
If we consider Europeans' confidence in public institutions we see that while there 
has been a decline in some, Europeans stil have confidence in the major institutions 
that make up the institutions of the European political community, such confidence 
reflecting a common European civic political culture. 
32 The figures ranged as folows: 
Importance of Helping other people: 	 Highest - Ireland (98%), lowest - France (92%) 
Importance of Valuing People for who they are: Highest - Greece (96%); lowest France - (88%) 
Importance of being involved in creating a better Society: Highest Portugal - (93%), lowest Denmark - 
(76%) 	 Source Europinion #13 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/ 
33 The figures ranged from: 
'I want a world where people live by traditional values' 
Highest Greece (88%), lowest Netherlands (52%). 
'We'd [be] better off if we returned to our traditional ways of doing things' 
Highest Greece (71%) Lowest Denmark (27%) 
'A Husbands Job is to earn the money and a wife's job is to look after the home' 
Highest Portugal (44%); lowest, Denmark (13%) 
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Figure 8.3 	 Confidence in Major Institutions 
Source: European Value Studies cited in Newton & Budge The Politics of The New Europe 127. 
The liberal, pluralist basis of European political culture is an important supportive 
measure of a pan-European civic identity. As Europeans have endorsed a liberal 
democratic system of governance they have implicitly introduced a system of identity 
preferences. At the pinnacle of such a hierarchy of identity, at least in the public 
sphere, is their identification as citizens; European citizens. European's self-
understanding, in the political context, is more shaped by the prevailing norms of the 
liberal European political culture than they are by their identities as members of 
communities or families distinguished by ethnic, class and religious perspective. 
8.10 Tolerance of Other Ethnic and Racial Groups 
Europeans are not only bound together as a result of the communality created by a 
commonly held civic democratic pluralism within their political culture and political 
institutions, but also they further operationalise it. This is demonstrated in the 
tolerance Europeans display of other ethnic and racial groups. Survey data conducted 
by the EU suggests that 83% of those people surveyed were accepting of people of 
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other ethnic groups (with 13% not being accepting) while 81% were accepting of 
people of another race (while 15% were not accepting of other racial groups). 34 While 
there is some resistance to the 'other', as we shall consider later in this Thesis, its 
basis can be found in economic and security grounds, not ethnic. 
8.11 A European Political Ideology 
The endorsement and support of a common European civic political ideology, rooted 
in a common European political culture, is rapidly manifesting itself in contemporary 
Europe. It demonstrates Europe and Europeans as distinctive, and both reflects and 
promotes a European communal civic identity. 
A general European political ideology can be distinguished from a more general 
European political culture by its enhanced clarity and its greater articulation into 
practical political activity. As Dowse and Hughes suggest, political ideology contains 
a set of political values, states to be desired and, if possible striven for and 
maintained. 35 It is from such an ideology, and the political values that sustains it, that 
core decisions and choices are taken as to the nature of political life, the scope and 
emphasis of public, social and economic policy and the role of individuals and 
collectivities within it. 
As Effrat argues, the adoption of societal and political values into a broad political 
ideology has the effect of reflecting a specific cluster of values and assumptions about 
the relationship between the individual and the group. Further it brings about a 
generalised conformity to collective social and political norms and the allocation and 
acceptance of roles and tasks within the society based upon such codified values. 36 
A political ideology specifies the desirable end states of a political society and the 
methods of achieving them. It is rooted in a cluster of communal norms on the basis 
of human behaviour, motivation and of the constitution of a desired community. A 
34 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48, Figure 6.3, 72. 
35 Dowse, R. & Hughes, J. Political Sociology. (London: John Wiley & sons 1972), 243. 
36 
Effrat, A. 1972 'Power to the Paradigms: An Editorial Introduction in Effrat A. Perspective in 
Political Sociology. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc 1972), 3-33, 26. 
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communal political ideology is capable of provoking communal action and is central 
to the allocation of specific roles to individuals and organisations within society. 37 In 
short, a coherent and collectively adopted political ideology is highly suggestive of a 
communal identity. 
8.1 1.1 A Distinctive European Political Ideology 
The Left/Right cleavage in European politics is rapidly diminishing revealing a 
political and ideological landscape characterised by an emergent common ideological 
framework. In Western Europe, at both the national and supranational level, there 
appears to be a convergence of community expectations and values of the political 
system and the outcomes it produces. Such a convergence has been assisted by the 
process of European institutional and functional convergence. The internal market 
program, economic and monetary union, not only establish the means by which the 
European market should be organised, but additionally reflect a European normative 
position on the role of the market in European society. Likewise the European 
cohesion program and the development of a Social and a Citizens' Europe at an 
institutional level, are in part reflecting the expectations and values of Europeans. At 
the national level, the success of centre-left political parties supporting a relatively 
homogenous cluster of policy reflects and demonstrates an emergent communal and 
distinctly European political ideology. Such parties advocate a common set of policies 
including support for a strong deregulated marketplace, strong social intervention and 
environmental protection. This not only reflects the political preferences of Europeans 
but also reveals a unique and increasingly uniform convergence of European values in 
the political, social, and economic spheres. 38 
38 There is a clear tension between the neo-functionalist and neo-institutionalist viewpoint of the 
role of European institutions to either create or reflect a common European normative position 
We have earlier observed that neo-functionalists emphasise the importance of institutions in causing 
actors to develop new perspective and definitions of the social and political situation leading to a 
heightened level of co-operation and mutual understanding. Achieving the socialisation of Europeans 
through the process of integration and accommodation. (see Bulmer 1994, 1997 Pollack 1996) 
While neo-functionalists consider political institutions and policy dimensions as capable of socialising 
political actors, neo-institutionalists emphasise the incapacity of institutions to shape the values, 
attitudes and political orientations of social actors. Thus given the diversity of institutional settings to 
which political actors belong it could be that various institutions affect values and orientations in 
differing ways at differing rates. 
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8.11.2 The Manifestation of a Common European Political Ideology 
In 12 of the 15 Member states of the European Union, Socialist, Social Democratic 
and labour parties hold Government. 39 Such an occurrence is a clear reflection of an 
emergent common European (political) ideology based in a common value system 
and an important constituent part of a common form of European identification. In 
short Europeans, sharing the common values of humanitarianism, social democracy 
and social protection, are identifying with and supporting those political parties which 
reflect and institutionalise such values. 40 Let us consider in detail the elements of this 
ideology. 
8.11.3 Constituent Parts of the European Political Ideology 
Specific components of European political culture are demonstrated in the policy 
, 
manifestos of the successful parties of the centre-left. The elements include those 
39 
The constellation of the European centre-left Governments is comprehensive, as the table 
below details: 
County Main Party Coalition Partner(s) 
Belgium Socialists Liberal, Green 
United Kingdom Labour None 
Denmark Social Democrats Radical 
Finland Social Democrats Various 
France Socialists None 
Germany Social Democrats Greens 
Greece Socialists None 
Italy Democrats of the Left Greens/Socialists 
Luxembourg Social Democrats Christian Democrats 
Netherlands Labour Liberal & Democratic 
Portugal Socialists None 
Sweden Social Democrats Left/Greens 
Source:  Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand. email Grover/Hunter 
4 August 2000 
40 
The 'Citizens' Revolt' in Italy is further suggestive of the embracing of political liberalism, By 
the mid 1990s Italians, sick of both political and Mafia corruption demonstrated both their 'republican 
virtue' and the 'responsibilities of citizenship'. In 1992 Italian voters indicated in a referendum that 
they had 'had enough of a system in which the spoils of patronage had come to eclipse governance 
almost entirely' The vote with a 77% turnout represented 'a shocking indictment of the political class 
and the political system that have controlled Italy for almost half a century, observed the Economist. 
This represents a clear endorsement, by members of perhaps the most corrupted political culture in 
Europe, of the embracing of political and financial reform. Italians in rejecting the traditional political 
parties have openly proclaimed their allegiance to the north-European social democratic values. 
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detailed below. They are taken from the German Social Democrats (SPD), the Dutch 
PvdA and the British Labour Party, parties emblematic of the European Centre-Left. 4I 
1. A strong Economy with a increased focus on both job and wealth 
creation; (SPD) /A commitment to a strong private market, but strict 
controls and review over privatised public assets (British Labour Party) 
/participation in the international market with a secure social-economic 
dimension (Dutch PvdA); 
2. Strong labour market intervention, including labour market regulation 
and the creation of service jobs in the public sector (SPD) / Industrial 
democracy, including worker participation, in a deregulated labour 
market (British Labour Party) / minimum standards for working 
conditions, social security and equal rights for men and women (Dutch 
PvdA); 
3. The strengthening of consumer rights (SPD); 
4. Increase in levels of social protection including, affordable health, the 
security of pensions, family and child benefits in the context of 
lowering of gross government outlays on such protection and the 
replacement of social protection by employment (SPD) / Commitment 
to social protection, including signing of the European Social Charter, 
improvements to childcare and a 'New Deal' to improve the 
employability of the young unemployed and welfare reform, 'based on 
the principle of work for those who can and security for those who 
cannot'. (British Labour Party) Tax advantages and better social 
security for 'flex' workers (Dutch PvdA); 
5. The repositioning of the state 'as a partner in a free citizens society' 
including enhanced democratic participation for the public (SPD); 
6. The control of immigration in a 'social way' (SPD); 
7. A strong commitment to the fight against crime and enhancements to 
the judiciary and punishment (SPD)/ Strong Focus on 'zero tolerance' 
policing as part of a new 'Crime and Disorder Bill' and the banning of 
all handguns (British Labour Party); 
8. A focus on ecological regulation and protection (SPD) and 
9. Shaping Europe as a citizens' space, focusing on employment and 
social justice. (SPD/British Labour Party) 
41 The elements are taken from the German SPD Manifesto (SPD Manifesto for the 1998 General 
Election at http://www.spd.de/enzlish/congress/index m.htm accessed 12 October 1998, The Dutch 
Pvda home page at http://www.pvda.nl/partij/isibuitbel.html  accessed 10 January 2000 and the British 
Labour Party Briefing Papers; Labor Party Documents 'Delivering' and 'Weekly Brief- 24 December 
1998 and 26 November 1998 at http://www.labour.org.uk/core.html and 
http://www.labour.org.uk/views/ltems/00000027.html  accessed 19 January 1999. 
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The revised European political culture, of which the German and British examples are 
the most notable, is reflective of the particularly European ideology of the 'Third 
Way' 42 
Notwithstanding the difficulty in achieving practical implementation of certain 
elements of these platforms, the broad electoral success of European parties 
professing such values demonstrate their centrality, and the political ideology that 
champions them, to a majority of the European voting public. Further it demonstrates 
a distinctively European conceptualisation of Europeaness due to a common political 
ideology and value set.43 
8.11.4 A European Political Ideology - Concluding Remarks 
Political ideology can be understood as the compartmentalisation and legitimisation of 
societal values, based upon a preconceived notion of human behaviour and societal 
motivation, which, based upon general societal conformity, results in the allocation of 
tasks and resources within a society. It is a symbolic link between political elites and 
42 
The Third Way evades specific definition but contains various elements including: 
1. Democratic Reform - enhancement of popular participation, proposed adoption of 
direct democracy, voter initiated legislation, the devolution of authority to regional 
communities; 
2. Individual rights, including a Bill of Rights, protection of free association and 
freedom of expression and the right to privacy; 
3. Cultural Diversity - offering protection against globalisation and its potential to 
reduce populations to 'rootless, transient and disconnected from history'; and 
4. Environmentalism - the achievement of 'a good economic standard of life and an 
ecologically sound environment'. 
See www.thirdway.org  
43  
It is not surprising that there appears to be a nexus between the shift towards the new 
European political culture, and the more archetypal elements of European political and philosophical 
development. European cultural and political life, is characterised by secularism, individualism, 
rationalism, humanitarianism, value pluralism and political and economic liberalism and the pursuit of 
individual merit through and within a strong social network of support and protection. The widespread 
shift to the left in the majority of European states amongst European citizens, in the contemporary 
period, reflects the integration and operationalisation of a common European political ideology. Such 
an ideology reflects a convergent European political culture and European identity, a sense of 




the citizen body, and forms an additional link between individual citizens. In short it 
forms the basis for a common identity. 
While no general conclusion can be drawn on the topic of a generalised European 
political ideology a number of limited conclusions can be made. Firstly as examined 
earlier, there does appear to be an increasing European conformity in political values, 
and broad consensus, expressed at the ballot box, of a European political and societal 
ordering. This is reflected in the manifestos of the European centre left, and is 
supported by the European populace in 12 of the 15 European member states. 
Secondly there does appear to be a generalised European consensus on the nature of 
European governance, and the allocation of European resources to achieve such goals. 
While clearly public and political elites have a considerable influence in shaping such 
values, European public opinion, as evidenced by electoral support, seems to condone 
such values. The relationship between Europeans values, across member state 
borders, appears to be a complementary and increasingly convergent one. Further the 
evidence demonstrates that this common strand of values is an element in the 
establishment of the relationships between Europeans. Insofar as the ideology is 
generalised across the European polity, it provides a powerful and substantial binding 
element which reflects European commonality, community and identity. 
8.12 Common Symbols 
Collective attachment to common symbols - such as flags, the arts, national 
monuments and historical figures. 
8.12.1 European Symbols and European Identity 
Communal identity may be facilitated by the European polity in a variety of ways, not 
the least being the development of common European symbols. However the role and 
effectiveness of common European symbols in European identity formation is not a 
compelling one. 
The European Flag — formally adopted as the flag of the then, European Community 
on 22 April 1996, was chosen as it was considered to symbolise European unity and 
balance. After many proposals it was decided that the 12 golden stars on a blue 
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background symbolised 'perfection'. Quoting the Commission: "There were twelve 
apostles, there are twelve hours in a day; twelve months in a year; and there are 
twelve signs in the Zodiac."4 4 However, notwithstanding the fact that the flag is 
widely recognised and flown throughout Europe, there is no evidence that there is a 
significant emotional commitment to it expressed from amongst Europeans. As 
Dignan argues: 
"It adorns licence plates in some of the 12 European Union nations and greets 
travelers at border points from Athens to Amsterdam to the Azores. But 40 
years after it was created, the European flag and its twelve gold stars on a field 
of blue remains a source of confusion."45 
The European Anthem - In 1955 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi said: 
"I should like to propose the hymn from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as a 
European anthem, but I fear that I may discredit this suggestion by taking the 
initiative myself."46 
The communal participation in the singing of a national anthem in appropriate 
political, cultural and sporting setings can act as a powerful ralying point for 
communal identification. We have only to look at its effectiveness at Olympic events 
to gauge this. The effectiveness of such can be seen in circumstances as different as 
the Olympic games to the use of a national anthem at national days of remembrance. 
The Council of Europe first suggested the Ode to Joy, its melody set by Beethoven, 
based upon Friedrich Schiler's poem An die Freude, in 1972. However it was not 
until 1986 that it was adopted by the EC. Showing the sensitivity of the EU not to 
exclude Europeans from participation in a common anthem on linguistic grounds, the 
European anthem was adopted without words. It was decided in April 1986 that Ode 
to Joy should be performed at al Community events and ceremonies requiring the 
playing of a European anthem. In common with the European Flag, there is no 
44 Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to Australia and New Zealand 
EU Background - European Emblems, undated., 1. 
45 	 . Dignan, J. Otago Daily Times., January 9 1995. 
46 Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to Australia and New Zealand 
EU Background - European Emblems, undated., I. 
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evidence of a communal acceptance of, or common identification as Europeans as a 
result of the European anthem. 
Europe Day - The contrived nature of pre-fabricated pan-European symbols is no 
where better demonstrated in the fracas over Europe Day. European nations had 
difficulty in selecting a common Europe day - so there are two - May 5 and May 9. 
The Council of Europe uses May 5 because it is the date when, in 1949, Churchill in 
his Zurich speech, argued; "we must build a United States of Europe". The European 
Union calls May 9 Robert Schuman Day, in honour of the French statesman who was 
a key political member and co-founder of the Union. Under such circumstances it is 
not surprising that, notwithstanding their official commemoration, such days lack a 
popular resonance emblematic of a common sense of European belonging from 
amongst its citizen body. The most recent results available (1995) suggest that across 
the EU only 61% believe that Europe Day is a good idea and less than 50% think so in 
the Netherlands (46%), in Sweden (42%), in Austria (41%) and in Denmark (32%). 47 
These results demonstrate that Europeans do not derive a common form of belonging 
from such symbolism. 
8.12.2 The Euro and the Euro Currency Symbol 
The most promising European symbol capable of uniting Europeans and meaningfully 
progressing the articulation of a communal European identity is the euro and the euro 
currency symbol. The symbolic and identity implications of the move towards 
monetary union are profound. The single currency has the potential to act as a highly 
symbolic element in the evolution of a common European identity. Banknotes are the 
only industrial products that everybody handles, they are accepted by all members of 
a community without pause, from complete strangers. As Padoa-Schioppa suggests a 
state's currency: 
"Symbolise the power of the state and the sense of security that it is the duty 
of the state to provide."48 
47 
Europinion 5 http://europa.eu.int/en/commidg10/infcom/epo/eo/eo5/table08.html  accessed Ii March 
2000 
48 
Padoa-Schioppa,T. 'Engineering the Single Currency' in Gowan, P. & Anderson, P. The 
Ouestion of Europe., 171. 
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The introduction of the notes and coins of the euro on 1 January 2002 and the removal 
of national currencies will mean the removal of one of the primary symbols of 
statehood and institutionalised national identity. A currency, according to the 
European Union: 
" • . . symbolises this link with the state through the image it conveys, its use 
as a medium of payment of income and other taxes and the receipt of benefits, 
as well as in the severity with which the law punishes attempts at forgery." 49 
It appears that it is the intention of European authorities to ensure that the symbolism 
attached to national currencies is transferred to the euro, despite the fact, as the EC 
states: "European Union institutions may often seem distant, or even inaccessible and 
often incomprehensible to the ordinary citizen." 50 The Council of Ministers took this 
into account when deciding on the design of euro coins. The reverse side, showing the 
coins value will be identical throughout European member states in an attempt to 
symbolise the unity created by the euro. The face of the coin, however, will show 
national symbols, surrounded by the 12 Community stars. The intention of such a 
combined motif is: 
"In this way the coins will affirm the continuation of the national identity of 
each Member State, but within the whole formed by the European Union. The 
Euro clearly symbolises European citizenship and identity."51 
The European Commission has suggested that the introduction of the euro will lead to 
a new pan-European consumer culture, making it possible for European citizens; 'to 
cooperate truly in the euro project.' 52 If such a culture develops it will be another 
element in the fabric of positive sentiment binding Europeans together. Seeing the 
emotive and symbolic importance of the euro as a step towards a pan-European 
identity the EU has stated that: 
49 
Frontier-Free Europe, April 1988, European Commission, Office for Official Publications, L-
2985, Luxembourg, 1. 
5° Ibid. 




"The euro must become the symbol not only of Europe but also of 
Europeans."53 
A recent survey conducted by the American transnational corporation, Microsoft, has 
found a very high awareness of the euro currency symbol.54 The survey showed that 
in the European business community there is a 100% awareness of the euro currency 
symbol (with the exception of the UK with 89% awareness.) A total of 40% of 
business leaders said they knew the symbol for the euro. However 62% of the 
European business community was able to corectly identify the euro symbol amongst 
a sheet of similar symbols. Interestingly, when shown a sheet including the Euro 
symbol, 19% of managers who previously said that they knew the symbol were 
unable to correctly identify it, while 51% of managers who had previously said they 
didn't know the symbol were able to correctly identify it.5 Amongst the general 
European population, while there is a high degree of knowledge of the name of the 
European single currency, there is no evidence of a strong emotional commitment to 
it. Further there is an absence of evidence to suggest its ability to afect the creation of 
a stronger sense of European belonging, solidarity or identity, from amongst those 
who wil have occasion to use it on a daily basis.56 
As the above analysis demonstrates, notwithstanding the success of the euro in 
representing a commonly held and recognised European symbol there is no evidence 
to suggest that other European symbols or emblems have had any effect on uniting 
Europeans. There is both a lack of organic, popular European symbols and an absence 
of popular participation in their creation or application. Further, with the exception of 
the euro, the European symbols appear largely irelevant to the everyday concerns and 
aspirations of European citizens. They are neither ralying points for colective action, 
nor symbols of a united culture. The weakness of the European symbols may, in part 
be derived from their civic and somewhat distant, nature. National and regional 
53 	 . 
54 Survey conducted by Microsoft Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) Conducted 4-8 April 
1998 at htp:/www.microsoft.com/europe/euro/facts2.htm accessed 29 December 1998. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49, 51. 
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symbols highlighting European particularism abound. From Scotland to Greece local 
and national communities affirm their identities in their participation in their 
symbolism often ethnically based. By contrast Europe can offer little of an enduring 
civic nature, no matter how hard the EC tries. The only truly European symbols are 
ethnic and/or national in character — Christmas, Easter, the commemoration of the 
individual nation's war dead. The enduring strength of national symbols cannot be 
discounted, and to the extent that the European polity provides support and security to 
such symbols may provide a basis for the evocation of a collective form of European 





Common European Actions and Relationships and European Identity 
Cooperative intra-group interaction and relationship formation - colective behaviour 
and colective goal definition and atainment. Demonstrable commitment to common 
action in the name of the colective. 
9.1 	 Action and Relationships and Contemporary European Identity 
The concept of identity, as we examined in Chapter One, is in part expressed in the 
nature of the action of the individual within distinct, situationaly-salient 
communities, and in the relationship between one community and others. Within the 
sociological tradition of the discursive examination of the social, ident.ity is 
understood to be lodged within networks of relationships with others, society being 
formed by the overlay of persons in relationships and the series of commitments 
persons develop in such relationships.' As Miler has observed, a distinguishing 
aspect of national identity is that it is an active identity: "The nation becomes what it 
does by the decisions it takes."2 Progressing the nature of identity in its relational 
form, Social Psychology, within the paradigm of social identity theory, argues that 
distinctive identity construction and articulation occurs insofar as individuals identify 
with, and wish themselves to be identified as members of distinct social categories. 
Such a process of identity formation takes place both at the most banal level, such as a 
result of the relationships developed as a member of a footbal team, or at the political 
level such as the individual's cognitive response to relationships as a member of a 
political community. It is possible to test the strength of such identity formation by 
reference to a set of standard criteria, including the occurrence of common roles and 
norms, behavioural cohesiveness and uniformity, interdependence and common goals 
and cooperative interaction within the relational group.3 Conversely the construction 
of identity in relational terms, while being partly defined by commonality or 
Preston, P.W. Political/Cultural Identity — Citizens and Nations in a Global Era. p.25 
2 	 . Miler 1993:7 in Auer, S. Reflections on Nationalism and Minority Rights in Central Europe., 11. 
3 Refer to Chapter One for details 
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homogeneity within common social structures, is also largely dependent upon its 
difference from or negation of some other form of social construct. As Hall suggests: 
"Identity is a structured representation which only achieves its positive 
through the narrow eye of the negative."4 
Thus both 'self and 'other'-definition are intimately linked, and cannot exist without 
each other. Each defines itself by marking itself as different from the other, and it is in 
the nature of the interactions and relationship between the self and the other, that 
identity is, in part, defined and formed. The importance of relationships as a basis of 
identity foundation is well articulated by Castells: 
"Symbolic communication between humans and the relationship between 
humans and nature, on the basis of production (with its complement, 
consumption), experience, and power, crystallise over history in specific 
territories, thus generating cultures and collective identities."5 
A central question with respect to the articulation of a European identity as expressed 
in relational networks is: "how does it happen that individual Europeans come to 
think of themselves as being members of a European (civil) society and, at a more 
abstracted level a European (political) community?" Such a question is answered in 
terms of the nature of interaction between Europeans and with others and the 
relationships that such interactions constitute. Identity, considered in terms of 
relationships can be seen to have two distinct but interrelated aspects. The organic, 
non-political, non-institutionally based set of trans-European civic interactions forms 
the first component of European identity defined in terms of relationships. To what 
extent have individual Europeans formed transnational networks of relations, and in 
what way have such relationships engendered a sense of Europeaness? Secondly, part 
of the development of identity as relationships, at least in the European context, is the 
range of institutional measures taken by the EU to facilitate trans-European 
relationships and networks. We are concerned here with the policy and structural 
mechanisms that European institutions have implemented to facilitate the building of 
European relationships and consequently a trans-European consciousness. As we have 
earlier observed, identity is always, in part, constituted out of difference. Thus the 
4 Hall. S. 'The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity', 19-39, 21. 
5 Castells, M. 1996 The Rise of Network Society., 15. 
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creation of identity is additionally conditional upon the relation between the European 
subject and another, as we shall presently consider. 
A number of theorists have considered the relational basis of European identity 
formation as being paramount. For Wallace it is from the density of interaction that 
Europe can be differentiated from non-Europe. The continuity of flow of social and 
economic interactions is considered by Deutsch as dividing the territoriality of 
Europe. Core Europe reduces with the intensity of interactions. 6 The 'gravitational 
pull' of the economic dynamism of the core European economies has had the effect of 
increasing the degree of economic, social and cultural interactions between it and the 
more peripheral areas of Europe, such as Southern Europe and Scandinavia. Similarly 
the structure of core Europe has effected a greater degree of relationships between 
itself and the countries of central and Eastern Europe. 7 Thus the network of bilateral 
and multilateral networks at an institutional and political level, which has been 
mirrored by relationships at the economic, social and cultural level, have been not 
only reshaping the relationship between core and peripheral Europe, but, more 
significantly have provided a basis of communal European identity. 
In this chapter we delineate different types of relationships and assess their effect on 
the creation of communal European identity in the following manner: 
1. Pan European Economic Actions and Relationships - which have the 
effect of binding people together through commercial exchange and 
markets; 
2. Pan-European Political Actions and Relationships - through a system 
of political integration, delineating the mode of political relationships 
through a common system of justice, and administrative apparatus, 
creating a common centre for political allegiance; 
3. Pan-European Social Actions and Relationships - which have the effect 
of individuals identifying with, and wishing to be identifiable as, 
members of distinct social groups; and 
6 




4. 	 Pan-European Cultural Actions and Relationships - which may have 
the effect of binding people together through a shared belief in a 
system of values, norms, language, symbols and rituals.8 
9.2 	 Pan-European Economic Actions and Relationships 
Notwithstanding the initial economic raison d'etre that promoted the establishment of 
the EC, European economic integration lost considerable impetus by the early 1980s. 
The need to develop closer European relationships and the structural impediments 
associated with the maintenance of individual national markets was most criticaly 
highlighted in the Cecchini Report of 1988.9 The report, an exhaustive analysis of the 
costs of 'non-Europe', addressed a number of issues. Primarily a tool aimed at 
engendering impetus for the unification of what was perceived as Europe's 
fragmented markets, the report focused on the blockages in trans-European economic 
relationships associated with the (then) curent system of member state border-related 
controls, divergent national technical standards and member state protectionism.10 
The costs of regulatory diversity on existing trans-European economic relationships' 
while difficult to quantify in detail, ran into tens of milions of ecu." Thus European 
inter-company linkages, and corporate expansion were considered to be inhibited by 
regulatory obstacles. 
The adoption of the European Single Market in 1992 can be seen, in the context of the 
identified costs of 'non-Europe', as a significant aid to trans-European economic 
relationships. This in turn has assisted in the formation of a transactionaly based 
8  This typology is a variation on one presented by Neil Smelser in Smelser, N. Sociology, 
(Cambridge MA: Blackwel Publishers 1994), 262. 
9 See 'The Economics of 1992: An Assessment of the Potential Economic Effects of Completing 
the Internal Market of the European Community'.  European Economy, no. 35, March 1988. For the 
generaly accepted precis of this three volume report see, Cecchini, P The European Chalenge 1992: 
The Benefits of a Single Market. (Wildwood House, The Commission of the European Communities 
1988). 
10 The costs of non-Europe, by the artificial limits on European economic relationships were 
estimated as costing 4.5% of the EC'c GDP , inflating the European Economy by 6.1% and costing 1.8 
milion jobs and adding 1.5% to the EU's unemployment rate — see Cecchini, P. The European 
Chalenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market ., 97. 
H Ibid., 31. 
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European identity. The positive effects of the single market on the development of 
European economic relationships may be considered in three ways: 
1. Increases in trade and foreign direct investment flows: trade volumes between 
member states has increased by 20-30% since the introduction of the single 
market. Moreover from 1985 to 1995 the share of intra-EC imports in total 
manufacturing imports increased by 6.7% from 61.2% to 67.9%. For services 
during the same period, the share of intra-EC imports in total imports of 
services increased 3.1% from 46.9% in 1985 to 50.0% in 1995; 12 
2. Significant changes in member states' production structures, level of 
competition and a consequent impact on prices. There has been an explosion 
of European economic relationships as evidenced by the increases in European 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This growth has been particularly strong in 
cross-border activity, although the bulk of M&A activity has remained 
domestic (over 70%) The intensification in trans-European trade has largely 
prevented any potential for a reduction in economic competition resulting 
from such high levels of economic inter-relationships; and 13 
3. Improvements in EC total factor productivity, growth, employment and 
convergence: As a result of the heightened level of economic relationships 
within the European single market, Community income in 1994 is estimated to 
have been 1.1 to 1.5 percentage points higher than would have been the case in 
the absence of the single market. Territorially peripheral member states have, 
in relative terms benefited most from this improvement. The open European 
market has allowed for a convergence of member states real per capita income 
levels. Levels of employment are also higher as a result of the intensification 
of economic relationships within the single market. Somewhere between 
12 
European Economy No.63, 275. This is particularly significant given the increased exposure 
to the global economy that occurred due to trade liberalisation during the same period. 
13 
The heightened level of European economic relationships as a result of institutional reform is 
demonstrated in the current level of European M&A including such cases as the Vodafone Air Touch 
PLC (UK) bid to takeover Mannesmann AG (Germany) at the bid value of 121,239 euro's, and French 
example of TotalFina SA bidding to takeover Elf Aquitaine at a bid price of 56,762 euro's. See; 
Miller, K. 'All of Europe is in Play' Newsweek December 1999, 90-95. 
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300,000 and 900,000 extra jobs have been created as a result of the single 
market. 14 
The table below demonstrates the increase in economic transactions between 
Europeans. 
Table 9.1 	 Intra-EU 15 Import of Goods 1960-1995 
Intra-EU 15 Import of goods 1960 - 1995 
(Percentage of gross domestic product commited to intra-European trade at market 
prices) 
State 1960 1980 1995 
B/L 19.0 38.2 39.9 
DK 16.5 19.6 16.4 
D 5.6 12.6 10.5 
GR 7.4 9.7 14.5 
E 2.2 5.3 13.3 
F 3.6 10.5 11.3 
IRL 21.7 41.0 27.5 
I 4.4 10.9 12.0 
NL 20.7 25.9 25.0 
A N/A 20.7 20.1 
P 9.9 15.6 24.9 
FIN N/A 14.6 13.9 
S N/A 15.7 17.4 
UK 3.9 10.6 12.7 
EU12 6.0 13.1 13.7 
EU15 N/A 13.4 14.0 
Source: The European Economy no.63 1997 pp274-275 
The increase in intra-European trade has not been uniform. As the figure below 
demonstrates economicaly peripheral European states have increased their level of 
intra-European trade at a greater rate than core European states. 
14 For further detail on these maters refer to; European Commission Directorate -General for 
Economic and Financial Afairs, European Economy Annual Economic Report for 1997 (Ofice for 
Oficial Publications of the European Communities. Luxembourg 1997)., 64-65. 
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Source: European Commission European Economy no 63 1997 Annual Economic Report  for 1997 246 
As a result of the implementation of the single market, the level of economic 
interaction within the EU has greatly intensified. Such an intensification of economic 
relationships has resulted from not only the removal of the blocks to trans-European 
business activity as outlined in the Cecchini Report, but through active economic 
management by the EU in order to promote economic cohesion. We should not forget 
that the structure of EC imports between 1958 and 1994 saw an increase in intra EC 
trade (as expressed as a percentage of total imports) from 35.2% in 1958 to 57.0% in 
1994.15 
At a more localised level, the expansive range of trans-national economic 
organisations demonstrates the development of European economic relationships. 
While some are centraly important in the facilitation of European economic 
relationships, such as the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (Eurochambres), the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) and the 
European Association of Craft and Smal and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(UEAPME),I6 A plethora of lesser known bodies exist such as the Association of 
European Manufacturers of Instantaneous Gas Water Heaters and Wal-Hung Boilers 
15 See Table 46 'Structure of EC imports by country and region 1958 and 1994, 246; European 
Economy no 63 1997 Annual Economic Report for 1997. 
16  Union of International Associations (eds) Yearbook of International Organisations 1996/97 
Vol. 3, 33rd Edition.( Munchen: K.G. Saur), 297-390. 
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(AFECI), the European Quality Assurance Association of Expanded Polystyrene 
Foam Manufacturers for Food Packaging (EQA) and the European Health Industry 
Business Communications Council (EHIBCC). These organisations play an important 
role in creating trans-national loyalties and associations." Further the current plan to 
create a pan-European stock market, valued at $US7 trilion, with a daily turnover of 
$US9 trilion, wil further strengthen trans-European economic arangements.18 
9.3 	 Pan-European Political Actions and Relationships 
9.3.1 Pan-European Political Engagement and Participation 
We have examined in some detail European macro-level political relationships; the 
cooperation between European states that has led to the formation of supranational 
Europe. We are concerned here with the question of political relationships at the 
individual level. 
Political participation, at either the national or supranational level, is a foundation 
stone of political society. It has been defined by Dowse and Hughes as: 
"those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the 
selection of rulers, and directly or indirectly in the formation of public 
policy'.19 
Political participation is highly suggestive of the strength of a society's cohesion and 
communal identity. Accordingly to the extent that Europeans colectively engage with 
European political life, such engagement is evidence of a heightened European 
identity. 
The scope of political participation and engagement is potentialy broad and can range 
from personal exposure to political stimuli and voting, at one end of the scale, to 
contacting a public official or political leader; to being a candidate for office and 
actualy holding public and party office. It is important to note that in most western 
17  Ibid. 
18 Mann, S. 1999 'Europe Sets Sights on new super Bourse' The Age, (Business) 6 May 1999, 1. 
19 Dowse, R. & Hughes, J. Political Sociology., 290. 
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liberal-democratic regimes the majority of the population is unaware and uninterested 
in the political world around them and that only between 1 and 3 percent of the 
population are politicaly active.20 
There are important variables that must be taken into account when considering 
political participation within Europe. The rate of participation at the national level, 
varies significantly between states. In the United Kingdom fewer than 80% of the 
eligible population generaly vote at general elections. In Germany the figure for the 
1990 election was 77.8% (West Germany 78.5%, East Germany 74.5%), - such 
figures can be compared with Russia, where in the June 1996 elections, 68% of the 
population turned out to vote.21 The interest level amongst populations and the level 
of knowledge about political institutions at a national level, let alone a supranational 
level, varies significantly within member states, and even further across the pan-
European electorate. Accordingly, we need to be wary of atempting to extrapolate 
conclusions that may be unsupportable. 
We identify four key avenues for European political engagement. They are: 
1. European Voting; 
2. Political Interaction with the European Union (including the 
politicisation of the European Regions); 
3. The formation of and support for European Political Parties; and 
4. Pan-European NGO's social movements and interest groups. 
To the extent that Europeans are participating and engaging in European political life 
via these four mechanisms, we are able to demonstrate European identification as 
exhibited by colective actions and the formation of uniquely European political 
relationships. Such a process has the combined efect of creating the in-group bias and 
intergroup discrimination central to the articulation of identity.2 
20 	 . Milbrath, L. Political Participation. (Chicago: Rand McNaly 1965), 19. 
21 Cook, C & Paxton, J. European Political Facts 
22 See Marques, J. et al 'Context effects on intergroup discrimination: In-group bias as a 
function of experimenter's provenance' British Journal of Social Psychology (1988) 27, 301-318. 
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9.3.2 European Voting 
Europeans are strongly commited to European political engagement, via the balot 
box. However their turnout rate at European as opposed to national elections is lower 
overal, as the figure below outlines. 
Figure 9.2 	 European ersus National Parliamentary Election Turnout 
Sources: Steiner, J. European Democracies  (2" Edition) (White Plains NY Longman Publishing Group 
1991) p.87 & Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer  51 p.79 
As the above figure demonstrates, the level of European political engagement is lesser 
at the pan-European level than at the national level. Notwithstanding the actual 
European election turnout in 1999, the voting intentions of Europeans reveal a much 
higher level of proposed political engagement in 1999 than in previous years. In 
Greece 92% of eligible voters indicated prior to the election that they would vote 
however only 70% did so, whilst in Denmark 59% indicated their intention to vote, 
and only 45% actualy voted. The only two states where voter turnout in the European 
elections of 1999 exceeded proposed voter intentions occurred in Belgium (89% 
intending to vote, 90% actualy voted) and Luxembourg (75% intending to vote, 86% 
actualy voted) which reflects these two states broadly stronger commitment to 
European affairs.23 The United Kingdom forms the weakest link in pan-European 
23 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer  51, 79. 
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political engagement, largely as a result of a hostile political elite during the last 
period of Conservative rule. Demographic analysis shows that older people are more 
likely to take part in elections than those aged between 15-24. Considering the 
relationship between economic activity and voting intentions, we find that 83% of 
managers and 80% of the self-employed said they would vote, whereas only 64% of 
the unemployed intended to vote in the 1999 European elections. Education is 
positively correlated to European political engagement. Sixty-nine percent of people 
who left school by the age of 15 or younger say that they wil vote, compared with 
82% of those who stayed in education until the age of 20 or older. Those sympathetic 
to the European Union are further more likely to vote. Eighty-two percent of those 
who regarded their country's membership as a good thing said that they would vote, 
compared with only 58% of those who felt their country's membership was a 'bad 
thing' 24 
9.3.3 Political Interaction with the European Union 
To the extent that Europeans are wiling to engage with the political institutions of the 
European Union two aspects of European identification are demonstrated. Firstly, 
such engagement demonstrates that Europeans are conscious of the role of the EU in 
their lives. Secondly, by virtue of the process of active engagement, and the 
relationships that build from such engagement, identity formation, occurs as European 
political life becomes more substantive and central to Europeans lives. As the table 
below demonstrates. 
Table 9.2 	 Wilingness to be Pro-active in the Search for European 
Information 
Percentage of Europeans saying they would be prepared to . . . 
European Union Initiative Percentage Positive 
Responses 
Cal a specialy reserved free phone number. 68 
Go to a public Information Ofice. 49 
Send a fax to a specialy reserved number, free of charge. 37 
Go to an Information Ofice of the European Commission. 36 
Source: Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49 fig 1.8a p.17 
24 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49, 74. 
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9.3.4 Interaction between Europeans and the European Parliament 
Europeans are increasingly active in contacting and lobbying the representative 
institutions of the European polity. The European Parliament is being used by the 
European public as a forum for the fulfilment of political aspirations. As the figure 
below indicates, Europeans are increasingly utilising and participating in  a uniquely 
European set of political interactions. Such increased interaction is emblematic of the 
shift to a European frame of reference amongst Europeans in political maters. 
Figure 9.3 	 Petitions to the European Parliament 
1 
Y•ars 
•1971 •1972 01973 01974 •1975 •1976  •1977 01978 M1979 •1980 01981 •1982 •1983 •1984 •1985 •1986 •1987 01988 01989 
01990 •1991 111992 1111993 
Source: Corbet, R, Jacobs, F. & Shackleton, M. The European Parliament (31d Edition) (London: 
Cartermil International Ltd), 220. 
9.3.5 Regional Relationships 
Across the European Union sub-state regionalist and nationalists have created 
networks of associations and interests with a distinctly trans-national flavour. They 
have used the process of political and economic integration to imbue their particular 
message with a European flavour, in a transition from relatively marginalised 
separatism to significantly more popular politics of inclusive autonomy in a 
supranational Europe.25 
25 See Goodman, J. 1997 'The EU: Reconstituting Democracy Beyond the 'Nation-State' 
Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia Newsleter, Number 18, May 1997, 4-18. 
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During the 1970s and 1980s regional devolution was introduced within European 
states to assist with the representation of regional interests and to improve the 
democratisation of state structures. By the mid 1980s in France, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, elected sub-state authorities had become a permanent feature of political life. 26 
These sub-state entities have assumed a pivotal role in the implementation of EU 
policies, most particularly the structural reform programs. More significantly they 
have developed direct relations both with the institutions of the European Union, but 
have direct and complimentary relations with other national and sub-national 
groupings within the Union. The effect of a heightened regional presence and a 
stronger degree of interrelatedness between such regions have been to strengthen a 
'Europe of Regions'. Local elites have maximised their autonomy from the central 
state and have acquired a key role in stimulating economic development. The 
increased EU-orientation is expressed in the burgeoning of the EU regional lobby 
with numerous authorities opening offices in Brussels as we observed earlier in this 
work. 
As well as participating in purely formal relationships with the EU, generally through 
participation the Committee of the Regions, sub-state authorities have established 
strong trans-European relationships through the establishment of cross-regional 
associations. Legally recognised under EU law since 1989, these groupings are known 
as "European Economic Interest Groupings". 27 By 1992 there were 322 of these 
groupings, many acting as 'holding' organisations of broader inter-regional 
associations, often formally recognised as "Euro-Regions" by the Commission. The 
more prosperous regions have taken the lead in forging these inter-European 
relationships; Catalonia, Lombardy, Baden-Wurtemburg and Rhone-Alpes, for 
instance set up an association in September 1988 termed 'the four motors of a 'new 
'intra-European high technology cartel'. 28 Similarly a "High Technology Route of 
Southern Europe" has been established, linking Catalonia with the two adjoining 
French regions of Languedoc-Roussillon and the Mid-Pyrenees. Other regional 
26 
Keating M. State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State.  
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1988). 
27 Goodman, 'The EU: Reconstituting Democracy Beyond the 'Nation-State' Contemporary 
European Studies Association of Australia Newsletter., 13G. 
28 Ibid. 
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relationships are organised along sectorial lines, for instance in the "Regions of 
Traditional Industry" or the "Motor Industry Cities and Regions." 
Relationships of the sub-state actors have encouraged the development of a linking of 
both areas of common interest within regional and peripheral areas of Europe but has 
also had the effect of redefining Europeans consciousness. This has occurred both in 
realising the linkages across Europe and in the 'Europeanisation' of the demands for 
autonomy of sub-state actors. Such a sense of communal Europeaness has been 
particularly marked in the UK where Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalists have 
become enthusiastically pro-European, defining themselves as 'European' and 
defining those who oppose regional autonomy and intra-European regional 
relationships as `anti-European'. 29 Thus European identification has become a vessel 
to further sub-state nationalist aspirations. 
9.3.6 The Formation of, and Support for, European Political Parties 
The role of political parties is an essential feature of European political life. Their 
existence, at a trans-European level is a further example of the linkages that exist 
above and beyond the level of the individual European member state. Political parties 
evolve to offer alternative conceptions of how to organise and coordinate the various 
complex and competing claims that exist within a society. To the extent that there is a 
meaningful sphere of political authority, public administration and public policy, 
political parties exist to coordinate and perform these functions. The existence of 
European political parties, reflect the existence of an independent European political 
sphere and an independent European society, with its own interests, values and 
institutions separate to those of the member states which comprise it. 
European political parties contribute to the evocation of a European identity in a 
number of ways. They provide a unified, centralised structure for the development of 
pan-European policy. They also provide a unified point for the conduct of pan-
European political representation. To the extent that they are effective at developing 
European policy, representing common European interests, and furthering the 




of European political engagement. Further, they demonstrate the commonality of the 
European's democratic, civic political experience, reinforcing the perception of a 
community of Europeans. 
Let us briefly consider the nature of the key European political parties. The 
Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists consider that the key 
European priorities are employment, growth, European economic and social cohesion 
and harmony between the economy and the environment. The European Socialists are 
firmly committed to the European project.3° The European Liberal, Democrat and 
Reform Party is firmly pro-Europe and is committed to further European integration, 
most especially in the Eastern Hemisphere. It advocates a free and open European 
market, with sufficient protection at the European level to offset economic recession, 
political instability and rising crime. It further calls for a strengthened common 
foreign security and defence policy and the advancement of human rights. 31 
It is important to note, consistent with our earlier arguments regarding European 
normative convergence, the party ideology of the key European parties have far more 
in common than they have separating them, notwithstanding varying degrees of 
priority and the proposed nature of policy execution. Such a reality further reinforces 
the normative convergence within European political life. The European Greens call 
for significant revisions to European transport, energy and industry policy, but in a 
similar manner to the larger European parties, are sympathetic to integration, popular 
participation and representation and the strengthening of European judicial and 
humanitarian powers. 32 Finally the European Peoples Party, the second largest group 
in the European Parliament, advocate: "Christian responsibility in democracy, social 
market economy and human rights." The Party is committed to a free European 
economy, a strong and independent European Parliament and democratic processes 
30  Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists Home Page 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/pes/trl/group/en/prior en.htm accessed 29 January 1999. 
31 European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party Home Page. 
http://www.eurolib.org/Party%20Web%20Site/Manifesto/Introd.../text New_introduction.htm 
accessed 29 January 1999. 
32 The Greens, Press Room http://www.europarl.eu.int/greens/press/1988/09 en.htm accessed 7 
February 1999. 
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and the advancement of Human rights both within the EU and in Eastern Europe and 
areas such as Yugoslavia.3 
Considering the electoral successes of the respective parties we see that the Socialists 
have recently lost ground to the right, as the 1999 EP election results indicate: 
Table 9.3 	 The Composition of the European Parliament (1994/1999) 




United Left 35 34 
Greens 38 27 
Socialists 180 214 
Radicals 13 21 
Liberals 43 42 
EPP 224 201 
Union of Europe 17 34 
Europe of the Nations 21 16 
Independents (Far-Right) 55 37 
Source: The Economist June 19t1 — 25th 1999 p.53 
While the right and extreme right in Europe have been recurrent elements in 
contemporary European political life their level of support on a pan-European level is 
not sufficient to detract from the leading positions of centralist and social democratic 
political forces in Europe. The shift to the right in the EP elections of 1999 has been 
variously explained as a backlash against under-performing domestic socialist 
governments, and national discontent associated with the move towards a single 
currency and the perceived loss of national independence.34 The results do not 
contradict the broadly uniform normative convergence of the European political 
culture and ideology. The predominant political group in Europe is the left-centre, 
which as we have seen at the national level also predominate. Such predominance 
reflects a popular normative position. 
The emergence of European, as opposed to purely national, political parties is highly 
significant. In common with the experience of party formation at the state level, the 
33 European Peoples Party in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. 
htp:/stars.coe.fr/groupespolitiques/EPP/activities/activities1996.htm accessed 7 February 1999. 
34 See 'Europe's voters stay at home' The Economist. June 19th —25th 1999, 53-55. 
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emergence of a European party system is both closely associated with the emergence 
of an independent European polity, and a separate sociopolitical dynamic at the 
European, rather than then member state level. Political parties emerge when the 
activities of a political system reach a certain degree of complexity and autonomy 
from pre-existing forms of decision-making, resource-alocation and popular 
participation. Such political trends occuring within the context of an independent and 
distinctive colective form of European consciousness. 
Space precludes a ful examination of the complex interrelationship between 
European political parties, the institutions of the EU, European interest and pressure 
groups and individual European citizens. However in identifying the complex 
networks and inter-relationships between them, the enduring nature of the European 
party system and the nature of political interaction between the EU and citizens, we 
have demonstrated another strand of European political engagement, which 
contributes to a separate European form of political consciousness and identification. 
European political parties reflect not only atitudinal similarity at a pan-European 
level but reflect the alocation of political values and resultant interactions and 
relationships that transcend traditional state boundaries and European identification as 
opposed to national identity. 
9.4 	 European NGO's, Social Movements and Interest Groups 
"It is time to realise that Europe is not just run by European institutions but by 
national, regional and local authorities too — and by civil society."35 
The importance of European Non Government Organisations, social movements and 
interest groups in the articulation of European identity is central. The process by 
which social, political, economic and ecological values are shared between 
communities across intra-European borders demonstrates an adjustment in the 
conceptualisation and behaviour of communities of interest, which have become 
European rather than solely national. The practice of trans-European interest 
formation has the effect of building an association of individuals - as Europeans — 
who, in certain circumstances, identify more strongly with the interests of the group at 
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a European level than with the interests of their state of origin. Categories such as 
occupational strata, gender and environmentalism, become situationaly salient in the 
process of political group formation. Such trans-national identification and interest 
consolidation is contained within and best understood by reference both from 
participants and observers, as a uniquely European categorisation. Europe provides 
the stage upon which the business of politics is played and against which 
identification is configured. In short such groups form the basis of a distinct and 
separate European civic dialogue and form an important element in the European civil 
society. 36 
We have considered earlier in this work the extent that the process of European 
integration reflects a decline in the importance and potency of the constituent 
sovereign-states. Under such circumstances we can expect atendant changes in forms 
of interest aggregation and articulation away from the state.37 Inglehart was one of the 
first to observe the potential for the shift from state, to trans-national non-government 
institutions to be associated with a similar shift in colective interest and identity 
articulation.38 Once considered as ephemeral and merely expressive, social 
movements are now best characterised as enduring and instrumental. They are both 
indicative of the widening political space for non-traditional action within traditional 
states, and evidence of the limitations of the state system. Argument on the nature of 
the emergence of social movements centres around their emergence in response to 
changes that rendered institutionalised political systems increasingly vulnerable or 
receptive to chalenge. As Eisinger argues: "Protest signifies changes not only among 
previously quiescent or conventionaly orientated groups but also in the political 
system itself."39 Not simply were the emergent social movements chalenging 
35 Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, European Parliament, 15 February 
2000 cited at htp:/www.socialplatform.org/ 
36 We shal consider the emergence of a pan-European civil society and its demonstrable efects 
of a European civic identity later in this Chapter. 
37 Marks, G. & McAdam D. 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the European Union', 249-278, 249. 
38 See Inglehart, R. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles amongst 
Western publics. 
39 	. . Eisinger, P. 'The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities' American Political 
Science Review., 48. 
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established political orders to reform, but further, such social movements were 
challenging the sovereign-state as being politically involatile. 
The precise role of member states in decision making at the trans-national level 
remains elusive. Decision making, policy development and policy monitoring is 
shared amongst diverse policy networks including member state executives and 
courts, sub-national governments and various private and semi-public groupings 
including social movements. The creation of such a multi-level polity has resulted in a 
centripetal process in which decision making has swung away from the state level and 
allowed for the creation of sufficient political space for the active involvement of 
social movements in the development of European policy. ° 
NGOs and interest groups in Europe have proven to be a potent force for change in 
many European countries. They have engendered trans-European networks of 
understanding and solidarity, albeit focused on specific issues, which contributes to a 
greater sense of European commonality and identity from amongst their respective 
membership. The scope of such movements is broad and has proven extremely 
difficult to quantify. However by referring to their institutional manifestations we gain 
a good appreciation of their scope. 4 I Such movements are represented by pan- 
40 Such a process has occurred at the member state level also. Over the last three decades 
Belgium has transformed from a unitary into a Federal polity. Italy France and Spain have created a 
comprehensive layer of regional government . Only Germany, according to Marks and McAdam, has 
resisted giving autonomy to regional government. 
41 
The most prominent NGO's operating in Europe today are: 
Federation Europeenne d'Associations / Nationales Travaillant avec les Sans-Abri 
(FEANTSA) / Comite europeen des Associations d'Interet General (CEDAG) / Siege social 
Eurolink Age / Lobby Europeen des Femmes (EWL) / Observatoire social Europeen / Euro-citizen- 
Action-Service (ECAS) / Plateforme des ONG europeennes du secteur social / Comite de Liaison des 
ONG Developpement —UE / European Network Against Racism (ENAR) / Forum Europeen de la 
Jeunesse / Communaute europeenne des cooperatives de la consommation (EURO COOP) / Comite 
europeen des cooperatives de production et de travail associe, des cooperatives sociales et des 
entreprises participatives (CECOP) / Bureau Europeen de l'Environnement 
(BEE) / Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC) / Centre europeen pour la 
promotion et la formation en milieu agricole et rural (CEPFAR) / Solidar / Forum des Migrants / 
Forum europeen des personnes handicapees (EDF) / Antipoverty network (Reseau Europeen 
des Associations de lutte contre la Pauvrete et l'exclusion sociale (EAPN) / Mouvement international 
ATD Quart / Federation Europeenne des Personnes Agees (FERPA) / Plateforme europeenne des 
Organisations de seniors. 
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European NGOs as diverse as seniors, Women's groups, European immigrant groups, 
agricultural groups, anti-poverty, anti-racist groups and social NG0s. 42 
We shall consider four major European movements, and their institutional 
manifestations. The first three 'movements' have dominated in Western Europe over 
the last 25 years. The pan-European labour movement, the environmental movement 
and the anti-nuclear movement, and the fourth movement; the European women's 
movement which is rapidly emerging as a powerful element in uniting European 
citizens and creating a collective form of identification centred upon 'European' 
understandings of community and action. 
9.4.1 The Pan-European Labour Movement 
The principal response to the process of the consolidation of the European polity has 
been the establishment of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) which 
encompasses union federations in EU and potential EU countries. The ETUC, which 
was formed in 1973, represents 40 federations in 21 European countries with a 
combined membership of 44 million European workers, accounting for 86% of the 
total workforce in those countries. 43 Notwithstanding its organisational uniformity and 
size, on important issues the ETUC is split. Unions in the richer European states, are 
interested in high wages, improved benefits and health and safety regulations wheras 
those in the poor countries resist the push for higher employment standards, being 
aware of their comparative economic standard. Further the ETUC is too decentralised 
to play a constructive role in collective bargaining as in particular European economic 
sectors the coverage and type of union differ substantially across countries. 
42 
i It s important to note that not all pan-European groups are actively supportive of European 
integration. There are a number of significant interest and pressure groups that actively articulate an 
anti-European message. Most significant amongst these are the groups clustered around the Anti-
Maastricht Alliance, the Bruges Group and the Eurosceptics. Such groups can be contrasted with the 
grouping of European far-right and neo-fascist parties whose policies include the role back of the 
European project. Then influence of employee and farmer groups, most particularly in Germany and 
France is also a significant element in organised anti-European resistance. These groupings have been 
considered in Chapter Six of this study. 
43 
Despite its extensive geographic and membership coverage the ETUC has been characterised 
as being 'a feeble peak organisation'. It has only 35 full time staff and as it is a loose confederation of 
61 European union federations and confederations it tends to take the lowest common denominator 
position in representing union interests in the European Union. See Marks, G. and McAdam, D. 
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The ETUC, supported by its research arms, the European Trade Union Institute 
(ETUI) and the European Trade Union College (ETUCO), is active in overlaying a 
rich matrix of alliances and links between different trade unions and affiliated 
organisations across Europe. Adopting the role of advancing a range of industrial, 
economic and environmental policies, the pan European labour movement provides a 
strong unifying link for European labour, as Europeans rather than national members. 
Specific policy platforms adopted by the ETUC include the development of a 
statement of fundamental rights for European workers, the democratisation of the 
economy, including information and consultation of workers and the development of 
an equitable pan-European social policy in order to enhance European social 
cohesion.'" This collective effort, across member state borders towards 
environmentalism, social welfare and the advancement of human rights demonstrates 
an emergent element in a meaningful European civil society, with its own distinct 
identity.45 
The existence of the pan-European union movement, most especially in the context of 
the political alignment amongst European governments to the centre-left, is 
illustrative of the positive effect of interaction on identify formation. Such an identity 
is promoted by the engendering of a sense of social democracy and shared political-
cultural practice originating within the union movement. The trans European labour 
movement also contributes to communal European identification by reinforcing the 
positive virtues of collective effort and common solidarity across national borders for 
European workers, and thus plays both a practical and an ideological and symbolic 
role in promoting a common European identity. 
'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union', 261- 
262. 
44 European Trade Union Confederation at www.etuc.org/Structure.cfm  
45  
It is worth noting that there is a employer derived NGO response to the Pan European labour 
movement. The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UN ICE), and the 
European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic 
Interest (CEEP) are other pan European social actors who form part of the dialogue and relationships 
which comprise a distinct European civil society. 
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9.4.2 The Pan-European Environmental Movement 
The engendering of a colective European (environmental) consciousness has been 
perhaps the most successful example of colective European interaction, on a non-
government level, in the last three decades. Not only has there been a general 
synthesis of support for European environmental maters across member state 
boundaries, but further the institutions of Europe have responded positively to the 
transnational concerns by developing specific policy domains sympathetic to the 
movement's interests. An earlier expression of supranational Europe's receptivity to 
the concerns of the environmental movement came with the Union's proclamation of 
the Common Environmental Policy at its 1972 summit meeting in Paris. More 
recently the EU has initiated four major environmental action plans aimed at, amongst 
other priorities: 
"The prevention and reduction of atmospheric, water and soil polution; 
management of waste and dangerous materials and the promotion of clean 
technologies; [and] . . . restoration of the natural environment and habitats."46 
The EU has been consistent on environmental maters and there has emerged a 
distinctive EU position that transcends an aggregation of national environmental 
positions. The environmental movement has been confronted with a EU, that has 
shown itself to be: "both atitudinaly sympathetic and structuraly open to the 
interests of the movement."'" 
The European environmental movement has proven to be both trans-European in 
focus and organisation and responsive to the political opportunities granted to it by a 
ideologicaly sympathetic EU. The movement is made up of four major organisations; 
the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), the European office of Friends of the 
Earth (SEAT), the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace. While it is difficult to 
estimate total direct and indirect membership of European environmental 
organisations EU Policy Director, Dr Christian Hey, has estimated such membership 
46 	 . 	 . Wistnch, E. After 1992: The United States and Europe. (London: Routledge 1991), 73. 
47 Marks, G. and McAdam, D. 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the European Union', 269. 
352 
to exceed 11 Million in the EU. 48 European environmental organisations are 
financially supported by various Union programs - so much so that in 1990 some 
ECU50 million was made available to these and other lesser environmental groups. 
The environmental movement has established a strong lobbying presence in Brussels. 
The groups take part in information gathering, lobbying and educational activities at 
the European level. Significantly the movement has embraced parliamentary and 
judicial avenues of access to pursue their interests. Their representation in the 
European Parliament and their willingness to use the European court system is 
evidence of the truly European focus of the movement's activities. 
The implications for the emergence of a communal European identity as a result of 
the interests and activities of the environmental movement are clear. The nature of 
European environmental concerns transcends regional and national borders. More 
significantly the vast majority of Europeans are united in their concern for 
environmental degradation. 49 The EU provides a suitable forum for the organisation 
of environmental policy and for the lobbying of European decision makers. To the 
extent that the institutions of the EU remain responsive to the environmental 
movements concerns, and that such concerns transcend national boundaries and 
prompt a common response from amongst environmentalists, regardless of 
nationality, we discern a growing appreciation, and consciousness of a common 
European environment and a communal European identity. 
9.4.3 The Pan-European anti-Nuclear Movement 
Chernobyl clearly demonstrated the truly pan-European nature of and threat from 
nuclear technology. No corner of Europe was exempt from the fallout of the accident. 
The accident at Chernobyl proved to Europeans that they shared a common 
vulnerability which united them in an unprecedented way. 
48 e-mail correspondence Hey/Grover 14 January 2000 
49 
A poll carried out for the European Commission among 13,000 European citizens in March and 
April 1992 revealed a sharp rise in environmental awareness over the preceding five years, The 
percentage of Europeans who considered that combating pollution was a main objective of the EC rose 
from 72% in 1986 to 85% in 1992. See Fact Sheets of the European Parliament, 300. 
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The anti-nuclear movement is far less conspicuous in Brussels than the environmental 
movement. Not one anti-nuclear organisation maintains offices in Brussels, and the 
movement has been unable to pursue its cause with any of the leading EU 
institutions.50 However there are no organisational structural elements to impede the 
movement from taking on a truly pan European profile. The movement seems to have 
similar characteristics to the environmental movement which has allowed that 
movement to adopt a pan-European profile and awareness. While accepting and 
advocating the truly international aspect of nuclear dangers, the movement has long 
eschewed traditional bureaucratic forms of organisation. This combined with its 
ideological commitment to non-traditional forms of action, has prevented the 
necessary form of administrative and bureaucratic integration and centralisation 
which is a necessary component of an effective social movement. Whereas the 
environmental movement is a tightly set web of interconnected interests, the anti-
nuclear movement 'tends to remain loose networks of adherents rather than enduring 
coalitions of formal movement organisations'. 51 Accordingly while there are clear 
transnational and pan-European aspirations of the movement, such aspirations are 
somewhat frustrated by an ambivalent EU and an unstructured organisational base. 
Notwithstanding these limitations the movement does provide a particular 'European' 
point of reference around which distinctly European understandings, allegiances and 
relationships have been built. 
9.4.4 The Pan-European Women's Movement. 
European women outnumber men; 51.9% of the European population is female. 
Despite the fact that women constitute a slight majority of the European population 
they, according to Glasner remain a disadvantaged group, and gender continues to be 
a major structural dimension in European societies. 52 
50 Marks, G. and McAdam, D. 'Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the European Union', 272. 
51 Ibid. 
52 
Glasner, A. 'Gender and Europe: Cultural and Structural impediments to change', in Bailey, J. 
(ed) Social Europe. (London: Longman 1995), 70. 
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The international Women's movement originated in Europe. The first wave of 
European feminism from the mid-nineteenth to the first quarter of the twentieth 
century had a pervasive effect across not only Europe but also in the United States 
and in European colonies. The second wave of feminism arose in the 1970s, under the 
umbrella of the women's liberation movement, and resulted in the formation of a large 
number of both European and international women's organisations. Factors that 
created these associations included birth-control, equal opportunity, and the peace 
movement. 53 The Feminist movements in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s took on a 
variety of forms. In Britain, four basic demands emerged as the central issues; equal 
pay; equal opportunities in education and work; free contraception and abortion on 
demand, and free 24-hour nurseries. In Germany, the women's movement had a 
particularly significant impact upon changing women's expectations of the political 
process which, according to Glasner, had significant modification in the recruitment 
criteria of the main German political parties in the 1980s. 54 In France, abortion was a 
pivotal element in the formation of the women's movement, while in Italy the 
platform for feminists has been divorce; workplace status and abortion. 55 
A major element in the Europeanisation of the European Women's movement has 
been the Europeans Women's lobby (EWL). The EWL is the largest coordinating 
body of national and European non-Governmental women's organisations in the 
European Union, with over 2,700 member associations in the 15 member states of the 
Union. 56 Established in 1990, it seeks to respond to the lack of woman's participation 
in the creation and participation in various European structures. The EWL monitors 
European legislative activity and takes action where necessary to ensure that women's 
interests are protected. The goal of the EWL is the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women and to serve as a link between political decision-
makers and women's organisations. 57 The EWL's membership comprises both 
53 Ibid., 73. 
54 Ibid., 74. 
55 Ibid., 75. 
56 




individuals and other non-government European Women's organisations as long as 
they are active in at least four EU states. National organisations become members 
indirectly by joining their country's National Section of the European Women's lobby. 
Specific actions taken by the European Women's Movement in engendering closer 
trans-national Feminist European relationships include the European Women's talent 
bank and the Women's Electronic Business Incubators network (WEBIN). The 
European Women's Talent Bank is an active database of European Women experts in 
fields relevant to the process of European integration and the European Union. It 
provides speakers, teachers, consultants and conference participants for issues 
concerning women in Europe. Its aim is to foster stronger relationships between 
expert women in European affairs to ensure that there is full participation of European 
women in European Decision-making. 58 The European Union recognises the strength 
of this organisation and often asks members of the Bank to find women speakers for 
the conferences they organise and to provide consultants when European working 
groups are established. WEBIN is a network of women in the European Union and 
Eastern Europe who support European women starting up in business. The Womens 
electronic Business Incubators network researches into different models of business 
incubation and how they can be applied to support the business interests of European 
Women. 59 Closely associated with this program is the MUWIC association; 
Multimedia for Women in the Cultural Industries. 60 




i It s i mportant to note that the institutions of the European Union have been active in assisting 
in the development of not only a trans-national women's movement and in the pursuit of the 
movements goals. Directly the European Union, under its program of 'Funding for the Social Economy' 
provides direct financial support to social programs such as WEBIN and MUW1C. More generally The 
European Union through its treaty system and its social charter, implemented in 1975, has supported 
women's issues including the first Equal Opportunity action program of 1982, designed 'to strengthen 
and extend existing individual rights through legislation, but also to change habits and traditions by 
means of positive action' On the legal front the EU assisted the development of a feminist 
consciousness and feminist relationships by requiring member states to take action to monitor equal 
opportunities implementation and to provide legal redress with respect to equal treatment to review 
protective legislation and social security entitlements to women and to abolish discrimination against 
pregnant women in employment. Further programs were initiated in 1986 and 1991-95 to develop new 
initiatives for women in relation to vocational training and employment and to improve the integration 
of women into the labor market and the import the state of women in society. Accordingly the EU has 
worked in a close and complimentary fashion to raise the profile of the European Women's movement, 
to ensure that women's interests were being looked after, and perhaps most importantly in the context 
of this discussion, to ensure that trans-European Feminist relationships grew and thus gave a specific 
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9.4.5 European Social Non Government Organisations 
Civic and social dialogue within and across Europe is not limited to the examples 
cited above. There is a extensive range of other pan European social NGO's which 
individually and collectively represent an intricate matrix of European relationships 
which strengthen European social cohesion, and in so doing enhance European 
communal identification. The scope of social NGOs is extensive. It is estimated that 
there are over 1700 European social NGOs active in social development and human 
rights areas61 . They collectively represent a strengthening of European civil society. 
The Platform of European Social NGOs is the most notable of these NG0s. It 
comprises members including the European Federation of the Elderly, the European 
Forum of Child Welfare and the European Union Migrant Forum. It aims to enhance 
civil dialogue across Europe, promote the fight against poverty and social exclusion 
and aims to remove structural impediments to a deepening of relationships between 
Europeans. 62 
Such an emphasis on participation, transparency and accountability acts to supplement 
the EU's attempts to bring Europeans together and to engender a stronger sense of 
belonging based on democratic participation. Significantly the institutions of the EU 
are increasingly utilising NGOs to develop social and economic policy. The EU has 
recognised that NGOs have an important role in cementing together a community of 
Positive European sentiment insofar as they provide a common European focus for 
European citizens and that they can be instrumental in the delivery of public services 
and the regeneration of depressed areas, and the integration of socially and 
economically individuals and groups. 63 
'European' flavour to the women's movement, with the effect of engendering a greater sense of 
European identity amongst European women. 
61 
European Social Observatory at: http://www.ose.be/ 
62 
The Platform of European Social NGOs at: http://www.socialplatform.org/ 
63 
European Economic and Social Committee at: http://www.ces.eu.int/ 
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9.5 	 The Effect of Pan European NGOs Social Movements and Interest 
Groups on the Emergence of a European Identity 
The increased profile and involvement of European transnational NG0s, social 
movements and interest groups have a positive influence on the development of a 
sense of European identity amongst individual European citizens. As the competence 
and coherence of individual European sovereign states becomes increasingly 
questionable, new sociopolitical spaces have opened up in which new social 
movements have claimed a public role and legitimacy. Such communities of common 
interest constitute the nucleus of communities of pan-European identity that move 
beyond the teritorial state.64 
The emergence of pan-European movements effect the emergence of a European 
identity in a variety of positive ways. To the extent that such social movements are 
pan-European they reduce the sense of 'difference' and distance in terms of location 
for Europeans across pre-existing state borders. There is homogeneity of interest and 
action on issues, whether ecological or economic, that wil highlight the positive 
efects of pan-European action and relationship building which wil link Europeans as 
Europeans rather than as national members. Pan-European movements alow for a 
deeper web of relationships to develop. European NGOs facilitate the emergence of 
an active form of European citizenship. Their emergence reflects the 
'Europeanisation' of what were traditionaly areas of national interest and 
competence. Further, they reflect the new rights, duties and interests of Europeans 
within a progressive participatory model of European civic society. A society that has 
been shaped and made tangible by clusters of communal interests and identification. 
Such movements are increasingly pro-active, planned and enduring. In terms of trans-
European action and interaction, such phenomena wil assist in the development of a 
sense of being part of and loyalty displaying an affinity with 'Europe', regardless of 
national origin. 
64 See Goodman, J The EU Reconstituting Democracy Beyond the 'Nation State'. 
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9.6 	 Pan-European Cultural Actions and Relationships 
Pan European culturaly based interaction and relationships are becoming a major 
element in European cultural activity. European cultural networks are playing a major 
role in acting as intermediaries between grass-roots cultural activities and the 
institutions of the state and supranation. As the European Commission has 
commented: 
"[Cultural] Networks make it possible for cultural initiatives to break out of 
their isolation and participate in common projects. They enable people and 
ideas to travel and foster the emergence of new forms of expression and new 
ideas."65 
Some of the main European cultural networks include in the performing arts: L 'Union 
des Theatres de L 'Europe, The European Network of Information Centres for 
Performing Arts, Dance Network Europe and the Euro Festival; Junger Artisten. In 
the visual arts and Multimedia pan-European networks include Cartoon Arts Network 
and ECTN-European Children's Television Network. In the fields of books and 
reading EBLIDA European Bureau of Library, information and Documentation 
Associations and in the fields of Cultural heritage; NEMO — Network of European 
Museums Associations, the European Heritage Group and the European Network to 
promote the conservation and preservation of the European cultural heritage.6 
65 European Commission, 1. 
66 There has been an explosion in the scope of Trans-European socio-Cultural associations in the 
last five decades . . .they include associations in the artistic fields such as the Europa Cantat - European 
Federation of Young Choirs (EFYC), the European Cultural Foundation (ECF), the European Academy 
of Arts, Sciences and Humanities (EAASH), Europa Nostra - International Federation of Non-
Government Associations for the Protection of Europe's Cultural and Natural Heritage. Trans Europe 
Hales: Association of Independent Cultural Centres (TEH) European League of Institutes of the Arts 
(ELIA). Chamber Orchestra of Europe European Community Youth Orchestra and the European Union 
Baroque Orchestra are perhaps more notable associations of the European artistic community. 
Pan European Educational Associations include the Association of European Universities (CRE) the 
Association of Faculties and Schools of Law in Europe (AFSOL1E) the Consortium of Institutions for 
Development and Research in Education in Europe(CIDREE), the ES1B - National Union of Students 
in Europe (ESIB), European Training Network (ETN), the European Vocational Training Network and 
specific Universities of a trans-European Flavour including European University, Antwerp European 
University, Brussels European University Centre for the Cultural Heritage, Ravelo. Ibid. 
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The growing involvement of the European Union in both removing barriers from the 
realisation of trans-European sociocultural flows and actively sponsoring European 
culture and education, has resulted from the 'spilover' from economic to cultural 
liberalisation, and more generaly an enhancement of the symbolic nature of a trans-
European cultural networks. The EU supported more than 3500 transnational cultural 
activities in 1997, including 182 pan-European dance and theatre activities, 200 cases 
of the restoration and conservation of European cultural sites and buildings and 
assisted with 218 cases for the wider dissemination of literary works across Europe.67 
Both the Council of Europe and the European Union provide mechanisms for cultural 
flows across Europe. The Council of Europe is the main European forum for cultural 
cooperation, whereas the European Unions principal aim is to facilitate economic 
flows with cultural flows subordinated to this principal aim. Culture is expressly 
included in the Council's mandate and it has provided an institutional framework to 
facilitate the free flow of culture.68 The institutional set-up within the Council of 
Europe to facilitate cultural flows includes the European Cultural Convention which 
provides that: 'the Contracting Parties shal consult with one another within the 
framework of the Council of Europe with a view to concerted action in promoting 
cultural activities of European interest'.69 A number of intergovernmental bodies 
have been set up to undertake such action including the Council for Cultural 
Cooperation, the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, and the 
Steering Commitee on the mass media.7° 
67 	i It s significant to note that the European Commission approved on 6 May 1998 the First 
European Union Framework Programme in support of Culture (2000-2004). Here the RAPID press 
release: 
The European Commission adopted a proposal aiming to introduce the First European Union (EU) 
Framework Programme in support of Culture. This global approach extends the scope of Article 128 of 
the Treaty by considering cultural action as a Community objective in its own right and by placing the 
European cultural project in the context of the construction of Europe. The proposal entails 
rationalizing and strengthening the efectiveness of cultural cooperation actions, within a single 
financial and programming instrument for the period 2000-2004 intended to replace the three curent 
programmes (Kaleidoscope, Ariane and Raphael). ECU 167 milion have been alocated under this new 





Within the European Union there is a range of cultural programs including the most 
recent Kaleidoscope program, the aim of which is to support artistic and cultural 
activities with a European dimension. Further support from the EU takes the form of 
the Ariane program, a support program for books and reading including translation 
into other European languages, the European City of Culture and European Cultural 
month initiatives and the community action program Raphael, which is designed to 
enhance the status of Europe's common cultural heritage. 71 
Within Europe there are a range of cultural networks, which can be seen as separate 
from, but reinforcing cultural transfer and homogeneity within particular European 
regions. The Dutch language area has seen the creation of the Nederlandse Taalunie, 
The German language area is linked both within the Nordic Council, which has a 
specific Secretariat for Nordic Cultural Cooperation, and by the cultural linkages 
between Austria, Germany and Switzerland, although these are of an informal nature. 
As a subordinate part of the Franco-German relationship a cultural agreement was 
reached in the form of the Elysee Treaty of 1963, which made cultural cooperation 
into a major element of reinforcing political entente and economic solidarity between 
the two counties. 72 
The positive effects on European identification as a result of the development of pan 
European cultural flows are multi-dimensional. The heightened level of cooperation 
and interaction between European cultural practitioners promotes artistic creation and 
the promotion of European cultural heritage. Further it accelerates the process of 
European identification resulting from a common knowledge of and experience in 
European, rather than simply national cultures and the commonality of European 
culture and its appreciation across member state borders. 
The emergence of European cultural interaction and networks provides a counterpoint 
to the eroding effects of economic and cultural globalisation. The cooperation 
between Europeans in the cultural sphere and the institutional support granted to pan- 
71 
See European Commission — DG X — Cultural Activity at 
http://europa.eu.int/commidg10/culture/index-en.html   
72  Ibid., 200. 
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European cultural activities by the EU means that local and national identities are 
preserved and the cultural rights of individual communities protected. As the EU 
argues: 
"The public need not consider the Union as something which dilutes their 
cultural identities, but rather as something which guarantees the existence and 
flowering of such cultures."73 . 
Cultural flows across European national frontiers accelerate trans-national 
employment opportunities, thus furthering European associations, networks and a 
common European sense of community. They further promote European-based social 
cohesion by promoting cultural and social inclusion. In short Pan-European cultural 
networks confirm European identity as they accelerate European social cohesion and 
unity and provide an institutionaly supported realisation of cultural difference 
without such diference being politicaly mobilised. 
9.7 	 Pan European Social Actions and Relationships 
Delineating the observable paterns of social relationships in Europe is not an easy 
task, however there are two indicators of pan-European social cohesion that we wish 
to examine: 
1. The European Movement; and 
2. Trans-European Mobility. 
9.7.1 The European Movement 
The European Movement is an independent voluntary association which exists to 
promote the economic, political and social development of Europe. Membership of 
the movement, according to the movement come from a wide range of political 
parties, from the corporate world and from interest groups, academics and the 
corporate sector. 
73 Communication from the Commission to the EP and Council of the Regions 
htp:/europa.eu.int/comm/4g10/culture/program-2000-part1_en.html,  1-2. 
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The European movement, through a wide variety of activities attempts to shape 
individual and collective European attitudes to Europe. Further it seeks to play an 
active role in influencing the policy process and in the promotion of public discussion 
on issues relating tho the development of Europe and the implications for individual 
Europeans and the Member States. Activities undertaken to build cross-national 
relationships amongst Europeans include the organisation of conferences, lectures, 
briefings on European developments, submissions to Government, provision of 
information services, including a monthly newsletter on European Affairs. The 
European Movement also organises a number of European awards and Educational 
competitions. 74 
European Action and Interaction - European Mobility and Identity -  An increasingly 
mobile European population is relocating from one member state to another. This 
network of population flows suggests that Europeans are becoming more aware of 
their rights of pan-European settlement. It further suggests that they are less 'national' 
in regard to their territorial aspects of identity formation. In 1990 over 600,000 
persons left one Member State to settle in another. According to a study 
commissioned by Eurostat, European emigrants tend to move towards the centre of 
the European Union. Portugal and Greece have the highest levels of emigration, while 
Italy and Spain, which for decades had high levels of emigration, are currently 
witnessing the return of a number of persons who emigrated at the start of the 1980s. 
74 
European Movement -Ireland Home Page www.europeanmovement.ie  
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Table 9.4 	 Estimate of Migratory Flows Between the Countries of the 
European Union 1993/4 
Country of Emigration Total Immigration/1000 Principle State of 
Immigration 
EU 12 600.8 
Belgium 40.8 France 
Denmark 8.3 United Kingdom 
Germany 145.2 Italy/Greece 
Greece 22.5 Germany 
Spain 42.8 France 
France 85.9 UK/Germany 
Ireland 25.3 UK 
Italy 59.0 Germany 
Luxembourg 20.7 Portugal 
Netherlands 32.3 Germany 
Portugal 12.4 Germany 
United Kingdom 105.3 Ireland 
Source: Commission of the European Communities A Social Portrait of Europe.(Luxembourg: Office 
of Official Publications of the European Communities. 1996) p.37 
Intra-European mobility is increasing. Europeans are moving around Europe freely, 
with a reversal of the centre/periphery model. While many Germans are moving to the 
Mediterranean states, those at Europe's periphery, such as Portugal and Greece, are 
moving to the European centre. 
9.7.2 Trans-European Mobility 
We should further consider trans-European mobility in the context of European 
holiday paterns. To the extent that Europeans choose to stay in another European 
State we suggest a higher degree of trans-European interaction, and communal 
identity formation through such interaction. According to the first Commission of the 
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European Communities Eurobarometer survey on the profile and habits of Europeans 
on holiday, six out of ten Europeans when travelling 'abroad' their main destination 
was to another European Member state. Significantly, only in nine percent of cases do 
Europeans spend holidays in a country outside the EU. 75 For the calendar year 1997 
53% of Europeans had either travelled, or intended to travel, away from home for 
holidays. The Danish (74%), Dutch (70%), Swedish (68%), and Finns (65%) are the 
most mobile on their holidays, while the Austrians (41%), Irish (38%), and 
Portuguese (33%) are the least mobile. 76 
Culture and history rates highly in the rationale for European holiday-makers to 
holiday in Europe, demonstrating the acceptance of and interest in edmocultural 
diversity in Europe. Historic centres in towns are visited by at least 60% of Europeans 
on holidays. Half of them visit other European museums, exhibitions and 
archaeological sites, as well as nature parks and reserves. There is also a strong 
interest in visiting religious sites and churches (40% of those surveyed). 77 Such results 
demonstratean openness to pan-European cultures and traditions and an interest in 
other cultures and religions from amongst a majority of European travellers which is 
consistent with a highly tolerant, multicultural European civil society. 
European Student Mobility - Student mobility is the major form of mobility for 
European citizens. Under the EU education and training programs, including 
ERASMUS and TEMPUS, the phenomena of trans-European (student) mobility has 
become a leading example of the effectiveness of European action and interaction at 
contributing to a sense of European identification. The stock of mobile students 
within the EU represented some 184,000 people in 1993/94, two-thirds of whom 
(120,000) fell within the category of spontaneous mobility and one third within the 
category of organised mobility. The stock of mobile students represents some two 
percent of the total student population of the EU, which has been estimated by the 
75 The European Commission, Directorate General XX 1 11 Enterprise Policy, Distributive Trades, 
Tourism and Cooperatives 'Europeans on Holiday - results of the first Commission of the European 
Communities Eurobarometer Survey at http://europa.eu.Int/en/comm/dg23/tourisme/press/eubar-






Commission to be 9 milion in 1993-94. It is possible to conclude from these figures 
that total European student mobility is stil a relatively marginal phenomenon, despite 
the efforts of the EU. However the percentage of mobile European students varies 
considerable between European member states. It is low (around one percent) in the 
Mediterranean countries and Finland. Whereas it is high in Austria (5.6%), which is 
the leading host nation of students, the United Kingdom (four percent) and Belgium 
(3.6%)." 
9.8 	 Pan-European Actions and Relationships - Concluding Remarks 
Europe is increasingly characterised by a complex matrix of colaborations, aliances 
and links between European economic, social political and cultural participants. 
European action and relationships form the basis of a communal European social 
seting and as such constitutes a colective European frame of reference and identity 
separate and distinct from others 
The imperative of economic globalisation has necessitated the removal of state-based 
impediments to pan-European interactions and relationships. Increased 
competitiveness and accelerated European growth that has resulted from the 
realisation of a truly single European market have been important for wealth creation, 
employment generation and welfare distribution. It has further established a distinct 
European economic network with its own structures and activities which progresses 
European identity by colective reward distribution and cooperative interaction. 
Politicaly, as our analysis demonstrates, Europeans are increasingly interested, and 
participating in European political life. Increasing participation in European elections, 
interest in civil rights and the increase in frequency in claims against the European 
Parliament and Commission are indicative of a progressive European participatory 
civil society. This model enhances communal European identification through the 
development of colective engagement of European citizens in political issues that 
transcend national frontiers. 
78 See European Institute of Education and Social Policy 1996 'Student Mobility within the 
European Union'., I. 
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Pan-European NG0s, social movements and interest groups are demonstrative of the 
increasing nature of European interaction and the intensity of European political self-
consciousness on a pan-European level. Such groups have had the effect not only of 
increasing self-identification amongst their respective memberships with the cause 
concerned, but further has resulted in a far greater level of interaction between 
Europeans, contributing, in part to a greater sense of European identification. They 
colectively unite Europeans from across a range of national, cultural and 
ethnolinguistic boundaries. European interest groups have arisen out of the increased 
'distance' between centres of societal decision-making, which have progressively 
shifted from the national to the supranational level. While the basis of European 
political movements may vary, the significance of these associations is that they have 
emerged within a European context and have developed a high degree of interaction 
and intercommunication across intra-European boundaries.79 
The range of cultural and social actions and relationships are broad and multi-
dimensional. They contribute to a cohesive, European community of sentiment, 
which as we have observed earlier in Chapter Three is a key feature of identity. They 
constitute a new set of understandings and linkages between Europeans that transcend 
the existent state system. While the process of globalisation is having a massive and 
historicaly unprecedented effect on the reconstitution of cultural products and the 
information society, European social and cultural relationships, with the active and 
open support of the EU, are enduring. They are creating a distinctly European social 
and cultural sphere. The increasing integration of economics, politics and 
sociocultural policy, such as positive employment support in the cultural field and the 
creation of a distinct European information society is contributing to a heightened 
sense of awareness of Europe and Europeanness which is consistent with the 
evocation of European distinctiveness and uniqueness. 
79 	 . 	 . 	i While it s possible to conclude that European political engagement has been given greater 
weight by the emergence and activities of European interest and pressure groups, it is not possible to 
quantify the contribution of such a process to European identity formation. While pan-European 
political movements exert an influence on the European consciousness, their existence may further 
suggest a general internationalist and cosmopolitan consciousness that may not serve a European 
identity at al. Accordingly while the rise of European interest and pressure groups demonstrate a 
greater degree of European political engagement we cannot conclude that they are a necessary 
component of a Pan-European identity. 
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9.8.1 Common Cognitive Boundary 
A discernible cognitive boundary, demonstrated by in-group favouritism and out 
group discrimination - both positive discrimination of other collective members and 
negative discrimination of the constructed 'other'. 
Europe's Relationship with the 'Other' - Central to the assertion of identity is the 
discourse of difference and exclusion. We have previously examined the essentially 
discursive and socially constructed nature of identity, and in so doing argued against 
the essentialist position of identity being fundamentally fixed and unchanging. Such a 
discursive nature of identity infers identity as being largely cognitive, symbolic and 
differential. Identity within the group is cognitively and symbolically constructed 
based upon culturally or civic determined representations systems and markers. This 
social and symbolic nature of identity formation is predicated upon symbolic and 
practical interaction and relationships between both group members and those who 
are outside the group. Thus both the symbolic conceptualisations of identity and the 
practical interactions of individuals and communities establish who is included and 
who is excluded. Thus the relationships outside the group boundary are at least 
equally important to the formation of identity as those within the group. 8° 
Because communal identity is essentially constructed within discourses of 'self' and 
'other' it is sustained by the marking of difference and exclusion. It is constructed by 
reference to that which it is not - the other. The construction of an identity is only 
possible because of what it is not. Identities can only function because of their 
capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 'outside'. As Stuart Hall relates: 
"Every identity has at its 'margin' an excess, something more. The unity, the 
internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a 
natural, but a constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its 
necessary, even if silenced and unspoken other, that which it lacks"81 
80 See Woodward, K. 'Concepts of Identity and Difference' in Woodward, K. Identity and 
Difference. (London: Sage Publications 1997), 11. 
81 
Hall, S. "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" in Hall, Stuart & du Gay, Paul (eds.) Questions 
of Cultural Identity., 5. 
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The demarcation of boundaries is central to the process of identity formation. 
Through the relationship between 'us' and 'others' members of a community are able 
to mark out who they are and to differentiate between members and non-members. In 
the case of Europe - between Europeans and non-Europeans. As such European 
identity is produced through a series of relationships some affirmed and inclusive, 
while others are negated and excluded. The creation of a coherent sense of identity is 
a result of dynamic relationships of both affirmations and acceptance of the 'insider' 
and rejection and denial of the `outsider'. 82 
Perhaps the definitive 'ethnic' analysis of the relationship between Europe and the 
'other' and the construction of Western representations and identity is that offered by 
Said. 83 Referring to this process as Orientalism, a concise interpretation of the 
paradigm is put by Turner: 
"Orientalism as a discourse divides the globe unambiguously into Occident 
and Orient; the latter is essentially strange, exotic and mysterious, but also 
sensual, irrational and potentially dangerous. . . . The point of Orientalism, 
according to Said, was to orientalise the Orient and it did so in the context of 
fundamental colonial inequalities. Orientalism was based on the fact that we 
know or talk about the Orientals, whereas they neither know themselves 
adequately nor talk about us." 84 
Accordingly our consideration of the significance of relationships in the construction 
of a European identity must contain an analysis of those relationships between those 
included and excluded from the common European Home, and the basis of such 
inclusion and exclusion. We argue that in the contemporary period that the discursive 
element of European identity is based on 'civic' grounds. The European rejection of 
the 'other' is not rooted in ethnic or linguistic criteria, but rather in civic elements. 
Europeans reject those of the South or the East not because they are of a different 
ethnolinguistic or cultural group, but rather the erection of a common cognitive 
boundary of exclusion is based on the communal fears amongst Europeans that 
associates such out-groups with organised crime, drug trafficking, civil and human 
82 
See Evans, M. 'Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe' in Jenkins, B. & Sofos, A. 
(eds.) Nation & Identity in Contemporary Europe., 33. 
83 See Said, E. Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978), for a critique of Orientalism see Lewis, 
B. 'The Question of Orientalism' New York Review of Books 29:11 (June 24 1982), 49-56. 
84 Turner, B. Religion and Social Theory. (London: Heinemann Educational Books 1983). 
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rights abuses. Such qualities which are perceived as threatening European security 
and the enjoyment of European civic rights. 
The Symbolic European 'Stranger/Enemy - The identification of individual or groups 
not deemed to belong is a central element in any collectivity, including nations and 
emerging nations. 85 While the Jewish community, the Gipsies, and the Muslim have, 
historically been symbolically categorised as non-Europeans, the asylum seeker and 
the immigrant now play a central role in the creation of the European other. 
Immigration and the Literature of Ethnocentrism in Europe - It is important to make a 
distinction between the practice and reality of European exclusion and its resultant 
basis of a common European cognitive boundary. We are conscious of the extensive 
contemporary literature addressing the nature of racism, anti-immigration and 
xenophobia in Europe. However, while we do not deny its veracity, we question the 
basis of all such behaviours in Europe. We challenge the accepted basis of European 
exclusion, (but not its manifestation). European exclusion is a process that is both 
complex and diverse. We suggest that notwithstanding the very public occurrences of 
ethnic exclusion that it is, in the majority of circumstances, essentially based on civic, 
rather than ethnic, grounds. A brief review of the literature is illuminating. Muntz's 
analysis of European ethnocentrism suggests as Europe has not seen itself as an 
immigrant society, not withstanding the social and demographic realities of the post 
85 The position of the Jew, the Gipsies, and the Muslim symbolically categorised as non-
Europeans within European history have played a cental role in the affirmation of a European identity. 
Importantly, the relationships with these 'others' is still a distinctive, but peripheral, element in the 
affirmation of Europeaness. Although the new anti-Semitism has much in common with the 
experiences of historical Europe, the perceived unacceptable qualities of Jewry is now invoked under 
new historical conditions and within a context specific to current circumstances. 85 Within 
contemporary European racist literature Jews are symbolically characterised as 'alien, rootless' and 
fundamentally anti-European. The revival of the debate of the authenticity of the 'Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion' in a number of European states (albeit mostly Eastern) is evidence that some Europeans 
are yet to develop a more inclusive and humane relationship with its Jewish community. As with the 
relationship with the Jews, the Gipsies have also been subjected to renewed hostility and suffered less 
than satisfactory relationships with Eastern Europeans. According to Evans: "In common with anti-
Semitism, anti-Roma racism is deeply embedded within European Culture." The period since 1989 has 
seen a heightening of the relationship of persecution between Europeans and the Roma, most especially 
in Eastern Europe. For (ethnically-based) nationalists, for whom the attachment to territory and the 
creation of a homogenous society are paramount, the Gipsies disrupt these assumptions and thus are the 
object of loathing. "Their whole existence is viewed as a threat, undermining ethnic purity". 85 see 
Hockenos, P. Free to Hate., (London: Routledge 1993). For an analysis of the circumstances in Eastern 
Europe see Landsman, N. 'Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe' Journal of Area Studies, 1994, no.4, 159- 
71 and Evans, M. 'Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe', 43. 
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war period, that there is an implicit tension between Europeans and those that they 
considered as 'foreign'. Notwithstanding, such foreigners have residency, and in some 
cases, citizenship status.86 Evans argues that European cultural identity, increasingly 
politicised in the post-war period, is contrasted with those who 'don't belong' within 
the European cultural hemisphere.87 While Heisler and Layton-Henry argue that 
contemporary migration in Europe chalenges the ability of states to control their 
borders, and thus leads to both an institutional and individual reluctance to accept 
those potential migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.8 Even within these narratives 
of exclusion there is the suggestion of a non-ethnocentric basis of European 
exclusion. Munz analysis reveals that European exclusion is a sub-text for those who 
fail to fuly socialy and politicaly integrate into European society, rather than their 
ethnolinguistic 'otherness'. Evan's analysis suggests that the rejection of the 'other', 
while clothed in culture and ethnicity, is rooted in economics; suggested in the phrase: 
"Europe is not a welfare ofice for the Mediteranean".89 While the societal insecurity 
created by the European other, according to Heisler and Layton-Henry, is essentialy 
concerned with increased pressures on European economic and social life caused by 
migrants and asylum seekers. Thus while nationalist and ethnocentric logics are 
initialy formulated and deployed in the articulation of the European other, we argue 
that civic conceptions — centring upon questions of perceived economic and political 
insecurity — informs the construction and subsequent rejection of the European 
'other'. 
A Revised Basis of European Exclusion - The ideology of nationalism, fascism and 
ethnocentrism is difficult to ignore as a source of European exclusion; it is very 
public, very atractive to the media and thus very much in the public eye. However if 
we abstract out the root of the opposition to immigrants and asylum seekers in 
contemporary Europe we find the opposition is generaly civic rather than ethnicaly 
86 Munz, R. 'A Continent of Migration: European mass migration in the Twentieth Century'. New 
Community 22(2) 1996, 201-226. 
87 Evans, M. 'Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe', 33-53. 
88 	 . Heisler, M. & Layton-Henry, Z. 'Migration and the Links Between Social and Societal 
Security' in Waever, 0. et al (eds) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe., 148- 
166. 
89 Evans, M. 'Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe', 47. 
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based. Europeans collectively reject the 'other' not because of ethnic or racial 
grounds, but rather because of the perceived threat of increased crime, economic 
competition and the potential weakening of the European project. Europeans are 
united as Europeans in their rejection of individuals and collectivities which are 
perceived as threatening 'European' security and rights. 
While Europeans find the prospect of increased immigration problematic they are not 
ethnocentric. Rather they are Eurocentric - they do not reject those of different racial 
or ethnic origins, because of their ethnic identity. However there is evidence that they 
do collectively object to the potential threat to their way of life, from increased crime, 
drugs and institutional and financial challenges that additional people present. 
If we consider European attitudes to factors such as institutional enlargement, to 
ethnicity, to other racial groups and immigration we find results that confirms our 
hypothesis that European exclusion of the 'other' is based on civic rather than ethnic 
grounds. 
European Positive Attitudes to Enlargement - Europeans consider the enlargement of 
the European Union, and the affiliated increase in European peoples, positively. As 
the table below outlines, 67% of EU citizens believe that the Union would be more 
important in the world if it were larger. Further Europeans are welcoming of cultural 
diversity. Sixty-one percent of Europeans believe that Europe would be culturally 
enriched as a result of enlargement. Such a phenomenon is inconsistent with the 
accepted paradigm that European exclusion is rooted in ethnic criteria. What does 
concern Europeans about enlargement is the costs which additional membership 
would involve. Europeans see that the inclusion of more peoples will have a 
detrimental economic, rather than cultural effect on Europe; as the table outlines 47% 
of EU citizens believe that their respective member state will receive less financial 
assistance if the EU is enlarged. Further 49% of Europeans believe that there will be a 
cost to pre-existing member states. 
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The more countries within the EU the 
more important it wil be in the world. 
67 17 16 
With more member countries Europe 
wil be culturaly richer 
61 21 18 
The more countries there are in the EU 
the more peace and security wil be 
guaranteed in Europe 
59 25 16 
Once new countries have joined the EU 
our country wil receive less financial 
aid from it 
47 26 27 
The enlargement wil not cost more to 
existing member countries 
28 49 23 
Source :Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48, p50. 
The Gulf War experience demonstrated the civic rather than ethnic basis of European 
exclusion. If European exclusion is rooted in ethnic signifiers then, given the difering 
ethnic origins of the Arab world and of the resident Muslim community residing in 
Europe, we should expect to find a heightened sense of opposition and resistance to 
both the Arab world and the EU Muslim community dating to the time of the Gulf 
conflict. Quite the contrary is the case. Despite the fact that 39% of Europeans 
expressed the view that an expanded war was likely, 70% of Europeans had not 
altered their feelings towards the Arab world, and 77% had not altered their feelings 
towards European Muslims. In fact 45% of Europeans viewed the Arab world more 
favourably, and 2% viewed European Muslims likewise. This evidence suggests that 
exclusion in Europe can not be atributed to ethnic criteria.90 
9.8.2 The Basis of the European Cognitive Boundary - What Makes the 'Other' Non 
-European? 
If we consider the enlargement criteria considered important by Europeans we find 
that cultural or ethnic homogeneity are not the issues considered significant by most 
Europeans. Enlargement issues focus on the civic - respect for human rights, most 
90 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 34, 34. 
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importantly, the fight against crime, the protection of the environment, and the 
economics of enlargement. 








The country has to respect Human 
Rights and the principles of democracy 
93 2 5 
It has to fight organised crime and drug 
traficking 
91 4 5 
It has to protect the environment 90 5 5 
It has to be able to pay its share 80 9 11 
Its level of economic development 
should be closer to that of other 
member states 
72 18 10 
Source Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 49 p62. 
This table is evidence that the majority of Europeans wish to see the new entrants to 
the EU protect its civic, rather than ethnic, values. Democracy, human rights, the 
environment, fiscal probity, these are the issues — the civic issues that denotes the 
basis of 'otherness'. They are not ethnic criteria of language, race or ethnicity. 
9.8.3 European Acceptance of Peoples from non-EU Countries 
Highlighting the civic basis of European exclusion we can correlate the level of 
acceptance of peoples from outside of the EU to the priority areas for both action 
from the European Parliament and European's preferences for increased funding 
within the EU. Europeans share a common fear that enlargement wil potentialy 
compromise human rights, democracy, lead to an increase in organised crime and a 
degradation of the European environment, as wel as expressing fears as to the 
economic implications of enlargement. Such concerns are mirrored in the demands 
from Europeans for greater financial input into the fight against violence, terrorism 
and drug traficking (78% want an increase).91 
91 Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer 48, 66. 
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Europeans, as the figures below demonstrate, do not reject peoples  of another 
nationality, or another racial group on the basis of their ethnicity alone. 
Figure 9.4 	 Acceptance of People of Another Nationality 'mum I 111 
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On average, 83% of Europeans are accepting of others of another nationality, and 
81% accept people of another race, clearly demonstrating that Europeans, while being 
Eurocentric, are not ethnocentric. Even in those states where there have been notable 
occurrences of ethnicaly-related violence - France and Germany - the acceptance of 
other nationality and races, from amongst the general population is high. In Germany 
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acceptance of 'another nationality' is 79% and 'another race' 76%, while in France 
the figures are 85% and 78% respectively. Europeans do not reject the 'other' on 
ethnic or racial grounds, thus we must look to other reasons for Europeans difficulty 
with the 'other'. 
9.8.4 What do Europeans Reject in the 'Other'? 
Europeans are united in their rejection of the 'other' on grounds of security and civic 
rights. Perceived threats to the structures and workings of liberal democracy, rising 
crime and faling economic returns to pre-existing EU states forms the basis of 
European exclusion, not ethnic or racial issues. Europeans reject the EU financial 
'cake' being divided any further, wish to return to more 'traditional ' lifestyles without 
the perceived threat of crime and poverty that the non-European is perceived as 
representing.92 The above analysis suggests that Europeans do not wish to exclude 
those from south and Eastern Europe on ethnic grounds. Europeans are apprehensive 
of rising crime, economic recession and threats to political stability and democracy, 
that they perceive may result from the inclusion of non-Europeans. Accordingly the 
rationale behind European exclusionary practice and perception are essentialy civic 
not ethnic. Claims made by commentators that Europeans are in the contemporary 
period, ethnicaly biased, misinterpret the more substantial basis of European 
exclusion. Although it would be naive to suggest that some European citizens do not 
discriminate against the European 'other' on racial and ethnic grounds, the core 
European population bases its discrimination on fiscal, normative and criminal 
grounds. On the basis that the 'other' represents a threat to European social, political 
and economic rights, and security. 
9.9 	 A Community of Europeans Within the European Community? 
9.9.1 Towards a European Civil Society 
The cumulative effect of the emergence of the dense institutional, community, non- 
government, cultural and business relationships, common European values and 
political preferences, the expression of a common European form of self-description 
92 For a current assessment of the economic imperatives of European exclusion see 'A Single 
Market in Crime' The Economist  October 16 1998, 23-25. 
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and belonging demonstrates the emergence of a European civil society. Such a 
European civil society reflecting and existing as a consequence of a common 
European civic identity. 
9.9.2 The Development of an European Society93 
In order to demonstrate that the above attitudes, relationships and economic, political 
and societal structures constitute a distinct European society - independent of pre-
existing state structures we must first consider what is meant by a 'Society' - European 
or otherwise. 
Simmel argues that society is understood as: 
"When we talk of society we mean. . . whenever several individuals stand in a 
reciprocal relationship to one another . . .out of the sum total of individual 
elements which constitute it, a new entity emerges."94 
Whereas Bensman and Rosenberg suggest that; 
"Society is a continuous chain of role expectancies and behaviour resulting 
from role expectancies. To put it another way, society is a fairly stable 
network of social relationships based on relatively uniform and predictable 
behaviour maintained between specific individuals in specified positions." 95 
9.9.3 The Nature of Civil Society 
While it is not our intention to give an exhaustive conceptualisation of civil society, a 
preliminary analysis of its meaning is necessary. 
93 
We are aware of the literature doubting the possibility of a continuous European societal 
artefact. Europe is uniting at a time when her distinctiveness is becoming increasingly problematic. 
Faced with growing cosmopolitanism, rising immigration and asylum pressures, the spread of 
culturally syncretic mass media, telecommunications, global interdependence, the globalisation of 
social relationships, the globalisation of demographic and ecological imbalances and the globalisation 
of trade and industry, specifically European characteristics may become less distinct. 
94 Georg Simmel 'Zur Methodik der Social wissenschaften', Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, 
Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft, vol 20, 1896, 232-232; Frisby, D & Sayer, D. (trans. and ed.) 
Society. (London: Tavistock 1986), 58. 
95 Bensman, J. and Rosenberg B. 1963 Mass, Class and Bureaucracy: The Evolution of 
Contemporary Society. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall 1963), 1963 Extract in 
Thompson K. Key Quotations in Sociology. (London: Routledge 1996), 105. 
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It was from the work of Aristotle that we derive the essential notion of civil society. 
The Aristolian interpretation of civil society was politike Koinonia [political society 
or community]. Aristotle considered that the state was divided between political 
society (polls) and the household (oikos). It was not until the sixteenth century that the 
nature of the relationship between the state and its constituent society was considered. 
In The Prince, Machiavelli utilised the conception of a civil society to delineate the 
relationship between the ruler and his subjects. The influence of the enlightenment 
theorists in projecting the nature of civil society is pivotal. The liberal theorists; 
Locke, Hume, Paine and de Tocqueville, in stressing the primacy of the individual in 
political life , considered civil society as being separate from the state and capable of 
autonomous action. The conservative theorists, such as Hobbes and Hegel, considered 
Civil society being created and under the direction of the state. 
The Liberal Model of Civil Society - The nature of civil society, within the liberal 
paradigm was most strongly articulated by David Hume and John Locke. For Locke 
the nature of Civil society was such that its formation was an organic process where 
free men in order to escape the "inconveniences, insecurity and violence" 96 formed a 
society which in turn collectively ceded its political authority to a political society. 
The act of formation of a political 'Common-wealth' is always preceded by the 
formation of a [civil] community. 97 The primary motivation of moving from the state 
of nature to a community (a civil society) to a political commonwealth, is the 
protection of 'life, liberty and estate', the nature of the relationship between civil 
society and political commonwealth is based upon the social contract. It is from the 
primacy of the individual and the civil community that the basis and legitimacy of 
Government is established Government 'must be by the people and aimed soley at 
their own good.' 98 Hume confirmed the pre-eminence of civil society over political 
society. He argued that civil society emerged out of the need to move away from the 
96 Macperson, C. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1962), 247. Quoted in Thomas, N. Democracy Denied Ph.D Thesis University of 
Tasmania, 1998. 
97 Locke, J. The Second Treatise of Government. (Hackett Publishers 1980), 99. 
98 Goodwin, B. Using Political Ideas. (London 1992), 181. 
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uncertainties of the state of nature, which then facilitated a political society that 
involved the formation of governing structures. 99 
It was the work of Alexis de Tocqueville in his work Democracy in America that the 
concept of, and necessity for an autonomous civil society blossomed. De Tocqueville 
saw the rise of the universalist state as dangerous and saw in the United States the 
lively complex set of non-state based relationships and associations that offered the 
best defence against the ambitions of an increasingly voracious political society. De 
Tocqueville viewed the range of American civil associations including 'scientific and 
literary circles, schools, publishers, inns, manufacturing enterprises, religious 
organisations, municipal associations and independent households' 1°° as being 
integral components of a self-perpetuating, autonomous civil society. Rather than 
being the product of the state, or subject to the control of the state such relationships 
and organisations acted to prevent the expansion of the state and to create an 
independent society. 1°1 
Civil Society and Contemporary Theorists - The heightened academic interest in the 
transformation of societies in the late modern period, the revival of conceptions of 
difference, ethnolinguistic diversity and the explosion of new social movements has 
resulted in a heightened interest in the nature of civil society in the late modern 
period. The decline of sovereignty thesis has been parallelled by the increased 
awareness of an expanding non-political societal space or a post-modern civil society. 
As Roniger has commented: 
"Expectations had it that social movements, voluntary associations and 
intermediate institutions of civil society would effect an overall reconstruction 
of the political centres and a reformation of community through a strong 
emphasis on participation and the endorsement of an egalitarian vision of 
rights and entitlements." 1°2 
99 See Chintis, A. The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History. (London: Croom helm 1976). 
100 de Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America., 90. 
101 See Thomas N. Democracy Denied, 176. 
102  Roniger, L. 'Civil Society, Patronage and Democracy' International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology. 1994 vol.35, no.3-4, 207. 
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Civil society in the contemporary period may be interpreted in two ways. Firstly it can 
be conceived as a space containing separate and overlapping spheres of social 
activity: 
"Where privately and cooperatively owned enterprises, independent 
communications media and autonomously run cultural centres operate without 
direct interference from political agencies or other third parties." 1°3 
Thus civil society becomes an autonomous, self-defining, and self-perpetuating space 
independent of the state. 
9.9.4 A European Civil Society 
From the preceding analysis we may summarise a civil society in the following 
manner; 
Civil society comprises of: 
1. independent organisations, associations and relationships which 
populate the space between the state and the individual; 
2. at the sociocultural level this includes organic organisations, 
associations, cooperative of a social or cultural nature, including social 
movements and interest groups, free of state control; 
3. at the economic level it includes the elements of a free-market 
economy, including private ownership of capital, the free transfer of 
goods and capital and security of private ownership of property; and 
4. at the political level it includes non-state sponsored political 
movements, politically orientated non-government organisations and 
key elements of liberal democratic practise, including freedom of 
association, citizenship and independent political movements vying for 
power. 
Accordingly, in what manner can we talk of a European civil society? 
The complex matrix of collaborations and alliances between European social, cultural 
and economic partners and the active efforts made to combat social exclusion and 
promote an inclusive non-discriminatory and economically equitable Europe is highly 
103 Held, D. 'From City-States to Cosmopolitan Order' in Held, D. (ed.) Prospects for 
Democracy: North, South, East, West. (Cambridge: Polity Press 1993), 42. 
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suggestive of the existence of a distinct and active European society. The expression 
of a distinct European culture, in terms of cosmologies, political practices and 
technologies, exported to much of the rest of the world, further suggests a unique 
European society. However the export of much of the basis of this sociopolitical, 
cultural and economic practices has paradoxicaly reduced the distinctiveness of 
Europe herself. 1°4 
Notwithstanding the effects of growing cosmopolitanism, high levels of immigration 
and the spread of media, telecommunications world trade and industry which has had 
the effect of blurring the territorial frontiers of Europe, we are justified in referring to 
a distinct European civil society. A society Independent of the rest of the world, and 
largely independent from the societies of individual European states. 
The process of political and economic integration within Europe that began with the 
Treaty of Rome has had a profound effect on both individual national societies and 
has assisted in the formation of a pan-European society. There is litle doubt, as the 
analysis in this work has suggested, that the introduction of the single market, the 
evolution of 'Social Europe' and the emphasis on regional Europe, amongst many 
other institutional measures, have linked the peoples of Europe together in a way that 
adds substance to the broad, but stil il-defined cultural, political and artistic 
inheritance that commonly defines 'Europeaness'. The atempt to develop European 
economic and political activity in a cohesive manner has had a 'spilover' efect on not 
only European polity building but also large-scale society building.105 
While on a superficial level it could be argued that a European society is an uncertain 
phenomena; that Europe is nothing more than a territorial expression lacking the 
characteristic networks of associations strong enough to realise an independently 
dynamic society, the contemporary trans-national trends suggests otherwise.1°6 There 
104 	 . Giner, S. 'The Advent of a European Society' in Haler, M. & Richter, R. Toward a European 
Nation: Political Trends in Europe., 15-31, 17. 
105  Ibid., 19. 
106 I am particularly concerned here for the sorts of criticisms Anthony Smith has made of the 
lack of an independent European Cultural or historical sphere see Smith, A.D. 'Nations and 
Nationalism in a Global Era'. 
381 
is a belief in the experience of a European society 'rising above and beyond the deep 
cleavages and confrontations that have divided her peoples'.1°7 Theorists such as 
Weber, Simmel and Pareto, Karl Mannheim and Norbert Elias have suggested there is 
a unique European Weltgeschichtliche (community of destiny). More practicaly, 
European culture politics and social structure are sufficiently unique and different to 
other non-European modes of society so as to warant not only the idea of a European 
society, but its practical manifestation.1°8 
While for a considerable period European civil society could only be described as 
being signified by such qualities as liberalism, socialism, capitalism, citizenship and 
the divide between private and public life (civil/political society) the acceleration of 
European integration since the end of the Second World War has made it possible to 
consider European society from a less theoretical viewpoint. 
The manifestation of a singular European society comes from a variety of sources. 
The growth of European youth organisations, distinct European social and cultural 
networks, the flow of Europeans across the European landscape and the development 
of both smal and large scale European industry linkages, are but a limited example of 
the wide range of increasing deeply rooted social, economic and cultural linkages 
across Europe. The explosion in the number range and interests of European 
organisations and associations, the cross-national trade flows and trans-European 
economic mergers and employment flows is matched by the rise in power and 
potency of European non-government organisations and pressure and lobby groups. 
It is central to the consideration of the development of an autonomous European 
society to appreciate the intimate involvement of the institutions of the European 
Communities. Policies and programs designed to promote trans-European economic 
and social cohesion, the promotion of education and information flows and the 
creation of a meaningful European network society are al trends that have reinforced 
the linkages made at the local and non-institutional level. Programs such as the 
Eramus program have served not only to ensure that Europeans remain sympathetic to 
107 	. Giner, S.  The Advent of a European Society', 21. 
108 Ibid.  
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European functional integration, but also that they move beyond a common market to 
a common society. We have examined above that a civil society may act 
independently of the apparatus of the political society (a liberal interpretation) or be 
conditioned by existing political structures (the authoritarian model of civil society). 
In the case of contemporary Europe neither model is entirely applicable, European 
political institutions are actively intervening in shaping a European civil society, 
however such a society is designed to exhibit enormous ethnic, linguistic, cultural and 
societal diversity. Unlike the Hobbesian State, contemporary Europe celebrates rather 
than attempts to banish societal variety and difference. 
As empirical indicators of common European socio-economic activities converge 
there is a corresponding convergence in European society. The rise in European life 
expectancy, the shift from manufacturing to service industries, the harmonisation of 
welfare provisions throughout Europe and the reduction of gender inequality, 
increasing secularisatrion and greater education retention rates, and the growth of 
European higher education reveals the homogenous nature of European society on a 
variety of levels. Put simply, as Europeans move towards more uniform social, 
economic, educational, cultural and political conditions, the rise of trans-European 
independent organisations, associations and relationships will become as 
characteristic at the supranational level as they were at the national level during the 
period of initial state-formation in Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. 
As macro-level political communities converge, and establish policy platforms to 
unite Europeans within specific socio-economic parameters the unsteady convergence 
of proto-national communities that occurred under the dynamic of European State-
formation, will be replicated. 
Developments such as these - the growth of European economic, cultural, social and 
political interpenetration beyond state and ethnic boundaries have according to Giner 
forced: 
6 4 • • . a substantial number of intellectuals and social scientists to address 
themselves to the implications of the possible rise of one single economy, one 




As European 'national' societies become bound together politically, economically 
socially and culturally the process of fusion and interpenetration results in distinct 
sub-national ethnic and cultural communities existing and thriving under one political 
order. Within such an order communal identity is defined by citizenship and 
participation in a single market, a single social landscape, a single society: a unified 
Europe. 
It is important to note that we are not suggesting that the existence of a unique 
European civil society precludes the ongoing existence of national, or sub-national 
societies. As we have previously argued, it is plausible that various modes of societal 
interaction can exist in parallel with one another. Further the various historical 
influences that produced stronger national civil societies in such European states as 
England and Sweden and weaker national civil societies in Italy or Spain, while acting 
as indirect prompts to the evolution of a pan-European civil society will not retard the 
general shift towards European society. Nor are we excluding the nature of civil 
society in the Eastern European hemisphere, notwithstanding significant impediments 
to its development: I° 
110  Prior to the liberal-democratic transformations in Eastern Europe the basis of civil society was 
authoritarian, that is the state attempted to control, manipulate and incorporate all approved forms of 
social and political activity into the public realm of the state. The private realm was derivative and 
ideologically conditioned by the public, political society. It should additionally be noted that the most 
powerful expression of civil society was found in the former soviet bloc: the Solidarity Movement in 
Poland. 
Civil society in such circumstances thus existed in an environment of collective cognitive dissonance - 
there was the officially sanctioned civil society and the unofficial, more vital civil society of unofficial 
associations and relationships. Political society created sufficient ideological space for the emergence 
of ideologically-consistent civil structures and associations. Thus non-state civic life was dependant 
upon the acquiescence of the state. While there were increasingly autonomous economic and cultural 
groupings within eastern Europe, eastern European authoritarian regimes found it impossible to allow 
for an autonomous civil society to emerge, within the liberal paradigm. Unofficial East European civil 
society was grass roots in orientation, self-organising and positioned in passive opposition to the state. 
The form taken by such society took in eastern Europe varied considerably; the basis of such 
organisations were variously religious, cultural or social an independent economic basis for civil 
society was not achieved until the political transformation had allowed for greater economic liberalism. 
The rise of an Eastern European civil society initially occurred in response to the decline in the 
structural integrity of the Eastern European states. The implosion of east European economies, and the 
growing social dissatisfaction that resulted from it and the sociopolitical space created by the 
liberalisation of Ideological doctrine in the Gorbachev era (post 1985) resulted in elements of the 
(unofficial) civil society challenge the state for legitimacy. A pivotal example of such an association 
was the solidarity movement in Poland and more generally the coalescence of groups associated with 
the 'Velvet Revolution' in Czechoslovakia. 
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Accordingly, we conclude that there is the visible assertion of a progressive, inclusive 
pan-European civil society. The pace and intensity of European convergence at the 
institutional level has assisted with a process that has its own dynamic as a 
consequence of the homogenising effect of market efficiency, increased education and 





To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield ... 
Approaching European Civic Identification 
10.1 Introduction 
This work has examined the nature of European identity in late modernity. It has 
tested the hypothesis that supranational institutions contribute to the development of 
transnational identity formation. The work has considered evidence of a contemporary 
civic form of communal identification within Europe. In an argument that informs our 
understanding of European identification we found that conceptions of European 
identity based on civic grounds form the basis of contemporary European identity and 
belonging. 
European identity, as this work has demonstrated, is rooted in the dynamics of 
European communal social, economic and political life. It demonstrates itself in a 
collective sympathy with, and participation in, European political culture and civic 
values. It is further demonstrated in the construction and rejection of the 'other' on 
civic grounds. 
As we stated in Chapter One, the question of how political communities, increasingly 
ethnically heterogeneous, socially fragmented and territorially dispersed, yet 
structurally and functionally linked, can contribute to the formation of a common 
consciousness and a common sense of identity, required attention. This thesis has 
established that the emergence of European supernational institutions and the 
development of effective mechanisms for the maintenance of European rights and 
security — in economic, social, political as well as ethnolinguistic terms - have 
contributed to collective European identification and the emergence of a (positive) 
European sentiment. 
The work initially discussed the difficulties associated with conceptions of both 
Europe and identity in late modernity. Identity, is, irrespective of its context, a deeply 
complex abstraction. It is built from social meanings and is transformed by social, 
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economic and political interaction. The complexity and diversity of the phenomena is 
illustrated by the crisis of identity in late modernity and by the challenges that 
different theorists have experienced in understanding the basis of such a crisis. The 
modernist construct of state-mediated national identity is, as we demonstrated, being 
undermined by the rapid growth of more 'authentic' signifiers of identity centred 
around narratives of consumption, gender, sexual orientation, environmentalism and, 
most potently, ethnolinguistic imagining. This crisis of identity, manifested in 
contemporary Europe by clusters of signification such as the multifarious regional 
movements and the neo-fascist movement, makes the elaboration of a homogenous 
sphere of national, let alone supranational identity, deeply problematic. Formulating a 
model of European identity, in the context of the heightened stylisation of identity, is 
thus difficult. 
Europe and 'Europeaness' have been variously configured. Europe has been analysed 
as a community of destiny, as a centre of a unique civilisation and as a bounded 
community of history, values and languages. Differing conceptions often reflect 
differing political, academic or economic agendas. As we observed, in the context of 
the breakdown of received notions of community and the incongruities of liberal 
democracy (that sustained the European state and the state-mediated `nation'), 
achieving an enduring understanding of contemporary European identity is highly 
problematic. This is especially so as a result of the normative and methodological 
suppositions that underlie each received paradigm of Europeaness, and the 
fundamental tensions between the two key paradigms of identity — ethnic and civic, as 
illustrated and defined by Greenfeld in her term Ressentiment. 
We began our examination of European identity by considering the differing 
discourses of identity. We found that developing a model of communal identification 
requires the articulation of several different kinds and levels of analysis. The thesis 
argued that it is possible to synthesise the main theoretical approaches to identity 
formation and to define identity in such a way as to adequately test for the existence 
of a European identity. We found that: 
Identity is best understood as a sense of belonging; to feeling part of a collectivity. It 
is associated with a readiness to adopt certain self-descriptions. 
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Identity formation is a process of community formation in which membership and 
association is based on a set of criteria which have both subjective and objective 
characteristics. Such as the characteristics of ethine or language, as in the case of 
'ethnic' identity or the features of citizenship, individualism and equality - as in the 
case of 'civic' identity. Identity is enabled by individuals, who by making favourable 
comparisons with the in-group and unfavourable comparisons with out-groups 
collectively categorise themselves as part of the collective. Communal identity is 
displayed in cooperative intra-group interaction, normative convergence and 
functional relations. 
Identity exists where individuals identift with and wish themselves to be identifiable 
as members of distinct social categories such as nations, ethnic groups or societies. 
Identity varies in accordance with the strength of the social attachments within the 
community (strong or weak) and the nature of the objects of such attachments (such 
as 'ethnic' or 'civic' signifiers - blood or citizenship, nation or society). Communal 
identity is also influenced by the benefits that individuals perceive as being attainable 
as a result of group membership. 
At its core identity is a subjective, psychological response to a set of objective 
conditions, which sorts the world into both favourable and unfavourable symbolic 
categorisations. 
Having established the nature of the discussion and established a definition of 
identity, the thesis considered the differing strands of communal identity, and their 
application within the European context. Ethnic conceptions of identity are associated 
with a selective form of remembering; the mythologisation of history, the veneration 
of one set of cultural traditions to the selective exclusion of others. It is also deeply 
influenced by the definition and exclusion of the 'other' based on a set of meanings 
which are culturally, ethnically, and linguistically defined. The work found that ethnic 
identity is a powerful and enduring form of communal belonging. It defines a 
community as a fixed, relatively impermeable organic entity rooted in race, language, 
culture and intergenerational ties. Notwithstanding its overt permeance ethnic 
identification is, as with all other forms of collective identity, constructed and 
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malleable. Its central elements are associated with selective remembrance and narrow 
renditions of a mythological historical and ethnically purified past. 
Civic identification, by contrast to ethnic, is inclusive. It is open to all who share 
civic values. It is based upon both a symbolic and practical commitment to equality, 
tolerance, diversity and the advancement of social, economic and civic rights within a 
social context of cultural and ethnic pluralism. Ethnic identity elevates ethnic group 
affiliation to the point where it is the primary basis of community, personal 
development and political stability. By contrast, civic identification binds 
communities together as a result of their common participation in, derived benefits 
from, and resultant shared sense of community from individual and collective rights 
and shared values. Such rights and values are what holds widely dispersed and 
ethnically heterogeneous societies together. 
This work considered the relationship between the two manifestations of communal 
identity. The study established that there are two necessary conditions for the 
elevation of either paradigm of communal identity. Firstly, that as one or other of the 
basis of communal identification becomes politically entrenched that the political 
potency of the other will be institutionally neutralised. Secondly, we found that for 
communal identification to endure that some provision needs to be made for the other 
form of communal belonging in order to manage the resentment that exists between 
the two. We observed that as communities formed around either of these two modes 
of identity that they contain signifiers of the other form. As Greenfeld suggests these 
two paradigms of identity stand in an uneasy relationship with each other. There is 
resistance, or as Greenfeld denotes as Ressentiment between the two modalities of 
identity. This relationship requires direct and careful institutional management. We 
considered theoretical attempts to signify Europe according to these differing 
paradigms. While there have been attempts to describe Europe in civic terms, the 
enduring discourse, most famously put by Huntington, is the conceptualisation of a 
unique European cultural and civilisation 'space'. 
There is a clear territorial dimension to the application of the dual communal identity 
within Europe. European spatiality is fractured along civic and ethnic grounds. 
Theorists link the liberal 'West' with a stronger articulation of civic values. Such 
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values include humanitarianism, individualism and a free market. By contrast, 
Europe's 'East' is conceptualised as an area of ethnic signification, where shared 
history, culture and ethnic and racial distinctiveness are the prime mobiliser of 
collective identification. 
As we considered, the attraction of the ethnic can appear irresistible. It is the most 
enduring and the least demanding form of identification. The myths of blood, custom 
and history require no great effort to imagine or articulate. The collective imagining 
of a historic, ethnically homogenous community is attractive to certain groups within 
every society, most particularly those who feel economically marginalised or 
politically disenfranchised. Ethnic identity offers a remedy for anomie, weak personal 
identity and communal insecurity by providing strong effective ties and fulfilling 
certain fundamental needs - security, identity and belonging. These needs may be 
difficult for certain individuals to achieve in other social contexts. Such a 
phenomenon is most readily evidenced in the emergent European underclass, those 
suffering economic and political dislocation and those within Eastern Europe. 
The alternative, communal form of identification is based on civic virtues of 
participative democracy, communal human and social rights, meaningful citizenship 
legal equality, freedom of speech, religion, and association. These more constructivist 
bonds, while forming the basis of civic society within the Western liberal state, are 
less immediately attractive as the basis for civic homogeneity and societal cohesion. 
We found that given the resilience of ethnic identification, active intervention is 
required by liberal political organisations — such as the EU - to actively encourage 
inclusive civic identification in the context of the return of ethnically-derived 
Ressentiment. 
As a field of study European identity is difficult to confine empirically and difficult to 
limit theoretically. The development of a model of European identification, as this 
thesis has demonstrated, requires the articulation of differing levels and modes of 
analysis. Our examination of the arguments surrounding the 'decline of the state' 
argument and the rise of international organisations and structures, demonstrates both 
the changing modalities of macro-polities and the nature of the impact that they have 
on communal identity formation. The phenomenon of transnational interdependence 
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in the context of a weakening in the credibility and competency of the state arises 
from a variety of influences. The internationalisation of production and finance; the 
integrative capacity of information technologies that have overcome economic and 
territorial borders and the increasing power of transnational corporations, that lead 
rather than follow national policy debates, has rapidly debased the effective autonomy 
of individual states. In such a context there has been an impetus for increased power 
for supranational organisations in order to best manage affairs that were traditionally 
orchestrated by the sovereign state. This phenomenon has been nowhere more 
apparent than in Europe. 
An important result of the expansion of the supranational and the decline of the 
national has been the growing disjuncture between state and identity. As the state is 
increasingly less able to independently secure desired policy outcomes, there arrises a 
general dissatisfaction with the state and a broader crisis of its popular legitimacy. 
This has the effect of undermining national identity, which was, in its formative stage, 
built upon strong centralised and centralising state apparatus. In such a circumstance 
communal identification can 'default' to primordial ethnic and exclusive signifiers, as 
a reflection of popular disillusionment with established institutions and elites. 
We considered in detail that the state has been historically and intimately linked with 
the formation and management of a (state-sponsored) national identity. In an 
environment of declining state competency, key elements of identification have 
become problematic. Specific instruments utilised by states to engender a positive 
sense of communal identification such as the consolidation of territory, the creation of 
a state-centred economic and societal rights domain and protection system, the control 
over a common education system and the encouragement of a common set of 
historical memories are eroding. We found that policy domains, commonly associated 
with the engendering of communal identification and traditionally associated with the 
state are shifting to a supranational domain. Increasing political, economic and 
cultural dimensions critical for defining and creating communal identity are emerging 
at a trans-European level. However such a process is occurring in a context of ethnic 
persistence. The residual affection for the state, combined with the splintering impact 
of globalisation has encouraged the growth of exclusionary, ethnically based, 
attitudes. This poses a threat not only to the integrity of the civic state and 
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supranation, but more significantly to the mobilisation of a communal civic form of 
European identification. 
In Chapter Four we examined the premier example of supranationalism in late 
modernity — the European Union. In the context of an economically and militarily 
impotent, but strategically important, European space at the end of the Second World 
War, the creation of a supranational Europe was acknowledged by Europeans as the 
most practical structure for the 'rebirth' of Europe. Nearly five decades of 
institutional building and the elaboration of sovereign policy domains — both 
internally and externally focused - have resulted in the emergence of a unique form of 
polity, neither state nor nation - but with the potential to be both. 
The thesis considered in detail the reshaping of European political affairs in the 
context of a highly structured and increasingly sovereign European polity. We 
observed that the structural patterns of the European polity, increasingly `state-like', 
include an emergent executive, legislature, bureaucracy and most significantly an 
active judicial arm. These institutions are establishing distinctive European patterns of 
political, economic and social activity. Such patterns, while notionally dependent 
upon the member states, are functionally independent of the states that comprise it. 
Such structures are creating particular and unique fields of action and interaction for 
Europeans, which systematically link Europeans to the polity. They are the links that 
hold Europeans together. More significantly such fields of action and interaction link 
Europeans collectively together, engendering a common form of European 
identification, in a manner not dissimilar to that experienced amongst individual 
European states in early modernity. 
While the structuring of the European polity has taken on the broad characteristics of 
statehood, there exist certain unique qualities that lead us to categorise the European 
polity to be neither a: "state in the making or a nation in the betraying" as earlier 
observed. The European polity is not politically independent of its component states. 
Europe lacks practical material or security autonomy and is reliant upon rules, 
resources and leadership which remain essentially state based. Notwithstanding such 
limitations we found that in a number of critical arenas that Europe, rather than its 
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constituent member states, provides the central focus of political, economic and 
increasingly, social interactions. 
We considered, in Chapter Five, the positive effects of the European polity on the 
engendering of communal European civic identification. We found that the European 
polity has created the necessary structural preconditions wherein Europeans act and 
interact within a specificaly European delineated set of structural apparatus and 
possibilities. Such a uniquely European institutional and policy architecture provides 
sufficient room for Europeans to actualise their European civic rights and privileges. 
Resulting from such a process, ethnic group identification, at least as it politicaly 
mobilises and manifests itself as a rival for communal sentiment has declined, while 
the right, within a social context, to display ethnic identification has improved. This 
has been a direct result of a deliberate and subtle policy imperative at the 
supranational level that has both drawn atention to the importance of ethnic 
identification and persistence in a globalised marketplace and which legitimises the 
process of culturaly enhancing — while at the active political level, marginalising - 
ethnic identification. Thus the Ressentiment between ethnic and civic is 
acknowledged and managed. 
The thesis demonstrated that the European polity is acting to develop and protect its 
emergent civic identity by a variety of mechanisms. Most notably, this occurs through 
the creation of a meaningful rights and security environment, in which personal and 
colective economic, social and political rights (including the right to participate in 
and derive meaning from preexisting linguistic, cultural and ethnic networks and 
identities) are entrenched within a politicaly and economicaly secure environment. 
This process is manifested in the folowing manner: 
a. 	 By the active support of its political elite. The effectiveness of an organised 
European elite in engendering European identification was demonstrated. 
Reinforcing the significance of elites in engendering identification we found 
that in those states, most notably the United Kingdom, where political elite's 
have resisted European integration, we demonstrated a lower than average 
level of European identification. 
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b. The consolidation of the European territory, the delineation of Europe from 
non-Europe on civic grounds, and provisions for its internal and external 
security and protection. 
c. The control over and improvements to European economic and social 
conditions, that act to inhibit social and economic fragmentation and thus the 
potential for the revival of ethnic primordialism. This acts to neutralise the 
socioeconomic causal elements of 'ethnic' political mobilisation. Such 
improvements have, as this study demonstrates, the effect of engendering a 
greater sense of European identification most particularly from amongst those 
Europeans most benefiting from European economic redistribution, such as 
those found at Europe's periphery. 
d. The creation of a meaningful European arena for democracy and participatory 
citizenship, including the articulation of individual pan-European civil, 
political and economic rights and security and the institutionalisation and 
protection of regional, ethnic and linguistic interests and identities. 
e. Associated with the previous point, a common European policy domain in 
defence of European civic values — freedom security, justice — a structural 
commitment to fundamental human rights, the principles of equality and non-
discrimination. 
f. Institutional support for information, education cultural and social interaction, 
contributing to the enhancement of trans-European social-cultural networks 
and the common enjoyment of pre-existing signifiers of identity. 
We demonstrated that the European polity has created a unified European (structural) 
space in which the depth of institutional and policy domains attach individuals and 
groups together across preexisting national borders and ethnic differences. Further the 
EU has acted to promote the belief in the minds of its citizens that others within the 
EU are of the same community by creating meaningful boundaries of the community 
between itself and 'outsiders'. The basis of difference, separateness and exclusion, so 
central to all forms of identity creation, is articulated and realised on grounds which 
are civic and culturally accommodating. They divide Europe from non-Europe on 
normative, economic and behavioural grounds rather than ethnic. Europe has 
responded to the demands of international economic competition, from the demands 
of regional and sectorial interests and from the struggle for jobs, incomes and 
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ultimately identities by creating a central — distinctly European — point of reference 
for its citizens. We noted that widespread economic and social instability and 
uncertainty characterize the global condition, where communal identities are no 
longer firmly anchored in the state. Responding to this, the EU has mobilized not only 
to reinvigorate its constituent economies but more importantly, in the context of this 
discussion, to provide a secure and right-bearing environment in which Europeans 
identify with each other precisely because of the certain and secure environment in 
which they live. Most particularly when compared with the effects of globalization 
and fragmentation that characterizes those outside of 'Europe'. 
There are some significant institutional and non-institutional impediments to 
European identification. The thesis considered in detail the politically and socially 
disruptive effect of economic alienation and marginalisation within Europe. We 
demonstrated that the emergence of a European underclass and the emergence of a 
massified European society act to dilute the socially integrative effects that result 
from broad societal and economic integration. The western metanarratives of 'nation', 
'subject' and liberal-democracy' are, for increasingly larger communities, giving 
way to a growing reorientation towards the particular niche clusters of identity. The 
modernist project of capital, democracy and the infinite capacity of the stable 
individualised subject are being seriously challenged by unresolved problems of 
systemic unemployment, economic exploitation, environmental damage, gender 
discrimination and increasing levels of insecurity at the individual and collective 
level. The realignment of community, territory and identity in late modernity has also 
acted to dilute the strength of a pan-European sense of community, as the disjuncture 
between place, community and self, realised in a globalised market, erode notions of 
community at both the national and supranational level. 
The resurgence of the ethnic nation, religiqus fundamentalism and political 
extremism, (as manifested in the European extreme right), is highly problematic for 
European identification. The resurgence of these splintering elements demonstrates 
the ongoing veracity of ethnic signifiers of identity. The thesis further found that a 
notable part of the European public is antagonistic towards Europe insofar as it is 
perceived as denying citizens sufficient democratic influence. Europeans are 
unconvinced by a European polity where there is the perception that national 
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governments have little say in European decision-making Such developments and 
perceptions represents a clear threat to the manifestation of a European identity. 
In Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine the study operationalised the model of identity 
established in Chapter One. We demonstrated that: 
1. There is a genuine and enduring sense of both European and national 
identity amongst a majority of Europeans. 
2. A significant percentage of Europeans feel that the European identity is 
at least as important as their national identity. 
3. Europeans are attracted to Europe not only on economic and social 
grounds but, unlike pre-existing forms of macro-social identification, 
European identification is based upon a collective understanding that 
the European polity supports rather than threatens pre-existing national 
identities, including ethically derived ones. 
4. Europeans are highly self-conscious and aware of the cementing 
functions of the institutions and policies of the European Union. Such 
institutions and policies are perceived as being beneficial to them both 
individually and collectively. This is most particularly the case at the 
territorial periphery of Europe. 
5. There is a central European language — English. Notwithstanding the 
EUs promotion of regional and minority languages. English is 
predominant in the world of commerce, education and personal 
transactions. The EU by promoting and funding the continuance of 
minority languages and cultures mediates against ethnically based 
political mobilisation in response to the dominance of English. 
6. The occurrence of European identity increases with youth, socio-
economic position and education level. European identity is positively 
correlated with the relative economic gain obtained by individuals 
from the EU and from the depth of European transactions and 
interrelationships entered into. 
7. Europe's aging, unemployed and disadvantaged feel the least 
European. 
8. As relative economic conditions improve, support for European 
integration, democracy, a single currency and united economic foreign 
and social policy increases, this is felt most especially at Europe's core 
- Belgium, Luxembourg and France and at Europe's Periphery; Greece, 
Ireland and Spain. 
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9. The effect of common European symbols on the emergence of 
communal European identification is not convincing. There are a 
comparably limited number of European symbols, and while there is a 
high awareness of key European symbols such as the European 
currency symbol for the euro, Europeans are not united in their 
recognition of or affection for other European symbols such as Europe 
day or the European Anthem. National symbols continue to 
predominate as signifiers of state rather than supranation. 
10. There is a demonstrable set of core European civic values, which 
inform a collective and distinctive European political culture. These 
values include political liberalism, democratic engagement, 
humanitarianism, and social protection. Europeans collectively uphold 
such values. The communal support for and participation in a common 
political culture is demonstrated in the communal European support for 
human rights and political parties which share a common set of 
political ideologies which are consistent with European civic values. 
11. Europeans are engaging and interacting with each other in an 
increasing multi-layed and complex ways, leading to a stronger sense 
of community and communal identity. The European Union has been 
instrumental in facilitating the increased level of European 
identification resulting from this engagement and interaction. 
12. While there is a widening expanse of pan-European engagement and 
participation across member-state boundaries, there is a historically 
low level of political violence both between European states and within 
them, demonstrating a heightened sense of community and identity. 
13. Discrimination forms a key element of European identity. However the 
basis of communal European discrimination is civic rather than ethnic. 
Europeans are Eurocentric not ethnocentric - Europeans, by a large 
percentage, accept peoples of other nationalities and other races. As 
argued European identity, as with all other forms of communal 
identification, is rooted in discrimination and common attitudes to the 
'out' group — the 'other'. The basis of this discrimination is not 
ethnically or culturally based. European discrimination is based on the 
common European concerns for an 'out' group that does not uphold 
the core European normative value set and which potentially threaten 
Europe's social and economic fabric. Such threats are manifested by 
the introduction of drugs, heightened criminal activity, or by 
threatening to compromise Europe's standard of living or international 
competitiveness. 
14. European boundaries are an important part of identity formation. Such 
boundaries are both physical, through the articulation of a 'fortress 
Europe' and a rejection of the non-European on civic grounds. 
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15. 	 There is an emergent European civic society, which is separate from 
individual member states' societies. The structures and policies of the 
European Union influence the European civic society. 
10.2 A Final Consideration on the Question of Europe 
One of the core dilemmas facing states and societies in late modernity is the 
reconciliation of the impetus towards economic globalism, and the desire for quality 
of life within a progressive, socialy cohesive society. Overlaying this tension, and 
revealing the depth of the dilemma between globalised markets and localised 
anxieties, are the unfulfiled ambitions of individuals and colectives of being 
someone; of sustaining meaningful identity. We argue that the European polity is 
uniquely placed to provide such a resolution to these anxieties. It is from this 
resolution that communal identification — common belonging — originates. The 
increasingly diverse and globalised paterns of social and economic interaction, the 
political impotence of the traditional state and the enduring need for community and 
belonging reveal that in may respects that communal identity can no longer be 
meaningfuly sustained at a national level. The European Union, as this analysis has 
demonstrated, provides both the ideological framework and the practical policies that, 
notwithstanding differing cultural and ethnic heritages, bind Europeans together. 
Europe provides economic security, a rights domain and gives European security to 
choose. As Greenfeld argues in her work to be part of a national community is to be 
part of an "elite". Such a phenomenon is nowhere more acutely felt than in 
contemporary Europe. 
This study has demonstrated that European identity is essentialy civic in nature. 
Internaly Europe is an arena of articulated civic rights and colective economic, 
political and social security. European identification is effected by the systemic 
changes in European governance that have occured in the period folowing the end of 
the Second World War. The component elements of European identification: 
colective self-consciousness and self-description, colective symbols, normative 
convergence and colective actions and relationships within a secure landscape have 
been actively and skilfuly negotiated by the structures, institutions and elite 
intervention of the European polity. Such negotiation has been predicated upon the 
acknowledge persistence of etImic identification which has been largely politicaly 
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neutralized within a materially supportive pluralist democratic structure. Europe is a 
structural phenomenon, a political and an economic project which has been 
instrumental in the articulation of a unique European empathy. Beyond the structure, 
Europe is its people, culturally and ethnically diverse, inheritors of a chaotic and 
deeply moving history yet protected and secure within the EU. They are united in 
their freedom to be whom they choose to be. 
The search for the basis of European belonging in the contemporary period cannot 
overlook the prime signifier of communal identity in the modern period - the nation-
state. We have considered at length the decline in the credibility and competences of 
the state and the resilience of collective identification for it. Loyalty to the State and 
identification with it is still the predominant marker of identity in contemporary 
Europe. Intimately linked with the resilient national identity is, as Greenfeld has 
argued, an active resistance between it and other signifiers of identification, either at 
the local sociocultural level, or the supranational level. The two-fold effect of national 
identification and national prejudice can be seen in a variety of arenas. In its benign 
form at the European football championships, or in the rhetoric of the Eurosceptic 
movement, and in its most destructive forms in the neo-fascist treatment of ethnic 
minorities, and in ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. As Martin Jacques reminds us: 
"One of the most negative effects of this search for the true Europe, and the 
archetypal European, is that it can serve to reinforce one of Europe's most 
fundamental, less attractive, characteristics: the relationship between territory 
and ethnicity. Europe's ethnic groups often display a tenacious and 
proprietorial relationship with the land that they have inhabited, as the Balkans 
and Ireland, cases in extremis, demonstrate." 
Part of the challenge in the construction of an inclusive non-prejudicial 'civic' 
European identity is the enduring tension between it and the deep-seated bias and 
prejudice that has paradoxically assisted in the evolution of nations and national 
communities, and the ethnic preconceptions which are entrenched within them. While 
in the new European integrated space, with a common frontier protected by the 
Schengen agreement, a strong economic and social infrastructure and meaningful 
participative citizenship one might expect a lessening of intra-European rivalries. 
However more ancient divisions, selective remembering of histories that both unite 
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and divide remains. They are accentuated in an international climate of increasingly 
homogenised cultural and economic products. It is in the construction of a unified 
European polity, and its distinctive structural elements and distinguishing policy 
domains that have accentuated the division between Europe and the rest. The 
institutional 'otherness' while civic in form, appears ethnic in practice. The 
displacement of the North African and West Asian from Europe by increasingly 
restrictive immigration and asylum laws, reinforces the differences between an 
affluent and exclusive Europe and a more disjointed series of other spaces inhabited 
by other peoples. Such an institutionally derived 'otherness' is matched with a 
communal form of exclusion within the European polity based on ethnic signifiers - 
the exclusion of the Turk in Germany, the Indo-Chinese and Algerian in France and 
the West-Indian and Pakistani in the United Kingdom. If, as we have argued 
throughout this work, European identity is orientated around civic conceptions of 
community; diversity, tolerance, common participative citizenship and 
multiculturalism, then the endemic tension between Europeans on ethnic grounds on 
one level, and the more significant macro-tension between ethnic and civic 
conceptions of identification broadly need to be addressed. The 'other', as Greenfeld 
suggested in Chapter One, is a constant element in the form of the self, and 
unavoidable. Its permeance and durability in Europe is clear both in the physical 
presence of other groups and in the profound influence of the other such as the Turks 
and Moors on European architecture, science and mathematics. Accordingly if a 
European civic identity is to endure it will have to confront the paradoxes inherent in 
the tensions inherent in all identity at its boundary. 
It would be unwise to forget the rationale that governed the construction of the 
European polity since the end of the Second World War. Torn by fratricidal war, 
Europe sought to institutionally unite not only to become domestically and 
internationally more efficient, but in order to eliminate the original grounds of 
European conflict — unchecked nationalism. Simply put, the European polity needed 
to redeem the myth of nation by politically neutralising it — removing it from its 
divisive, exclusive ethnic domain - and distilling its positive elements of belonging 
and loyalty. Old conceptions of national identity will endure, they can but not. The 
Jacques, M. `... . can't buck Trend' The European. 19-25 (January 19910), 25. 
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challenge for Europe is to channel such loyalties to a supranational level, which 
creates a 'community of sentiment' based on common institutions; not in the divisive, 
antagonistic or exclusive manner in the way that European nationalism has 
historically been. 
The European Union has provided the conduit for the emergence of a unique 
European identity. It has provided both an engine for the growth of state-like 
institutions that have historically linked 'national' communities to states. It has 
engendered a purposive elite capable of articulating a common European vision and it 
has provided the security and rights domain which provide a positive point of focus 
for Europeans. It has equally importantly sought to enhance rather than supplant pre-
existing linguistic, ethnic local and national identities, conscious of their importance 
to Europeans and their enduring nature. Further the European polity has provided a 
point of reference for both determining individual states' commitment to a shared 
common destiny, and a point of individual self-reference. The European polity has 
consistently provided positive results in increasingly wide policy domains, from the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the European Social Fund, European cohesion policy 
quite apart from the central elements of a single market and economic and monetary 
integration. Such steps have, as we have empirically established, enhanced a positive 
European sentiment amongst Europeans. 
Just as the EU is a unique organisation, so too is the form of communal belonging that 
is derived from it. Whereas in modernity the state appropriated elements of civil 
society to create the nation, in late modernity the European supranation has largely 
contributed to social and cultural change capable of articulating and supporting a pan-
European form of identification, quite separate from the national identity that 
preceded it and yet accommodating of such identity within its own civic sphere. The 
European polity has effected dramatic change in the consciousness of its citizens. As 
Ingo Kolboom has commented, the EU: 
"Equally united the victors, the vanquished and the others, the great, the 
medium and the small, the strong and the weak."2 
2 Kolboom, I. Quoted in Lang, J. 1991 "Europe: the Dwarf that needs to Grow' The European. 2- 
10 (February 19910), 30. 
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For fifty years Europe has structurally reinvented itself. Functional and institutional 
alignment has assisted in the hitherto unknown assurance of increasingly uniform 
material well being for its citizen body. The development of an inclusive socio-
economic infrastructure, granting Europeans specific rights as diverse social and 
economic actors have further developed a model that Europeans are largely 
sympathetic to and willing to collectively defend largely because of the cosmopolitan 
but protected society that has been created. 
Those who perceive the process of European institutional deepening and widening as 
a threat to pre-existing national sociocultural identities, reveals a deep 
misunderstanding. As opposed to an ethnic conception of community, in which pre-
existing forms of identification are excluded, often violently, civic nation building and 
identification offers the promise, and the institutional assistance to make it so, of a 
heightened profile for national and proto-national identities, rather than their 
diminution. Europe is uniquely placed to become a community of tolerance, diversity 
and equality, and is providing the institutional and financial resources, as we have 
previously examined, to make such a dream a reality. The European polity is a civic 
arena of diverse identification, rather than a super-state with a state-imposed mono-
identity. As Francois Mitterand commented: 
"Europe is in our nations' interest: it will not dissolve them but make them 
bloom."3 
As the Scots, Catalans, and Gaelic speakers have found Europe does not stifle 
historical and cultural identities; it supports them, as evidenced by its institutional 
support for the European regions and European lesser-used languages. As Lang 
suggests: 
"We must not confuse integration with absorption. The EU can function as a 




10.3 Chapter Ten - Concluding Remarks 
"Anyone who does not believe in miracles in European affairs is no realist." 5 
We have demonstrated that European civic identity inhabits a separate hemisphere to 
that of the ethnic. European identity is broadly derived from the commonality of a 
civilisation of common values, ideas and aspirations. European identity is essentially 
progressive and democratic. The collective imagining shared by contemporary 
Europeans is of a secure and right-bearing community of aspiration and achievement. 
It is a commonality built on specific social, political and economic progress rather 
than a simplified and selective distortion of a mythologised past. It is much more than 
a narrow and exclusionary rendition of a oversimplified past. Regressive ethnic 
identity honours the past, Progressive European civic identity celebrates the potential 
and collective security of a common future. 
Notwithstanding the veracity of European civic identification it would be foolhardy to 
overlook the enduring antithetical relationship between the different modalities of 
identity. Ethnic and civic identification do not coexist in an ambivalent relationship, 
just as they contain elements of each other, they resist each other, often violently. The 
potential for a `spill-over'; from the civic to the ethnic, as the present circumstances in 
the Balkans clearly reminds us, is entirely possible in Europe. The political 
mobilisation of ethnic signifiers of identity in one part of Europe has the potential to 
reignite similar signifiers within Europe's heartland, in such a circumstance, the 
promise of Europe - the promise of one equal eternity - may remain unfulfilled. 
In the context of the decline of the competence of the state, the rise of a global market 
place for goods, services, capital and also identities, the search for arenas that guard 
and secure pre-existing identities, as well as providing physical and material security 
and rights, the idea of a strong, secure Europe, laying within it a deep tapestry of 
identifiers has acquired a new saliency. The pre-existing attachment to the separate 
state and its supporting national myths of a unique national community, has been, for 
growing segments of the European population, replaced with attachments to new 
5 The European Commission's first President, Walter Hallstein, Quoted in Zagorin, A. 1991 
'Heading into the 1992 Countdown' Time. (December 9, 1991), 22-23, 23. 
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forms of non-national communities, or with nihilistic self-absorption. It is in this 
manner that the idea of Europe, and its ability to act as a transmitter of identities, has 
acquired a greater importance. The previous concern for the nation-state has been 
partially replaced by a growing preoccupation with micro-identities such as 
configured within ethnic, gender or environmental narratives. Europe as a liberal, 
civic domain for the articulation of such niche identities, and its contributions to the 
realisation of more personal identification, has in itself induced a positive sentiment 
towards Europe from amongst its population. 
Europe will emerge as the pre-eminent political community in the next millennia, how 
such enmity, suspicion, destructiveness and waste could have inspired such a sharing 
of sovereignty is an impressive phenomenon. The challenge has been to translate such 
a shared sovereignty into a common sense of attachment, belonging and loyalty 
amongst the citizens of Europe. The challenge is being well met. 
Europe, a civic Europe, founded on humane and democratic values, has a message of 




Historical Imaginings of an Unified Europe 
The idea of a politically unified Europe has its origins in a variety of sources, 
predating its present manifestations by at least 900 years. While it was not until much 
later that Charlemagne would be described as the 'Father of Europe" his revival of 
that which was the Western Roman Empire was a pivotal influence on the emergence 
of political unity in central Europe until the mid-fourteenth century. During the period 
some Emperors tried by propaganda to create a theoretical, rather than practical, 
edifice of European authority, albeit religiously rather than secularly based. 
Despite the decay in the hegemonic aspirations and realisations of the Papacy, most 
acutely manifested in the failure of the last Crusade and the rise of more secular 
authority, proposals for an administratively coherent European space was advanced 
by various generations of thinkers and political elites. Writing in the late 13th century, 
Englebert of Admont and Alexander of Roes argued that centralised political (and 
religious) authority within Europe was essential as Europe was unlikely to achieve 
peace and security without it. Englebert suggested an argument which is remarkably 
modern that despite linguistic and cultural differences that there was an underlying 
homogeneity within Europe, based upon the precepts of natural and Roman law. 
Alexander went further and specifically suggested a triumvirate of German Emperor 
endowed with political leadership; Italian Pope with spiritual leadership and French 
King with intellectual leadership. 2 
Other, more secular theorists of the Middle Ages, suggested the necessity of 
centralised temporal authority in Europe. 
This Appendix is intended to provide a precis overview of the varying motive forces towards the 
idea of a unified Europe. It is broadly reliant upon the scholarship from two sources. See: Pim Den 
Boer et al. See Boer, P, Bugge, P & Waever, 0. The History of the Idea of Europe. (Milton Keynes: 
Open University; London; New York: Routledge. 1995), and Heater, D. The Idea of European Unity. 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992). 
2 Heater The Idea of European Unity. 8. 
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Dante, in De Monarchia published in 1311, calls for a universal European monarch, 
separate from the Church to preserve the peace in Europe and to minimise aggression 
between individual European States. Pierre Dubois, despite being a layman, suggested 
in his 'De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae' of 1306 that European political union should 
proceed on the basis of a confederal 'Christian Republic' overseen by a Council. Such 
a Council, made up of judges, would arbitrate disputes between individual European 
states. European peace would allow for the consolidation of European Culture and for 
the development of European Culture and Education. 3 Close to the methods proposed 
by Dubois were the 15th century plans of George Podebrad, the King of Bohemia and 
Antoine Marini, an industrialist. They suggested a confederal structure for Europe, 
against the Turks - De Unione Christianorum Contra Turcos and Traite des Alliances 
et Confederations. The principal institutional features of such a 'Europe' were to be an 
Assembly, a Court of Justice, international arbitration machinery, a centralised armed 
force and a confederal budget. 4 The poignancy of this plan as a historical echo of 
what was to be made manifest 500 years later, is visionary. The plan suggests a 
degree of supranationally manifested in the decisions of the Council, where the 
sovereignty of individual states could be abridged by the use of decision-making by 
majority. 
"The above-mentioned College shall have as well over us, over our subjects 
and those who will have prolonged its term, gracious and contentious 
jurisdiction, at the same time as material and joint empire, according as the 
above mentioned Assembly or majority thereof shall have resolved and 
decided."5 
The prospects of a politically unified European Space during the early middle ages 
were constantly diluted by the tension between religious and secular paramountcy, 
however the effect of the reformation more deeply and acutely denied the prospects of 
a singular Europe. Despite the immediate divide between Catholic and Protestant 
Europe, the attractiveness, albeit theoretical, of a united state of Europe, remained 
active. Sully's 'Grand Design' of the 16th century acknowledges the recent European 
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 Ibid., 13. 
5 Ibid., 13. 
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religious schisms and rather suggests the reorientation of Habsburg power 
consolidated into a number of states. Europe, reconfigured into a continent of fifteen 
powers of approximate equal strength would create an equilibrium in which 'none of 
them might cause either of envy or fear, from the possessions or power of the others'. 6 
Representatives of these States would then form a senate which would: 
"Discuss the different interests, pacify the quallels, clear up and determine all 
the civil, political and religious affairs of Europe, whether within itself or with 
its neighbours."7 
Political unity would require administrative and military unity. Europe would form a 
coordinated organisational framework with regional representatives, regional councils 
and a consolidated military force to deal with both internal and external threats. Again 
with premonitions of the future raison d etat of a politically and administratively 
unified Europe, Sully suggested that political unity would contribute to the emergence 
of social unity, that his design would: 
"unite them all in an indissoluble bond of security and friendship, after which 
they might live together like brethren, and reciprocally visit like good 
neighbours"8 
The intimately interrelated rise and consolidation of secular military states in Europe 
and the prolonged periods of aggression and rivalry between such states in 17th and 
18th centuries had the two-fold effect of inflaming tensions within Europe and 
promoting leading thinkers to conclude that Europe could only be lead out of such 
fratricidal conflicts by political integration. Despite a time of revived 
cosmopolitanism and humanism within the intellectual elite, Europe was characterised 
by over a century of continuous internal conflict. It was within this context that the 
leaders of the Quaker Movement were amongst Europe's strongest advocates during 
this period. George Fox, the leader of the Society of Friends, proclaimed the need for 
European political consolidation in order to avoid constant European war. William 
6 Ibid., 32. 
7 Ibid., 32 
8 Ibid., 34 
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Penn, writing in the early 1690's suggested a scheme for the pacification and 
unification of Europe based upon a particular parliamentary basis. The revised 
constitutional structure of Europe is suggested in; 'An Essay Towards the Present and 
Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an Euro_pean Diet, Parliament or 
Estates' 9  In which the author argues for a unified European Parliament made up of a 
fixed number of representatives from the pre-existing European states. An annual 
Congress or Senate of Representatives would be instituted so that 'all the Princes and 
States of Europe' would be joined as one State' and 'a standing European Law' would 
be codified. I9 
In the heartland of European cosmopolitism two Frenchman advocated a form of 
political union for Europe. Abbe de Saint-Pierre argued in minute detail the benefits 
of an improved Europe. A rationalist, who believed in the power of human thought, 
he was determined to articulate a scheme for European peace, consistent with the 
character of an enlightened European mind. His work, in three volumes, completed in 
1717 in a book entitled ' Project for a treaty to restore perpetual peace in Europe 
among the Christian sovereigns, to maintain free trade for ever between nations, to 
strengthen even more the sovereign houses on their thrones. Proposed formerly by 
Henry the Great, King of France, agreed by Queen Elizabeth, by James I of England, 
her successor and by the majority of other potentates of Europe. Elucidated by M. the 
abbe de Saint-Pierre' In the work Saint-Pierre suggests that European warfare is 
endemic and that its final resolution, as opposed to temporary abatement, is a 
European Diet which; 'will secure the peoples of Europe from War, as the Germanic 
Diet has actually secured the Peoples of Germany for so many centuries." 
Membership of such a Diet would be open to all 'Christian Sovereigns' and disputes 
between such Sovereigns would be resolved within the Diet by mediation and 
arbitration. The operation and financing of such a political structure is spelt out by the 
author, as to is the judicial apparatus attached to it and the sanctions against non-
compliance by individual member-states. The advantages of such a political-judicial 
9 Ibid., 53 
I° Ibid., 57 
I I Ibid., 71 
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arrangement are not simply measured by the absence of conflict but also are 
expressed in financial terms. In a not dissimilar approximation to the European 
Communities, the states would have an equal voice, would share in the economic 
benefits of peace and would implement sanctions against self-interested sovereigns 
and states. 12 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued in favour of European supra-state institutions. In his 
Social Contract he suggests that the relationship of the individual to the state and of 
the state to a confederate system are parallel and complementary. 'In both cases 
security and true liberty are enjoyed only through participation in the greater whole'. 13 
His argument is that at the level of the individual, the evolution of civil society is 
incomplete until such time as men have renounced their state of nature vis-a-vis the 
state, while at the state-level states likewise need to renounce their state of nature with 
regard to each other. Tyranny and war will remain endemic until the transition has 
been completed by bonding states into a confederal system. Rousseau follows Saint 
Pierre in suggesting a European confederation to preserve European peace and to 
promote prosperity, however Rousseau concludes that such a confederation could 
only be established by violent means which would deny the very reason for its initial 
proposal - the avoidance of war: 
"No Confederation could ever be established except by a revolution. That 
being so, which of us would dare to say whether a league of Europe is a thing 
more to be desired or feared? It would do more harm in a moment than it 
would guard against for ages." 14 
The concept of a European Union was progressed in far greater detail by Saint Simon, 
who believed that the acceleration of industrialisation, the trauma of Jacobinism and 
Bonapartism had provided both threats and opportunities for European unity. He 
believed that it would only be a result of supplanting existing modes of European 
12 
As Heater reminds us Saint-Pierre's influence on the creation of a European Identity, impacts on 
the present day. In 1970 the Council of Europe and in 1986 the European Community adopted a 
European anthem; 'ode to joy' from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Beethoven took the words from 
Schiller, who was inspired to write them by reading Rousseau's Abstract of Saint-Pierre's Project. 
13  
Ibid., 80 
14  Ibid., 84 
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governance and replacing it with a unified form of pan-European government and 
administration that modern industrial society could progress at an optimum rate. He 
was convinced that Europe was historically self-destructive, the revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars being the most recent manifestation of that nature in his time, yet 
was potentially capable, via the process of unification of significant material and 
spiritual progress, and further argued that Europe was historically unified, but had 
fallen more recently into anarchy: 
"Until the end of the fifteenth century, all the nations formed a single body 
politic, at peace within, but armed against the enemies of its constitution and 
independence." I5 
Further more, in 'The Catechism of the Industrialists' he suggested that there existed a 
sense of European Identity shared amongst individual Europeans, which would form 
the basis of a unified Europe. He wrote: 
"We are convinced that having thought about it, you will agree that 
philanthropic sentiments, those new family sentiments of Europeanism, take 
precedence today among all Europeans over their national sentiments." I6 
The political manifestation of unification, a single government made up of a common 
house of commons, a house of peers and a European hereditary monarchy was based 
upon an Anglo-French model and was considered unworkable and improbable by 
Saint-Simon's contemporaries, however, despite being dated for us too, he did astutely 
outline what the basic pre-conditions for a collective European administration: 
1. Any political organisation founded to link together several different 
peoples, while preserving their national independence, must be 
systematically homogeneous - that is to say, all the institutions should 
be derived from a single conception. 
2. The common government must certainly be independent of the national 
governments. 
15 Ibid., 102. 
16 Ibid., 101 
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3. The members of the common government should . . . consider 
exclusively the common interest. 
4. They should be endowed with a power which is their own, and does 
not derive from any outside authority; this power is public opinion. I7 
The manifestation of institutional Europe received its most significant impetus as a 
consequence of violent repulsion felt by European intellectual and political elites to 
both the first and second great wars. Perceiving that European Warfare resulted in the 
contraction rather than the expansion of European values, economic life and social 
intercourse, best summed up in the comment of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle that 'De 1914 
a 1918, il n'y a plus d'Europe' - From 1914 to 1918, there was no Europe.' 18 European 
the oritans and political elites condemned the irrational nationalism and mindless 
patriotism that threatened to destroy the European ideal. 
The key proponents of an institutional Europe in the inter-war period were Friedrich 
Naumann, T.G. Masaryk, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Aristide Briand and 
Edouard Herriot. 
Naumann, deeply concerned with the detrimental effects of war upon Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, concerned himself with suggesting the formation not of a fully pan-
European state, but rather of a post-war Europe with two 'Chinese walls' of economic 
and military character one between Germany and France the other Between Germany 
and Russia. Within these boundaries he suggested 'Mitteleuropa' or Mid-Europe 
naturally existed rooted in the medieval Holy Roman Empire and the German Nation 
and that an Oberstaat - 'overstate' should be created to reflect the natural and historical 
symmetry of central European political and cultural life. Such a state would be a 
confederation of Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Balkan states and possibly Italy. Its 
principle manifestation would be political uniformity and the creation of a Central 
European common market, and a common defence force. Despite the criticism of his 
17  Ibid., 104 
18 
Boer, P, Bugge, P & Waever, 0. The History of the Idea of Europe 89 
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theory, most especially from those critics who saw it as an attempt to justify German 
hegemony in central Europe, Neumann believed that the lives and economies of 
Germans, Czechs, Hungarians and south Slays would be sufficiently intertwined to 
make some form of supranational cooperation a necessity. 19 
The Czech philosopher and statesman T.G. Masaryk presented a post-war political 
program for Europe in a book entitled 'The New Europe' published in 1918. 
Suggesting that Europe could only progress if it was constituted with independent 
nation-states based on the values of self-determination and democracy. If such an 
arrangement was realised, an arrangement that would involve the introduction of a 
number of new nation-states in central Europe, including his own Czechoslovakia, 
then in time supranational structures would develop in Europe to promote 
modernisation and economic development for all European states. Masaryk was 
convinced that if they obtained their freedom, the nations of Europe would form some 
form of brotherhood for mutual benefit. 
The most prominent orators of the interwar period supportive of the creation of an 
institutional Europe was Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi who argued for the 
creation of a Pan-European Union in his work 'Paneuropa', published in 1923. 
Disagreeing with Spengler who considered Europe to be declining in power, He saw 
Europe's natural pre-eminence as being retarded by the inappropriateness of its 
reliance upon states, rather than some form of cultural decline. Considering the state 
as being a abstract, malleable construct, wholly inappropriate to a reorientated 
political world system, characterised by global, rather than regional or national, power 
fields, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that if Europe was not unified and included in 
the political world as a power, as it deserved to do, it would, in its fragmented form, 
come under increasing military and economic pressure from the other principle power 
grouping such as Russia, Britain and Panamerica. Paneuropa's main function was to 
secure peace and would involve a pan-European defence alliance, beyond this 
Paneuropa would promote the economic base of Europe and would create a 'common 
market' without internal customs barriers which would be able to compete efficiently 
19  Ibid., 92 
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within the world market. Such arguments are highly suggestive of the theoretical and 
practical justifications for the tangible creation of institutional Europe after 1945. 20 
Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand, prominent French Politicians influenced by the 
profound effects of the First World War on the French nation, and greatly influenced 
by Coudenhove-Kalergi's pan-European aspirations were primary movers in the 
efforts to establish networks of pan-European political cooperation. Herriot made a 
watershed speech in January 1925 calling for the establishment of a 'United States of 
Europe' , which in part contributed to the formal rehabilitation of Germany into 
European life. Aristide Briand pressed further and called, in a speech to the League of 
Nations in 1929 for the creation of a federal link between European states. Tangible 
outcomes of this were various, following discussions with all European foreign 
ministers represented in the league of nations Briand submitted an official 
memorandum suggestive of political and economic linkages across European states. 
Arguing the dangers to security and stability inherent in the contemporary division of 
Europe into small states, and reflecting upon the 'moral union' of Europe already 
established by virtue of a common racial background, common civilisation and 
geographical proximity, he called for the establishment of a 'European Conference' for 
all European states to meet regularly to deal specifically with the furtherance of 
political cooperation and integration of administrative, security and economic 
policies. Despite this form of pan-European political association being widely adopted 
by the European media, the 26 European Governments who received and commented 
on the memorandum failed to grant the scheme the political priority that it required if 
it were to have progressed from theory to reality. 2I 
It has been suggested that the National Socialists were the penultimate exponents of a 
unified Europe. The present day European Union conforms to the design of the plan 
for a European Economic Community ('Europaische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft') 
developed by the Nazi Economics Minister and President of the Reichsbank, Dr 
Walther Funk. The work of the National Socialists included plans for the 






policy, a common exchange rate system and monetary policy, as well as common 
industrial and trade policies and the establishment of a European central bank.22 The 
American academic Allan Nevins, working from Oxford in 1941 assessed Nazi's 
intentions. The Nazi plan for a United States of Europe was quite precise. The 
predominantly industrial Reich had been enlarged by the annexation of the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Alsace Lorraine, Northern France and Western 
Poland. To feed this industrial heartland, food was to be conveyed from the outer 
periphery of Europe. 23 The ultimate manifestation of the unified Europe as envisioned 
by the Nazi's would allow for the following transition, according to the Nazi Professor 
Hunke: 
1. "the utilisation of the productive powers of the peoples will initiate a 
general change in what is produced in terms of its expansion." 
2. 'secondly, the aim of future economic cooperation is a community of 
living space, ie. it should not be the task of the new economic policy to 
destroy mono-cultures only to replace them with insularities.' 
3. 'the European States would run the risk of being economically 
overwhelmed and losing their political independence if trade barriers 
were removed all at once, unless one day a new organic organisation 
were to replace the economic impoverishment of the individual 
states. ,24 
Interestingly in a concluding section of 'Europasche Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft' 
Professor Hunke wrote: 
"Europe is much more than a geographical term. Its foundation will reflect its 
political power, and the extent of awareness of its political existence. It has 
been said that 'the natural boundary of Europe coincides with a boundary of 
peoples, a boundary of a way of life, of civilisation. . . .In our own times the 
22 International Currency Review, 23, Summer 1996 35-42. 35. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 36. 
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Fuhrer himself has yet again pointed out that there is no geographical 
definition of Europe, but only "one of peoples and culture."25 
Despite a variety of premonitions ranging over a thousand years the idea of an 
institutionalised pan-European order, notwithstanding the essentially ecclesiastically 
structured Holy Roman Empire, was not manifested until the crisis of the second great 
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